

## **Searching for Status in All the Right Places?**

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## Introduction

The salience of status attribution, status competition, and the theoretical and empirical utility of status for a wide variety of international political phenomena have waxed and waned in the theories and models of international relations (IR) scholars. The status of major powers has been of particular interest, yet scholarly attention to their status—separate from their capabilities—appears to have followed a similar, cyclical pattern over the last five decades. The position and salience of major powers was recognized famously as early as the Melian debate (Thucydides 1951:331) and resuscitated more systematically in the 1960s and especially by Galtung’s (1964) classic writing on the subject. His pioneering work was followed by a short explosion of scholarship (e.g., East 1972; Gilpin 1981; Midlarski 1975; Wallace 1971; 1973) but status considerations receded as our theoretical conceptualizations and empirical models narrowed their foci on the more measurable observations involved with the changing capabilities between major powers.

Yet, the salience of major power *status* stubbornly persisted in significance across most empirical conflict models. There are few if any models of conflict (either focusing on interstate war or militarized interstate disputes—MIDs) where the “status” of being a major power, *in addition* to its military or economic capabilities, does not show a significant relationship to the dependent variable in question. Major power *status* remains a significant predictor in alliance formation, MIDs and crisis intervention, alliance memberships and multilateralism.<sup>1</sup> Most of these findings are in turn based on an empirical identification of major power status created by the Correlates of War (COW) project. COW creates a dummy variable that measures the absence

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<sup>1</sup> For a short summary of the range of empirical findings connecting the status of major powers with varied forms of conflicts and interactions in international politics, see Corbetta et al. 2008.

or presence of major power status on the basis of experts' perceptions of whether or not states considered other states as having the *status* of being a major power (Singer, 1988).

As with much of the field's analytical reassessments following the end of the Cold War, there has been a reemergence of studies focusing on status attribution, status seeking, and status competition between major powers (Larson and Shevchenko 2003; 2009; Mercer 1995; 1996; Nayar and Paul 2003; Volgy and Mayhall 1995; Wohlforth 2009; Wohlforth and Kang 2009). Increasingly, social identity theory (SIT)—probing the social constructivist dimension of being a major power—has been utilized as the theoretical foundation for exploring status attribution as well as its consequences.<sup>2</sup>

Our work (Corbetta 2006; Corbetta et al. 2008; Grant et al. 2010; Volgy et al. 2010a) has relied on the integration of SIT and materialist explanations to create a conceptualization and measurement of status for major powers and regional powers, and to explore the consequences of different types of status attribution for these states. We have delineated membership within two status clubs: the club of major powers (Volgy et al. 2010b) and the club of regional powers (Cline et al. 2010). Within these clubs we have explored conceptual and empirical differentiation across status types: status consistent powers and status inconsistent powers (underachievers and overachievers) and suggested likely consequences of such differences in status among the powers.

In this effort we probe further the consequences of status differentiation, by comparing status consistent and status inconsistent major powers with respect to their involvement in conflict and cooperation processes. We assess the extent to which differences among major

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<sup>2</sup> Examples include Mercer 1995; Hymans 2002; Larson and Shevchenko 2003, 2009; and Sylvan, Graff and Pugliese 1998).

powers, according to the type of status they hold, can help to distinguish their involvement in certain forms of conflict (intervention in militarized international disputes—MIDS) and cooperation (participation in the creation and maintenance of intergovernmental organizations) in international politics. Below, we discuss the salience of status, how we define and operationalize major power status and membership in the club of major powers, suggest likely differences across status types in terms of their engagement with conflict and cooperation processes, and offer a limited set of tests for our predictions.

### **Why Status?**

Why focus on status and status inconsistencies rather than simply on the capabilities, strength, or material bases controlled by major powers? As we noted above, there is substantial evidence exhibited in empirical models of conflict that the “status” of major powers matters—in addition to their capabilities—for analyses of international crises, MIDs, and interstate wars. We believe that there are good theoretical reasons why such empirical relationships have been documented.<sup>3</sup> Our arguments are summarized as follows:

The attribution of major power *status* by states to a handful of others provides a form of soft power with which status recipients can complement their material capabilities. Acceptance by others as being a major power creates legitimacy for a wide variety of foreign policy pursuits, making it less costly to either intervene in conflicts or to seek to create mechanisms of cooperation. When the community of states attributes major power status to a few of their own, such attribution is indicative of community expectations that these very strong and determined states will exercise leadership on a variety of issues and conflicts central to international or

