

Iran's Nuclear Ambitions:
What Caused this Multilateral Headache?

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Abstract: Iran's nuclear ambitions challenge the current nuclear order. The Iranian leadership has proven remarkably resistant to the pressure imposed by powerful international actors, including the United States, the European Union, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the UN Security Council. The beaten track in the analytic efforts to reveal primary causes to nuclear proliferation is the actual and perceived security-situation, but the empirical record point in the direction of mixed motives to states' nuclear ambitions. Recent qualitative and quantitative research alike present results indicating the NPT as insignificant to mitigate proliferation, and jump into conclusions with regard to the constructivist argument of norm impact on state action as invalid. Yet there is a flip-side to the constructivist argument. This article accentuates the obstacles to norm impact identified in the constructivist literature, and uses the Iranian case to empirically illustrate that deficiencies in the institutional context might reinforce motivations to nuclear ambitions. To clarify, the experience of the NPT-regime as illegitimate does not only offer a sense of rightness to cause in relation to other states and international actors, but armours the domestic vision of the nuclear program as a symbol of scientific progress. The empirical study relies on an analytic framework that identifies three contexts (geo-political, institutional and domestic) with corresponding motives (instrumental, normative and societal). The analysis focus on the dispositional dimension: the set of beliefs and experiences among state representatives that connects these contexts and motives.

For presentation at the SGIR 7th Pan-European International Relations Conference,
Stockholm, September 9-11, 2010.

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Iran's Nuclear Ambitions – A Lingering Multilateral Headache

The Iranian nuclear issue has been an important topic on the global agenda the past seven years, and the Iranian leadership has proven remarkably resistant to the diplomatic pressure imposed by powerful actors, including the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the EU, the United States and the UN Security Council.¹ Iran's nuclear program is a global concern – most immediately to the non-proliferation regime – for at least three reasons. First, Iran has been caught in non-compliance with the safeguards agreements of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).² Second, there are indications that some of these non-compliant activities might be weapon-related.³ Third, although not a breach of the NPT, Iran's decisiveness to master the complete nuclear fuel cycle equals an actual domestic capacity to produce fissile material as fuel for a nuclear weapon. These concerns are in a way separate, yet also related. The worst headache is arguably caused by the circumstance that although the NPT allows non nuclear weapons states (NNWS) to develop uranium enrichment capacity, there is a widespread suspicion that the Iranian political leadership desires this technology primarily due to a nuclear weapon ambition. Throughout the entire process, Iranian officials have argued to the contrary. Apprehensions are nevertheless entertained by a number of structural circumstances, such as the revolutionary character of Iranian statehood, its unstable geo-political context, and the absence of clear economic benefit to the uranium enrichment project. Misgivings for the already concerned are strengthened further by the *ideas outspoken* and *actions taken* by Iran's current political leadership. As one of the key-figures of the principalist movement in Iranian politics, Mahmoud Ahmedinejad has recurrently during his presidency expressed a more radical Islamist version of the Iranian state's views of world affairs. The Iranian diplomatic strategy has had a strong tendency of delaying the process. Reassurances of “no undeclared activity in Iran” were also contradicted through the announcement of another nuclear facility under construction in Qom.⁴ The character of the Iranian case, with the nuclear weapons ambitions still in dispute, makes it less suited for an empirical test to reveal whether security may be considered a primary motive, and more suitable to advance our understanding. It is much more suitable for analysis with regard to other motives to nuclear ambitions, since the diplomatic process, most notably the dialogue between the IAEA and Iran, have produced a public material that allows analysis for the sake of tracing ideational links within the Iranian nuclear position. As the theoretical section is about to illuminate, such analysis seems required to advance our understanding on contextual circumstances to state leader's nuclear decisions.

Aims of the Article

The political rationale to Iran's nuclear program is the analytic centre of attention. This article seeks to contribute to the existing knowledge of nuclear ambition through analysis of descriptions and motivations by the Iranian leadership to its nuclear program. The analysis is carried out on basis of an empirical framework that identifies three contexts (geo-political, institutional, domestic) with corresponding motives (instrumental, normative, social) to nuclear ambitions. The aim of the empirical study is not to identify the primary motive to Iran's nuclear ambitions, but to investigate the interconnections between these different contexts and motivations. The results reveal that deficiencies in the institutional context might reinforce normative as well as social motivations to nuclear ambitions. To clarify, the experience of the NPT-regime as illegitimate does not only offer a sense of rightness to cause in relation to other states and international actors, but armours the domestic vision of the nuclear program as a symbol of scientific progress.

The Study of Nuclear Proliferation

In the literature on nuclear proliferation, the beaten track in the search for explanations is the actual and perceived security-situation. The current empirical record points in the direction of mixed motives.⁵ Similar to studies of state action in general, the study of nuclear proliferation relies rather heavily on assumptions of intentions and goals behind a chosen direction of policy. *Motives* are considered essential to "the initiation, maintenance and direction of action".⁶ Yet to actually reveal motives to state action is recognised as notoriously difficult – nuclear ambitions are by no means an exception. To the contrary, the indeterminacy of a lengthy and complex process, and the extensive secretiveness of decision-making, accounts for particular challenges to studying nuclear proliferation. The limited number of cases is another obstacle to this field of research. International relations theory and foreign policy analysis (FPA) address the challenge of revealing motives to action differently. IR-theory assumes a number of objectives to foreign-policy carried out by the state, and for the most part these objectives are deducted from the structural conditions of the international system. Foreign policy analysis (FPA) objects the ascribing of motives to the abstraction a state, and seeks instead to unpack the agency of the state, and to employ more specified theories in order to understand the motivational part of foreign policy decision making.⁷ The theoretical framework that guides this study does in fact do a little bit of both. I will introduce research on proliferation to prove the utility of this somewhat eclectic approach. Scott Sagan's three models – the most important point of reference in the study of causes to nuclear proliferation

