

# **Analyzing regional security governance: The example of the Organization of American States**

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## Abstract

This paper aims at a systematic assessment of security governance and conflict resolution efforts by regional security organizations, and exemplifies the analytical tools it proposes through the case of the Organization of American States (OAS) and other institutions belonging to the inter-American security system. In the theoretical part, a comprehensive list of mechanisms of security governance provided by international organizations will be presented, and it will be discussed why not all regional security organizations dispose of all of those mechanisms. Drawing on the literature on policy processes in international organizations, the paper will then develop analytical categories for the assessment of security governance by regional security organizations. The empirical part looks at the changing form and role of the inter-American security system in the light of these analytical categories. A special emphasis will be laid on the definition and mechanisms of conflict resolution that prevailed in each of the phases of the organization's evolution. The concluding section highlights the characteristic features of the OAS in terms of security governance.

## **I. Introduction**

When looking at security governance by international institutions, introductory books on international organizations focus almost exclusively on the United Nations (cf. Karns & Mingst 2004; Rittberger & Zangl 2006). Chapters in introductory volumes that deal with regional security usually focus on European examples such as the OSCE and NATO (cf. Pease 2008). Accordingly, when exploring conflict resolution mechanisms, the focus is on UN activities in accordance with Chapters VI and VII of the UN, whereas the assessment of conflict resolution mechanisms provided by regional organizations remains anecdotic.

This paper strives toward a systematic assessment of security governance and conflict resolution efforts by regional security organizations, and will exemplify the analytical tools it proposes through the case of the Organization of American States and other institutions belonging to the inter-American security system. First, a comprehensive list of mechanisms of security governance provided by international organizations will be presented. In the subsequent chapter, it will be discussed why not all regional security organizations dispose of all of these mechanisms. Drawing on the literature on policy processes in international organizations the paper will then develop analytical categories for the assessment of security governance by regional security organizations. The next part looks at the changing form and role of the inter-American security system in the light of these analytical categories. A special emphasis will be put on the definition and mechanisms of conflict resolution that prevailed in each of the phases of the organization's evolution. This leads to the concluding section, which highlights the characteristic features of the OAS in terms of conflict resolution, and undertakes some preliminary reflections on the evaluation criteria for regional security governance.

## **II. Mechanisms of security governance by international organizations**

The following categorization of what international governmental organizations (IGOs) contribute to the search for peace and security draws on lists of mechanisms of security governance presented in the literature on international organizations (see, for example, Karns & Mingst 2004: chapter 8; Rittberger & Zangl 2006: chapter 8) but expands and partly rearranges them.

### *1. Consensual security: Mechanisms for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes*

As early as 1899 and 1908, the Hague conferences produced the Conventions for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, laying the foundations for mechanisms still in use today. They established the international community's stake in preventing war and therefore created mechanisms for third-party roles variously labeled good offices, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, adjudication, and arbitration that were later incorporated into the League of Nations Covenant, into Chapter VI of the UN Charter, as well as into the policy program and/or practice of regional security organizations. The standard current variants of mechanisms for the peaceful settlement of disputes include preventive diplomacy, good offices, investigations, mediation, adjudication and arbitration.

As former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali put it in his „Agenda for Peace“, published in 1992, „Preventive diplomacy is action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur“ (Boutros-Ghali 1992). In most cases, it takes the form of diplomatic efforts, sometimes coupled with economic sanctions or arms embargoes or the threat thereof. Preventive diplomacy is intended to change the calculus of parties regarding the purposes to be served by political violence and to deter them from choosing to escalate the

level of conflict. This is far easier to achieve early in a conflict, before the level of violence grows. Hence, successful preventive diplomacy depends upon its timeliness.

The good offices technique is practiced by the UN and by regional organizations, too. Usually, the Secretary General of the IGO offers communication channels for the disputing parties, which enables them to speak to each other without officially entering into negotiations. An IGO might also offer to carry out investigations. A commission of inquiry is then formed and sent to the countries involved in the dispute to clarify the situation. Mediation is a mode of official negotiation in which a third party helps the parties find a solution which they cannot find by themselves (Zartman & Touval 1996: 446). It is a political process that may involve persuading the parties to accept mediation in the first place or include multiple mediators over time, for different phases of a conflict and search for settlement. Mediators can come from a single state or group of states, an IGO or NGO; they may be individuals, or an ad hoc group.

Adjudication and arbitration involve referring a dispute to an impartial third-party tribunal for a binding decision. In contrast to preventive diplomacy and mediation, these methods seek to find a basis for settlement in international law rather than in a political/diplomatic process. However, they can be used only when states give their consent to submit a dispute and be bound by the outcome. Arbitration panels are usually selected ad hoc out of a list of potential international arbitrators (lawyers, judges, diplomats, academics or former government officials) and can be composed of a single neutral individual or a panel of several individuals. Adjudication, in turn, is carried out by the International Court of Justice or other international courts.

## *2. Collective Security: Enforcement and Sanctions*

Collective security is based on the conviction that peace is indivisible, that all states have a collective interest in countering aggression and that potential aggressors will be deterred by the united threat of counterforce mobilized through an international organization. If enforcement is required, however, then a wide range of economic and diplomatic sanctions as well as armed force may be utilized. Collective security comprising political, diplomatic, economic and military measures is not directed against a specific country or group of countries outside the organization which are identified as posing a threat, but is appropriate for maintaining order among member states (Claude Jr. 1970: 245-285; Weiss 1993; Alagappa 1997: 427).

## *3. Between consensual and collective security: Peacekeeping*

Peacekeeping was the major innovative approach to promoting peace and security during the Cold War that enabled the UN to play a positive role in dealing with conflicts at a time when hostility between East and West prevented the use of the Charter provisions for collective security and enforcement. Peacekeeping originally was a measure under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, since the inception of a peacekeeping operation required the consent of the target country. However, as peacekeeping is not explicitly mentioned in the UN Charter, it lies in a “grey area” between the peaceful settlement provisions of Chapter VI and the military enforcement provisions of Chapter VII and is sometimes referred to as “Chapter VI and a half”. The tasks of traditional peacekeeping missions during the Cold War era were observation and monitoring, the supervision of adherence to ceasefires and the separation of combatant forces, f.ex. by means of establishment of buffer zones. Since the Cold War’s end, peacekeeping operations have taken different forms (cf. Karns & Mingst 2004: 306-327; Rittberger & Zangl 2006; Gareis & Varwick 2006). The so-called “robust peacekeeping” involves greater use of force and, often, an absence of parties’ consent, and combines efforts to enforce an end to violence with humanitarian assistance and measures to rebuild a viable state. Complex peace missions are designed to implement a peace agreement and build

conditions for stable, long-term peace. For that purpose, they take substantial political and administrative responsibility, to the point of providing interim civil administration.

Although peacekeeping as long-term deployment of military and/or civil personnel is currently a domain of the United Nations, some regional organizations also carry out observation and monitoring activities to help restore peace and security in areas of recent conflict. These international investigation or verification missions are typically formed some time after an agreement has been negotiated and aim at verifying the compliance of the dispute parties with the agreement.