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<sup>3</sup> Although, as we note below, we disagree with the measurement strategies used to identify what constitutes major power “status”.

regional politics. The community of states attributing major power status will expect the recipients to be involved in international affairs, will accept their involvement as legitimate, and may even ask for assistance. French involvement in simmering disputes among and within Francophone African countries, Kyrgyz requests for Russian assistance with its domestic conflicts, Central Asian acquiescence to Russia and China in developing a network of organizations for cooperation and coordination in post-Soviet space, or U.S. support to Colombia in its war on narcotraffickers are but a few of such examples of expectations and receptivity toward those considered as major powers to help establish local or regional order. This status-based receptivity to major power activity is similar to the Weberian notion of status as a soft power that confers privileges to certain states (Sylvan, Graff and Pugliese 1998:7-8; Nayar and Paul 2003).

Such additional soft power in the arsenal of major powers should be consequential in creating added influence and motivation to pursue policies and interests outside their immediate neighborhoods. While major powers are by far the strongest of actors in international politics, *relative* to the other states, there is also evidence to suggest that their *structural strength* has been diminishing. Relative strength is about the strength of one state versus another; structural strength is the strength a major power state possesses with which to effectuate the course of global affairs (Strange 1989), or for a regional power to create order and some semblance of governance within its region. Thus, it is possible that while the relative strength of a major power such as the U.S. may increase substantially compared to other major powers, and thus create what appears to be unipolarity in the international system, the structural strength of all major powers, including the U.S., may be diminishing. In fact, there is evidence that the diminution of structural strength—given the growth of new actors, increased interdependencies, and the growth

in system complexity—has resulted in declining structural strength among *all* major powers (Volgy and Bailin 2003), including those whose relative strength appears to have increased (U.S., China) after the Cold War.

While status attribution has never been unimportant for major powers, in the context of declining structural strength, it may be even more salient than when structural strength is stable or increasing. To the extent that other states look at great powers for leadership and guidance in the face of crises and/or collective action problems, high status may reduce some of the material costs of efforts to structure order and/or institutional development necessary for global governance. Thus, major powers may engage in the quest for additional status if they feel that the status attributed to them fails to match the status they “deserve”, or create maintenance strategies if they are in jeopardy of losing the status they have had. For instance, we suspect that in no small part have status issues motivated both Russia and China to develop new governance mechanisms for the conduct of relations in Central Asia after the Cold War (while at the same time the status attributed to them by other states in the region made their success far more likely).

To the extent that major power status is valued domestically,<sup>4</sup> foreign policy makers in these states may receive added support from domestic constituencies and key political elites for being active, influential, and important major players in global politics. Conversely, the domestic value placed on such international status may require policy makers to seek to maintain or increase their state’s status or run the risk of being removed from office.<sup>5</sup> Thus, status matters, and as structural strength declines, status may matter even more.

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<sup>4</sup> The value of major power status may vary with domestic political regimes and elite recruitment patterns (Wohlforth and Kang 2009).

<sup>5</sup> Note Labour’s claim to keeping the UK’s major power status before the recent national elections, and the temporary bounce it received during the campaign; see “Hero, villain or victim of the global age?” *The Economist* February 27,

## Defining Major Powers and Their Status

Given the microscopic attention given to major powers in the IR literature, there is amazingly little agreement about what constitutes a major power, although there is virtual consensus within the large-N empirical literature about how to measure major power *status* (given the overwhelming reliance on the designation developed by COW). In our work, we begin with and slightly modify Levy's (1983) classic definition. A state is a *major power* if it has a) the *opportunity* to act as one through unusual capabilities with which to pursue its interests in interstate relations; b) demonstrates its *willingness* to act as one by using those capabilities to pursue unusually broad and expansive foreign policies beyond its own region and seeks to influence the course of international affairs *relatively independently* of other major powers; and c) is *attributed major power status* by policy makers of other states within the international community and they act toward it consistent with that perception. If a state meets the empirical correlates of these three dimensions, then we designate it as a major power.

