

Peacekeeping and the Contagion of Armed Conflict

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Abstract

Existing scholarship has characterized the severity of and mechanisms behind the problem of conflict contagion, in which armed conflict perpetuates further conflict in neighboring states. Although studies of peacekeeping have demonstrated that it can prevent conflict recurrence, we know little about whether international actors can also help prevent conflict from spreading. Using event history analysis that incorporates information from neighboring observations, the empirical findings indicate that the risk of contagion decreases by about 80% in the presence of peacekeeping. Moreover, both lighter and more substantial peacekeeping deployments can prevent conflict spread. One of the key means by which peacekeeping helps contain conflict is through restricting external harboring of and support for transnational insurgencies.

Can peacekeeping missions prevent conflict contagion across state borders? The diffusion of conflict has emerged as an important problem in studies of international security, but little is understood about how the problem can be reduced. This question is of crucial importance as the international community confronts situations like those in Iraq, Afghanistan and the DRC that threaten to disrupt general stability throughout the Middle East, South Asia and central Africa. If peacekeeping provides public as well as private benefits, then it should help increase peace and stability beyond the country of deployment such that the negative externalities of conflict borne by the greater international community are minimized. This paper assesses the ability for peacekeeping operations to do just that through preventing the contagion of both interstate and intrastate armed conflicts.

It is well known that conflict can spread across borders. Contagion can be so strong that it frequently makes little sense to consider conflicts in isolation of those in neighboring states. We cannot understand the 2006 Israeli-Lebanese war independently from the conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinian Arabs, or the Bosnian war independently from the Croatian war, or the Russia-Georgia war independently from the intrastate conflicts in South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Chechnya. Indeed, existing scholarship finds that states are more likely to experience both interstate and intrastate conflict if neighboring states are in conflict (Buhaug and Gleditsch 2008, Gleditsch 2002, 2007, Gleditsch, Salehyan and Schultz 2008, Gleditsch and Ward 2000, Kathman 2010 forthcoming, Most and Starr 1980, Siverson and Starr 1990, 1991, Starr and Most 1983, Ward and Gleditsch 2002). Peacekeeping operations such as those in the Balkans and in the DRC, discussed later, have been explicitly justified for the purpose of preventing conflict contagion, yet we know little about whether peacekeepers are effective in that regard. No existing work has systematically examined whether peacekeeping can prevent the spread of conflict to other actors.

And it is not obvious that peacekeeping excels in containing conflict spread. It is easy to find examples of regions such as the Great Lakes Region in Africa and South Asia where conflict appears to perpetuate across state borders rather easily even in the presence of peacekeepers. Many have used such cases of peacekeeping failure as evidence that peacebuilding in the UN system is broken (Mills and McNamee 2009). The analysis here assesses if such conspicuous cases of peacekeeping failure resemble typical outcomes, or if instead they are relatively rare exceptions.

Since existing work has almost exclusively focused on the ability for peacekeeping to improve the duration of peace between the combatants (Collier, Chauvet and Hegre 2008, Diehl 1994, Doyle and Sambanis 2000, 2006, Fortna 2004*a,b*, 2008, Gilligan and Sergenti 2008, Mattes and Savun 2009, Walter 2002), we actually know little about whether it is in the international community's interest to adequately supply peacekeeping. That is, states that fund peacekeeping missions do not directly benefit from improving the duration of peace in foreign countries, so it is only in their interest if they can derive some residual benefits related to the reduction of negative externalities. While foreign policy makers may receive some altruistic social-psychological benefit from providing peacekeeping, it is doubtful that altruism can explain the massive growth in peacekeeping burdens over the past two decades. States that bear these peacekeeping burdens must also be consuming more tangible benefits – either public benefits that are consumed by all or private benefits that only the providers can consume – in order to explain the increasing willingness to authorize and pay for peacekeeping (Bobrow and Boyer 1997). The most obvious source of such benefits is through peacekeeping's role in stabilizing the international system – through interrupting the contagious-nature of conflict. Whether and to what extent peacekeeping can provide such benefits to its providers is a key determinant of optimal peacekeeping provision but has remained unexamined.

Taking up the question of whether third-party involvement can help contain conflict, I first

define peacekeeping and related concepts and then present the theoretical basis for expecting peacekeeping to attenuate conflict spread. Empirical tests confirm the resulting testable hypotheses, as peacekeeping can reduce the threat of contagion by about 80 percent. Additional analyses clarify the mechanisms through which peacekeeping best attenuates the spread of armed conflict.

Peacekeeping and Conflict Contagion

Definitions of peacekeeping typically have two common components related to form and intent. With regard to form, peacekeeping must involve the deployment of foreign military personnel. With regard to intent, peacekeepers exist for the purpose of securing a recently established peace. Along these lines, Fortna (2008, 5) offers a fairly minimal definition of peacekeeping as “the deployment of international personnel to help maintain peace and security in the aftermath of war.” This definition includes the deployment of traditional peacekeeping forces, as well as military observers, peace enforcement missions and multidimensional peacekeeping operations. The conceptual issue of what it means for peace to be kept is relevant, as many operations that Fortna and other scholars deem to be peacekeeping missions are deployed in areas where there is only a tentative ceasefire and not much peace to maintain. Objectives of the third-party forces are crucial in this regard, as peacekeeping missions, including those with peace enforcement mandates, are distinct from humanitarian interventions and collective security missions in that a peacekeeper’s primary task relates to deterring additional hostilities and protecting human security, even in the midst of ongoing violence if need be.

To understand conflict contagion and then how peacekeeping might respond to it, I build on work in the existing literature and highlight three non-mutually exclusive mechanisms by which

armed conflict spreads geographically.¹ For a reasonable scope, I only consider the spread of conflict locations and not the mere expansion of the participants in a particular conflict.² One primary mechanism by which the location of conflict might actually shift is through transnational insurgencies. When rebels and militia groups engaged in conflict in one state seek haven or plunder in surrounding states, those surrounding states become more prone to both interstate and intrastate conflict (Salehyan 2007, 2008*a*, 2009). Intrastate conflicts become more likely if the transnational insurgents are not welcomed by the destination state, as in the LRA's presence in Uganda and the DRC. Moreover, interstate conflicts become more likely if states pursue the groups across state borders or otherwise seek retribution against a state of origin (Gleditsch, Salehyan and Schultz 2008), as has occurred when India has militarized against Pakistan following attacks from Kashmiri militants.

A related mechanism is that conflicts might spread to neighboring states through external sponsorship of insurgencies (Buhaug and Gleditsch 2008, Cederman, Girardin and Gleditsch 2009, Gleditsch 2007, Schultz 2010).³ Conflict can lead to heightened external support for a nearby rebel movement when a state experiencing or having recently experienced an armed conflict actively supports an insurgency in a neighboring state as a reciprocal gesture. A prominent example of this type of behavior is the tit-for-tat support for insurgencies in Sudan and Uganda, as the Sudanese

¹In addition to the factors considered at length here, demonstration effects have also been considered as a mechanism for the spread of ethnic conflict (Kuran 1998), but Forsberg (2007) finds evidence that such effects are only rarely able to explain the spread of conflict.

