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EUROPEAN UNION and AFRICAN UNION SECURITY RELATIONS

** Work in Progress: Not to be quoted without permission **

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Abstract

The first decade of the new millennium saw the European Union deploy nine security missions to the African continent, quoting the European Security and Defence Policy. Unlike the numerous United Nations security missions that European states had previously contributed to, these were part of a grand strategy designed to link the African Union and the European Union in a process of trans-regionalism defined as a unique organisational infrastructure (joint secretariat for research, policy planning, preparation and coordination of meetings and implementation of decisions). The rationale being that security and its associated peace and stability are the basis for sustainable development in other areas. This article follows the development of the trans-regionalism detailing the security missions.

Abstract

Introduction

In the post-colonial and post-Cold War period of the 20th century countries such as the United States, France, the United Kingdom and others deployed security missions to Africa sometimes individually and sometimes as part of United Nations (UN) missions. Some missions related directly to their own foreign policy objectives based upon their own security needs such as the United States involvement in Somalia (1992-1994), the United Kingdom in Sierra Leone (2000) and France in Chad (ongoing). Other missions were a reaction to a specific crises situation designed to stabilize a process leading to conflict resolution such as in the Congo (1960-1964) where the UN forces rarely had a mandate for the use of intervening force (known as Chapter 7). No overriding grand strategy emerged for a comprehensive plan for peace and stability on the entire African continent. Impetus to change was the birth of the African Union (AU), from its predecessor the Organization of African Unity, who has as part of its agenda the promotion of security and stability as a prerequisite for development and integration on a continental-wide basis. It has the legitimacy and authority from its Constitutive Act to intervene in a Member state.¹

A prominent success story that gave impetus for joint and common African armed forces to deter conflict and to intervene should the need arise was the creation by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) of the multi-lateral Economic Community of West African States Monitoring group (ECOMOG) that intervened in the civil war in Liberia (1989-1996). Following this a grand strategy (The African Peace and Security Architecture) progressively emerged within the AU for furthering the goal of African continent-wide security and stability by establishing five sub-regional organizational infrastructures. To meet this requirement an African Standby Brigade was envisaged, deployable both at sub-regional and continental levels encompassing military, police and civilian components. Despite the AU objective the immediate implementation was beyond its reach due to a lack of experience in such types of security missions, and due to the lack of available equipment for extended logistics such as airlift on a continental-wide basis. Countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom and France with experience and capability to assist were approached to provide training and logistics as were the UN, NATO and the European Union (EU). Resulting from this were combined, joint and hybrid force structures in varying forms consisting of the AU, EU, NATO and the UN for example the AU AMIS mission to Sudan (2004-2007) that had EU and NATO assistance. The EU and its member states agreed to collaborate with the AU partly because of their believed historical obligation to assist in

¹ Africa Union, Constitutive Act, 11 July 2000, Lome Togo.
http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/AboutAu/Constitutive_Act_en.htm

promoting security and development in Africa but also because they believed African stability as being essential to European security especially in areas such as terrorism, drug and human trafficking and migration.²

Such EU and AU collaboration provides a unique account of two regional fora engaged in a step-by-step process of dialogue and co-operation in security missions resulting in a grand strategy for Africa wide peace and stability which has also led to a unique trans-regional organizational infrastructure. This article will continue by detailing the policy decisions, the security missions and the development of the trans-regional organizational infrastructure

Bi-lateral inter-regionalism verse Trans-regionalism

International organization collaboration with the AU is not unique as in a previous article published in *Scientia Militaria* I demonstrated the specific assistance provided to the AU by NATO for the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) in Darfur (April 2005 - December 2007).³ NATO, and not the EU, answered that call for assistance as it possessed the requested logistic capability even though it had no treaty obligation to do so. Africa was outside of its regional obligations and there was no direct threat against any of its member states which is its' Treaty basis. I applied the theoretical underpinning of Jürgen Rüländ who defined bilateral inter-regionalism as group-to-group exchanges of information and cooperation (projects) in specific policy, based on a low level of institutionalization, with no common overarching institutions, both sides exclusively relying on their own institutional infrastructure.⁴ This article constructs further theoretically considering the range of security activities and relations that could be described as trans-regionalism, which is applicable to this article's case of EU and AU interactions. Trans-regionalism, when compared to bilateral inter-regionalism, is defined as a situation where the agenda and relations have grown in complexity requiring trans-regional fora, a unique organizational infrastructure (secretariat for research, policy planning, preparation and coordination of meetings and implementation of decisions) that comprises states from more than one region.