Note then that we require attribution of major power status along with the opportunity and willingness to act as a major power. Further, for theoretical reasons, we have opted for focusing on one of the three mechanisms by which status attribution may occur: 1) self-attribution; 2) in-group attribution; and 3) community attribution. While each of these three mechanisms deserve substantial attention and focus, it is community attribution that comes closest to the "soft power" considerations we have discussed in the context of declining structural strength, and is therefore of most immediate interest to our concerns.<sup>6</sup>

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2010:63. For the importance of major power status considerations in Indian domestic politics, see Nayar and Paul (2003); for France, see Badie (2010).

<sup>6</sup> We recognize as well that these three processes are not mutually exclusive, and may be highly interdependent. Without self-attribution, there is not likely to be either community or in-group attribution. Likewise, in-group attribution should

The attribution of major power status by the community of states is based on a number of factors, including perceptual judgments about whether a state acts as a major power (demonstrates unusual capabilities and uses them in a highly active fashion to influence the nature of international affairs, and demonstrates independence from other major powers) and the extent to which these judgments may be influenced by very strong states that, for example, may wish to constrain the status granted to other states with which they are in conflict (or to enhance status for like-minded states).<sup>7</sup> Thus, the attribution of major power status may not mirror well the capabilities and actions of states that have the opportunity and perhaps the willingness to act as major powers. The extent to which being a major power corresponds to receiving the status of major power should vary with these perceptions and constraints.<sup>8</sup>

Clearly, while some states receive status consistent with their capabilities and behavior, others do not: some are attributed major power status when they are no longer (a halo effect); some are denied their status while becoming a great power (latency effect). Thus, we differentiate between types of status: assuming a threshold above which a state would be considered a major power, *status inconsistency* occurs either when major power status attribution is not in synch with the capabilities and/or the foreign policy pursuits of the state in question; or, if states are inconsistent in awarding status to a major power. Thus, we suggest three types of status conditions for major powers: *status consistent* major powers (where status attribution parallels major power capabilities and behavior) and two types of status inconsistent

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correlate highly with community attribution, but this relationship may vary with the type of international system in existence (depending on the number of poles and the extent of polarization between them).

<sup>7</sup> For instance, the U.S. pressured states to increase the status of its allies (West Germany, Israel, etc.) and to minimize the status of communist states during the height of the Cold War.

<sup>8</sup> Historically, we know for example that Italy's major power status attribution actually "covered some stupendous weaknesses" (Kennedy 1987: 206). Similarly, Austria-Hungary's status attribution dwarfed its capabilities well prior to its disintegration (Sylvan et al. 1998).

ones: *underachievers* and *overachievers*. The former lacks the status proportional to its capabilities and behavior, while the latter has more status attributed to it than its capabilities and/or behavior would warrant.

### **Status Consistent Versus Status Inconsistent Powers**

If status matters then how much and what type of status a major power has should matter as well. Status consistent powers should have the most legitimacy and influence; they should be able to engage in a range of activities (from cooperative to conflictual) that would be far more costly for status inconsistent major powers or those who fall outside of the major power club altogether. Given their strength and receptivity to their actions, status consistent major powers are likely to pursue their objectives with the expectation of success and to run lower risks of failure not only externally but to risk fewer domestic political consequences as well for their foreign policy pursuits.

Wolforth (2009) proposes that when states experience status inconsistency they will seek to resolve it and such resolution will be manifested through status competition with other states “whose portfolios of capabilities are not only close but also mismatched (2009: 40).” We agree and suggest that underachievers—given their muscular portfolios but unmatched status attribution—will seek to resolve uncertainty around their status by competing more aggressively than overachievers to create larger roles and more status for themselves in global affairs. However, lacking the soft power of full status attribution, they will be less likely to be as aggressive as states endowed with full major power status.