²Many armed conflicts lead to interventions from outside actors which have strong interests in a conflict's outcome (Davis and Moore 1997, Gleditsch 2007, Gleditsch, Salehyan and Schultz 2008, Gleditsch and Beardsley 2004, Kathman 2010 forthcoming, Moore and Davis 1998, Regan 2002). Since such interventions really entail the expansion of existing disputes and not the creation of new, albeit related, conflicts in neighboring states, I leave the study of peacekeeping's effect on interventions to future analysis.

³External support for neighboring rebel movements is related to the issue of transnational insurgency, as such support is often in the form of harboring insurgencies that are fighting elsewhere.

government has supported the LRA's activities in Uganda and Uganda has supported the SLA's activities in Sudan. Armed conflicts can also result in support for neighboring insurgencies when existing or former rebel groups continue their struggle by supporting allied insurgencies elsewhere against neighboring states. Charles Taylor's support for the RUF in Sierra Leone amidst the turmoil in Liberia is an example of this type of dynamic. Such external support of insurgencies not only can affect the propensity for neighboring intrastate conflicts but also interstate ones. Interstate conflict can become more likely when the external support becomes a source of grievance (Gleditsch, Salehyan and Schultz 2008, Schultz 2010). The 2008 war between Russia and Georgia is a prime example of this type of diffusion, where the Georgians and Russians both accused the other side of supporting secessionist movements being fought on both sides of the border in the Caucasus. The logic presented thus far of how conflicts can spread comports well with studies that find that transnational ethnic linkages between states are a crucial source of conflict diffusion and clustering (Buhaug and Gleditsch 2008, Davis and Moore 1997, Forsberg 2008, Gleditsch 2007, Lake and Rothchild 1998, Moore and Davis 1998).

In light of these mechanisms for conflict contagion, one of the means by which peacekeepers can prevent it is through the securing of borders, either directly in the provision of security and monitoring forces or indirectly in strengthening the force projection capacities of the central and regional governments. Such a function of peacekeeping can dovetail with security sector reform, which Toft (2009) has found essential to securing peace in post-conflict states. Securing the borders will decrease the ability for transnational insurgencies to move to other areas where they destabilize intrastate relations and/or become a source of tension between states. The role of peacekeepers in securing borders can also prevent the flow of arms and other support from neighboring governments or irregular forces in and out of conflict areas. Schultz (2010), for example, finds that peace

agreements with monitoring provisions substantially decrease the extent to which external rebel support leads to interstate conflict.

This role of peacekeeping has been especially relevant in the Great Lakes region of Africa, where rebel and militia groups roam across porous borders and engage in armed conflict. The evolution of conflict in the eastern part of the DRC is a case in point. In 2004, violence involving the FDLR and dissident FARDC forces loyal to Laurent Nkunda along the Rwanda and Burundi borders (in South Kivu province near Bukavu) threatened to undermine the peace established in 2002 and 2003. In response, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1565 in October 2004, which increased the strength of the existing peacekeeping force (MONUC) and focused on developments along the eastern borders. In particular, it called for MONUC to monitor on and around the bordering lakes, take steps to disarm and repatriate foreign combatants, discourage cross-border movements and coordinate with the peacekeeping mission in Burundi (ONUB). After some success in reducing conflict in the east, violence once again increased, with the CNDP and FDLR as critical belligerents in North Kivu province. In no small part because of the growing violence in North Kivu, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1856 in December 2008, which again increased the strength of MONUC and expanded MONUC's mandate to improve the territorial security of the eastern DRC.

The need for and effect of peacekeeping to secure the DRC eastern borders can be seen in Figure 1, which portrays counts of specific battle locations along the DRC borders with Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi during various time periods. These are snapshots of the ACLED data (Raleigh, Linke and Hegre 2010 forthcoming). While the ACLED project has information on other types of events, those shown are battles that involved any type of irregular force – principally rebel groups and militias – in order to get a sense for the transnational insurgency problem facing the region.

In Figure 1A, which shows battle totals for nine months in 2004, there is a large cluster of violence on the border near Bukavu. This cluster spurred the focus in UNSC Resolution 1565 on securing peace in the border area. If we jump ahead two years, to the same period of time in 2006, we see in Figure 1B substantially less violence in the Bukavu area. While these snapshots cannot alone attribute the decrease in violence to MONUC efforts, they are at least suggestive that the attention paid by all the actors involved, including MONUC as mandated in Resolution 1565, attenuated conflict in that particular border region.

Jumping ahead again to the same period in 2008, we see in Figure 1C that violence remains low in the southern part of the snapshot, near Bukavu, but violence has greatly increased north of Lake Kivu, the body of water in the center of the map separating the DRC and Rwanda. This helps explain the urgency at the time, seen in Resolution 1856, of needing to quell violence along the border that once again threatened the security of the DRC, Rwanda and Uganda.

The point of comparing the snapshots of the DRC borders is to show how cross-border insurgencies, and conflict along state borders in general, can be a major issue in the spread of conflict across space. It is clear that in the case of the UNSC resolutions specifying the mandate for MONUC, the international community was keenly aware of this potential and directed peacekeeping resources to help secure the DRC borders. Not only do we specifically see the patterns of violence in the border areas change with the peacekeeping deployments, but on a more general level, the same severity of armed-conflict spread in the region that led to wars in Zaire/DRC in 1996 and 1998 did not occur during this time period when MONUC was active in eastern DRC.

The importance of securing borders to the prevention of conflict contagion is also demonstrated well in the Balkans conflicts. On the one hand, UNPROFOR and UNPREDEP were vigilant in monitoring the Macedonian borders with the FRY and Albania. These peacekeeping missions had

explicit mandates to that effect and thereby helped prevent the further spread of major violence into Macedonia when that seemed a distinct possibility. On the other hand, the international community, and UNPROFOR in particular, failed to stop the flow of both Serbian and Croatian arms into Bosnia-Herzegovina (Bosnia) as the war in Croatia wound down and the hostilities in Bosnia escalated. Lord David Owen notes that “[d]ecisive action and a readiness to find the UN troops at the end of 1992, when the Security Council had its best-informed discussion on controlling the borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina, would have shortened the war” (Owen 1995). Although a failure of peacekeeping, this at least helps demonstrate how the unrestricted flow of arms across borders can increase conflict contagion. In fact, Owen’s remarks assert not that peacekeeping was useless in preventing the spread of conflict but that *more* peacekeepers were needed to properly secure the borders.

Aside from securing borders, peacekeepers can also prevent conflict from spreading by minimizing its potential to weaken the security of surrounding areas. The displacement of large groups of people provides a key source of such a negative conflict externality. These displaced persons often flee across state borders where, as refugees, they create political and economic problems for the surrounding host states (Forsberg 2009, Salehyan 2008*b*, Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006). The refugees can upset political dynamics, exacerbate competition for resources, and otherwise spread arms, combatants and ideologies that make conflict more likely (Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006). As another means for conflict to weaken a neighbor’s security, armed conflicts can create destabilizing disruptions to the flow of trade, people and capital that will be most strongly felt by the states with economies and societies that are interconnected with the states experiencing conflict (Enterline 1998, Maoz 1996, Murdoch and Sandler 2002).