– represent an eloquent deduction of state motives to nuclear ambitions on basis of IR-theory.⁸ To illustrate, 1) the security model, which relies on structural realism, anticipates that strong states develop nuclear weapons if this capability improves their security-situation, whereas weaker states are obliged to acquire a nuclear ally for the sake of improving their national security. Thus, the presence of external threats and concerns of national security, along with the actual capacity to defy the international community, is what clinch the matter. 2) The domestic politics model, which relies on neo-liberalism, underlines the significance of domestic pressure from public opinion and/or elites in society, such as the military or nuclear scientists, to the decision to go nuclear. Thus, the political leadership might seek nuclear weapon capability in order to please influential elites and/or to strengthen their own power through support from public opinion. 3) The norms model, which relies on constructivism, underlines the impact of norms prescribing what is appropriate in international relations, and how these norms interact with state identity. Thus, the political leadership may choose a policy-direction that adheres to the principles of international regulations.⁹ In addition to Sagan’s rather straightforward models, the literature on nuclear proliferation reveals a complex pattern of drives and motivations for nuclear ambitions. These explanations do not necessarily contradict Sagan’s approach, but might offer a more detailed study of the general logic captured through these models. To illustrate, in his analysis of the shift in India’s nuclear path, Sumit Ganguly points at an increased threat-perception from China and Pakistan since the end of the Cold War, along with “the reactions of the great powers to its security-concerns”.¹⁰ George Perkovich’s analysis rather underlines impact of factors such as the nation’s moral norms, India’s postcolonial identity, and underlines the conscious exclusion of the military from nuclear decision-making.¹¹ Itty Abraham illuminates how institutional preconditions have accounted for an extraordinary influential nuclear scientific lobby in India. In addition, Abraham argues that the employment of nuclear-technology, as an energy-source and for military ends, should be seen as part of the practices development and security that are of crucial importance for a third world country in the process of state-building.¹² In his exploration of Iran’s nuclear ambitions, Shahram Chubin argues that the quest for regional leadership is an important drive.¹³ In contrast, Saira Khan concludes that “Iran’s quest for nuclear weapons has been a function of its security needs.”¹⁴ She appoints Iraq as the “long-term military rival”, and underlines past experiences, that these two states “fought one of the deadliest and longest wars of this century”.¹⁵ These referred studies support and complement Sagan’s models, and add to the empirical pattern of mixed motives to nuclear proliferation. Yet there is also recent research that stand more in contrast to the established views. Hymans

(2007) explains the decision to either abstain from, or finally choosing to “go nuclear”, by state leaders’ national identity conception. State leaders with an “oppositional nationalist” identity conception are likely to “go for the bomb”, whereas leaders with a “sportsmanlike subaltern” identity conception are unlikely to desire nuclear armament. Thereby, this cross-case comparison (including France, Australia, Argentina and India) points at the significance of ideational properties of single leaders, and quests structural/contextual factors as determinants of strategic decision-making. Hymans specifically questions conclusions drawn in research regarding the NPT as “an essential dam holding back the tide of nuclear proliferation”.¹⁶ He argues that the NPT cannot support the explanatory weight it has been asked to bear, by referring to a number of objections: the wide gap between nuclear capable and actual nuclear weapon states already before the NPT was negotiated, that recent proliferation has not been restricted to “rouge states” assumed not to care about their reputation, and severe shortcomings in the treaty design that means it cannot offer adequate assurance that rivals “are also keeping their nuclear powder dry”.¹⁷ Recent quantitative analysis to nuclear proliferation adds to the view of a rather limited role of the NPT. Jo & Gartzke (2007) relies on multivariate regression to assess the effects of domestic and international conditions on nuclear proliferation. According to their results, signatories to the NPT appear somewhat less likely to initiate nuclear weapons programs, but the treaty has not deterred proliferation at the system level. They conclude that “Enthusiasm for the NPT among proliferation opponents thus appears to be misplaced. We speculate that the most important contribution to the treaty is as a forum for communication and debate about nuclear issues.”¹⁸. Given the rather limited number of cases, the study of proliferation has a strong tradition of comparative case-studies and historical process-tracing. The study by Jo & Gartzke (2007) is part of a second wave of statistical analysis to this field.¹⁹ The approach, design and findings of this statistical research have given rise to some debate. One matter of dispute concerns the potential policy-implications of studies, and what counts a robust basis for recommendations. Jo & Gartzke (2007) argues “With few systematic tests, it is possible for expert opinion and policy recommendation to be formulated in error.”²⁰. In contrast, Müller (2010) argues that a lack of devotion to the single case, and abstaining from tracing the process that led to the nuclear decision, has potentially damaging consequences.²¹ Given the secrecy of nuclear decision-making, Müller quests whether the statistical method fits data, and he also reveals doubtful decisions on coding within statistical studies. In a somewhat more subtle tone, Sagan & Montgomery (2009) identify specific problems that burdens statistical analysis in the study of proliferation, which need to be taken into account in the context of policy-

recommendations. These problems include accurate coding of the dependent variable (given nuclear secrecy), coding rules for the independent variables (a tendency to measure what is easy to measure), relationship between method, data and research-question, trivial findings, and the risk with neglecting individual data points (like the Kargil-war between India and Pakistan). It is beyond the scope of this article to indulge further in the details of this debate. Rather, in the context of this debate, next section return to, and contests the conclusions drawn with regard to the limited role of the NPT and the limited explanatory-capacity of the constructivist norm-argument.

The Flip-Side of Norm Impact

It is noteworthy that recent studies in the quantitative and qualitative tradition alike have reached strikingly similar conclusions with regard to the NPT. Perhaps even more so considering their competing theoretical starting-points; Hymans study may be described as ideational-psychological-domestic, whereas the second wave of statistical analysis adopts a strategic-international approach to nuclear proliferation. It may be argued that this similarity in conclusions with regard to the insignificance of international regulations on nuclear decisions drawn from both quantitative and qualitative research, on basis of competing theoretical views, would strongly indicate their robustness. I am about to argue to the contrary. First, both these studies substantiate their conclusion not only on basis of their empirical results, but also through a simplified view of the constructivist argument of norm impact on state action. They seem to ascribe constructivism the rather naïve assumption that presence of international norms always should socialize states in the direction of cooperation, when this in fact is conditioned on a number of circumstances. To be fair, the presumption that the impact of the NPT per definition runs in the direction of cooperation is not uncommon. Sagan argues the NPT has contributed to a normative shift in the sense that joining “the nuclear club” as a legitimate act granting international prestige was a part of the 1960s, whereas the 1990s rather is about joining the club of states that adheres to the NPT. However, there is a flip-side to the constructivist argument that we will turn to in a while. Second, neither of these studies analyse the actual dynamic between state agents and international environment. Jo & Gartzke(2007) reveal a statistical relationship, but add very little to our actual understanding to the processes that turns the NPT insignificant on the systemic level. In contrast, Hymans (2006) offers additional understanding to the rationale for leaders’ nuclear choices. Nevertheless, while his framework acknowledges an ideational domestic sphere, it excludes the relationship between state agents and the international