Overachievers have full status attribution but lack either some of the opportunity and/or willingness to match fully the position accorded to them by the global community. Given this

type of mismatch between status and capabilities, we expect that overachievers would be less likely to risk exposing weakness beneath their status attribution and to engage in international affairs less aggressively than underachievers. Yet, overachievers must be vigilant not to lose the status attributed to them. Such quest to maintain status can be attained with fewer risks by engaging in cooperative architectures: participating in and perhaps creating and sustaining networks of intergovernmental organizations.<sup>9</sup>

### **Identifying Membership in the Major Power Club**

Previously (Corbetta et al. 2008; Grant et al. 2009; Volgy et al. 2010b) we had identified measures corresponding to the definitions for major power opportunity, willingness, and community-based major power status attribution. Unusual capabilities (at least one standard deviation above the mean) include military spending and military reach, as well as the size of a state's economy and its economic reach beyond the region. Willingness to act as a major power is measured by unusually high levels of both cooperative and conflictual activity globally. Independence of foreign policy orientation is measured by matching foreign policy portfolios to the lead major power (U.S.) and requiring low thresholds of conformance with U.S. leadership. Status is measured by an unusually high level (two standard deviations above the mean) of embassies sent to the major power in a given year, and a corresponding number of state visits sent to its capital.

Using these measures and applying them to the 1951-2005 period, we were able to establish thresholds above which states are either status consistent major powers, or status

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<sup>9</sup> We recognize that the overachiever category includes both states whose capabilities are increasing (e.g., China) and states whose capabilities are in decline (Russia). Policy makers operating in the realm of potential losses (consistent with prospect theory) may take more risks than those who are gaining. We believe however, that those risks would be most likely taken in their regions where there may be potential direct security threats or direct challenges to their regional leadership role (e.g., Russian confrontation with Georgia).

inconsistent underachievers or overachievers, and below which states are not considered major powers. Status consistent major powers are those that demonstrate opportunity to be one consistently (exceeding our thresholds on both military and economic capacity and reach), demonstrate unusual willingness to act (exceeding the one standard deviation threshold on both cooperation and conflict outside their regions), and are attributed full status (crossing the thresholds on both diplomatic contacts and state visits). Status inconsistent major powers cross thresholds on both status measures both not consistently across measures of opportunity and willingness (overachievers); or, fully meet criteria on both opportunity and willingness but lack consistency on status attribution (underachievers).

Our results differ from the COW designations in a number of respects, including differentiating between status consistent and status inconsistent powers, and showing more variation in club membership across time than shown by COW. We are also able to eliminate some of the anomalies contained in the COW data (Volgy et al. 2010b).<sup>10</sup> Our results are displayed in the Appendix.

### **Status and Major Power Involvement in Interstate Conflicts**

These differences in the status attribution portfolios of major powers should be manifested both in major power conflict and cooperative behaviors. We offer three hypotheses regarding conflict engagement that underscore differences among major powers, according to the status accorded to them. First, and most obvious, we expect that status consistent major powers, equipped with substantial capabilities, the willingness to act as major powers to order interstate relations, and having been accorded substantial status, are the ones most likely to intervene in

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<sup>10</sup> Previous work also developed a series of procedures with which to establish substantial face validity for the data generated (Corbetta et al. 2008).

ongoing interstate conflicts, compared to both status inconsistent major powers and other states. Second, we expect status *underachieving* major powers to intervene substantially in ongoing interstate conflicts, but lacking full status attribution and hence having more limited capabilities to engage successfully, they are less likely to do so than status consistent powers. Third, we expect status *overachieving* major powers, equipped with full status attribution but lacking substantial material capabilities to match their status, to be less willing to participate in ongoing interstate conflicts.

**Table 1. Joining MIDS by Status Type, 1950-2001.**

\* The unit of analysis is country year.

Type of State	Does not Join	Joins	Total
<b>Not Major Power</b>	94% (5,799)	6% (372)	100% (6,171)
<b>Status Consistent Major Power</b>	20% (14)	80% (56)	100% (70)
<b>Status Inconsistent Major Power</b>	59% (80)	41% (55)	100% (135)

We offer preliminary tests of these predictions, using data on militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) and assessments regarding when states join an ongoing MID.<sup>11</sup> The temporal time frame for the analysis is the period 1950-2001. We present the evidence in Tables 1 and 2. The first table simply compares the MID joining behavior of status consistent major powers,

<sup>11</sup> We use the Correlates of War Militarized Interstate Disputes data, available at: <http://www.correlatesofwar.org/COW2%20Data/MIDs/MID310.html>. See Ghosn et al., 2004.

status inconsistent major powers, and other states in terms of their proclivity to join ongoing MIDS. Clearly, status consistent powers are overwhelmingly found to intervene in MIDS, status inconsistent powers far less so, while other states not initially party to the MID, hardly at all.