In response, peacekeepers can decrease the spread of conflict by solidifying peace in the area

of deployment and in the process curtail other destabilizing changes. This especially relates to the role of peacekeepers in reducing the displacement of large groups of people. When effective at securing post-conflict environments, peacekeepers will enable displaced persons to return to their homes and prevent noncombatants from becoming vulnerable to further hostilities. With fewer displaced persons, refugee flows will be diminished, which means that there will be less disruptive pressure in neighboring polities. Or, in conjunction with the UNHCR, regional organizations or humanitarian organizations, peacekeepers can reduce the local burdens from internally displaced persons and refugees. For example, ONUB was crucially involved in the resettlement of refugees in Burundi, as has been MONUC in the DRC. Similarly, Howard (2008, 77-80) relates how UNTAG's coordination with the UNHCR to resettle over 42,000 refugees from mainly Angola and Zambia into Namibia was crucial for that operation's success. Indeed, the Namibian conflict did not cause much disruption to the stability of the surrounding states once UNTAG deployed, in spite of close ties to dynamics in Angola and the so-called frontline states.

Containment Hypothesis: States with neighbors that have recently experienced armed conflict will be less likely to experience new interstate or intrastate conflicts when peacekeepers deploy to such neighbors.

More specific testable implications of how peacekeeping can interrupt the mechanisms by which conflicts spread also emerge from the discussion. Salehyan (2007, 2008*a*, 2009) posits that transnational insurgencies are more of a problem in spurring conflict when a state has neighbors that are enduring rivals or are economically weak. Insurgents can better find support or escape from policing in such neighbors. If peacekeeping succeeds in securing borders and shutting down the potential for transnational insurgencies to find relief abroad, then we should observe less of a conflict-aggravating effect from having such neighbors when peacekeepers are present.

Border Security Hypothesis: States with neighboring rivals or neighboring weak states will be less likely to experience new armed conflicts when peacekeepers deploy to such neighbors.

Peacekeeping might also work through containing refugee problems. We should expect that if peacekeeping succeeds in reducing the burden of refugee flows, then we will observe less conflict in neighbors of refugee-producing states when peacekeepers deploy to those states. In contrast, states will be much more susceptible to new armed conflict when neighbors have many refugees and no peacekeepers.

Refugee Hypothesis: States with neighbors that have many refugees will be less likely to experience new armed conflicts when peacekeepers deploy to such neighbors.

Whether these hypotheses are confirmed will bear on potential counter claims that might expect peacekeeping to actually exacerbate diffusion. One such argument might be that peacekeeping missions tend to force transnational insurgencies to move elsewhere and thus create a threat to stability in their new locales. Instead of blotting up the sources of conflict, peacekeepers might displace them into neighboring areas. In the snapshots of the DRC borders, we see that there may have been some such displacement of conflict, as the principal loci of conflict tended to migrate north as the peacekeepers responded at first to the violence in the area near Bukavu. Or, even more concerning, peacekeepers could help harbor and protect insurgent groups either intentionally or unintentionally. Mills and McNamee (2009) propose that UN peacekeepers in the wake of the Rwandan genocide actually helped protect the perpetrators of the genocide from being brought to justice and enabled them to become a source of conflict in eastern Zaire/DRC.

Another argument might be that peacekeepers can drastically shift the balance of power in neighboring areas and create windows of vulnerability for rapid conflict escalation. If peacekeepers prevent transnational insurgencies from moving across borders to supply and support areas con-

trolled by them or their allies, then rival groups or government forces in neighboring areas might become more aggressive in challenging the status quo so as to take advantage of the restrictions on transnational movement. If such effects are powerful and systematic, then we might observe a heightened, rather than a reduced, potential for conflict in neighboring states when peacekeepers deploy.

Research Design

The data used to test the hypotheses follow all the states in the the international system from 1946 to 2005 or from time of entrance into the international system until 2005.⁴ The outcome of interest is whether a state experienced an armed conflict episode onset in a particular period, where the definition of an armed conflict episode comes from version 4-2009 of the PRIO/Uppsala Armed Conflict Data (Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg and Strand 2002). An armed conflict episode occurs when there is a dispute that involves at least one government actor and results in 25 battle-related fatalities in a year. Involvement in armed conflict is defined as whether a state is coded as the location of an armed conflict and not just a participant.⁵

Observations are recorded at the end of each month, producing state-month discrete time series cross sectional data. I use discrete monthly data because the dependent and key independent variables relate to events with specific timing, and the start dates of armed conflict are sometimes

⁴System membership is defined by Gleditsch and Ward (1999).

⁵The “extrasystemic” armed conflicts that primarily involve colonial powers putting down rebellions in their colonies are not included in this analysis because the locations of the conflicts do not take place within the set of sovereign states observed as at risk for conflict onset, the mechanisms for diffusion prevalence and prevention are likely to be uniquely shaped by colonial dynamics, and these cases would reveal little about the role of peacekeeping in the contemporary international system. This is not to say that extrasystemic conflicts will not exhibit similar diffusion patterns, just that peacekeeping’s effect on their contagion is outside the scope of this analysis.

coded with some uncertainty. When coders of the Armed Conflict Data are unsure about the exact day in which an armed conflict began, they typically code the start day as the beginning of the month in which it is believed the conflict occurred. Since there is greater certainty with regard to the month that a conflict began than the precise day, monthly data are preferable to daily data.⁶ Moreover, the contagion mechanisms hypothesized above, and conflict processes in general, take some time to develop. As neighboring conflicts break out, it would be difficult for those conflicts to have an immediate effect on the likelihood of conflict in a particular state, but they very well could have an impact within a month's time as events unfold.

Tests of the hypotheses require event history models that allow for the inclusion of spatial dependence. In terms of the event history component, I make use of the fact that binary time series cross sectional data are event history data (Beck, Katz and Tucker 1998). In this way, I use probit estimation and include a count of the number of peaceful periods that have elapsed for each subject, and the square and cube of this count in order to build in duration dependence (Carter and Signorino 2010). I also report robust standard errors that account for clustering on each state. In terms of spatial dependence, as further detailed below I include information about the conflict and peacekeeping developments in the previous 24 months in neighboring states.⁷ Using Gleditsch and Ward's (2001) minimum distance data, neighboring states are defined as those states with less

⁶Findings from models in which the data are set up as non-discrete (continuous) multiple-observation event history data are consistent with those reported here.

⁷Note that Hays and Kachi (2009) have developed a novel spatial duration model for single-observation event history data. Akin to Buhaug and Gleditsch (2008), I choose instead to test the hypotheses using discrete binary time series cross sectional data because it is prudent to adopt a more computationally simple model when there is no potential for simultaneity bias. That is, the methods employed here use information about *previous* events in neighboring states, and no information about contemporary neighboring events are included because, as mentioned above, conflict processes take time to develop. So, probit estimation of the monthly data with information about what has happened in neighboring states during the previous 24 months, but not during the current month, is not at risk of simultaneity bias (Beck, Gleditsch and Beardsley 2006).

than 25 kilometers between their nearest borders.

With the data set up for event-history analysis, failure events are defined as the onset of an armed conflict episode in the state under observation. States can experience multiple onsets even while other episodes are ongoing – at the extreme, India has experienced 34 onsets of intrastate or interstate conflict since 1946 and has had as many as eight different armed conflicts ongoing simultaneously. A dummy variable controls for whether an armed conflict is ongoing at the time of observation, since there might be meaningful differences in the processes that lead to onset when an armed conflict is ongoing versus when peace is present.