environment. Yet it seems plausible to assume that individual leaders' national identity conceptions do not come about in an international vacuum. To the contrary, it is rather likely that a state's international role is strongly connected to leaders' conceptions of national identity. To recapitulate, the study of proliferation acknowledge security as a key-factor to nuclear weapons capability, but has produced an empirical record that point in the direction of mixed motives to nuclear ambitions. Recent research seems in agreement that the NPT is of limited significance to nuclear choices. I have argued that this has led to a hasty conclusion regarding the constructivist argument of norm impact on state action, which rests on an over-simplified view and is based on approaches and/or methods that fail to take into account the ideational links between agents' decision and their environment. An empirical pattern indicating that the NPT does not prevent states to acquire nuclear weapons does not necessarily allow the conclusion that norms do not impact state action. The constructivist literature reveals potential obstacles that may obstruct norm impact in the direction of state cooperation. Finnemore & Sikkink (1998) identify three phases in the process when a norm becomes influential in world politics: emergence, cascade and internalization. The first phase concerns aspects of the initial norm building-process; the norm entrepreneurs and their organizational platform. At this stage, the norm spread basically through persuasion and the primary motivation is ideational commitment. The second phase is when the norm has had a major breakthrough and spreads more rapidly. There is a process of socialisation where states (and IOs) start to identify themselves as followers of this particular normative principle, and the primary motivations are reputation, esteem and legitimacy. The third phase is when the norm internalises in states' policies through institutionalisation among the concerned parties of society, such as bureaucracy and professions, with conformity as the primary motive.²² Further, their framework suggests a set of conditions for this extensive norm impact on state action: legitimation, prominence and intrinsic characteristics of the norm. Possible implications of these set of conditions are that: 1) state leaders may endorse international norms as a way of improve their position, at periods when the legitimacy of the political elite is threatened on the domestic arena, 2) norms promoted by prominent states – viewed as successful – have a greater chance of spreading, 3) norm content, specificity and clarity, may impact how influential the norms become in constraining state action.²³ Arguably, it is important to acknowledge that these implications sketch the successful path, but they might very well turn into obstacles. To illustrate, state leaders may also contest an international norm when their political authority is contested domestically (1), also at, or perhaps even because of, the support it acquires from powerful states (2), given that the content of this

particular norm has a weak support among public opinion (3). In fact, to those familiar with the history of the NPT, the scenario of highly contested principles also in the context of great power support should appear more familiar too.

Contextual Sources of State Motives

Previous section revealed the flip-side of the constructivist argument of norm impact on state action; norms are not constraints of state action per definition but need to possess certain qualities in the eye of the beholder to become powerful. Empirical examination requires an analytical tool that explicitly takes into account the ideational links between agents' decision and their environment. Preferably, the analysis should also take other potential motivations into account. A fundamental insight offered by the literature foreign policy analysis (FPA) is the lack of any immediate channel between structural circumstances and state motives.²⁴ Structural circumstances could very well translate into certain goals, but in order to do so they need first to be experienced on a more general ideational level, which means that might be more or less strongly experienced and/or interpreted differently among state agents. One way to capture this analytically is through the distinction between an intentional, dispositional and structural dimension of foreign policy actions is one way to capture this analytically. The dispositional dimension is a potential link between structural circumstances and the objectives of an agent as a broader view of experiences and beliefs that might make a given objective seem desirable. To illustrate, in order for an actual negative shift in a state's geopolitical environment (structural dimension) to translate in to attempts to counter such shift (intentional dimension) it has to be known and interpreted as a threat to national security (dispositional dimension).²⁵ Thus by integrating the dispositional dimensions, the study will depart from relevant structural circumstances in order to explore empirically the extent to which these circumstances are experienced by representatives of the Iranian state. Similar to Sagan's models, IR-theories will be used as departure for specifications of the contexts that may produce or reduce motives to a nuclear program, depending on state agents' beliefs and experiences. To clarify, structural realism focus on the geo-political context of the international environment, whereas neoliberal institutionalism and constructivism would pay more attention to the institutional context, and liberalism seeks to illuminate the significance of the domestic context. Iran's breach of the non-proliferation regime might be considered a multilateral case of non-compliance. The analysis might therefore gain from incorporating insights from motivational analysis conducted by research addressing the problem of compliance to regulations. In addition to instrumental motivations, this literature identifies

normative and social motivations for consent and rule-acceptance, suggesting that they could play a complementary explanatory role to non-compliance.²⁶ To specify, normative motivations emanate from an evaluations of whether regulations, their enforcement and overall authority are legitimate. Perceptions of illegitimacy decrease the inclination to comply. Social motivations are rooted in aspirations to appropriateness in accordance with norms shared among members in a community; roles and positions in a society are connected with expectations of performing certain actions rather than others. If acting in accordance with international regulations corresponds with what is regarded as appropriate leadership within the domestic context they are more inclined to do so. domestic Consequently, in contrast to Sagan I argue that the assumption of appropriateness as logic of action is less valid as an expectation between states when it comes to whether state cooperate or not, and more relevant for political leaders' relationship with the domestic opinion. To clarify, I suggest that there are normative motivations with regard to the international regulation founded in an evaluation of whether principle content, regulation and authority as legitimate. Further, I suggest that there are social motivations with regard to the domestic scene in terms of an expectation of appropriateness. In the field of nuclear technology I argue that the aspect of societal development needs to be considered, since previous research has pointed to the significance of nuclear technology as a sign of technological advancement and societal modernisation. Next section summarises and advances these initial theoretical specifications in a framework.