**Table 2. Logit Models of Major Power Status and MID Joining, 1950—2001.**

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
All Major Powers	.83*** (.231)		
Status Consistent Major Powers		1.34*** (.332)	1.34*** (.333)
Status Inconsistent Major Powers		.59** (.200)	
Status Inconsistent Overachievers			.61 (.340)
Status Inconsistent Underachievers			.58*** (.224)
=====			
In (Capabilities) <sup>12</sup>	.33*** (.048)	.32*** (.048)	.32** (.048)
Constant	1.33*** (.369)	1.25*** (.372)	1.25*** (.375)
N	6,441	6,441	6,441
Chi 2	493.88***	738.81***	770.96***

Table 2 offers three logit models with which to compare major powers in terms of their status and their proclivity to join ongoing MIDS; this approach allows us to control for a variety of factors normally associated with MIDS participation. Nevertheless, the relationships hold as

<sup>12</sup> Other control variables (contiguity, regime type, gdp/capita) are not shown but were included in the models).

expected, and even though the capabilities of states are separately estimated in the models. Overachieving, underachieving and status consistent major powers demonstrate significantly different patterns of involvement with ongoing militarized interstate disputes, consistent with our predictions.

### **Status and Involvement with the Network of IGOs**

While status overachieving major powers are understandably less engaged in ongoing interstate conflicts, this does not mean that they are unengaged in international affairs. In fact, quite the contrary. It is not likely that they can keep the status that they have been attributed without substantial, ongoing engagement and exhibition of major power leadership. We expect to find evidence of such engagement partly in the realm of structured international cooperation, where states are less dependent on overwhelming material capabilities for the pursuit of their objectives. Specifically, we expect that status overachieving major powers, compared to underachievers and status consistent powers, should be the ones most likely to be engaged in intergovernmental organizations: participating in them, helping to create them, and helping to maintain them.

We seek to test this idea by focusing on the changes that have occurred in the constellation of formal, intergovernmental organizations (FIGOs)<sup>13</sup> since the end of the Cold War. We are examining the types of FIGOs that have been created, the states that were key to their creation, the viability (how many of them endured after being created) of these organizations, and the extent to which we can differentiate between major power involvement in the creation and maintenance of these FIGOs, based on their status classification.

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<sup>13</sup> For analysis of FIGOs, and the appropriate database, see Volgy et al., 2009.

Anecdotal evidence suggests that overachieving major powers have been in the forefront in creating inter-regional FIGOs, and have articulated visions of global FIGOs as well (although the creation of viable global organizations requires substantial capabilities that they may not possess). Russia and China, two status overachieving major powers have been in the lead in the creation of inter-regional structures in former Soviet space and Central Asia since the end of the Cold War. Likewise, France, during the 1980s moved aggressively into the FIGO realm in order to maintain its status attribution as an overachieving major power (Badie, 2010).

We are still in the process of compiling systematic data in order to move from anecdotal to more rigorous evidence, and unfortunately, that process is not yet finished as we come to this conference. We are loath to make claims with incomplete data, *and warn the reader that what follows is extremely preliminary*, but the following trends are beginning to appear, consistent with our expectations:

- When inter-regional FIGO creation occurs in the post-Cold War era, overachieving major powers are leading the effort;
- Typically, and since they lack substantial capabilities, the effort is seldom undertaken alone, without the partnership of at least one other overachieving major power, or a regional power that is highly salient to the geopolitical space in question;
- The long term viability of these efforts, given limited resources with which to nurture and stabilize these organizations, is somewhat questionable: while FIGOs created by overachieving major powers tend to outlive those without any major power involvement, they are less likely to endure than those created by underachieving or status consistent major powers.

- No global FIGO creation can occur—at least those that can attain some longevity—through the prime sponsorship of overachieving major powers, even in combination with regional powers and other actors that are not major powers. This, of course is not the case for status consistent major powers.

### **A Concluding Note**

We offer once more our apologies for failing to produce the data needed for the relationship between status consistency and organizational creation and viability. Our empirical work however is nearly complete and appears to provide support for our contentions regarding construction of networks of FIGOs in post-Cold War international relations. That status overachieving powers are not sufficiently strong to create enduring FIGO architecture—while underachievers and status consistent major powers are less interested in this process—is consistent with more general observations regarding the increased movement of states toward informal mechanisms of collaboration in the absence of viable, strong institutions of inter-regional and global governance in the post-1989 world (Forman and Segar, 2006).