Such trans-regionalism contrasts substantially from UN peace-

2 Factsheet on EU support for peace and security in Africa, February 2005

<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=400&lang=en&mode=g>

3 Glen Segell, "The first NATO mission to Africa: Darfur", *Scientia Militaria*, Volume 36 Number 2 (2008) pp.1-18.

4 Jürgen Rüländ, Inter- and Transregionalism: Remarks on the State of the Art of a New Research Agenda, National Europe Centre Paper No. 35, <http://www.anu.edu.au/NEC/Archive/ruland2.pdf> accessed 15 October 2008.

orientated missions. These are legitimised by United Nations Security Council Resolutions granting each mission a specific mandate, budget, force structure, length of deployment, and equipment. Although the underlying commonality is peace-related there is no grand strategy of trans-regionalism since the forces deployed and the structure of each UN mission differ even if individual soldiers or their units might have been deployed to previous UN missions offering a learning curve on the tactical level. In my previous article I noted that in this fashion the NATO assistance to the AU AMIS mission was similar to such UN missions.

The nature of the organizational infrastructure is significant in defining trans-regional security since there is no clear agreed definition on the size or nature of a region. An example of a trans-regional security organization is NATO comprising 28 states from Europe and North America in its own unique organization. In the African context moving from the local to the global is Gauteng as one of many regions (provincial) having its own police force within a sovereign state where the organizational framework for trans-regional (provincial) security matters would be the authority of central government under the Secretariat for Safety and Security. Africa is a region (continental) consisting of 53 sovereign states where the AU through its Constitutive Act (2000) has the legitimacy to construct an organizational infrastructure of security affairs. Within Africa there are sub-continental regional organizations having security infra-structures that work with each other. For example, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) operates within its own region as does the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Both also interact in African-wide peace-keeping within the AU.

The SADC has a Regional Indicative Strategic Plan (RISDP) and a Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) aimed at deeper regional integration and poverty eradication which include an organizational framework for "peace, political stability and security in the region".⁵ The SADC has regional peace-keeping training centers and is aiming to establish a regional Standby Brigade, as part of the goal to contributing to the AU Standby Force by 2010. This is accordance with Article 13 of the Protocol establishing the Peace and Security Council of the African Union within the concept of the African Peace and Security Architecture, guided by the United Nations Peace keeping framework.⁶ Another sub-regional organizational infrastructure along these lines is the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in Eastern Africa that is also working with the SADC and ECOWAS as part of the AU organizational infrastructure for security matters. In

5 SADC Secretariat, SADC Regional Indicative Strategic Plan, March 2003, <http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0000294/index.php>

6 SADC Institutional Framework, <http://www.sadc.int/index/browse/page/62>

these efforts the SADC is not confined to working within Africa but is also engaged in trans-regional relations with bi-lateral partners (Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, USA) and with multi-lateral partners (AFDB, EC, EIB, FAO, UNDP).⁷

In a similar vein the EU is an organizational infrastructure of governance for Europe having various structures for combined and joint armed forces and for weapons procurement pronounced in formal Treaties. Bi-lateral relations have existed for many years, on many levels and on many issues between the 27 member states of the EU and the 53 member states of the AU. From this it has been natural for bilateral inter-regionalism to emerge on specific issues between the two regional organizational infrastructures (AU/EU) in such affairs as economic, cultural and political. It has also been natural for this to evolve into trans-regionalism in certain areas such as security affairs as an underlying necessity for development.

The Origins of AU-EU trans-regionalism: From Cairo (2000) to Congo (2003)

Reviewing and reflecting on the development of trans-regional organizational infrastructure in security affairs between the AU and EU in the first decade of the new millennium shows the origins arising with the Cairo Plan of Action (2000) following a summit meeting between heads of state of the EU and the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the predecessor organization of the AU that was disbanded in 2001. The purpose of the Summit was "to work towards a new strategic dimension in the global partnership between Africa and Europe."⁸ The summit reached a crucial decision towards a unique organizational infrastructure linking the two regional organizations on many levels when it called for security matters to be integrated with broader economic, cultural, development and political considerations.⁹ The Cairo Plan stressed that resolving conflicts (peace-building) would need to address the causes of conflicts, arms control on light weapons, the removal of land-mines, the NPT, fighting terrorism, the gender dimension for the active participation of women in diplomacy and at peace negotiating tables as well as food and health security and development issues including education. Such diversity could not be achieved through *ad hoc* measures and the first joint organizational infrastructure created was a Senior Official Group