Studying Nuclear Ambitions: An Analytical Framework

The table below separates between a structural, dispositional and intentional dimension of nuclear ambitions. The dispositional dimension links between structural conditions, or contexts, and state agents motives, or purposes of action; it is a set of beliefs that makes a certain objective seem desirable given certain circumstances, and thereby they may be regarded as a source of state agents' motives. The table identifies three relevant contexts for state agents nuclear ambitions, and illustrate the specification with regard to the "because of" that might encourage nuclear ambitions. Further, the framework reveals preliminary expectations with regard to motivations connected to each context. While the geo-political context is expected to account for instrumental motivations founded on assessments of security, the institutional context is expected to account for normative motivations on basis of evaluations of the overall trustworthiness and legitimacy of the international regime, and the

domestic context is linked to social motivations with regard to appropriate paths towards scientific and societal advancement.

Table 1. Dimensions of states' nuclear ambitions.

Structural dimension	Dispositional dimension ("Because of")	Intentional dimension (Purpose of action)
Geo-political context	Concerns of national security	Instrumental motivations
Institutional context	Legitimacy and trustworthiness of regime	Normative motivations
Domestic context	Scientific progress and societal development	Social motivations

Before studying the position of the Iranian political leadership on the nuclear issue by help of this framework, we need to advance the content of these intentional dimensions. The coming sections will give a brief description of the three contexts identified as relevant to Iran's nuclear ambitions, and this will generate specifications of the potential motives.

The Geo-Political Context

Iran's nuclear ambitions are commonly seen in the context of regional security, which tend to reinforce rather than diminish the conclusion that there is military dimension to Iran's nuclear program. True, Iran is situated in one of the most instable regions in the world, and this might of course lead to a rather high level of security-alert among the Iranian leadership. In addition to profound regional instability, there is also an Iranian quest for regional leadership. Chubin (2006) identifies nationalism as the main source of this aspiration with "the emphasis on revolutionary Iran as a role model, the exploitation of Islam, and the zero-sum approach to the Western powers" as specific features to the Islamic Republic of Iran.²⁷ The two most problematic relations to Iran are Iraq and Israel. In the past years, Iraq has become slightly less concerning - the new political situation enables establishing relations with Shiite groupings in Iraq. The relationship with Israel remains characterised with a profound distrust, manifested in a rather fierce rhetoric among decision-makers. Iran is the only state in the Middle East that denies Israel's right to exist. Iran's current president, Mahmoud

Ahmedinejad, has been particularly eager to question Israel. Israel, on the other hand, argues that Iran is not only a threat to Israel, but to the entire world. There is a prevailing view among Israeli decision-makers that Iran seeks regional hegemony, and is thereby dividing the Middle East, undermining the prospects of stability and peace. Overall, Iran's regional position has been strengthened since 2001, through the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The fall of Saddam Hussein's regime was clearly beneficial to Iran, and has led to a greater influence on Iraqi politics. However, considerations of Iran's regional security cannot be conducted only be relationships with states in the region, but has to take Iran's troublesome past with the United States into account. This becomes particularly evident from the perspective of an Iranian quest for regional leadership, as the US' involvements in the region tend to collide with Iran's priorities. Confrontations between Iran and the US are played out in Iraq, in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and in Lebanon.²⁸ Also a very brief overview like this identifies at least two potential ways in which the geo-political context may translate into beliefs that would foster instrumental motivations to a nuclear program. First, Iranian decision-makers could experience a profound fear on basis of the uncertainties and instabilities that characterise the political order of the region. The experience of a threatening environment might be the source of the urge for a nuclear deterrence. As already mentioned, it is noteworthy that a limited form of deterrence is established already through the declared enrichment capacity. A signal of technical capacity to produce fuel for a nuclear weapon, combined with the risk of a clandestine weapon program, might be terrifying enough. Second, Iranian decision-makers could assume that a nuclear weapons arsenal is beneficial to their aspirations for regional leadership. The regional role requires matching the capacity of one's most important adversaries active in the region, the United States and Israel.

The Institutional Context

The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was opened for signature 1 July 1968, entered into force 5 March 1970, and made permanent (or indefinitely extended) in May 1995. As is generally the case with multilateral agreements, the Non-Proliferation Treaty addresses a global social dilemma, rooted in the circumstance that even though nuclear weapons impose a threat to world security, possessing such weaponry could still appear beneficial to single states. Key to resolve such a dilemma through multilateral efforts is to get states, preferably all but at least a large majority, to commit to an agreement that formulates expectations in the shape of restrictions and obligations of action. The public good are successfully delivered when the agreement is reached and respected. The NPT separates between two categories of states –

Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) and Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) – and encourages cooperation in nuclear technology for peaceful purposes between them.²⁹ The treaty aims at preventing proliferation of nuclear weapons and formulates the expectation on parties to work in the direction of nuclear disarmament.³⁰ The NPT is today accepted by an overwhelming majority of the world's states and has the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at its service for matters of control and safeguard.³¹ Thus nuclear safeguard entertains broad support among states and is upheld through a rather mature and robust institutional framework. In the past decades, the development have nevertheless been in the direction of nuclear proliferation, including Iraq's secret nuclear weapons programme, the nuclear tests carried out by India and Pakistan (May 1998) and North Korea (in October 2006, May 2009), the nuclear business of the A.Q. Khan network, and the Iranian determinacy to further advancement of the complete nuclear fuel cycle. Behind these rather sensational contestations of the current nuclear order, there is also a more widespread discontent among non nuclear weapon states and INGOs alike with how the nuclear weapon states have privileged avoidance of (horizontal) proliferation, at the expense of working towards disarmament. The critique was present already at the inception of the NPT, and has gradually evolved to something like a "discourse of resistance" during the past decades – expressed at all occasions when the parties meet to negotiate in the field of nuclear weapons arms control. The unfortunate situation can be understood as a consequence of the uneasy bargain upon which the NPT rests – in the sense states who have abstained from developing nuclear weapons experience the nuclear weapons states unwilling to give up the strategic advantage they possess through their nuclear weapons arsenals. When the NAM-movement criticize the NWS for not paying sufficient attention to the goal of disarmament it is basically an accusation of free-riding. The bargain illustrates a shift in the US strategy as the world's first nuclear weapons capable state. The previous attempts to avoid spread of nuclear know-how were replaced with a readiness to assist other states to develop nuclear technology for civil use – if combined with an obligation to abstain from the weapons-option.³² The decision not to make the NPT permanent from the start, but to hold review and extension-conferences every five years, was a consequence of the remaining hesitation among states to agree to such an obligation. Given the uncertain future – the significance of nuclear weapons would after all depend on the coming actions of states already in possession of them – to permanently give up the weapons-option appeared too risky. The difference between nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states in their priorities between non-proliferation and disarmament became strikingly evident at the 1995 review and extension conference, when the NPT was