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**APPENDIX: Major Power Measures and Status Consistency, Five Year Intervals, 1951-2005.<sup>14</sup>**

STATE/Time Frame	Capabilities				Foreign Policy <sup>15</sup>		Status <sup>16</sup>		Consistency <sup>17</sup>
	GDP	EcReach	MilSp	MilReach	Coop	Conflict	Dipcon	Visits	
<b>US</b>									
1951-55	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	SC
1956-60	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	SC
1961-65	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	SC
1966-70	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	SC
1971-75	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	SC
1976-80	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	SC
1981-85	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	SC
1986-90	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	SC
1991-95	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	SC
1996-2000	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	SC
2001-2005	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	SC
=====									
<b>USSR/RUSSIA</b>									
1951-55	+		+		+	+		+	SIU
1956-60	+	+	+	+	+	+		+	SIU
1961-65	+		+	+	+	+		+	SIU
1966-70	+	+	+	+	+	+		+	SIU
1971-75	+	+	+	+	+	+		+	SIU
1976-80	+	+	+	+	+	+		+	SIU
1981-85	+		+	+	+	+	+	+	SIO
1986-90	+		+		+	+	+	+	SIO
1991-95	+				+	+	+	+	SIO
1996-2000	+				+		+	+	SIO
2001-2005	+				+		+	+	SIO
=====									
<b>UK</b>									
1951-55	+	+			+		+		ns
1956-60	+	+			+	+	+		ns
1961-65	+	+		+	+	+	+		SIU
1966-70	+	+		+	+		+		SIU
1971-75	+	+			+		+		ns
1976-80	+	+		+	+		+		SIU
1981-85	+	+	+	+	+		+		SIU
1986-90	+	+	+	+	+		+		SIU
1991-95	+	+	+	+	+		+		SIU
1996-2000	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	SC
2001-2005	+	+	+	+	+	+	+		SIU
=====									
<b>FRANCE</b>									
1951-55		+			+	+	+		SIU
1956-60		+			+	+	+		SIU

<sup>14</sup> Table is from Volgy et al. 2010b:33-35.

<sup>15</sup> Asterisk (\*) indicates that the one sd threshold is met or surpassed but not for extra-regional interactions.

<sup>16</sup> Status attribution measures at two standard deviations from mean of all states.

<sup>17</sup> SC = Status consistent; SIO = Status inconsistent/overachiever; SIU = Status inconsistent/underachiever; ns= no major power status.

1961-65	+	+			+			+	ns
1966-70	+	+		+	+	+		+	SIU
1971-75	+	+						+	SIO
1976-80	+	+			+			+	SIO
1981-85	+	+			+			+	SIO
1986-90	+	+			+			+	SIO
1991-95	+	+	+	+	+	+		+	SC
1996-2000	+	+	+	+	+	+		+	SC
2001-2005	+	+	+	+	+	+		+	SIU

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**GERMANY**

1951-55	+				+				ns
1956-60	+	+							ns
1961-65	+	+		+	+				ns
1966-70	+	+		+	+				ns
1971-75	+	+							ns
1976-80	+	+		+				+	ns
1981-85	+	+						+	ns
1986-90	+	+						+	ns
1991-95	+	+	+	+	+			+	ns
1996-2000	+	+	+	+	+	+		+	SIU
2001-2005	+	+			+	+		+	ns

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**CHINA**

1951-55	+					+			ns
1956-60	+								ns
1961-65	+		+			+			ns
1966-70	+		+			+			ns
1971-75	+		+						ns
1976-80	+		+			+			ns
1981-85	+								ns
1986-90	+							+	ns
1991-95	+	+			+	+		+	SIO
1996-2000	+	+			+	+		+	SIO
2001-2005	+	+			+	+		+	SIO

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**JAPAN**

1950-55									ns
1956-60	+								ns
1961-65	+	+							ns
1966-70	+	+							ns
1971-75	+	+							ns
1976-80	+	+							ns
1981-85	+	+						+	ns
1986-90	+	+		+				+	ns
1991-95	+	+		+	+	+		+	SIO
1996-2000	+	+	+	+	+	+		+	SC
2001-2005	+	+		+	+			+	SIU