#### *4. Cooperative security: Addressing risks*

Another variant of conflict prevention is the concept of cooperative security. Cooperative security relies on information exchange, transparency and communication by means of collaboration in international organizations. It is usually applied when there is no concrete threat to address. There might be latent risks of conflict, for example due to long-standing rivalry relationships between states (fueled by the quest for a predominant position in the region, ideological differences, territorial issues or access to resources) that, however, in themselves do not suffice to trigger war. Cooperative security encompasses confidence-building measures to mitigate latent tensions and rivalries. Confidence and security-building measures are agreed military or non-military measures to enhance mutual understanding, convey non-hostile intentions, define acceptable norms and behavior and allay excessive fears and suspicions. Hence, they are “reciprocated measures that reduce the potential for military surprise” (Gottwald, Hasenclever & Kamis 2009). The instability of political regimes constitutes another risk that might be addressed by a cooperative security strategy. This approach therefore also includes instruments that promote democracy and the respect for human rights and contribute to state-building, the establishment of the rule of law and the reorganization of civil-military relations in former dictatorships.

#### *5. Arms Control and disarmament*

The subject of limiting, controlling, and reducing the weapons for waging war has been established permanently on the agendas of the UN as well as regional security organizations. The main tasks in this area are limiting proliferation of nuclear weapon capability, the prohibition of chemical and biological weapons, banning landmines, and the monitoring and controlling of conventional weapons acquisitions and military expenditure. IGOs not only produce treaties and conventions, but also establish safeguard systems of inspections and collect information on military spending and armament of their member states (cf. Karns & Mingst 2004: 327-336; Rittberger & Zangl 2006).

#### *6. Countering new threats to security*

In addition to challenges to international security, such as territorial and boundary disputes, international organizations in the security realm increasingly have to deal with new challenges, such as terrorism, organized crime (drugs, arms trade, contraband, human smuggling etc.), guerrillas and insurgencies, illegal migration and natural and manmade disasters. Although terrorism is an old threat to individual and state security, the emergence of transnational terrorist networks such as Al-Qaeda and the potential scenario of terrorist groups obtaining control of weapons of mass destruction has converted it more than before into a threat to international peace and security. These threats are “intermestic”, which means that they challenge international and domestic security at the same time and cannot clearly be assigned to either the military or the internal security forces.

### III. Types of security organizations

The above discussion of the measures of security governance has shown that it is difficult to generalize across security organizations. Whereas some of them fulfill all the functions and address all the challenges outlined above, other organizations restrict themselves to using only some of those measures. To determine why this is the case, distinctions between different types of security organizations have to be made. One common criterion of classification of IGOs is membership, which can be universal or restricted. While membership of those latter organizations can be limited by many criteria, such as geography, economy, or culture, the most common restricted type are regional organizations that include countries from a particular geographic region only.<sup>1</sup>

Most regional security organizations don't offer all the pieces of security governance outlined above. The UN is unique as an organization with global membership assuming responsibility for world peace. The principal aim of the United Nations is "to maintain international peace and security" (Article 1 of the UN Charter). For the first time in history, the UN Charter lays down a general ban on the threat or use of force between states and obliges all members to settle their international disputes by peaceful means. It also establishes a system of collective security with the Security Council as a powerful organ to identify "threats to peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression" (Chapter VII UN Charter) and set in motion enforcement measures against the states that neglect their duties.

Regional organizations are particularly weak in the area of collective security and also in the area of peacekeeping, which, as mentioned above, is in fact a creation of the UN. However, regional organizations are explicitly recognized in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. Their security roles are supposed to complement the UN, providing alternative avenues for peaceful settlement of local disputes or for enforcement action. According to Article 53 of the UN Charter, regional organizations are subordinate to the UN, as „No enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council“. By recognizing regional agreements in the security field, the founders of the UN hoped to establish an international division of labor and ease the burden of the Security Council. Drawing on their familiarity with the regional and local conditions, conflicts should be solved by peaceful conflict resolution mechanisms of regional organizations before bringing them before the Security Council (cf. Gareis & Varwick 2006: 111-112). On the other hand, the closeness to the conflict can also be a disadvantage. Conflict parties might prefer interference of neutral external actors that don't have their own interests in the conflict region and are not aligned (or suspected to be aligned) with one of the conflict parties. During the Cold War, only in a few instances regional organizations complemented the UN's effort, for example ASEAN when it spearheaded activities to isolate Vietnam for its 1978 invasion and occupation of Cambodia and searched for a diplomatic settlement (cf. Karns and Mingst 2004: 315).

After the end of the Cold War, the importance of regional organizations increased (Karns & Mingst 2004: 143). Boutros-Ghali's „Agenda for Peace“ contains a chapter on regional organizations, stating that they have important contributions to make (Boutros-Ghali 1992), and a more detailed division of labor is set out in his 1995 „Supplement to An Agenda for Peace“ (Boutros-Ghali 1995). In fact, regional organizations took a decisive role in some situations, f.ex. the ECOWAS intervention in the Liberian and Sierra Leonean civil wars (cf. Karns and Mingst 2004: 204-205).

The important question in relations between the UN and regional security organizations is to clarify the responsibility of each level, the flow of information, and the rules of

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<sup>1</sup> For a list of regional security organizations, see Dembinski, Freistein and Weiffen 2006: 49-52.

accountability. According to Alagappa (1997: 437), “regional institutions... should take the lead in conflict prevention, while the UN or other actors may be better able to take the lead in the other stages of conflict management.” Barnett (1995) refers to regional organizations as having a comparative advantage over the UN at the earliest stage of the peace operations process, i.e. peace-making, while their actions are less promising in peace-keeping and peace-enforcement. In contrast, authors such as Stadtmüller (2005: 116) argue that this functional division of labor should be modified for specific cases, as apparently the role of regional organizations is increasing also in the other stages of conflict management, especially when the major powers in the region are included in the regional organization and are ready to act. The UN has to play its role as a coordinator, but also has to share its burdens with regional institutions located closer to the conflict. Enthusiasts even advocate the admission of purely regional authorization of enforcement mechanisms, without the involvement of the UN Security Council (Kühne 2000: 307-318). More moderate observers, however, fear that such procedures would undermine the UN’s authority in its core sphere of responsibility and would lead to confusion and chaos (Mutz 1998). Currently, regional organizations are still subordinate to the UN. They sometimes complement the UN’s efforts or execute decisions taken by the UN Security Council, but do not by themselves offer the full range of security governance measures.

Apart from this division between global and regional security organizations, there are also other criteria determining that not all security organizations are the same. Wallander and Keohane (1999) developed a typology of security institutions based on three dimensions: degree of institutionalization, the situation the state is facing, and participation criteria. With respect to the latter, coalitions can involve all states that could pose threats or risks, or can deliberately exclude some of them. A coalition is facing a threat when there are actors that have the capabilities to harm the security of others and are perceived by their potential targets as willing to do so. In that case, the institution’s norms, rules and procedures enable the members to identify threats and retaliate effectively against them. In turn, when states are facing risks, no threat exists, because the states do not have the intention or the capability to harm the security of others. In that situation, the norms, rules and procedures of the institution enable members to obtain information and to manage disputes in order to avoid generating security dilemmas. When looking only at highly institutionalized security coalitions, three types of institutions can be distinguished (Haftendorn 1997; Peters 1997):

- Collective defense arrangements or alliances deter and defend against common external threats by a pact of mutual military assistance between the member states.
- Collective security arrangements are inclusive security coalitions that deal with threats among members. The aim is to integrate a potential aggressor into the system of norms and rules of the institution. Noncompliance with the rules is punished by means of collective military enforcement measures.
- Cooperative security arrangements/security management institutions enable the member states to cooperate in order to deal with a rather undefined risk inside or outside the coalition and the states that constitute it. The aim is the promotion of peaceful change based on agreed-upon norms, rules and procedures.