made permanent (or indefinitely extended). Tariq Rauf and Rebecka Johnson describe the work as “a disaster from the outset...carried out in the stilted and confrontational manner of a bygone time”.³³ Thus, on the matter of disarmament, opinions clashed completely. The NWS resisted calls made both by NAM states, and some Western states (including Canada, Sweden and Switzerland) for stronger commitment to disarmament. Instead, they kept their focus on already made arm reductions. In the end, the most significant achievement of the NPT conference was the indefinite extension of the treaty, and the inability to agree on a final declaration was the obvious setback.³⁴ As mentioned, discontent is most widely spread by members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and is rooted in the experience that Nuclear Weapon States privilege non-proliferation at the expense of disarmament. In 2000, the conference actually agreed upon a final document, including principles for proceeding in the direction of disarmament, but in 2005 work deadlocked yet again.³⁵ Taking stock of the institutional context reveals the presence of a normative tension within the NPT and a contestation of the current nuclear order that very much appear to contribute to undermining the legitimacy of the current nuclear order. There are at least two ways in which this particular context may translate into beliefs that would foster normative motivations to a nuclear program. First, Iranian decision-makers could experience a profound discontent with the principles of the NPT, which could generate the urge to question and conduct resistance against this particular order. Second, this profound distrust in the regime and its advocates could generate actions of non-compliance as a principal defence of state sovereignty. Unlike the dispositional dimension linked to the geo-political context, this one is less likely to constitute a main intentional drive to a nuclear weapons program. It could however very well intensify an existing desire to advance a nuclear program.

The Domestic Context

Commitment to the legacy of the Islamic Revolution in 1979 is a necessity in Iranian politics. Aspirations to appropriately carrying the revolutionary principles are important on the political battlefield. In the past years, the new conservatives – the Principlists – have gained ground as the true heirs of Ayatollah Khomeini and loyal subjects of the current Supreme Leadership. The Principlist movement evolved in strength as a response to the success of the reformist wing of Iranian politics that was evident through the election of Khatami in 1997; they have been arguing for the return of the early purity of the Revolution..³⁶ After the Principlists defeated the reformist wing in the election to parliament, the presidential election in 2005 brought Mahmoud Ahmedinejad to power. Ahmedinejad remains in power – although

the demonstrations in the aftermath of the 2009 presidential election have proven that the Principalist movement does not stand uncontested. Although there has been extraordinary turmoil in Iranian politics the past year, the power of the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei appears unaltered. While Iran's president has tended to overshadow the Supreme Leader in Iran's foreign relations, the constitutional authority of the Supreme Leaders trumps that of the president. No major decision can be made without his consent.³⁷ From the perspective that Khamenei is the critical figure to understand the policies of the Islamic Republic, Sadjadpour (2008) analyses the views of his speeches and writings. Broadly, the analysis reveals a strong focus on the virtues of the 1979 revolution – justice, independence, self-sufficiency, and Islam – and views permeated by a deep disdain for Israel, and criticism against the United States. With regard to the nuclear program, Khamenei believes that the opposition to Iran's nuclear ambitions from the United States is rooted in a concern with regard to the independence and economic leverage Iran would acquire from it Sadjadpour concludes there is a revolutionary symbolism to it in the sense that Khamenei's views includes a link between scientific advancement, self-sufficiency, and political independence. This should also be seen in the context of Khamenei's constantly stressing the necessity of overcoming Iran's "scientific retardation".³⁸ With regard to the significance of advancing nuclear technology, the views of the Supreme Leaders coincide with a majority of the Iranian public. Studies conducted by World Public Opinion show that a large majority (81 percent) are in favour of the production of nuclear fuel for energy production. Noteworthy, a somewhat smaller majority (59 percent) still thinks it is a good idea that Iran continues to be a member of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and a majority (58 percent) also considers nuclear weapons as against the principles of Islam.³⁹ A brief overview of the domestic context like this reveals there are beliefs that could foster social motivations to nuclear ambitions. The political leadership might experience an expectation to guide the society in the direction of scientific progress and modernisation, and a nuclear program may very well be regarded as an appropriate mean for this purpose. The uncertain and instable tendencies of Iranian politics might also make the need for such success-story even more important.

The specifications on nuclear motives made on basis of the contextual dimensions are summarised in the table below.

Table 2. Contextually fostered beliefs that promote nuclear motives

Structural dimension	Dispositional dimension ("Because of")	Intentional dimension (Purpose)
Geo-political context	Deterrence as response to regional instability Nuclear weapons as a necessary mean to the quest for regional leadership	Instrumental motivations: Improve national security Become regional power
Institutional context	Untrustworthy regime Illegitimate principles	Normative motivations: Contest illegitimate multilateral regime Carry out Principle defence of state sovereignty
Domestic context	Nuclear technology as a symbol of scientific progress and modernisation	Social motivations: Appropriate leadership Move society towards success

The coming sections continue with the empirical analysis on basis of these specifications. The study will cover five initial phases of the diplomatic process: "Negotiating with the EU3", "Facing the UN Security Council", "El Baradei's work plan", "Deadlock" and "A New Dialouge?"