7 SADC Thematic Coordination, <http://www.sadc.int/icp/>

8 Africa-Europe Summit Under the Aegis of the OAU and the EU / Cairo- 3-4 April 2000 : Cairo Plan of Action 4/4/2000 Nr: 107/4/00

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/00107-r4.en0.html

9 Africa-Europe Summit Under the Aegis of the OAU and the EU / Cairo- 3-4 April 2000 : Cairo Plan of Action 4/4/2000 Nr: 107/4/00

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/00107-r4.en0.html

to oversee the co-ordination of security matters with economic, cultural, development and political issues. The first Ministerial meeting (Brussels 11 October 2001) followed four meetings of the Senior Officials group and declared the need for a Summit meeting (Lisbon 2003). Given the previous month's terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, the AU and EU were able to find a new common ground to further co-operation in security affairs, against terrorism.¹⁰

Further commonality ensued from the AU's launch of the "The New African Initiative" (NAI) to eradicate poverty and to place African countries, both individually and collectively, on a path of sustainable growth and development, while aiming to participate actively in the world economy and body politic. This vision was immediately enacted when a permanent link was set up between the different NAI tasks forces and the European Commission.¹¹ The Senior Official Group was tasked to link this with the Cairo Plan and another already existing process, the Cotonou Agreement (June 2000) which is the Partnership Agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States based on based on three complementary pillars: development cooperation, economic and trade cooperation, and the political dimension.¹² The subsequent Africa-Europe Ministerial Meeting (Burkina Fasa, 28 November 2002) saw agreement that the method for trans-regionalism would be small groups representing each side and the facilitation of coordinators (for example the EU President and Commission) where the main format of dialogue would be meetings at the levels of officials as well as *ad hoc* groups that could also include NGO's and civil society.¹³

Desiring to be on an equitable level in this trans-regionalism the AU took the initiative in establishing "The African Peace and Security Architecture", (Maputo 2002). It would follow the policy pattern and structure of the EU's European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) for regional security, conflict management and civil crises issues and hence would require, as exemplified by the EU, a regional military force at brigade strength that could be deployed anywhere within the Africa region. Legitimacy was granted through the founding act of the AU (2000) establishing "the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect to grave circumstances namely: war crimes,

10 Africa-Europe Ministerial Conference, Brussels, 11 October 2001,

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/12794.en1.pdf

11 Statement of the meeting between African heads of state and the EU "The New African Initiative" 10 October 2001

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/er/ACF2A66.pdf

12 The Cotonou Agreement

http://ec.europa.eu/development/geographical/cotonouintro_en.cfm

13 Africa-Europe Ministerial Meeting in Burkina Fasa (28 November 2002),

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/73482.pdf

genocide and crimes against humanity".¹⁴ A goal was set for 2010, for the African Stand-by Force (ASF) and its military and civilian crises management tool, to reach its full operational capability.

Sharing this with the EU as a trans-regional vision for peace, stability and development led to an intense educating and training cycle dedicated to the ASF decision, command and control structures. Called "AMANI AFRICA", meaning "Peace in Africa" in Swahili, this cycle, based on an EU framework (EURORECAMP) was adapted to the African reality. The training cycle was aimed at being a flexible tool allowing the AU to reach its objectives by providing an assessment and validation of its multidimensional peace operation integrated management capacity, notably in terms of structures, procedures and available means. Correspondingly to sustain this within the broader framework of the ESDP the EU issued the European Security Strategy (2003). This pronounced security as the first condition to development where African security was voiced as not only a precondition for the African continent's development but also as being essential for European security.¹⁵ At the end of 2009 the cycle entered a crucial phase with the Political Strategic Seminar/Conference (POLSTRAT) where the African Peace and Security Architecture engaged its constituting bodies to develop a mandate and an integrated mission plan. A scenario, called CARANA, was specifically developed for Africa to simulate a crisis in a fictitious area which needed an AU engagement. The outcome allowed the AU to implement its developed plan during the command post exercise in 2010 as the culminating point of the AMANI AFRICA cycle.

This process indicative of trans-regional views, policies and activities was an evolving one based on vital interests within and between the AU and the EU and their respective member states. It built upon previous successes the first of which was the operational and diplomatic success of the first autonomous EU-military led operation without recourse to NATO assets and the first EU security mission to Africa (Operation Artemis to Ituri in the Democratic Republic of the Congo lasting three months). The ability to undertake this mission was also a consequence of the development of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) conceived for European security that required a Rapid-Reaction Force. This force had just reached its preparedness level and was designed to be utilized for many different types of missions including humanitarian. The EU Operation Commander was Major-General Neveux (France) and the EU Force Commander was Brigadier-General Thonier (France) who deployed 2 000 troops from 12 Member

14 Africa Union, Constitutive Act of the Union, Article (h) 4, 11 July 2000
http://www.au2002.gov.za/docs/key_oau/au_act.htm accessed 7 October 2008.