Depending on what type of security organizations we are dealing with, the term “conflict management” has different implications. In organizations which are facing a threat, either from outside or from a potential aggressor inside, conflict management usually relates to interstate conflict and war, although a collective security system may also deal with civil wars in its member states when they affect or pose a threat to other states. In cooperative security arrangements “conflict management” means confidence building between rivals and managing the risk of political instability.

## **IV. Analyzing international security governance – A toolbox**

Drawing on the literature on policy processes in international organizations (see f.ex. Rittberger & Zangl 2003; Reinalda & Verbeek 2004; 2006), this chapter introduces analytical categories for the assessment of security governance by regional organizations. This analysis intends to concentrate on the output dimension of the organizations, i.e. what kind of legal framework and which administrative measures to implement those norms and rules they produce. It focuses on what the particular contribution of regional organizations to peace and security governance can be and how their efforts concur or collide with the policies of other, overlapping regional security arrangements and the United Nations.

In turn, the analytical framework presented does not systematically measure the outcome, i.e. the effect of the measures on state behavior, nor does it analyze the impact of regional organizations' policies, i.e. their immediate or medium-term problem-solving capacity and their effect on the wider socio-economic environment.<sup>2</sup>

### ***1. Output of regional security organizations***

#### *1.1. Type of output*

What do regional security organizations produce? When looking at the output of international organizations, it is common to differentiate between policy programs, operational activities and information activities which accompany both program and operational decision-making (cf. Rittberger & Zangl 2006).

**Policy programs:** Policy programs are sets of norms and rules. The policy program output of international organizations consists of treaties, declarations, and resolutions – in other words, the legal framework they provide to guide the behavior of their member states and the interaction between member states and the international organization itself.

**Operational activities:** Implementing the policy programs is another important activity of international organizations. That is why a large part of the output takes an operational form. When a policy program has been designed and norms and rules have been formulated, the next logical step is to think about implementation by means of mechanisms and specialized organizations, by monitoring the compliance of member states and setting up norm enforcement mechanisms to be activated in case of non-compliance.

Rittberger and Zangl (2006: 106-112) differentiate five types of operational activities:

- specification and concretization of the norms and rules of policy programs
- their active implementation through the international organization itself
- monitoring of their implementation by member states
- adjudication in cases of disputes about member states' non-compliance
- imposition of sanctions in case of non-compliance

**Information activities:** The third type of output is information activities. These activities are specific insofar as they have an impact on both program decisions and operational decisions. International organizations act as agencies for collecting and publishing information relevant to their mission. Some international organizations independently generate information and knowledge, for example by funding research projects, requesting research from scientific

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<sup>2</sup> For the distinction between output, outcome and impact, see Börzel and Risse 2002.

institutes or coordinating research activities of member states. Additionally, international organizations function as a forum for the exchange of information about the subject the organization is concerned with and offer the member states the opportunity to get to know the perceptions and positions of other states.

### *1.2. Origination*

In addition to a mere survey of the output of regional security organizations, it is also interesting to identify the origin of program decisions and operations decisions. This implies looking at which actors pushed forward the issue, what motivated those actors, which points of view and demands other actors had with respect to the policies in question, and how the decision-making process in the international organization worked. In the terminology of Rittberger and Zangl (2006) on policy-making in international organizations, assessing the origination of regional security governance outputs requires to look at the “input dimension”, i.e. different actors’ demands and support, as well as on the “conversion process” within an international organization.

Most of the demands as well as support for certain policies originate from the member states of each organization. Through their financial contributions and their supply of information and personnel they provide the support which enables regional security organizations to broach their tasks. The influence a state can exert in a given issue area often depends on its control over resources specific to that issue area. Hence, in regional security organizations, internal distribution of power between member states is very much determined by the balance or imbalance of their military (and also economic) resources, so that power dynamics varies between cooperative and hegemonic.

While representatives of member states provide the majority of inputs into international organizations, the various organs of international organizations themselves, especially the administrative staff, can exert considerable influence on the input side of policy-making (Jacobson 1984). The influence of the administrative staff stems mainly from their location at the center of the policy-making process. As a result, they have an information advantage over representatives of member states. Their central position enables them to act as an agenda setter and influence the issues to be dealt with during the meetings of the representatives of the member states.

Although not as relevant in the field of security as in other policy areas, interest groups, especially NGOs, are also a source of inputs. NGOs have an interest in getting access through either formal or informal channels, but likewise, international organizations also benefit from the information and expertise of NGOs. As the policies of regional security organizations have to respond to increasingly complex problems such as the new security threats, the advice of experts has a growing importance for their policy-making. Hence, communities of experts giving advice are another important actor.

## ***2. Evaluation of the output of regional security organizations***

### *2.1. Evaluating policy programs*

When evaluating policy programs in the field of security cooperation, it is important to look at their binding nature (Abbott et al. 2000; Rittberger & Zangl 2006: 104-105). Although the degree of legal obligation does not necessarily correlate with the level of member states’ compliance, it certainly remains an important characteristic of the norms and rules whether they contain legally binding obligations or are simply political recommendations. Whereas resolutions of the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter are immediately binding, resolutions and declarations of the UN General Assembly and the plenary organs of

regional organizations merely have the character of recommendations. They may be of a highly symbolic value, though (as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, both signed in 1948). International conventions, treaties and agreements, in turn, are intended to become legally binding on member states. This usually requires the ratification by the states who are party to the treaty, convention or agreement.

Apart from the binding nature, policy programs can be differentiated according to the effects their norms and rules are intended to have. In accordance with the different types of security organizations, the question is whether the policy program intends to solve internal cooperation and coordination problems and regulate the interactions among the member states or whether it is outlining the external actions of the organization and directed towards an outside addressee (Haftendorn 1997). In other words, the question is whether, according to the intention of its policy program, we are dealing with a collective defense, a collective security or a cooperative security/security management organization.

## *2.2. Evaluating operational activities*

When evaluating the operational activities of regional security organizations, it is obvious that they usually do not have to exclusive right to deal with the issue in question. On the one hand, regional security arrangements often overlap. This is most obvious in the case of Europe, where different subsets of states belong to OSCE, NATO, EU and WEU (cf. Karns and Mingst 2004: 154). But also in the Americas, the OAS as hemispheric security organizations is complemented by regional arrangements such as the Andean Community and MERCOSUR which are multi-purpose organizations dealing with security and defense among other issues, or the Contadora/Rio Group, which was founded to address a specific security problem in the region.

Moreover, as already discussed above, regional security organizations are to a certain degree subordinate to the United Nations. The UN Charter specifies how regional organizations could act as subsidiary actors. On the one hand, regional arrangements make efforts to achieve pacific settlements of disputes before referring them to the Security Council. They keep the Security Council informed of their activities and must not take enforcement measures without the authorization from the Security Council. However, the existence of a regional arrangement does not impair the opportunity of any member of the United Nations to bring disputes to the attention of the Security Council (in accordance with Article 35 (1) of the UN Charter), the possibility of non-members of the UN to bring to the attention of the Security Council or the General Assembly any dispute to which it is a party (in accordance with Article 35 (2) of the UN Charter), or the possibility of the Security Council itself to investigate any dispute or situation that might lead to international frictions or disputes (in accordance with Article 34 of the UN Charter). If regional organizations are unable to solve the problem, they can still ask the Security Council to take care of it. On the other hand, the Security Council, when appropriate, utilizes regional arrangements for enforcement action under its authority (in accordance with Article 53 of the UN Charter) or relies on regional arrangements to take over and carry on with a peacekeeping mission.