Revealing Non-Compliance

In December 2002, USA released satellite images of the nuclear sites discovered in Iran, and stated that Iran is "actively working to develop nuclear weapons capability".⁴⁰ The Iranian President Mohammed Khatami emphasized that Iran is a signatory to the NPT declaring that Iran does not seek nuclear arms. In February 2003, an IAEA inspection team, including Director-General Mohammad El Baradei, visited the sites at Natanz and Arak. The team detected breach of the NPT, and was surprised by the advanced state of Iran's nuclear program. El Baradei urged Iran to sign an additional protocol, but Iran refused to agree to undeclared inspections. The past years of diplomatic activities have aimed to sort out the origin and character (civil or military) of the Iranian nuclear program, to make Iran implement

the Additional protocol of extended inspection and supervision, and to make Iran sustain uranium enrichment. Throughout the complete process, Iran has maintained its right to develop a complete nuclear fuel cycle and to stress that the nuclear programme is purely civil in character. The process has involved the IAEA, the EU3, the United States and the UN Security Council on the one side, and Iran on the other. The efforts have included inspection and dialogue (IAEA), bargaining and economic incentives (EU3), resolutions and sanctions (UNSC), and initially also a threatening reassurance that “all options are on the table” (USA). They have all failed so far.

Negotiating with the EU3

In September 2003, an IAEA resolution called for Iran’s full cooperation by October 31, and the US announced that this is Iran’s last chance to escape being brought to the UN Security Council. By the end of October, there was an agreement of negotiations between Iran and France, Great Britain and Germany (EU3).⁴¹ The initial agreement with the EU3 included an acceptance to halt enrichment activities, to sign and implement the additional protocol and to satisfy the IAEA’s concerns about nuclear activities in the past. The EU3 diplomacy was complemented with political pressure from the US, and the IAEA continues to investigate Iran’s nuclear activity. During this process, Tehran revised the previous claim that the enrichment-related technology was the result of indigenous activity, as the IAEA discovered traces of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in environmental samples at Natanz. It became clear that enrichment centrifuges are of Pakistani origin and activities are linked to the AQ Kahn network. Teheran claimed that these past activities were solely for the purpose of developing a national civilian nuclear energy program, with no weapon ambition. The negotiations culminated in August 2005 with the EU3 proposal promising economic and political cooperation, if Tehran abstains from the aspirations of a nuclear fuel cycle. Teheran rejected the European offer, stating that it fails to meet minimum expectations and informs the IAEA the intention to resume enrichment work.⁴² At this point, there had been a shift in conservative direction of Iran’s political leadership: Mahmoud Ahmedinejad succeeds Khatami as president, and appoints Ali Larijani as head of Iran’s National Security Council, replacing Hasan Rowhani.⁴³ In September 2007, at his first speech in the UN General Assembly as President of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmedinejad levels fierce critique towards “hegemonic powers”, and gives an intense defence of Iran’s right to nuclear technology. Similar to the speeches in the coming years, it is intensely nationalist in character, describing Iran as a true bearer of democracy, and asking for a new spirituality and the return of justice as guiding principle in

world politics. Ahmendinejad appoints terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) as two major threat, and warns for the strong influence of a powerful states: “even more dangerous is that certain parties relying on their power and wealth try to impose a climate of intimidation and injustice over the world make bullying, while – through their huge media resources – portray themselves as defenders of freedom, democracy and human rights.”⁴⁴ The speech acknowledges the suffering of the people in Palestine. A large part of the speech describes the nuclear issue, as a matter of great injustice imposed on the Iranian state: “How can one talk about human rights and at the same time blatantly deny many the inalienable right to have access to science and technology with applications in medicine, industry and energy through force and intimidation hinder their progress and development.”⁴⁵ The speech defends the right to technological and scientific advancement, but asks whether nations can be “deprived of scientific and technological progress through the threat of use of force and based on mere allegations of possibility of military diversion?” The experienced injustice is described as inherent to the non-proliferation regime: “Some powerful states practice a discriminatory approach against access of NPT members to material, equipment, and peaceful nuclear technology, and by doing so, intend to impose nuclear apartheid.” Ahmedinejad declares that pursuit of nuclear weapons is prohibited in accordance with the religious principles of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the speech contains a request to reform the NPT “so that it can combat nuclear weapons and abolish the apartheid in peaceful nuclear technology”. The speech emphasis the “inalienable right to have access to a nuclear fuel cycle” and declares the technical and legal cooperation with the IAEA as “the centrepiece of our nuclear policy”.⁴⁶

Facing the UN Security Council

In March 2006, the IAEA submitted a report on Iran’s nuclear program to the UN Security Council. The permanent members of the UNSC have met already previous to this to discuss the matter. Iran responded with a decision not to implement the Additional Protocol and stalled cooperation with the IAEA that aims at clearing the past nuclear activities. The UNSC agrees on the first legally binding measures in July 2006. Resolution 1696 demands Iran to suspend enrichment activities. As Iran ignored this resolution, two sanction resolutions follow (1737 in December 2006 and 1747 in March 2007). Iran continued to ignore the UNSC demand.⁴⁷ In the 2006 UN speech, Ahmedinejad argues against WMDs, describing prevailing injustice as due to the use of force from powerful states. “How long should the people of the world live with the nightmare of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons?” “Is it not

possible to rely on justice, ethics and wisdom instead of these instruments of death?" The speech urges reform of the UN Security Council, and regrets the situation in Iraq, Palestine and Lebanon. The Security Council is criticised for incapacity to act with regard to these conflicts.⁴⁸