15 Factsheet on EU support for peace and security in Africa, February 2005
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=400&lang=en&mode=g>

States and 4 Third States.¹⁶ This EU military mission (12 June 2003 - 1 September 2003) took over from a UN mission as an interim force (UN Security Council Resolution 1484, 30 May 2003) contributing to the stabilization of the security conditions and the improvement of the humanitarian situation in Bunia until the subsequent UN mission where it worked well with South African troops.¹⁷

Reviewing and reflecting on this mission the EU-Africa Dialogue Ministerial Troika meeting (Rome 2003) noted the AU Peace Support Operation Facility (PSOF) as a valuable partner resulting in the European Commission allocating € 250 million to its development stating "The functioning of this Facility will require an enhanced and permanent political EU-AU dialogue and continued consultations with the UN."¹⁸

The Security Missions

The success of Operation Artemis and the continuation of common vital interests of the AU and the EU led to eight subsequent security missions (civil and military) in Africa under the auspices of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) and in collaboration with the AU:

- 1) EUFOR RD Congo - Lasting 25 April 2006-30 November 2006 as support of MONUC for elections.
- 2) EUPOL Kinshasa - This force deployed 12 April 2005-31 December 2006 with mandate UNSCR 1493 (28 July 2003), which encouraged donors to support the establishment of an integrated Congolese police unit. The official request, came on 20 October 2003, from the government of the DRC to the High Representative for the CFSP for European Union assistance to set up an Integrated Policy Unit to contribute to ensuring the protection of the state institutions and reinforce the internal security apparatus to help the Congolese National Police keep order during the DRC's transition to democracy, particularly during the electoral period in 2006.
- 3) EU support for AMIS - Deployed to Darfur, Sudan with an EU Coordination Cell in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia for the period 18 July 2005-31 December 2007. It's mandate was a letter dated 29 April 2005 from the President of the AU Commission to the Secretary General/High Representative (SG/HR) hoping to be

16 European Union Parliamentary Answers, 29 January 2009

<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=E-2008-5747&language=PL>

17 Stephen Castle, Military mission to Africa is first for the EU , The Independent, 5 June 2003, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/military-mission-to-africa-is-first-for-the-eu-539787.html>

18 EU-Africa Dialogue Ministerial Troika 10 November 2003 Rome,

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/77923.pdf

able to count on the substantial support of the EU and its Member States to the efforts of the AU and to the reinforcement of AMIS II. UNSCR 1556 (30 July 2004) welcoming the contributions already made, notably by the EU, to support the AU led operation. The EU made available equipment and assets, provided planning and technical assistance and sent out military observers, trained African troops, helped with tactical and strategic transportation and provided police assistance and training. This concluded when AMIS merged to UNAMID.

- 4) EUFOR CHAD/RCA - Deployed to Chad and to the Central African Republic for the period 28 January 2008-15 March 2009. The mandate was UN Security Council Resolution 1778 (25 September 2007), authorising the EU to deploy a force; UNSCR 1834 (24 September 2008) also welcomed the EU deployment. The EU Operation Commander: General Nash (Ireland) and the EU Force Commander: General Ganascia (France) deploying 3700 troops (14 EU Member States present in the field, 18 in theatre, and 24 at the Operations Headquarters; 3 Third States contributing)¹⁹. The force successfully contributed in protecting civilians in danger, particularly refugees and displaced persons, facilitated the delivery of humanitarian aid and the free movement of humanitarian personnel by helping to improve security in the area of operations, contributed to protecting UN personnel, facilities installations and equipment and ensured the security and freedom of movement of its own staff, UN staff and associated personnel. It handed its mission over to a UN force MINURCAT in March 2009 although some 2000 EU troops who served under the EU banner continued under the MINURCAT banner.
- 5) EUPOL RD CONGO - This was originally intended to last 2 July 2007-31 June 2009 but it's mandate was extended until 30 June 2010 as a follow-on from EUPOL Kinshasa whose mandate was based on an official invitation, on 26 April 2005, from the DRC government to the Secretary-General/High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy with a view to obtaining assistance from the European Union through the establishment of a team to provide the Congolese authorities with advice and assistance for security sector reform. The extension of the mandate from 2009 to 2010 came with the formation of a Project Cell with a complementary approach in order to implement small projects within the mission's mandate and also to provide reinforced coordination and technical assistance to Member States and Third States.
- 6) EUSEC RD CONGO - This was launched on 8 June 2005 with a mandate that ran until 30 September 2009 to restore governance in general and defence reform in particular in creating lasting conditions for stability in DRC. It also had