Whereas those are all variants of cooperative action between regional organizations and the UN, there are also situations where it turns out that a regional security organization is unable or unwilling to become active in pacific dispute resolution and peacekeeping. In that case, the issue is taken out of the regional organization's hand, and the UN or other regional arrangements have to take charge of it.

Hence, an evaluation of security governance by regional security organizations has to gauge what degree of autonomy they have, to what degree they cooperate with other IGOs or whether they even have to be completely substituted.

## **V. The case of the Organization of American States**

Guided by the analytical categories outlined above, this chapter will take a look at the changing form and role of the inter-American security system. The OAS is an interesting case as, in the terminology of Wallander and Keohane (1999), it intended to address both risks and threats originating both from within and from outside the hemisphere. It is also interesting because, during the Cold War era, it was frequently regarded as passive and ineffective – mainly due to the hegemonic position of the United States and the Cold War dynamics that set the fight against communism on top of the United States' foreign policy agenda. Although the power asymmetry between the United States and the rest of the hemisphere in terms of economic and military resources persisted after the end of the Cold War, the OAS was revitalized – above all, in the policy area of security.

Drawing on the tools for analyzing international security governance, the subsequent assessment of the inter-American security system's trajectory will center on the following questions:

- Type of output: what type of output did the OAS and related security arrangements produce in the Cold War era, after the Cold War and in the new millennium?
- Origination: With respect to origination, it is particularly interesting to look at the power dynamics between the United States and Latin American countries. To what degree was the hegemonic power able to impose its interests?
- Evaluation of policy program: What were the principal tasks of the OAS?
- Evaluation of operational decisions: In what instances did the OAS cooperate with other IGOs and when did it have to be substituted?

### ***1. Between Hegemony and Agony: Security Governance in the Americas during the Cold War***

#### ***1.1. Policy program***

The Organization of American States dates back to the nineteenth century. In 1889, the first of nine International Conferences of American States (including the United States) created the International Union of American Republics, which was renamed the Pan American Union in 1910. The last of those conferences in 1948 produced the Organization of American States (OAS). The OAS was intended as the primary forum for inter-American cooperation. In Article 2, the OAS Charter affirms that one of the central purposes of the organization is "to strengthen the peace and security of the continent", and conflict resolution was among its fundamental goals. Chapter V of the OAS Charter envisions the creation of means for pacific settlement of disputes, and according to Chapter VI, the organization defines itself as a system of collective security.

Additionally, as a direct consequence of World War II, several treaties and conventions related to hemispheric security were issued for which the OAS is depositary. In 1945, at the Inter-American Conference on the Problems of War and Peace, held in Mexico City, representatives of 20 countries adopted the Act of Chapultepec, which called for the region to respond collectively to aggression against any American state. Two years later, this concept took form in the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance signed in Rio de Janeiro (Rio Treaty). The Rio Treaty created an arrangement of regional collective defense. Its task was to deal with military actions or aggression initiating from outside the region, and also with conflicts between two or more American states. However, the collective defense

arrangement was much less institutionalized than NATO, because the Latin American governments refused to accept joint command of military forces or any binding obligation to use force without their explicit consent. The Rio Treaty had already been signed before the foundation of the OAS, but was incorporated into the OAS Charter as security instrument, applicable to the states that ratified it. It was amended in 1975, but this reform protocol never became effective due to lack of ratifications.

Another instrument designed to regulate conflicts between American states was the American Treaty on Pacific Settlement, which was signed in Bogotá in 1948. It delineated formal mechanisms of conflict resolution (Kurtenbach 2000, 2002b). The Latin American Nuclear Free Weapon Zone, established by the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco, dates back to the 1962 Cuban missile crisis and the sense of alarm created among states of the region that a superpower nuclear confrontation might occur on their soil.

### *1.2. Operational activities*

The Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs is an OAS organ designed to consider problems of an urgent nature (Article 61 OAS Charter). It does not meet on a regular basis, but can be convoked upon request of any member state to deal with problems such as an armed attack on the territory of an American state (Stoetzer 1993: 167). The most recent meetings of this kind took place after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, and in reaction to the incursion by Colombian military forces and police personnel into the territory of Ecuador in March 2008.

According to the OAS Charter, the Permanent Council and the Secretary General have the mandate to monitor and assist in the peaceful settlement of disputes. Any party to a dispute may resort to the Permanent Council to obtain its “good offices” (Art. 85 OAS Charter), which can be delegated in the Secretary General. Beyond that, the OAS Charter did not specify any measures and procedures to adopt in case of an aggression, and most of the time, the organization was unable to respond to the ongoing conflicts in Central America and the frequent U.S. interventions in its “backyard”. During the Cold War, the OAS was even perceived as an instrument consolidating U.S. hegemonic status. In some cases, the U.S. referred to the principle of non-intervention in order to legitimize their activities, arguing that they were defending the target state’s sovereignty against the intrusion of international communism (Brock 1978). As the Cold War deepened, U.S. security concerns and the desire to fight communism overshadowed all other foreign policy goals. In fact, in several instances, the U.S. government backed clearly anti-communist authoritarian regimes in the region and hindered or even abolished democracy (Shaw 2007). Hence, the strategic framework of the Cold War consisted in the perception of a threat outside the hemisphere and the monopoly of the U.S. government in defining and identifying the enemy. That is why, after repeated instrumentalization by the U.S., the OAS was regarded as politically irrelevant and entered into a long phase of agony during the 1970s and 1980s (Frohmann 1995).

The Rio Treaty suffered the same fate. Whenever an external threat occurred and the Treaty was invoked, the invocation merely consisted in declarations of solidarity, but never led to common action. Several incidents, like the United States’ active participation in the 1954 overthrow of the Guatemalan government and its 1962 Santo Domingo invasion, have undermined its credibility as a security instrument (Fontana 2001: 42). At the same time, the mechanisms of conflict resolution which had been outlined by the American Treaty on Pacific Settlement, signed in Bogotá in 1948, have never been applied up to now (Kurtenbach 2000, 2002b).

Other hemispheric security institutions include the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB) and the Inter-American Defense College. The IADB was founded in 1942 with the purpose of coordinating the defense of the Americas during the Second World War. It is based in

Washington D.C. and according to its statutes, conducted by a military representative of the United States. In contrast to the Rio Treaty, it had not been incorporated in the OAS structure when the OAS was founded. For a long time, the IADB hardly had any significance, as the member states did not want to equip it with operational capacity. Some OAS member states are not even members of the IADB, either because they do not have a military (as Costa Rica and some Caribbean states) or because the IADB was not considered as useful.

The Treaty of Tlatelolco created the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Organismo para la Proscripción de las Armas Nucleares en América Latina - OPANAL) to ensure that the obligations of the Treaty are met. However, at that point the Nuclear Free Zone did not encompass the entire Latin American continent, since Argentina and Brazil were pursuing domestic nuclear programs and therefore did not ratify the Treaty (Davies 2004: 57-58).

## ***2. Vitalization in the 1990s? Security Governance in the Americas after the Cold War***

### ***2.1. Output***

The scenario after the Cold War made a redefinition of the concept of regional security necessary (Hurrell 1998b; Sennes, Onuki & Oliveira 2004). Anti-communism no longer served as a guiding principle. However, there were still traditional security threats that had to be addressed. While interstate war was a remarkably rare event in Latin America throughout the 20<sup>th</sup> century, there have nevertheless been a number of militarized interstate disputes or more subtle strategic or enduring rivalries resulting from undefined terrestrial and maritime border lines, conflicts about resources or competition for regional predominance (Grabendorff 1982; Child 1985; Mares 2001). On the other hand, challenges to regional security increasingly arise from problems like international crime, migration and environmental degradation. Additionally, in the course of democratization in the region, security was redefined as collective defense of democracy and the improvement of civil-military relations, both of which are supposed to guarantee stability (for a discussion on the reform of civil-military relations after military rule in Latin America, see f.ex. Millett & Gold-Biss 1996; Fitch 1998; Mares 1998).