Peacekeeping forces are defined using the International Military Intervention (IMI) data (Pickering and Kisangani 2009). These data include information on all forceful interventions across state lines from 1946 to 2005.⁸ For the purposes of this analysis, peacekeeping is defined as the deployment of military personnel to a foreign state by the UN, a regional security organization or a coalition of states.⁹ The purpose of the force also must be for observing, patrolling, monitoring, disarming, intimidating or combating. Since such a definition could also include collective security actions that clearly are not peacekeeping, I have excluded such interventions as the US-led UN force in the Korean War. The missions are listed in the online appendix.

To test the principal hypothesis, the models include an indicator of whether any neighboring states have experienced a conflict episode – either onset or an ongoing episode – in the previous two years along with peacekeeping.¹⁰ The models also include an indicator of whether any neighbors

⁸The data code the purpose of the force, which is useful in defining peacekeeping, as well as an ordinal measure of the force size. The data also include start and end deployment dates.

⁹Only missions that fall under the purview of the UN, regional security organizations or coalitions are considered as peacekeeping missions since forces from single states, such as the Russian “peacekeepers” in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, often have a dubious designation as really being intended for peace. Diehl (1994) similarly stresses that neutrality is a key characteristic of peacekeeping missions.

¹⁰A dichotomous measure is used because Buhaug and Gleditsch (2008) find that, once a state is

have experienced a conflict episode in the previous two years and that did not have peacekeeping forces.¹¹ It is possible for both indicators to be true, as when a state has at least one neighbor that experienced conflict with peacekeeping and at least one neighbor that experienced conflict without peacekeeping. The coefficients on these two variables can be directly compared to see the effect of peacekeeping.¹² These variables are modified versions of spatial lag variables that enable information about both the onset and continuing existence of neighboring conflicts, as well as neighboring peacekeeping missions, to be captured as right-hand side variables.¹³

Secessionist conflicts and isolated border clashes present an issue in coding who the neighbors are of a particular conflict. While in many cases it makes sense to code all of a conflict-state's neighbors as bordering the conflict, it would be dubious to code, say, Norway or Mongolia as bordering states of the Chechnya conflict in Russia. For conflicts that are isolated to a particular region, as noted in the Armed Conflict data, I coded only those states bordering the contested regions as neighbors to the conflict. For interstate border conflicts, I coded only those states that bordered both combatants as neighbors to the conflict.¹⁴ In contrast, when a state experiences an intrastate conflict over government or a foreign invasion that poses an existential threat, all of that

exposed to a single neighboring conflict, subsequent exposures do not further affect armed conflict onsets.

¹¹Neighbors that at some point had both peacekeeping and armed conflict but in which conflict outlasted the peacekeeping during the 24-month period are considered as having conflict without peacekeeping because, at the closest point to the time of observation, peacekeepers were not present to prevent conflict contagion.

¹²For parsimony, I choose not to include a third dummy variable of whether any neighbors had peacekeeping during the 24-month period but no conflict. I have no theoretical basis to expect such neighbors to shape the propensity for conflict onset, since there is no mechanism for diffusion. When this dummy variable is included as a regressor, the coefficient is statistically insignificant and the other principal results remain robust.

¹³A pure spatial lag variable would only capture information about neighboring conflict onsets, when the theoretical mechanisms being tested apply to the overall presence of conflict in neighboring states.

¹⁴States are not considered neighbors of interstate conflicts in which they are also listed as locations.

state's neighbors are coded as neighbors of the conflict.

To control for the potential for peacekeeping missions to cluster, the models include a variable that indicates if a peacekeeping force is present at home during the time of observation. I also generate a variable that indicates if peacekeeping had previously been in place. The inclusion of both variables allows the effects of peacekeeping in neighboring states to be separated from peacekeeping in the state under observation.

It is also important to control for conflict history, as an indicator of the propensity for conflict to occur. If peacekeepers are deployed to particularly nasty regions, as suggested by Fortna (2004*a*, 2008), Gilligan and Sergenti (2008) and Gilligan and Stedman (2003), then this could potentially mean that nearby peacekeeping would correlate with higher conflict onset even if there is no causal relationship. The measure of conflict history is defined to include built-in decay such that it declines in value as long as no new conflicts occur. The decay is relevant since conflicts in the distant past should not have as strong an effect on shaping the propensity for conflict in the present. I set the exponential decay rate such that the half life of the conflict history variable is ten years.¹⁵

I include additional control variables in different model specifications. The most essential one is the number of neighbors a state has, since states with more neighbors have a greater potential for one of their neighbors to experience conflict and also are potentially more likely to draw international interest in peacekeeping because of the potential for negative externalities. It is also possible that characteristics specific to the most influential regions will confound the observed con-

¹⁵That is, when a conflict erupts, the conflict history variable increases by one unit in the following period and, in each subsequent period, a fraction of the previous conflict history is lost such that the conflict history variable becomes half of what it was after ten years of peace, a quarter of what it was after twenty years, etc. The results are robust if the half life is set to two, five or twenty years, or if linear decay (with full decay after 20 years) is used instead or if there is no decay. In comparing the explanatory power of the models with these alternate conflict history specifications, the model with a half life set to ten years does just as well as a model with a half life set to twenty years and better than all the other alternatives.

tagion relationships, especially since existing work has found that peacekeeping deployments are inconsistent across regions, in which case it is necessary to control for geographic region (Gilligan and Stedman 2003). I thus include in one model specification dummy variables for North America, Central America, South America, Western Europe, Western Africa, Central Africa, Southern Africa, North Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia, East Asia, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific Islands and Australia – Eastern Europe is the reference category so that all the signs of the coefficients are the same.¹⁶

In another model specification, I include three other variables that have been found to be robustly associated with the onset of intrastate conflict (Hegre and Sambanis 2006). They are kept in a separate model because of the loss of observations due to missing data. First, average income in a country can shape both the propensity for conflict and the attractiveness of peacekeeping, so I include lagged GDP per capita from the Penn World Tables. Second, and related to income, I include a measure of economic growth, which is the percent increase in lagged GDP per capita from the previous year. Third, population size is included as a control and was also taken from the Penn World Tables. Aside from these three predictors of armed conflict, I include a post-Cold War dummy variable, defined as 1989 and later, because the nature of peacekeeping has changed substantially since the end of the Cold War (Doyle and Sambanis 2006, Fortna 2008). In particular, most of the peacekeeping attempts during the Cold War involved interstate conflicts, while most of the peacekeeping in the post-Cold War period involves intrastate conflict. Later, I use the post-Cold War dummy variable to split the sample and see if the effectiveness of peacekeeping is conditional on the time period.

¹⁶While I do not include the regional dummy variables in all the model specifications to avoid a potential incidental-parameters problem, when they are included in all the model specifications the results remain robust.

Selection effects are not likely to make peacekeeping look more effective than it otherwise is at containing conflict contagion. Existing scholarship has shown, not surprisingly, that peacekeeping forces are not deployed to states at random. While they, by definition, are deployed to situations that recently experienced conflict, they are also more likely to be deployed to the post-conflict environments that are most difficult to stabilize (Fortna 2004*a,b*, 2008, Gilligan and Sergenti 2008, Gilligan and Stedman 2003, Mullenbach 2005). Similarly, Fortna (2008) does not find that peacekeepers tend to go to the cases that are least likely to spill over, which would be needed for a related selection effect to make peacekeeping appear more effective at preventing contagion than it really is. Selection (endogeneity) effects should thus bias the estimation against finding that peacekeeping is successful, making any findings of a positive impact of peacekeeping quite compelling.