19 European Union Parliamentary Answers, 29 January 2009

<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=E-2008-5747&language=PL>

a mandate to implement or supervise projects in areas such as gender, human rights, health and infrastructure, financed or initiated by Member States and/or the EC. The EUSEC RD Congo mission also played a part in the efforts made by the European Union Special Representative for the African Great Lakes Region in the work being done to implement the statements of commitment for the Kivus.

- 7) EU SSR Guinea-Bissau - The EU mission in support of Security Sector Reform in Guinea-Bissau had an original mandate from 12 February 2008-31 May 2009 from a report by the UN Secretary-General of 28 September 2007, underlying the Guinea-Bissau's inability to combat drug trafficking by itself and calling for technical and financial support from regional and international partners furthered by a letter dated 10 January 2008 from the Government of Guinea-Bissau inviting the EU to deploy a European Union SSR Mission in Guinea-Bissau. The force provided advice and assistance on reform of the security sector in Guinea Bissau in order to contribute to creating the conditions for implementation of the National Security Sector Reform Strategy. The mandate was extended until November 2009 where the purpose of the extension was mainly to fully accomplish the mission's original mandate, to further explore the capacity and the commitment of the new government to carry forward the reform process and to assess the willingness of the International Community to support it.
- 8) EU NAVFOR Somalia - This is the first EU maritime operation, conducted in the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) deployed 8 December 2008-8 December 2009. The EU Council decided on 15 June 2009 to extend the Operation's mandate for another year to 13 December 2010 in conjunction with a mandate of UN Security Council Resolutions 1814 (2008), 1816 (2008), 1838 (2008) and 1846 (2008) in order to contribute to the protection of vessels of the WFP (World Food Programme) delivering food aid to displaced persons in Somalia; the protection of vulnerable vessels cruising off the Somali coast, and the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast. This mission is closely linked to financial and training support provided to the AU's AMISOM mission with the EU. The first Operation Commander was Admiral Jones (UK) succeeded by rear Admiral Peter Hudson (UK) on 13 August 2009. The first EU Force Commander was Commodore Papaioannou (Greece) succeeded by Commodore Pieter Bindt (Netherlands). The military capabilities and personnel involved were 6 frigates and 3 maritime patrol aircraft entailing 1200 people taking part in the operation. To date all WFP ships protected by the EUNAVFOR have arrived safely at their destinations. The EU also established 10 cooperative frameworks and arrangements to enable the force to work with the international merchant community and other naval forces

deployed in the region. Arrangements were also reached concerning the judicial treatment of captured pirates with Kenya on subsequent prosecution

Some of these missions (EUFOR RD Congo, EUSEC RD CONGO, EU SSR Guinea-Bissau,) have been labeled as EU civilian missions also under ESDP since they have not actively involved the deployment of a fully-fledged military force of sizeable size. They have involved policing, rule of law, border assistance, and monitoring and security sector reform. Since June 2007, they are under a single chain of command. The current Civilian Operations Commander is a Dutch national, Mr Klompenhouwer who exercises command and control at strategic level for the planning and conduct of all civilian crisis management operations, under the political control and strategic direction of the Political and Security Committee and the overall authority of the High Representative for CFSP.

Common to all the EU security missions has been a UN mandate. For example, in the EUFOR CHAD/RCA mission, the existing EU forces on the ground switched their EU berets for UN blue berets at the handover of authority and continued the same or similar tasks. This is because EU countries have limited all-volunteer armed forces although have multiple commitments of these forces, and frequently are over-stretched to meet these. The practical benefit is that individual soldiers and units are able to apply their experience on the tactical level from an EU mission to a UN mission or vice-versa to the benefit of all.