#### ***2.1.1. Policy program***

The 1991 meeting of the OAS General Assembly in Santiago, Chile is considered a turning point in regional relations (Fontana 2001:42). At this meeting, the OAS member states committed to the renewal of the Inter-American security system under the changed conceptual and political context after the end of the Cold War. During the 1990s, reforms of the existing legal instruments and institutions were enacted or at least envisioned, and several new legal instruments and institutions were created within and outside the framework of the OAS.

Important arms control instruments created in the framework of the OAS during the 1990s included the Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and other Related Materials, adopted in 1997, and the Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisition. The latter convention was adopted in 1999. Its stated objective is to contribute to regional openness and transparency in the acquisition of conventional weapons by exchanging information regarding such acquisitions for the purpose of promoting confidence among the states in the Americas (Goldblat 2003: 235). Additionally, the extension of the Nuclear Free Zone to entire Latin America was realized in 1994, after Argentina and Brazil had finally refrained from their domestic nuclear programs and ratified or dropped their reservations regarding the Tlatelolco Treaty (Davies 2004: 57-58).

A frequently discussed topic was the future of the Rio Treaty. According to observers from some member states, this collective security arrangement has been largely inactive and is outdated and obsolete. However, from the perspective of some other states, among them the U.S., the Rio Treaty is a useful tool and should stay in force (cf. Radseck 2005). Hence, as far as this Treaty is concerned, no reform attempts were made during the 1990s. At the same time, there was a recurrent discussion whether the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB) and the Inter-American Defense College were still needed. Some countries considered the IADB an exercise in military diplomacy relatively isolated from other dimensions of diplomacy which acted according to an outdated Cold War rationale. Others, like Argentina and Canada, proposed to integrate it into the OAS structure in order to turn it into a useful tool for peace and security (Escudé & Fontana 1998: 59-60).

Confidence and security building measures (CSBMs) became an increasingly important topic within the OAS. To begin with, the objective of confidence-building measures is to contribute to the reduction, or in some cases, the elimination of the causes of distrust, tensions, and hostilities. Hence, confidence-building measures are the main tool to move from the logic of confrontation to the logic of cooperation (Donadio & Tibiletti 1998: 108; Rojas Aravena 1998: 136). Furthermore, confidence-building is related to democratization: Confidence-building measures are useful devices to manage civil-military relations in countries that, after a period of military rule, are still in the process of consolidating democratic institutions (Diamint 2000). Since 1992, the General Assembly passed resolutions encouraging the OAS members to carry out diverse types of CSBMs and to share information on the implemented measures with the other member states. Due to their own experiences with these measures, Argentina, Chile and Brazil took the lead in promoting the topic.

Besides the security mechanisms properly spoken, instruments designed for the promotion of democracy can also be interpreted as means for conflict prevention and therefore as parts of the security system (Kreimer 2003; Milet 2004; Ramírez 2004: 112; Soto 2004). Especially after the termination of civil wars, conflict mediation and peacekeeping can hardly be separated from measures destined to establish and stabilize representative democracies (Muñoz 1998: 14). The Santiago Commitment to Democracy and the Renewal of the Inter-American System, adopted at the OAS General Assembly in Santiago in June 1991, emphasized the member states' "inescapable commitment" to the defense of democracy in the region, and the accompanying Resolution 1080 sets up procedures of collective action in the case of a "sudden or irregular interruption of the democratic political institutional process or of the legitimate exercise of power by the democratically elected government" in a member state. The Protocol of Washington, which was adopted at the Sixteenth Special Session of the General Assembly in 1992 and entered into force in 1999, added a new article to the OAS Charter which grants the organization the authority to suspend a member state whose democratically constituted government has been overthrown by force (Gosselin & Thérien 1999: 179-180; Kreimer 2003: 258; Boniface 2007).

Some steps to deepen security cooperation in the Western Hemisphere were taken outside the OAS framework. In 1994, U.S. President Bill Clinton invited all presidents and prime ministers of the Americas to the first Summit of the Americas which took place in Miami. The Summit was interpreted as a signal of departure from the former U.S. practice of unilateralism and support for authoritarian regimes and towards the promotion of democracy and a politics of cooperation in the region (Fontana 2003: 173-175). In spite of its importance for cooperation in the region, security issues were not part of the agenda of the Miami Summit. This is why U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry decided to convoke the first Defense Ministerial of the Americas Meeting, which was held in Williamsburg, Virginia, USA, in 1995 and perpetuated biannually. Subsequent meetings took place in Bariloche, Argentina (1996), Cartagena de Indias, Colombia (1998), Manaus, Brazil (2000), Santiago, Chile

(2002), Quito, Ecuador (2004) Managua, Nicaragua (2006), and the most recent one in Banff, Canada (2008). The Ninth Conference of Defense Ministers of the Americas will be held in Bolivia in November 2010.

### 2.1.2. Operational activities

The most important institutional innovation on the way to a collective management of defense and security issues was the creation of the Committee on Hemispheric Security (CHS). It first came into existence in 1992 as a special commission, and its original task was to discuss and redefine the concept of security in the region, as envisioned by the Santiago Commitment in 1991. In 1995, it became a permanent organ. It is chaired by the Permanent Representative of one of the member states and holds meetings at least once a month. In general, the agenda of the CHS is determined by the mandates of the General Assembly. In addition, the Permanent Council instructs the CHS to consider and take action on those General Assembly resolutions that pertain to hemispheric security. The CHS is also entitled to take into consideration other resolutions that, according to its Chair, are directly related to its agenda.

To enact the General Assembly resolutions on confidence and security building measures, a first Meeting of Experts on this topic took place in Buenos Aires in 1994. Subsequently, the regional conferences of Santiago (1995) and San Salvador (1998) on CSBM issued declarations which, apart from some general considerations, formulated recommendations how to apply concrete steps towards confidence building. The Declaration of Santiago of 1995 contains a set of eleven CSBMs whose application is highly recommended. These measures encompass the participation in international security and defense mechanisms, exchange of information concerning defense policies and military exercises, joint activities and cooperation of neighboring countries as well as peace education and courses for civilians and military personnel. In the Declaration of San Salvador of 1998, the list of recommended CSBMs was expanded (Fontana 2001; Arévalo de León 2002; 2003).

During the 1990s, the OAS turned into an active defender of democracy. General Assembly Resolution 1080 and the Protocol of Washington opened the possibility to condemn an unconstitutional interruption of the legitimate exercise of power by democratically elected governments and to threaten with sanctions and ultimately to suspend a member state after its democratically constituted government has been overthrown by force (Gosselin & Thérien 1999: 179-180; Kreimer 2003: 258). Resolution 1080 was invoked for four times during the 1990s: after the coup in Haiti in 1991, after President Alberto Fujimori's "self-coup" (*autogolpe*) in Peru in 1992, in reaction to a similar *autogolpe* in Guatemala in 1993, and in Paraguay in the mid of a civil-military crisis with the credible threat of a coup in 1996. Already in 1990, Canada had taken the lead in the creation of a Unit for the Promotion of Democracy (UPD) whose main purpose is to provide advisory services and technical assistance to help OAS members develop democratic institutions and procedures. It carried out numerous election observation missions.