Findings

The findings support the central hypothesis, as peacekeeping reduces the propensity for neighboring conflict to spur current conflict. Table 1 presents the results from probit models with different configurations of the control variables. To see if peacekeeping prevents conflict contagion, we need only compare the two coefficients that involve the status of armed conflict in neighboring states in the past two years. States with neighbors that have experienced armed conflict without peacekeeping are themselves significantly more likely to become involved in an armed conflict. In contrast, states with neighbors that have experienced armed conflict with peacekeeping are not significantly more likely to become involved in an armed conflict. Moreover, the difference in coefficients is statistically significant. With peacekeeping, conflicts are less likely to diffuse across state borders, and this effect is robust across the different model specifications.

Although outside the scope of the present study, it is worth additionally noting in Model 1.1 that the coefficient on the previous peacekeeping variable is statistically significant and negative, while the coefficient on current peacekeeping is not statistically significant. The insignificant coefficient on current peacekeeping should not be surprising, as peacekeepers are deployed to difficult cases and will ideally remain in place when the risk of renewed conflict remains high (Gilligan and Sergenti 2008). The coefficient on previous peacekeeping does suggest, consistent with other quantitative studies of peacekeeping, that peacekeeping can help actors reach a more stable peace (Collier, Chauvet and Hegre 2008, Doyle and Sambanis 2000, 2006, Fortna 2004*a,b*, 2008, Gilligan and Sergenti 2008). Peacekeeping therefore can be thought to prevent the spread of conflict across both space and time.

Substantively, the relative risk of armed conflict onset increases by 75% on average when a neighboring state experiences a conflict without peacekeeping.¹⁷ In contrast, the risk of armed conflict does not significantly change when there is a neighboring conflict with peacekeeping. The mean effect is 12%, which is not distinguishable from zero with any meaningful degree of confidence. These effects are seen in Figure 2, along with 90% confidence intervals.¹⁸

To fully grasp the substantive meaning of the results, we must consider the reverberating effects as would-be conflicts in neighboring states and at home become less likely to diffuse further when peacekeeping is present. As discussed above, in the absence of peacekeeping when a conflict episode breaks out, the likelihood of conflict in neighboring states is 75% higher. Moreover, an increase in conflict history in a particular state by one will increase the probability of new conflict in that

¹⁷These estimates were calculated using the estimated coefficients from Model 1.1 and the Clarify software (King, Tomz and Wittenberg 2000, Tomz, Wittenberg and King 2003). All other variable values were set to their medians.

¹⁸A relative risk ratio – calculated by dividing the expected probability of conflict with the treatment by the probability without the treatment – of one indicates no effect.

state by 40%. So, when peacekeeping prevents conflict from spreading across space, there is great potential for additional benefits, as neighboring states will become more stable and, in turn, their neighbors will become more stable.

Figure 3 presents what the increased probabilities of conflict would be in a hypothetical nine-state system during the twelve periods (one year) after conflict occurs in the central state, with and without peacekeeping in that central state.¹⁹ Without peacekeeping in the central state when conflict occurs there, we see that the central state becomes 55% more likely to experience a conflict at some point in the following year, while its neighbors are 77% more likely to experience a conflict and the corner states are 8% more likely. With peacekeeping in the central state, the probability of conflict during the next year only increases by 43% in the central state, 13% in the bordering states, and less than 2% in the corner states. That is, peacekeeping reduces the increased-propensity for conflict to occur during the following year by more than 20% in the state that experienced conflict, and by about 80% in both the bordering and corner states.

Additional Analyses

The theoretical mechanisms of securing borders and reducing negative externalities may or may not require an abundance of “boots on the ground,” as well-positioned observers can perhaps prove sufficient to secure borders (Schultz 2010), and military liaisons that work in tandem with hu-

¹⁹I assume that there is no peacekeeping in the surrounding states. To calculate these values, I assumed a baseline probability of conflict onset in a particular month of 0.29%, which is the probability when the independent variables are set at their median values. I also take into account that the probability of a state experiencing a conflict is not just a function of whether there was a previous conflict at home or in a neighboring state in the previous period but whether such conflicts occurred in any of the previous periods. A state’s increase in the propensity for armed conflict onset is thus a function of one minus the probability of not having a conflict in any neighboring states in any of the previous periods and one minus the probability of not experiencing a new conflict at home in any of the previous periods.

manitarian workers could prove sufficient to reduce negative externalities. Model 1.4 distinguishes between smaller, primarily observational missions and larger peacekeeping missions. I use the cut-off in the IMI data as to whether a force has more than 1,000 troops or less. I term a mission with fewer than 1,000 troops “light” and a mission with more than 1,000 troops “substantial.” We observe that both types are able to reduce the diffusion of conflict. The coefficients in the presence of either type of peacekeeping are both significantly less than that without peacekeeping and insignificantly different from zero. While the coefficient related to substantial peacekeeping is less than that with light peacekeeping, the difference is statistically insignificant.

I also test the more specific hypotheses by adding data on refugees and potential transnational insurgencies from Salehyan (2007). Specifically, I incorporate whether a state has a neighboring state that is a rival, the natural log of the lagged number of refugees in neighboring states, and the lowest GDP of a state’s neighbors. These variables should pick up the potential for direct support of insurgencies by neighboring states, the potential for refugee problems to spill over and the potential for transnational insurgents to escape policing in the near abroad, respectively. These variables are then interacted with the variable of whether peacekeepers were present in recent neighboring conflicts to see if such peacekeepers are able to reduce the impact of these three mechanisms driving conflict spread.

Consistent with Salehyan (2007), Model 1.5 indicates that having neighbor rivals, high amounts of neighboring refugees and neighbors with low GDP increase the likelihood that conflict will arise when there are not peacekeepers present in neighboring conflicts. When peacekeepers are present, linear combination tests of the constitutive and interactive variables indicate that, as expected, each of these relationships become statistically insignificant. The strongest effect relates to the effect of neighboring rivalry, as the interactive term is statistically significant and negative.

Substantively, having a neighboring rival increases the probability of conflict by 20% when there are not peacekeepers deployed to neighboring conflicts. When such peacekeepers are deployed, having a neighbor rival actually decreases the likelihood of conflict in expectation, although the decrease is not significantly different from zero. This finding supports the notion that restricting the ability for transnational insurgencies to find support in neighboring states is a crucial mechanism by which peacekeeping contains conflict contagion. We thus find strong confirmation of the Border Security Hypothesis and some confirmation of the Refugee Hypothesis.

To further understand the mechanisms in play, I conduct a series of analyses that modify the above approach and assess if peacekeeping containment works for both interstate and intrastate conflict. One modification is to disaggregate the neighboring conflict variables into variables that denote whether there is a neighboring interstate conflict or whether there is a neighboring intrastate conflict. A second modification is to run separate analyses with different dependent variables: one for whether or not a state experienced an interstate armed conflict and one for whether or not an intrastate armed conflict occurred. To code interstate and intrastate conflicts, I make use of the original coding in the Armed Conflict data. With the extrasystemic conflicts excluded as mentioned above, the coding contains a three-point distinction between interstate conflicts, intrastate conflicts, and internationalized intrastate conflicts. The first category is the only one that includes at least two conflict-location states fighting each other, so I use that to define interstate conflicts. I thus lump together the other two categories as intrastate conflicts.²⁰

I then extend the analysis one step further by seeing if the effectiveness of peacekeeping in

²⁰Since I have defined whether a state experiences an onset of armed conflict as whether a state is listed as a location of the conflict, the internationalized intrastate conflicts are not problematic, since the locations are always the states experiencing civil war. The internationalization does not imply contagion as used here, as internationalization is not the onset of new conflicts but rather the inclusion of other actors into an existing conflict.

preventing the diffusion of both interstate and intrastate conflicts holds in both the Cold War and post-Cold War periods. As mentioned above, peacekeeping in the Cold War primarily dealt with interstate conflicts while peacekeeping in the post-Cold War primarily deals with intrastate conflicts. It might be the case that peacekeepers have placed different emphases on containing the spread of each type of conflict in either period, reflecting their emphases in deployment.