These nine EU security related missions in Africa compare with eight EU security missions in Europe, (six in the Balkans, two in Georgia), three security missions in the Middle East, (one in Iraq, two for the Palestinians), one mission to Afghanistan, and one mission to Indonesia. So Africa as a cause of concern for EU security missions predominates with 9 out of a total of 23 security missions. Of these 23 missions 12 are ongoing (four in Africa, three in the Balkans, two for the Palestinians, one in Georgia, one in Afghanistan, one in Iraq) and 11 have been concluded successfully.²⁰ Although security missions were not deployed to the crises in Cote d'Ivoire it was discussed intensively in EU forums as was the Ethiopian-Eritrean border issue. All the nine EU missions in Africa are important in their own right for having achieved the specific mission goals, important because the collective success furthered sustaining the grand strategy of security and development for Africa and important because of the evolving step-by-step process of establishing a common trans-regional organizational infrastructure (secretariat for research, policy planning, preparation and coordination of meetings and implementation of decisions).

20 European Defense and Security policy (ESDP),
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=268&lang=en>

This was evident at the EU-Africa Ministerial Meeting (Dublin Ireland, April 2004), with a declaration on multi-lateralism including the joint commitment to reinforcing cooperation with each other and the UN. The commitment recognized the role that regional and sub-regional organizations could play in the maintenance of international peace and security where the operationalization of the AU Peace and Security Council was an important step.²¹ Treating the commitment with the seriousness that it deserved the EU established in 2004 the ATHENA mechanism, a special mechanism to administer the financing of the common costs of EU-operations having military or defence implications. Athena is managed under the authority of a Special Committee composed of representatives of 26 Member States, who are accountable towards their own national parliaments via their respective ministers (Denmark has opted out). The remainder of the expenditure is financed directly by the Member States which contribute forces to the operations.²² While ESDP civilian missions are financed under the EC CFSP budget heading, ESDP operations having military or defence implications cannot be financed from the Community budget (cf. art. 28 TEU). Views were exchanged at the Third Meeting of the African and European Troikas (Addis Ababa, December 2004) where there was clearly a need to expand the deployment of EU security missions with Sudan and Chad were of particular significance. The EU agreed to provide financial assistance to the AU mission to Darfur (AMIS).²³

The Joint AU-EU Strategy for Africa

The understanding that security and economics were intertwined was reiterated when a Joint AU-European Commission Monitoring Mechanism was established as an instrument of development where security was voiced as the essential basis for development.²⁴ The European Council made a crucial decision confirming this when it adopted a new EU Strategy for Africa in December 2005. The emphasis of implementing this strategy was for the EU to address Africa as one regional entity.²⁵ This was an evolutionary decision as part of the aforementioned process that had commenced with the Cairo Plan (2000). Catalysts to the decision was the success of

21 EU Council Press Release, EU-Africa Ministerial Meeting, Dublin Ireland, 1 April 2004, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/79814.pdf

22 EU Council Secretariat Fact-sheet, Financing of ESDP Operations, June 2007, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/ATHENA_june_2007.pdf

23 EU-Africa Dialogue, Third Meeting of the African and European Troikas 4 December 2004, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/82969.pdf

24 EU-Africa Dialogue, Third Meeting of the African and European Troikas 4 December 2004, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/82969.pdf

25 Commission of the European Communities: EU Strategy for Africa, Brussels, 12 October 2005, COM (2005) 489 Final

http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/04_eu_strategy_for_africa_12_10_2005_en.pdf

Operation Artemis, the migration of the AU from the OAU, the formation of New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), the reinforced role of Africa's regional economic communities (REC) and the emergence of a new generation of African leaders. In adopting this strategy it was intended that all EU policies and activities towards and with Africa would be linked to each other. The grand strategy of the European Union's political stance to Africa was thus solidified within the military component defined under the auspices of the European Security and Defence Policy. This grand strategy would be achieved on the basis of the principle of subsidiarity: only matters which would be dealt with less effectively at a lower level should be reserved for a higher level of governance. The EU also aimed to enhance intra-African solidarity between these three levels and raise dialogue with the African continent as a whole to the highest political level.²⁶

To implement this, the institutions of the EU initiated dialogue with the AU and established joint programmes leading towards singular organizational infra-structure compared to the previous common infra-structure. As part of this strategy it was declared that peace and security were the first essential prerequisites of sustainable development.²⁷ An important step was to amalgamate existing agreements and processes that were successful that included the Cotonou Agreement, the Trade Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA), the Euro-Mediterranean partnership, the European Neighborhood Policy, and the CFSP/ESDP. This infrastructure development was simultaneous with the deployment of three EU military missions to the DRC namely EUFOR RD Congo, EUPOL Kinshasa and EUSEC RD CONGO and the EU support together with NATO and the UN to the AU mission AMIS in Sudan.