The OAS also addressed new threats to security. Combating terrorism was on the hemispheric security agenda ever since the first Summit of the Americas in 1994. The initial reasons to deal with the topic were the bomb attacks on the Israeli Embassy and a Jewish community center in Buenos Aires in 1992 and 1994, respectively. At the Summit of the Americas, the heads of state decided to hold a special conference on terrorism which took place in 1996 and adopted an action plan. At a follow-up meeting in 1998, it was decided to create the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism (CICTE), which was formally set up at the June 2001 OAS General Assembly. The Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD) had already been created in 1986, which illustrates that drug-trafficking is one of the oldest and most persistent non-traditional security threat the Americas are facing. In the 1990s, new provisions regarding money laundering were issued.

### *2.1.3. Information activities*

The Defense Ministerial of the Americas does not take binding decisions, but is regarded as a noteworthy discussion forum where current hemispheric security topics and issues in defense policies can be addressed. At the Second Defense Ministerial of the Americas in Bariloche in 1996, the ministers discussed the lack of civilian experts in defense and security matters as major obstacle to the civilian control of the armed forces. They decided to create the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, a civilian counterpart to the Inter-American Defense College, in order to train civilians for positions in defense ministries and parliamentary defense commissions. The Center was set up in September 1997.

### *2.2. Discussion and evaluation of output*

For the OAS, the end of the Cold War was an important turning point. In Latin America, the organization had for a long time been experienced as an instrument that the United States employed to enforce their hegemonic interests. The end of the Cold War brought about the abolishment of the strategic framework whose main rationale was the fight against communism. Democratic transitions in most Latin American countries as well as the world-wide movement towards regional integration were additional factors that pushed forward the revival of the Inter-American system. The legal mechanisms and institutions that were established in the 1990s were important steps toward security cooperation in the hemisphere; the advances with regard to arms control regimes and the initiation of confidence-building measures on the political as well as on the military level reduced insecurity in the region and contributed to the settlement of various bilateral rivalries (Hurrell 1998a; Nolte 2000).

In spite of the advances in security, the OAS's most significant achievements with regard to the adoption of new norms and norm enforcement mechanisms were made in the area of democracy promotion and defense of democracy, which also receives the bulk of attention in the literature on the OAS outside of Latin America (cf. Acevedo & Grossman 1996; Muñoz 1998; Cooper & Legler 2001; Alice 2002; Boniface 2002; Parish & Peceny 2002; 2006; Levitt 2006; Arceneaux & Pion-Berlin 2007; Legler, Lean & Boniface 2007; Boniface 2009; Weiffen 2009). Member states placed a strong emphasis on the principle of representative democracy, even at the expense of non-intervention and state sovereignty. In comparison to these advances and the degree of "democratic commitment" that was reached in the Western hemisphere, the inter-American security cooperation is considered as of low intensity (Fontana 2003).

Many institutional tasks necessary to reform the inter-American security system were not accomplished in the 1990s, and as progenies of the Cold War, its components appeared increasingly outdated. Although the plan to reformulate the concept of security was repeatedly stated, no conclusion on that matter could be reached. Hence, in spite of the noteworthy innovations described above, a lot of unfulfilled tasks remained. As the examples of the old Inter-American Defense Board and the new initiative of the Defense Ministerial of the Americas demonstrate consultations on defense issues and strategic cooperation often took place outside the OAS framework. This is an expression of Latin American persistent mistrust towards the U.S.: After their negative experiences with U.S. interventionism during the Cold War, Latin American governments still felt uneasy about cooperating with the U.S. in the field of security and defense, so that an initiative to create a forum like the Defense Ministerial inside the OAS framework would most probably have met with their resistance (Bitencourt 2003).

Hence, in the 1990s, the future of OAS as a regional security organization was still undefined. Despite the highly symbolic nature of the large number of summits and the declarations and instruments adopted, there was no shared vision with regard to fundamental characteristics of post-Cold War security cooperation in the Western hemisphere. The first phase of U.S. post-

Cold War policy towards Latin America during the 1990s shows a certain emphasis on economic issues. The main goals were opening up Latin American markets and promoting economic hemispheric integration under the aegis of neo-liberal economic policies. Additionally, fostering and stabilizing democracy was a central goal. The main security issue on the U.S. agenda for the Americas was the fight against drug-trafficking.

Three interconnected features related to the U.S. role in the hemisphere have determined the limited progress in regional security (cf. Hirst 2003: 57): Just like during the Cold War era, the power asymmetry between the United States and the rest of the region remained an outstanding characteristic. It meets with a lack of coordination of Latin American states *vis-à-vis* the dominant neighbor in the North. Additionally, the relative irrelevance of Latin America in U.S. global security considerations became increasingly obvious.

### ***3. Revitalized Hegemony? Security Governance in the Americas after 9-11***

While during the 1990s the main focus of interest in the Western hemisphere was on democratization and economic transformations, since 2001 security considerations and changes in security policy have moved back to the fore. Once again, from the perspective of the United States, security – especially the fight against terrorism – became the top priority. Already in the 1990s, security cooperation in the hemisphere suffered from mutual distrust and a lack of shared visions. Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the gap between U.S. interests in security policy and the concerns of the rest of the region widened (Fontana 2003: 171). There seems to be a move backwards to the U.S. hegemonic position of the Cold War: Instead of the fight against communism, the war on terrorism became the most important policy goal, and other states were urged to partake in this mission.

#### ***3.1. Output***

##### ***3.1.1. Policy program***

Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the OAS passed a resolution to strengthen the cooperation in the prevention and the fight against terrorism. In June 2002, the member states signed the Inter-American Convention against Terrorism, which offers a legal framework for cooperation efforts and exchange of information on this challenge.

At the same time, policy programs initiated in the 1990s continued in the new millennium. In April 2001 the Third Summit of the Americas had once again called for a thorough review of security issues in light of today's realities that had already been envisioned by the Santiago Commitment in 1991. The Declaration of Bridgetown, approved by the 2002 General Assembly, contained a multidimensional approach to security, which was taken up by the Special Conference on Security, held in October 2003 in Mexico City. The Special Conference on Security issued a Declaration on Security in the Americas (2003) which affirms the countries' political will to help preserve peace through close cooperation and elaborates on the new concept of security:

“Our new concept of security in the Hemisphere is multidimensional in scope, includes traditional and new threats, concerns, and other challenges to the security of the states of the Hemisphere, incorporates the priorities of each state, contributes to the consolidation of peace, integral development, and social justice, and is based on democratic values, respect for and promotion and defense of human rights, solidarity, cooperation, and respect for national sovereignty.” (Declaration on Security in the Americas, paragraph 2)

The particularity of the Declaration on Security is that the “multidimensional” security concept is much broader than the security concept usually employed in international relations

(Radseck 2005: 59-61). Apart from traditional security threats, like territorial and boundary disputes, this concept includes new challenges to security, such as terrorism, drug-trafficking, arms trade and contraband, migration and natural disasters. Moreover, it also encompasses aspects of public safety. According to this definition, genuinely socio-economic problems like poverty and diseases are defined as security risks. Some of them, especially migration, drug-trafficking and environmental degradation, had been on the agenda of the inter-American security system for many years (Hirst 2003). However, the novel thing about those new challenges is that governments increasingly realize their transnational scope and impact. Another new aspect is the involvement of non-state actors (cf. Tulchin 2005: 101-104).