Table 2 displays the results of these extensions. In Models 2.1-2.3, the neighboring-conflict independent variables distinguish between interstate and intrastate conflicts. In Model 2.1 the dependent variable is all armed-conflict onsets, in Model 2.2 it is interstate-conflict onsets, and in Model 2.3 it is intrastate-conflict onsets.

The results show that peacekeeping is able to prevent the spread of neighboring intrastate conflicts to both interstate and intrastate onsets. In all three models, neighboring intrastate conflicts without peacekeeping are significantly more likely to cause new conflict onsets, while neighboring intrastate conflicts with peacekeeping have no statistically significant effect on conflict onsets. Moreover, the differences between the coefficients on neighboring intrastate conflict without peacekeeping and the respective coefficients with peacekeeping are statistically significant in Models 2.1 and 2.2 and approaching significance ($p < 0.075$, one-tail test) in Model 2.3.

In Models 2.1 to 2.3, peacekeeping does not appear to be as able to contain the spread of interstate conflict. In none of the first three models is the difference between the neighboring interstate conflict without peacekeeping coefficient significantly different from the respective coefficient with peacekeeping, although in each case it is greater. In Model 2.2, when the dependent variable is the onset of interstate conflict, we see that neighboring interstate conflict is statistically significant in explaining new onset with and without neighboring peacekeeping. The more pronounced effect on the containment of intrastate conflict is consistent with the findings above that strongly sup-

port the Border Security Hypothesis. The problem of transnational insurgencies that peacekeeping does well to suppress is mostly a problem related to intrastate conflict becoming new intrastate or interstate conflicts in neighboring states.

The results from Models 2.4 and 2.5, which take Model 2.1 and split between the Cold War and post-Cold War samples, add an interesting caveat to this discussion. The general pattern still holds for civil conflicts – recent neighboring intrastate conflicts without peacekeeping have a positive and statistically significant effect on the onset of conflict while neighboring intrastate conflicts with peacekeeping do not – but, interestingly, the containment effect of peacekeeping on intrastate conflict is actually stronger during the Cold War. The difference in the coefficients on the two neighboring-intrastate-conflict variables is much larger in the Cold War period than during the post-Cold War. So, even though intrastate conflicts were less of a peacekeeping priority during the Cold War, peacekeepers did quite well when they were deployed to contain them. Fortna (2008, 4) notes that peacekeepers during the Cold War in such intrastate conflicts as the 1960 Congo war were principally concerned with preventing superpower confrontation. One side effect of such concern could be the containment of the conflict in general (Ritscher 2005, 114). At the same time, we see that the peacekeeping does have a statistically significant containment effect of interstate conflict during the post-Cold War and that interstate conflicts are not likely to spread with or without peacekeeping during the Cold War. Even though the post-Cold War emphasis of peacekeeping has primarily been on intrastate conflicts, it has done well to contain interstate hostilities in this time period.

Conclusion

Attempts to maximize peace and stability across the globe and within regions must deal with the problem of diffusion head on. This study has demonstrated that peacekeeping is an important means by which contagion processes can be contained. The findings confirm that peacekeeping especially excels in securing borders in fragile states, as seen in its ability to inhibit rival states from supporting transnational insurgencies and in its pronounced dampening of intrastate conflict diffusion. We also see that peacekeepers can prevent the diffusion of interstate conflict, but only during the post-Cold War. Peacekeepers are thus most efficacious when deployed to rather weak post-conflict states with peripheral insurgencies that could disrupt neighboring states.

We also observe that both light and substantial peacekeeping forces can effectively halt the diffusion of conflict. While this suggests that a little bit of peacekeeping can go a long way, it does not allow us to conclude that major peacekeeping efforts with thousands of troops are unwarranted. The objective of reducing contagion is only one of the many goals that peacekeeping forces strive to achieve, and this study is unable to say anything about the importance of force size to other goals.

If peacekeeping typically helps prevent the ability for conflict to perpetuate, what can we say about specific failures of peacekeeping to do so? For example, what went wrong in Rwanda prior to the 1994 genocide and during the subsequent spread of instability into Zaire (DRC)? While clearly a failure of UN peacekeeping, the lessons learned from the Rwanda case and others like it actually imply a need for more peacekeeping (Walter 2002). The weak mandate and small force deployment of UNAMIR failed to keep the violent competition between Hutus and Tutsis from spreading both within Rwanda and to surrounding areas. With the RPF invading from the north and no significant international force impeding the flow of people into Zaire, the Hutu militia

groups that perpetrated the genocide were able to escape retribution and justice in Zaire/DRC. From bases in Zaire/DRC, those groups were then able to wage attacks into Rwanda and became a source of contention between the Rwandan and Congolese governments. A direct link to the civil and regional wars that followed thus exists, as Rwanda assisted the overthrow of Mobutu and repeatedly invaded eastern DRC. Containing the Hutu militia groups during and after the violence in Rwanda would have greatly decreased the ability for the violence to spill over. Again, this is an argument for more peacekeepers in Rwanda and not a cause for avoidance.

As a final point, even though the findings demonstrate that peacekeeping can produce positive dividends for both the host countries and the surrounding regions, we should not expect that peacekeeping can do no wrong. While the results do not show that peacekeepers have systematic effects in displacing conflict or creating windows of vulnerability – concerns discussed earlier – this does not mean that peacekeepers cannot do such things if deployed carelessly. The analysis here also focused specifically on the contagion of conflict across state borders, and further analysis is needed to understand peacekeeping’s role in containing contagion within states.

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Table 1: Probit Models of Armed Conflict Onset