A review and a reflection of the progress of these agreements and activities, in October 2006, showed that the EU-Africa Dialogue had intensified requiring an interlocking system of peacekeeping capacities through a ten year building plan. To justify such a military strategy the overriding political goal pronounced was promotion of the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDG) in Africa. In doing so any EU military or police force could also act with states outside of both Africa and Europe exemplified by Russia and Ukraine (who provided helicopters and pilots to the security missions) and could exchange roles for UN forces, either handing over to them or taking over from them (as was the case when EUFOR CHAD/RCA handed over to MINURCAT). This generated a global option with the EU stating it was willing to co-operate and operate with states and institutions of governance from any other region. The

26 EU Strategy for Africa (2005), <http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/r12540.htm>

27 Europa Press Release, European Commission adopts "European Union Strategy for Africa" 12 October 2005,

<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/05/1260&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en>

review detailed how over € 500 million was being allocated to various programs some of which were in addition to the aforementioned security missions, for example to the UNDP for a disarmament program it was managing in Congo Brazzaville as well as to post conflict reconstruction.²⁸ This was not surprising since the EU is the largest donor to Africa and is Africa's biggest trading partner accounting, for example, € 144 billion in the year 2000 which was five times bigger than intra-Africa trade.²⁹

Beyond Donor-Recipient relations in Establishing AU-EU Trans-Regional Inter-Dependence

The next important watershed of AU-EU trans-regionalism was the second AU-EU Summit on security relations held in Lisbon Portugal (December 2007) that reflected on relations since the Cairo Conference (2000). The debate focussed on an increased understanding of the vital inter-dependence between the AU and the EU. Agreement was reached to build a new strategic political partnership for the future, overcoming the traditional donor-recipient relationship, and build on common values and goals in pursuit of peace and stability, democracy and rule of law, progress and development.³⁰ This was a landmark decision, giving the AU an equitable footing in any trans-regional institution, where the EU was determined to give such a new strategic partnership the necessary means and instruments to fulfil the Joint Strategy and Action Plan. Eight partnership programs under the EU-Africa Action plan were established where security was given as a pre-requisite for development.³¹

By the time that the 10th Africa-EU Ministerial TROIKA Meeting took place in Brussels (September 2008) the positions of the European Union Special Representative and Head of Delegation of the European Commission Delegation to the AU had been created and located in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. It was clear from the statement of that meeting that unique security organizational infrastructure (secretariat for research, policy planning, preparation and coordination of meetings and implementation of decisions) had been established to co-ordinate the various AU-AU collaborations in security affairs. This included the migration of AMIS into UNAMID, (Sudan), the deployment of EUFOR CHAD/RC on the Sudan/Chad border, ANISOM (Somalia), EU SSR Guinea-Bissau, continuing missions in the DRC as well as diplomatic efforts relating to the

28 European Union Factsheet, Progress report on the implementation of the EU Strategy for Africa, October 2006, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/061017-Africa_Strategy.pdf

29 European Union Factsheet, EU Support for Peace and Security in Africa, February 2005, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Africa.pdf>

30 EU Africa Summit - Lisbon Declaration 9/12/2007 - Press: 290 Nr: 16343/07 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/97494.pdf

31 Council Conclusions on "One Year After Lisbon: The Africa-EU Partnership at Work". <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/EU-AfricaDialogue103904.pdf>

internal instability of Zimbabwe, piracy off the Somali coast and the coup d'etat in Mauritania. Given that the AU and EU had recognised their equitable footing in such meetings, the EU briefed AU leaders regarding security issues of concern in Europe that included Georgia and Kosovo.³²

The 2007 declaration, the experiences from the military missions, the numerous joint, common and singular working groups, the various ministerial and summit meetings and the policy goals were instrumental in initiating EURORECAMP which as already mentioned was a joint decision in implementing the 2010 goal for the ASF where the Lisbon Agreement enabled the means for a joint training cycle with a budget of € 300 million. The cycle development would rely on a scenario allowing the conduct of a crisis management from the diplomatic phase to the deployment of an integrated (military, civil, and police) intervention force. In practise this would necessitate a unique trans-regional organizational infrastructure. The first phase commenced with an initiating conference on 21 November 2008 at the AU in Addis Ababa followed by a contributors conference (Brussels 6 February 2009) organised by the Joint Expert Group with a completion target for June 2010³³ This would be monitored by a Common Interactive Watch and Participation mechanism.³⁴ At the same a tri-lateral dialogue was initiated between the AU, EU and China with the aim of promoting peace and security and contributing towards the efforts of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) for Africa in light of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation framework (FOCAC) established in 2006 as a result of the ever increasing role of China in Africa. Both the AU and the EU emphasized that particular attention should be given to cooperation in the area of peace and security and that development and security were interdependent.³⁵