Whether the multidimensional security concept is an integrative and useful innovation or a dangerous inflation of the security term is highly contested. The main rationale behind this broad security concept is to represent the wide range of security risks and concerns relevant for the different sub-regions and thus to exert an integrative function. In this manner, the Declaration tries to depict an alternative to traditional U.S. unilateralism. At the same time, the principle of collective security guarantees that states help and support each other in dealing with their specific challenges, even if they are not affected themselves (Bitencourt 2001). The combination of a multifaceted security concept and a collective encounter with the threats and risks is what distinguishes the “multidimensional, flexible and cooperative” security architecture. However, critics argue that due to the inclusion of such a broad range of security threats and risks, the security term becomes diffuse and limitless, which means that social problems or political confrontation can easily be defined as security threat and hence become militarized. The “securitization” of internal problems and conflicts also wipes out the boundary between the competences of the armed forces and the internal law enforcement agencies. An amalgamation of military and police responsibilities and in particular an expanded scope of functions for the military is very delicate and dangerous, taking into account the long Latin American history of military intervention in politics (Villagra Delgado 2003: 8-9; Nolte 2004: 79-80; Chillier & Freeman 2005; Tulchin, Benítez Manaut & Diamint 2005: 19).

Another policy program which was deepened at the beginning of the new millennium was the defense of democracy regime. On September 11, 2001, the OAS adopted the Inter-American Democratic Charter (Graham 2002; Cooper 2004; Legler 2007). With it, the OAS broadened its conception of what constitutes a democratic crisis to include not only irregular interruptions of the democratic political institutional process, but also any “unconstitutional alteration of the democratic order”, a phrase applying specifically to undemocratic actions of democratically elected leaders.

### *3.1.2. Operational activities*

During the 1990s, the need to clarify the juridical and institutional relationship between the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB) and the OAS was repeatedly reiterated. The Special Conference on Security requested the CHS to maintain regular contact with the authorities of the IADB in order to determine the norms that govern the mandate of the IADB and its relationship to the OAS. Hence, the CHS formed the “Working Group to Conclude the Analysis of the Juridical and Institutional Link between the OAS and the Inter-American Defense Board”. The IADB was primarily a military body; to convert it into an entity of the OAS, the problem of civil-military relations had to be discussed, and the independence of technical bodies in general had to be determined in order to define the IADB’s level of subordination. The new statutes of the IADB, approved in March 2006, establish a juridical and organizational link to the OAS, especially to the CHS, and ideas on how to use the IADB. The functions of the IADB will be confined to technical advisory services in the military and defense areas, whereas it is not allowed to perform functions of an operational nature. Further activities include demining in Central America and developing educational programs on

regional security. The IADB's personnel consist mostly of military officers, typically in the rank of Colonel. Due to its character as military organization and its location in Washington D.C. it has always been dominated by the U.S. However, the new statutes explicitly admit civilians to the leading positions of the IADB.

Since its original task was the preparation of the conference on Security in the Americas and the redefinition of the concept of security, after 2003 the mission of the CHS changed: On the one hand, it is responsible for the follow-up and the implementation of the Declaration on Security in the Americas. On the other hand, it has established itself as the primary forum for discussion of current security challenges. During the 2005-2006 sessions, the majority of the meetings of the Committee on Hemispheric Security dealt with the establishment of the link between OAS and the IADB. Another important issue in 2005 and 2006 were natural disasters, a topic usually brought forward by the Caribbean countries, and reinforced by the impact of hurricane Katrina. The 2006-2007 as well as the 2007-2008 agenda addressed many issues that had been postponed due to the intense negotiations over the IADB issue. In the field of national security, the CHS held sessions on nuclear nonproliferation, discussing the consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty of Tlatelolco, as well as meetings of the states parties of the Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions. Other topics included MANPADS, portable firearms that might easily be used by terrorists, which is why a General Assembly resolution called for their control, and the UN Resolution 1540 against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

In the field of new security threats, besides regular follow-up meetings evaluating the implementation of the Declaration on Security, there are meetings on transnational organized crime, with a new OAS Technical Group on Transnational Organized Crime having to formulate its work plan, as well as meetings discussing natural disaster reduction and risk management, or the special security concerns of the small island states of the Caribbean. Additionally, the CHS also follows up on other security-related OAS activities, such as the work of the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism (CICTE) and the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD).

With respect to confidence and security building measures, in 2002 an OAS General Assembly resolution convened another Meeting of Experts as follow-up to the first Meeting of Experts in Buenos Aires (1994) and the regional conferences of Santiago (1995) and San Salvador (1998) on confidence- and security-building measures in order "to evaluate implementation and consider next steps to further mutual confidence," and "to transmit the conclusions and recommendations of the Meeting of Experts to the preparatory body of the Special Conference on Security as a contribution to the preparation of that Conference." At this Meeting of Experts, which took place in February 2003 in Miami, the experts formulated new recommendations building on the previous ones in the Declarations of Santiago and San Salvador. The Consensus of Miami, which is the document the experts submitted to the Special Conference on Security, contains two extensive lists of "military" as well as "general" CSBMs. Furthermore, they compiled an "Illustrative List of CSBMs" which identifies measures for future consideration and which for the first time attempts a systematic classification of CSBMs into diplomatic and political measures, educational and cultural measures, and military measures. The document also addresses the need to develop cooperative measures confronting the new security threats and challenges.

The experts also recommended to use the CHS as a forum for the topic of CSBMs. Accordingly, the Declaration on Security mandated the CHS to constitute itself as Forum on Confidence- and Security-Building once a year, in order to review and evaluate existing CSBMs and to consider and propose new ones. The first meeting of this kind took place in April 2005; the second meeting was held in November 2006, and the third meeting of the Forum took place on March 14, 2008.

Since the beginning of the new millennium, the OAS created new measures of conflict resolution: The Fund for Peace was established by the OAS General Assembly meeting in Windsor, Canada in June 2000, in order to address boundary disputes which still pose a risk to hemispheric security. This mechanism provides financial resources to member states in order to support the peaceful resolution of territorial disputes. From 1999 to 2003, the Fund for Peace brokered agreements to resolve disputes between Belize and Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua, and El Salvador and Honduras. In 2004, the OAS has also initiated a Special Program for the Promotion of Dialogue and Conflict Resolution as part of the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy, whose task is to contribute to discussion and analysis on dialogue, conflict prevention and resolution. After a substantial restructuring of the OAS General Secretariat, those conflict resolution instruments are now administered by the Department of Sustainable Democracy and Special Missions, which is part of the Secretariat for Political Affairs. Since 2005, the Department has coordinated special missions to Bolivia where it accompanied the electoral process, Ecuador where it assisted with the re-establishment of the Supreme Court of Justice, Haiti where it provided technical assistance for the 2006 elections and Nicaragua where it facilitated the dialogue after intra-governmental conflict. In 2004, it established the first genuine OAS peacekeeping mission, consisting of a staff of more than 100 civilian experts, to support the peace process in Colombia.

The new Inter-American Democratic Charter was invoked for the first time in 2002. Pursuant to Article 20 of the IADC, the OAS condemned the coup in Venezuela and sent a high-level mission to the country to support a dialogue between the adversary political forces. The most recent application was the coup in Honduras in 2009 – the first time that, in accordance with the Inter-American defense of democracy regime, a member state was suspended.

### *3.1.3. Information activities*

The annual General Assembly resolutions ask member states to provide information on their defense spending and weapons acquisition, in compliance with the two global confidence and security building measures – the Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisition and the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and United Nations Standardized Reporting of Military Expenditures. However, only Canada and Chile have provided reports on the acquisitions of conventional weapons pursuant to their obligations under the Inter-American Convention.