IV	(1.1)	(1.2)	(1.3)	(1.4)	(1.5)
Neighbor Conflict with PKO	0.0314 (0.0511)	-0.00470 (0.0508)	0.0563 (0.0562)		0.180 (0.157)
Neighbor Conflict without PKO	0.184** (0.0378)	0.127** (0.0405)	0.139** (0.0416)	0.182** (0.0361)	0.147** (0.0407)
Neighbor Conflict with Light PKO				0.0435 (0.0608)	
Neighbor Conflict with Substantial PKO				-0.0132 (0.0562)	
Rival Neighbor					0.184** (0.0561)
Rival Neighbor * Neighbor Conflict with PKO					-0.269* (0.124)
Neighbor Total Refugees (log, lag)					0.0104* (0.00458)
Neighbor Refugees * Neighbor Conflict with PKO					-0.00135 (0.0104)
Low Nighbor GDP					-0.0000341* (0.0000148)
Low Neighbor GDP * Neighbor Conflict with PKO					0.0000164 (0.0000443)
Current PKO	0.00507 (0.0770)	-0.0147 (0.0750)	0.115 (0.0809)		0.0425 (0.0816)
Previous PKO	-0.111* (0.0515)	-0.0855 (0.0559)	-0.0251 (0.0512)		-0.107* (0.0508)
Current Light PKO				0.0765 (0.0882)	
Previous Light PKO				-0.0961 (0.0696)	
Current Substantial PKO				-0.0710 (0.0959)	
Previous Substantial PKO				-0.0548 (0.0424)	
Conflict History	0.111** (0.0132)	0.0969** (0.0156)	0.112** (0.0254)	0.108** (0.0150)	0.133** (0.0140)
Ongoing Conflict	-0.367** (0.0525)	-0.399** (0.0554)	-0.390** (0.0649)	-0.371** (0.0531)	-0.355** (0.0631)
Number of Neighbors	0.00699 (0.00718)	0.0147 (0.0105)	-0.00127 (0.0105)	0.00831 (0.00840)	-0.00336 (0.00805)
North America		0.124 (0.117)			
Central America		0.0724 (0.0931)			
South America		0.0367 (0.0959)			
Western Europe		0.0209 (0.148)			
Western Africa		0.114 (0.0897)			
Central Africa		0.264** (0.101)			
Southern Africa		0.0765 (0.177)			
North Africa		0.105 (0.103)			
Middle East		0.246** (0.0992)			
Central Asia		0.108 (0.132)			
East Asia		0.120 (0.132)			
South Asia		0.345** (0.136)			
Southeast Asia		0.191* (0.0947)			
Pacific Islands & Australia		0.319* (0.150)			
Population			1.10e-07 (1.52e-07)		
Income (lagged)			-0.0531** (0.0223)		
Growth			-0.887** (0.208)		
Post-Cold War			-0.0367 (0.0469)		
Peace Months	-0.00525** (0.00100)	-0.00519** (9.94e-04)	-0.00417** (0.00118)	-0.00528** (9.90e-04)	-0.00309** (0.00123)
<i>PeaceMonths</i> ²	1.82e-05** (4.39e-06)	1.80e-05** (4.29e-06)	0.0000149** (0.00000496)	1.83e-05** (4.34e-06)	1.11e-05* (5.75e-06)
<i>PeaceMonths</i> ³	-1.93e-08** (5.16e-09)	-1.88e-08** (4.98e-09)	-0.000000162** (5.73e-09)	-1.93e-08** (5.11e-09)	-1.12e-08 (7.14e-09)
Constant	-2.429** (0.0658)	-2.579** (0.103)	-2.441** (0.0801)	-2.390** (0.0769)	-2.551** (0.0839)
Observations	84695	84695	70476	84695	66175

Standard errors in parentheses


* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$ in a one-tail test

Table 2: Additional Models

IV	(2.1:All)	(2.2:Interstate)	(2.3:Intrastate)	(2.4:Cold War)	(2.5:Post-CW)
Neighbor Interstate Conflict with PKO	-0.0383 (0.0905)	0.181* (0.109)	-0.164 (0.125)	0.0890 (0.109)	-0.257 (0.255)
Neighbor Interstate Conflict without PKO	0.0889 (0.0589)	0.203** (0.0719)	0.0230 (0.0805)	0.0566 (0.0737)	0.312** (0.131)
Neighbor Intrastate Conflict with PKO	0.0294 (0.0526)	-0.0756 (0.0834)	0.0658 (0.0657)	-0.0769 (0.0793)	0.110 (0.0728)
Neighbor Intrastate Conflict without PKO	0.190** (0.0390)	0.143* (0.0743)	0.198** (0.0460)	0.185** (0.0473)	0.183** (0.0668)
Current PKO	0.0105 (0.0771)	0.232** (0.0999)	-0.0296 (0.0966)	0.145 (0.0889)	-0.143 (0.106)
Previous PKO	-0.110* (0.0511)	0.00627 (0.0887)	-0.122* (0.0568)	-0.0408 (0.0553)	-0.238** (0.0770)
Conflict History	0.111** (0.0132)	0.0898** (0.0119)	0.115** (0.0149)	0.106** (0.0283)	0.124** (0.0162)
Ongoing Conflict	-0.372** (0.0540)	-0.104 (0.0912)	-0.273** (0.0598)	-0.226** (0.0737)	-0.625** (0.0989)
Number of Neighbors	0.00631 (0.00762)	0.00651 (0.0138)	0.00224 (0.00998)	0.00623 (0.0107)	0.00591 (0.0101)
Peace Months	-0.00522** (0.00100)	-0.00349* (0.00153)	-0.00559** (0.00116)	-0.00376** (0.00147)	-0.00903** (0.00166)
<i>PeaceMonths</i> ²	1.81e-05** (4.38e-06)	9.85e-06 (7.11e-06)	2.04e-05** (5.07e-06)	1.50e-05* (8.59e-06)	3.51e-05** (7.12e-06)
<i>PeaceMonths</i> ³	-1.92e-08** (5.15e-09)	-9.86e-09 (8.60e-09)	-2.19e-08** (5.98e-09)	-2.22e-08 (1.36e-08)	-3.73e-08** (8.15e-09)
Constant	-2.431** (0.0660)	-2.964** (0.120)	-2.519** (0.0804)	-2.551** (0.0778)	-2.241** (0.109)
Observations	84695	84695	84695	54502	30193

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$ in a one-tail test



A) April – December 2004

B) April – December 2006

C) April – December 2008

Figure 1: ACLED Battle Events Involving Irregular Forces along the DRC Eastern Borders




Figure 2: Relative Risks of Armed Conflict Onset

8%	77%	8%
77%	55%	77%
8%	77%	8%

A) Without Peacekeeping

2%	13%	2%
13%	43%	13%
2%	13%	2%

B) With Peacekeeping

Figure 3: Changes in the Relative Risks of Armed Conflict in a Hypothetical System, during the Year after Armed Conflict in the Central State