Conclusion

A skeptic may ponder if the European Union has developed a European Security and Defense Policy of any value however the nine security missions to Africa clearly show it has and that it is functioning. It would be hard pressed to ignore the deployment of these missions that in its first decade engaged 26 EU member states and involved 9000 troops (with no deaths or injuries as a result of hostile action). The dedication of the EU to these missions is noted through the increasing financial commitment that

32 10th Africa-EU Ministerial TROIKA Meeting, Brussels, 16 September 2008,

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Africa-EU_Troika_102801.pdf

33 EURORCAMP - AMANI Africa (2008-2010) <http://www.amaniafricacycle.org/spip.php?article8>

34 Joint Communique 11th Africa-EU Ministerial Troika Meeting, 20-21 November 2008

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/er/104245.pdf

35 Council Conclusions on the tri-lateral dialogue was initiated between the European Union, Africa and China, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Eu-Africa103901.pdf>

can be detailed as follows: ³⁶

- 1) Common costs administered by ATHENA in past operations: i) EU supporting action to AMIS: €1,3 million in 2007; ii) EUFOR RD Congo: €23 million in 2006; iii) EUSEC RD Congo: financing of a civilian project in 2005 to reform the chain of payment in the Democratic Republic of Congo, until the mission could be accommodated under the CFSP-budget (€0,9 million); iv) EUFOR TChad/RCA: €120 million in 2008; v) EU NAVFOR Somalia: €8,3 million
- 2) As far as civilian missions are concerned, they are financed under the EC CFSP budget heading which is administered by the European Commission. According to Council Secretariat estimates, the total budget of ongoing missions (multi-annual commitments) is €534 555 000.

Similarly a skeptic may ponder the role and successes of the African Union in its security commitments on a continent with so much poverty and conflict. However, it would be hard pressed to ignore the first decade of the new millennium which is also the first decade of this regional organization as it has emerged from the Organization of African Unity especially through the activities of its sub-regional organizations such as ECOWAS and the SADC. These have played an important role in creating regional security frameworks for dialogue that is about to be declared in 2010 as an operationally viable Standby Force of Brigade size.

Over the same decade (2000-2010) the various combined and even hybrid security missions, and the numerous summits, meetings, committees and working groups has led to the emergence of a trans-regional organizational infrastructure (secretariat) between the AU and the EU for the purpose of research, policy planning, preparation and coordination of meetings and the implementation of decisions. The AU has played an active and equitable partner role with the EU in determining that security is a prerequisite to development and stability.

The success of this trans-regionalism can be measured on the ground. Simultaneous to the intensive diplomatic and policy process and the nine security missions there has also been training and procurement for long range planning to suit the strategy. The underlying grand strategy is that security is the basis for sustainable development and other issues such as democratic governance, trade and regional integration, energy and food requirements, the environment and economics and migration, mobility, employment and health and that includes human rights as well as state territorial requirements. Progress towards the

36 European Union Parliamentary Answers, 29 January 2009

<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=E-2008-5747&language=PL>

Africa Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) is critical to the overall success of the entire AU-EU partnership, given the threat that continuing conflict poses to achieving fundamental political, economic and social development goals.

The above details and analysis of AU-EU trans-regionalism must be placed in a wider context. This is that it co-exists with other bilateral inter-regional and trans-regional endeavors. As mentioned many of the AU-EU security missions are in conjunction with the United Nations that gives the missions and regional organizations the authority and legitimacy through a mandate and often takes over or hands over to UN forces. Other endeavors include working with other regional fora eg NATO and individual states outside of Africa and Europe as partners eg Russia and China (with whom there is a tri-lateral dialogue and process underway).

Given the necessities and successes mentioned in this article there is no doubt that AU-EU trans-regionalism will continue to strengthen; that the EU will increasingly play an important role in training and logistics for the AU forces; where the AU and the EU may well form joint and combined rapid reaction forces to deter humanitarian crises caused by political strife and may also be able to deploy for civil emergencies caused by natural causes such as famine and floods. This trans-regional development will be simultaneous with the evolving structures within each regional organization that are aimed to strengthen integration and reduce conflict through the sharing of resources and territory that were previously causes of conflict. Given such a grand strategy it should not surprise the world if a viable joint and combined AU-EU force were to deploy jointly outside of Africa, maybe for an emergency due to natural causes in Europe or maybe as part of an interim UN force to the Middle East or Asia.