El Baradei's Work Plan

In July and August 2007, El Baradei managed to negotiate a work plan to guide further discussions with Teheran.⁴⁹ The plan is basic: IAEA would ask questions about each of the six outstanding issues regarding Iran's past and current nuclear program in turn. It would run parallel to negotiations with the EU3 and the decisions taken by the UNSC. In the 2007 UN speech, Ahmedinejad continues his critique of the UN Security Council, most directly the permanent members, for "exclusive and special right to veto in the Security Council act as prosecutor, judge and executioner, regardless of being a defendant or respondent. It is natural that countries that have been subjected to their infringements have no hope to get what they deserve from the Council."⁵⁰ He stresses the problematic situation in Iraq, and levels severe critique against "the Zionist regime" and speaks in defence of the Palestinian people: "The occupiers are protected and praised, while innocent people of Palestine are subjected to political, military and propaganda onslaughts."⁵¹ Addressing the nuclear issue, Ahmedinejad expresses discontent with the negotiation with the EU3, describing that "...the Iranian nation came to the resolute conviction that the main concern of these powers is not the possible deviation of Iran from the rules and regulations of the Agency, but its scientific progress." Critique is neither directed to the IAEA or the Security Council, but to the powerful states acting in their interest through these organisations. "By abusing the Security Council, the arrogant powers have repeatedly accused Iran and even made military threats against it over the last two years." In spite of the external pressure, Ahmedinejad describe the advancement of the nuclear program: "...thanks to the faith in God and the national unity, Iran has moved forward step by step and now our country is recognised as a country with the capacity for industrial scale fuel cycle production for peaceful purposes."⁵² On the substantive matter, the work plan worked reasonably well initially, but as things started to get more complicated the Iranians began to stall the process. The thorniest issue is the so called "alleged studies"; a set of documents that the IAEA has received from the USA and other member states that indicate past Iranian efforts to pursue experiments in line with a weapons ambition. The activities include the so called "green salt project", experiment on high explosives, and redesign of missiles to accommodate a nuclear warhead. The IAEA has assessed this information as

reliable in the sense that it “appears to have been derived from multiple sources over different periods of time, is detailed in content, and appears to be generally consistent.”⁵³ Iran has been confronted with this information, but without receiving copies. Instead, much of the information was handed over to the IAEA in electronic form, and the Agency has not been authorised to give copies to Iran by the member states that provided it in the first place. Iran used these restraints in access to question the substantive content of the documentation. Although admitting that some of the information is authentic, Iran stated that parts of it is fabricated, maintaining that “the Islamic Republic of Iran has not had and shall not have any nuclear weapon program.”⁵⁴ At this point, the UNSC adopted another resolution (1803 in February 2008), including new sanctions such as authorizing inspections of suspicious cargo to and from Iran, tightening the monitoring of financial institutions and extending travel bans and freezing assets. In May 2008, the IAEA reported that Iran is prepared to address the alleged studies. However, while Iran admitted that some of the information were correct, Iran still maintains that parts of it are fabricated.

Deadlock

In June 2008, the EU3 offered another incentive-package, which Teheran dismissed as the condition was halting the uranium enrichment program. In September 2008, the IAEA presented another report that focuses on Iran’s unwillingness to address the alleged studies. The report concludes that Iran is making progress in uranium enrichment through gas centrifuges, and has produced 480 kg of LEU.⁵⁵ A written response to the report, emphasis there is no undeclared nuclear activity and material in Iran, and expresses a strong discontent with the so called alleged studies, and accuses the United States for interfering in the process and through “exerting various political pressure the United States attempted to spoil the cooperative spirit between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the IAEA.”⁵⁶ Iran remains dissatisfied with not having had access to the accurate and complete documentation. In fact, Iran questioned the documentation, arguing that “slides and documents produced by the United States are fabricated and baseless allegations attributed to Iran.”⁵⁷ The response argues that implementation of safeguards in Iran should continue in a routine manner, and states “...it is not Iran but those countries which brought the issue to the UN Security Council should be blamed.”⁵⁸ A related response describes the alleged studies as “politically motivated and baseless allegations”.⁵⁹ At this point, positions were deadlocked. The IAEA urged Iran to identify what parts of the documentations are not authentic, but Iran responded that such clarification would lead to exposure of national security information and thereby violate

Iran's sovereign rights. According to Iran, this exceeds IAEA's mandate, restricted to investigate Iran's nuclear activities as agreed outstanding issues.⁶⁰ The IAEA reported to the UN Security Council that Iran has failed to cooperate regarding the alleged studies, arguing that "Iran needs to provide the Agency with substantive information to support its statements and provide access to relevant documentation and individuals in this regard."⁶¹ In his 2008 UN Speech, President Ahmedinejad reiterates the request for justice in world politics, and particularly expresses regrets for the situations in Iraq, Afghanistan and Palestine, along with anti-Semitic descriptions: "The dignity, integrity and rights of the American and European people are being played with by a small but deceitful number of people called Zionists." He gives ominous descriptions of the future of Israel: "Today, the Zionist regime is on a definite slope to collapse, and there is no way for it to get out of the cesspool created by itself and its supporters.", and in a similar manner regarding the United States: "American empire in the world is reaching the end of its road, and its next rulers must limit their interference to their own borders. Today, the thought of hegemony quickly becomes a demerit."⁶² With regard to the nuclear issue, he continues to underline Iran's (and all other nations) inalienable right to nuclear fuel for peaceful purposes, and expresses the view that Iran is subjected to a great injustice: "...despite such facts as the transparency of all Iranian activities and our country's full cooperation with the inspectors of the IAEA and the Agency's repeated confirmation of the fact that Iran's nuclear activities are peaceful, a few bullying powers have sought to put hurdles in the way of the peaceful nuclear activities of the Iranian nation by exerting political and economic pressures against Iran, and through threatening and pressuring the IAEA." It is suggested that these states are not against weapons, but against the progress of other nations as they "tend to monopolize technologies and to use those monopolies in order to impose their will on other nations". Again, Ahmedinejad underlines that the Iranian nation has managed to resist the pressure: "...it is very natural that the great Iranian people, with their trust in God, and with the determination and steadfastness and with the support of its friends, will resist the bullying and has defended and will continue to defend its right."⁶³

A New Dialogue?