In line with previous declarations and legal instruments, the Consensus of Miami suggests asking the countries for reports on the CSBMs they have carried out. It is desirable to monitor and evaluate the implementation of agreed CSBM through the exchange of information, for which the CHS as well as the OAS Information System (OASIS) could provide an appropriate tool. The CHS is in charge of the collection and distribution of information on all types of CSBMs. The General Assembly has urged all member states to provide the Permanent Council, through the CHS, with information on their ongoing CSBMs, so as to facilitate the preparation of the complete and systematic inventory of these measures. When convened as Forum on Confidence- and Security-Building, the CHS considers new CSBMs, which in the future might also be arranged between internal security forces in order to cope with the occurrence of new security threats. Additionally, the CHS publishes the OAS Roster of Experts in Confidence and Security Building Measures, which, as of November 2006, lists experts from 14 member states.

When formulating its new statutes, the Inter-American Defense Board has been instructed to offer advisory and consultative services on CSBMs of a military nature, when the Permanent Council so requests, and to administrate an inventory of confidence and security building measures in the hemisphere. The fact that the reports are forwarded to the IADB brings up the problem that not all OAS member states are members of the IADB as well. However, as the

new statutes establish that states may also send civilian representatives to the IADB, states that do not have a military or refused to participate in a purely military environment might now be motivated to join.

As a new forum for information exchange in security matters, the General Secretariat has decided to establish the Inter-American Peace Forum which was launched in September 2008. The Inter-American Peace Forum, which will operate directly within the framework of the Fund for Peace, is intended to create an opportunity for the development of programs aimed at creating a culture of regional peace among the different segments of inter-American society, such as conferences and seminars on the subject of peace and conflict management. It is also planned to prepare specialized reports, statistics, and surveys, to foster publications on these issues and to carry out institutional training workshops and cultural and educational events. In addition, the Inter-American Peace Forum will maintain an exhaustive database of institutions and NGOs involved in promoting peace and peace research, in order to facilitate the exchange of information, experiences, and best practices.

### *3.2. Discussion and evaluation of output*

The new millennium entailed further steps toward a new security architecture in the Americas (Franko 2003). The OAS and the other elements of the inter-American security system remain an important forum for security cooperation. By means of its Declaration on Security, the OAS has significantly contributed to a region-wide discussion and definition of new security challenges. At the same time, it has continuously addressed traditional security threats in the framework of its CHS and by the numerous initiatives regarding CSBM, and even accomplished the incorporation of a forum for military exchange and cooperation, the IADB, into the OAS institutional structure. In comparison to the operational activities of the 1990s, the most significant progress occurred in the field of conflict resolution mechanisms. By creating the Fund for Peace and, later on, establishing the administrative structure of the Department of Sustainable Democracy and Special Missions, the OAS accomplished a more autonomous stance in consensual and collective security and peacekeeping. Moreover, the OAS increasingly develops informational activities, establishing itself as an important forum for the collection and dissemination of information and as a venue which policymakers use for discussion and direct information exchange.

## **VI. Conclusion**

When looking at the organizational output during the three different time periods examined in this paper, the contrasts are striking. During the Cold War, the OAS basically maintained the normative framework that had been set up in the aftermath of World War II. In turn, in the comparatively short time period after the end of the Cold War, a large amount of new policy program initiatives have been adopted. More than before, they are followed by appropriate operational activities. Additionally, both policy programs and operational activities are increasingly complemented by information activities. Especially the communications revolution with the increased use and diffusion of the World Wide Web contributed to the intensification of information activities. The websites of the OAS are a rich source for anyone interested in the policy programs and operational activities of the Organization, even in the “sensitive” policy field of security. Besides a description of the OAS organs and press releases on recent activities, one can find the texts of declarations and treaties – only recently, a compilation of the “Key OAS Security Documents” has been published – and detailed information on operational activities, such as the work plan and schedule of the CHS, reports on expert workshops and detailed accounts of missions carried out by the conflict resolution mechanisms.

When evaluating the policy program, it is particularly interesting to observe that the inter-American security system exhibits elements of collective security, collective defense and cooperative security arrangements. However, the focus of its mission shifts over time, and this shift is intrinsically linked to the power dynamics among its member states.

During the Cold War, there was a predominance of the collective defense approach fostered by the clear predominance of a hegemonic power. The external threat was defined according to the Cold War logic of the United States' fight against communism. Concomitantly, this legitimization of U.S. interventions in the region by the rationale of combating the international communist threat contradicted and hampered a collective security approach: Aggressions by the U.S. against other OAS member states were not addressed by the Organization and due to fear of hegemonic interference, other conflicts within the region were often managed by alternative ad hoc security coalitions, such as the Contadora and later the Rio Group that were founded to promote the peace processes in Central America.

In the 1990s, OAS security governance was more than ever before guided by the interests of the Latin American countries. After the demise of communism, there was no need for collective defense (Cuba was just not powerful enough to be considered a serious threat). Comparable to the Cold War era, however, collective security tasks usually were not addressed by the OAS, but in sub-regional organizations and coalitions or, in the face of more serious security threats, such as the 1991 coup in Haiti and the peace progresses in El Salvador and Guatemala, by the United Nations. The OAS hence focused on the consolidation and defense of democracy as well as on confidence-building. Hence, a cooperative security approach, which is restricted to defining, discussing and monitoring security risks in the region, prevailed during the 1990s.

After 2001, we can observe a somewhat odd coexistence of continuity of the policy programs established in the 1990s and a re-emergence of certain dynamics familiar from the Cold War era. The focus of the United States shifted back to collective defense (although in fact the new threat of terrorism lies at the intersection of cooperative security - countering new "intermestic" security challenges - and collective defense against an external, albeit unknown, enemy). In the aftermath of 9-11, fighting terrorism became the central objective of the U.S. government's approach. Some authors argue that the war against terrorism initiated by the U.S. in 2001 generates the impression that the strategic framework of the Cold War becomes revitalized (Kurtenbach 2002a; Tulchin 2005: 98). Once again, the U.S. defines the enemy, even trying to redefine other threats to hemispheric security (especially guerrilla warfare and drug trafficking) as part of the new phenomenon (Loveman 2006). For the majority of Latin American countries, international terrorism does not pose an imminent threat. Anyhow, in compliance with the collective defense paradigm, most states chose to collaborate with the United States in order to address their concerns. One example is the "triple frontier" between Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay, where these adjacent countries primarily pursue the fight against transnational crime such as contraband and money laundering, but also agree to combat terrorism jointly with the U.S., since the region has gained renown as a retreat for Islamic terrorists. While focusing exclusively on terrorism, the U.S. lost out of sight other urgent problems in the region (cf. Hirst 2003: 62-63; Tulchin 2005: 110). Hence, the attention the United States has paid to the region has been highly selective, targeted at particularly troubling or urgent situations (Hakim 2006).

At the same time, the Latin American countries stick to their cooperative security and security management programs, as evidenced by the discussions on the new multidimensional security concept, the creation of the Inter-American Democratic Charter, new initiatives in CSBM, and the multiplication of information activities. During the 1990s, the U.S. Latin American policy had emphasized political liberalization, and in spite of its recent shift of attention, it still endorses this goal and hence has no incentive to hinder the cooperative security activities in

the region. In addition to the security management activities, hemispheric institutions increasingly fulfill collective security tasks, if needed. They create new organizational units such as the Fund for Peace in order to provide mechanisms for conflict prevention and mitigation and for the support of peace processes. Hence, they also aim at becoming more autonomous in conflict resolution.

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