Online Appendix: List of Peacekeeping Operations

State	Start	End	Operation
Greece	5-Jan-48	28-May-54	UNSCOB
Egypt	31-May-48	Ongoing	UNTSO
Syria	31-May-48	Ongoing	UNTSO
Lebanon	31-May-48	Ongoing	UNTSO
Jordan	31-May-48	Ongoing	UNTSO
Israel	31-May-48	Ongoing	UNTSO
Pakistan	1-Jan-49	Ongoing	UNMOGIP
India	1-Jan-49	Ongoing	UNMOGIP
South Korea	26-Jul-53	31-Dec-84	UN forces along the DMZ
Egypt	15-Nov-56	19-May-67	UNEF I
Lebanon	12-Jun-58	9-Dec-58	UNOGIL
DRC	16-Jul-60	30-Jun-64	ONUC
Kuwait	10-Sep-61	19-Feb-63	Arab League forces
Yemen	13-Jun-63	4-Sep-64	UNYOM
Saudi Arabia	4-Jul-63	4-Sep-64	UNYOM
Algeria	4-Nov-63	7-Jul-64	OAU observers
Morocco	4-Nov-63	7-Jul-64	OAU observers
Cyprus	13-Mar-64	Ongoing	UNFICYP
Tanzania	31-Mar-64	22-Sep-64	OAU Tanganyika deployment
Dominican Republic	14-May-65	31-Oct-66	DOMREP
Dominican Republic	23-May-65	31-Dec-65	IAPF
India	31-Oct-65	28-Feb-66	UNIPOM
Pakistan	31-Oct-65	28-Feb-66	UNIPOM
Honduras	18-Jul-69	30-Oct-80	OAS observers
El Salvador	18-Jul-69	30-Oct-80	OAS observers
Jordan	29-Sep-70	31-Dec-71	Arab League observers
South Yemen	31-Oct-72	31-Dec-72	Arab League peacekeepers
North Yemen	31-Oct-72	31-Dec-72	Arab League peacekeepers
Egypt	26-Oct-73	24-Jul-79	UNEF II
Israel	26-Oct-73	24-Jul-79	UNEF II
Syria	31-May-74	Ongoing	UNDOF
Lebanon	10-Jun-76	27-Jul-82	Arab Deterrent Force (AL)
Lebanon	22-Mar-78	Ongoing	UNIFIL
Chad	31-Mar-80	31-Dec-80	OAU peacekeepers
Chad	30-Nov-81	30-Jun-82	OAU peacekeepers
Egypt	10-Mar-82	Ongoing	MFO in Sinai
Afghanistan	16-May-88	15-Mar-90	UNGOMAP
Pakistan	16-May-88	15-Mar-90	UNGOMAP
Iraq	10-Aug-88	28-Feb-91	UNIMOG
Iran	10-Aug-88	28-Feb-91	UNIMOG
Angola	20-Dec-88	6-Jun-91	UNAVEM I
Namibia	16-Feb-89	21-Mar-90	UNTAG
El Salvador	1-Nov-89	31-Jan-92	ONUCA
Nicaragua	1-Nov-89	31-Jan-92	ONUCA
Costa Rica	1-Nov-89	31-Jan-92	ONUCA
Guatemala	1-Nov-89	31-Jan-92	ONUCA
Honduras	1-Nov-89	31-Jan-92	ONUCA
Liberia	23-Aug-90	21-Oct-99	ECOMOG
Rwanda	29-Mar-91	5-Oct-93	OAU observers
Iraq	3-Apr-91	30-Sep-03	UNIKOM
Kuwait	3-Apr-91	30-Sep-03	UNIKOM
Iraq	9-Apr-91	31-Dec-96	Operation Provide Comfort
Western Sahara	29-Apr-91	Ongoing	MINURSO
Angola	31-May-91	8-Feb-95	UNAVEM II
El Salvador	1-Jul-91	30-Apr-95	ONUSAL
Uganda	10-Jul-91	1-Nov-93	OAU peacekeepers
Cambodia	1-Oct-91	31-Mar-92	UNAMIC
Croatia	12-Jan-92	31-Mar-95	UNPROFOR
FRY/Serbia	12-Jan-92	31-Mar-95	UNPROFOR
Macedonia	12-Jan-92	31-Mar-95	UNPROFOR
Bosnia	12-Jan-92	31-Mar-95	UNPROFOR

State	Start	End	Operation
Cambodia	1-Feb-92	30-Sep-93	UNTAC
Somalia	24-Apr-92	9-Mar-93	UNOSOM
Tajikistan	7-Sep-92	16-Nov-92	CIS peacekeepers
Croatia	1-Feb-96	31-Dec-02	UNMOP
FRY/Serbia	1-Feb-96	31-Dec-02	UNMOP
Mozambique	6-Dec-92	15-Dec-94	ONUMOZ
Somalia	31-Mar-93	31-Mar-95	UNOSOM II
Rwanda	22-Jun-93	21-Sep-94	UNOMUR
Uganda	22-Jun-93	21-Sep-94	UNOMUR
Georgia	24-Aug-93	15-Jun-09	UNOMIG
Haiti	1-Sep-93	3-Jun-96	UNMIH
Liberia	22-Sep-93	30-Sep-97	UNOMIL
Rwanda	5-Oct-93	8-Mar-96	UNAMIR
Chad	4-May-94	13-Jun-94	UNASOG
Haiti	3-Oct-94	31-Mar-95	Operation Uphold Democracy
Papua New Guinea	8-Oct-94	19-Oct-94	SPPKF
Tajikistan	4-Dec-94	15-May-00	UNMOT
Angola	1-Feb-95	30-Jun-97	UNAVEM III
Macedonia	31-Mar-95	28-Feb-99	UNPREDEP
Croatia	31-Mar-95	15-Jan-96	UNCRO
Bosnia	20-Dec-95	31-Dec-02	UNMIBH
Bosnia	20-Dec-95	20-Dec-96	IFOR
Croatia	15-Jan-96	15-Jan-98	UNTAES
Haiti	1-Jul-96	31-Jul-97	UNSMIH
Bosnia	20-Dec-96	Ongoing	SFOR/EUFOR
Guatemala	1-Jan-97	31-May-97	MINUGUA
Central African Republic	8-Feb-97	15-Apr-98	MISAB
Albania	11-Apr-97	11-Aug-97	Operation Alba
Sierra Leone	29-May-97	4-Apr-00	ECOMOG
Angola	30-Jun-97	26-Feb-99	MONUA
Haiti	1-Aug-97	30-Nov-97	UNTMIH
Papua New Guinea	17-Nov-97	30-Apr-98	Bougainville Truce Monitoring Group
Croatia	16-Jan-98	15-Oct-98	UNPSG
Central African Republic	15-Apr-98	15-Feb-00	MINURCA
Papua New Guinea	30-Apr-98	30-Jun-03	Bougainville Peace Monitoring Group
Sierra Leone	13-Jul-98	31-Dec-05	UNOMSIL
Lesotho	22-Sep-98	15-May-99	Operation Boleas (SADC)
Guinea-Bissau	28-Dec-98	7-Jun-99	ECOMOG
Albania	11-Apr-99	1-Sep-99	Operation Allied Harbor (NATO)
FRY/Serbia	11-Jun-99	Ongoing	KFOR
DRC	31-Aug-99	Ongoing	MONUC
East Timor	25-Oct-99	20-May-02	UNTAET
Haiti	1-Dec-97	15-Mar-00	MIPONUH
Ethiopia	31-Jul-00	31-Jul-08	UNMEE
Central African Republic	30-May-01	31-Dec-02	COMESSA peacekeepers
Macedonia	17-Aug-01	31-Mar-03	NATO peacekeepers
Afghanistan	20-Dec-01	Ongoing	ISAF
East Timor	20-May-02	20-May-05	UNMISSET
Cote d'Ivoire	17-Nov-02	5-Apr-04	ECOMOG observers
Central African Republic	4-Dec-02	Ongoing	FOMAC/MICOPAX (CEMAC)
Macedonia	31-Mar-03	15-Dec-03	EUFOR Concordia
Burundi	27-Apr-03	1-Jun-04	AMIB (AU)
DRC	6-Jun-03	1-Sep-03	Operation Artemis (EU)
Cote d'Ivoire	23-Jun-03	4-Apr-04	MINUCI
Solomon Islands	24-Jul-03	Ongoing	RAMSI
Liberia	4-Aug-03	1-Oct-03	ECOMIC
Liberia	19-Sep-03	Ongoing	UNMIL
Cote d'Ivoire	5-Apr-04	Ongoing	UNOCI
Sudan	8-May-04	Ongoing	AU peacekeepers/UNAMID
Burundi	1-Jun-04	31-Dec-06	ONUB
Haiti	1-Jun-04	Ongoing	MINUSTAH
Sudan	27-Apr-05	Ongoing	UNMIS