The US presidential shift brought substantial hope of breaking the deadlock, and a presidential shift also in Iran was commonly wished for.⁶⁴ It is not until several months after the dramatic presidential election in Iran, which in the end did not lead to a shift in power, that there was a breakthrough. A meeting between the P-5 plus Germany and Iran took place October 1 2009. ElBaradei visited Teheran October 4 2009, and Iran agreed to inspections of

the recently declared nuclear facility in Qom.⁶⁵ As this dialogue is in progress, it is clear that Iran has not backed on the right to nuclear fuel enrichment. In June 2009, Ambassador Soltanieh had expressed the Iranian view of the nuclear issue to the IAEA Board of Governors. Soltanieh asks why the Iranian nuclear issue still is on the agenda and argues it is “due to political motivation and pressure exerted by couple of countries with a hidden agenda, in full contravention with the spirit and letter of the IAEA Statute.”⁶⁶ He argued further that these countries are manipulating the IAEA for their own purposes: “They are trying to turn the Agency into a “UN Watchdog” with maximum intrusiveness in safeguards in order to interfere to the national security of majority of Member States under the pretext of non-proliferation”.⁶⁷ The speech emphasis the widespread concern in the international community about shortcomings of the Non-Proliferation Regime, especially accusing the United States for: “the non-compliance with article VI of NPT regarding nuclear disarmament as well as violation of article I in transferring nuclear materials and technology to Israeli regime, the only non-party to NPT in the Middle East, the last but not the least in the double standard policy which has jeopardized the NPT credibility and universality.”⁶⁸ Soltanieh underscores that Iran is determined to continue with its nuclear program: “The Government of the Islamic Republic shall not deprive its Great Nation from its inalienable right utilizing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, including nuclear fuel cycle, specifically enrichment.....The world has noticed that the Iranian people with the background of thousand years of civilization and contribution of science to humankind are united on the issue of nuclear energy”⁶⁹ In his 2009 UN Speech, Ahmedinejad acknowledges the difficult situation in Palestine, and in Iraq and Afghanistan. He requests reform of the UN Security Council, and argues for elimination of WMDs. In general terms, but obviously with Iran’s nuclear program in mind, he links the military capacity of some states with oppression and injustice against weaker states’ quest for societal development: “It is not acceptable that the military budget of some governments exceed far larger than those of the entire countries of the world. They export billions of dollars of arms every year, stockpile chemical and biological weapons, establish military bases or have military presence in other countries while accusing others of militarism, and mobilize all their resources in the world to impede scientific and technological progress of other nations under the pretext of countering arms proliferation”.⁷⁰

Conclusions: A Nuclear Cause

When speaking broadly about world politics, as well as addressing the nuclear issue in specific, Iranian state representatives expresses beliefs and experiences that emanates from all

of the three identified contexts. Ahmedinejad's speeches in the UN reveal the experience of an instable geopolitical environment, to which he contributes through threats and dislikes towards Israel, and also includes a strong dislike of the US presence in the region. There are strong criticism towards the nuclear weapons states, and "powerful states", for forcing their will through military means. In that regard, Ahmedinejad's speeches are permeated by believes of nuclear weapons as offering security and constitute power. There are no expressions of such instrumental motivations – to improve national security through nuclear deterrence or to establish regional leadership – in relation to the Iranian nuclear program. Clearly, such explicit descriptions would have been very surprising considering that the weapons-dimension of the nuclear program is in dispute. It may be noticed, however, that the dispositional dimension of the beliefs of the Iranian leadership has a content that easily may foster instrumental motivations to advancing nuclear technology for armament. The institutional context is a source of beliefs that actually translates into explicit normative motivations to Iran's nuclear program. The broad profound discontent with world politics in general, is explicitly expressed also with regard to the non-proliferation regime for privileging non-proliferation at the expense of disarmament. There are frequent requests for elimination of nuclear weapons, along with critique of the NWS for ignoring such multilateral calls. Further, much of Iran's critique of the diplomatic process with regard to its nuclear program relies on descriptions that not only Iran but also the IAEA are subjected to pressure from the powerful states dictating the terms. It is within the ideational frame of these profound institutional shortcomings, that there are normative motivations to Iran's nuclear ambitions both as an act of resistance against an unjust order, and as a matter of defending "inalienable rights" of its state sovereignty. While such normative motivations are unlikely to be the initial drive for a nuclear project, they might very well be complementary to other drives, and become more important as the nuclear project are increasingly questioned and challenged. Finally, the analysis of the diplomatic process reveals an explicit ideational link between the domestic context and the beliefs of nuclear technology as symbols of modernisation through the descriptions of the greatness and strong will of the Iranian nation. This ideational frame generates social motivations to the nuclear program as an important part of developing the Iranian society. Interestingly enough, the institutional context appears to armour these motivations as well, in the sense that the strive for scientific progress has to be carried out in the context of extraordinary difficulty. To clarify, the Iranian political leadership do not only express a view of the NPT as suffering from undermined legitimacy which brings a sense of rightness to cause in relation to other states, the institutional shortcomings are also an

important obstacle that the Iranian nation need to overcome in order for further advancement and scientific progress. In that sense, the normative and social motivations appear to reinforce each other, turning Iran’s nuclear program into a “nuclear cause”. The table below summarises these ideational links that the empirical analysis have revealed.

Table 3. Revealed links between structural, dispositional and intentional dimensions of Iran’s nuclear ambitions.

Structural dimension	Dispositional dimension ("Because of")	Intentional dimension (Purpose)
Geo-political context	Deterrence as response to regional instability. Nuclear weapons as necessary mean to power and influence.	Instrumental motivations: Improve national security Regional leadership
Institutional context	Untrustworthy regime Illegitimate principals	Normative motivations: Contest multilateral regime Principal defence of state sovereignty
Domestic context	Nuclear technology as a symbol for scientific progress and modernisation.	Social motivations: Appropriate leadership/ leading society towards success

The results of this study are not news to those familiar with the Iranian case. The major relevance of this study has instead to do with the content of the theoretical debate and conclusion drawn by research within the study of proliferation. As the theoretical section made clear, there is a debate that addresses the limitations with quantitative and qualitative research respectively. However, recent research within both traditions coincide in their

conclusions with regard to the limited significance of the NPT to mitigate nuclear proliferation, and considers this as evidence that counters the constructivist argument of norm impact on state actions. I have argued that this conclusion has been drawn on flimsy grounds; quantitative analysis tells us nothing about the operating mechanisms, and the quantitative research has abstained from tracing them through the theoretical demarcation made. Further, I pointed out the flip-side of the constructivist argument of norm impact in terms of conditions that needs to be approved. This empirical analysis, although limited in scope, reveals how it looks when they are not. To clarify, while this study can say very little about the instrumental motivations to nuclear ambitions, it illuminates the ideational links between the experience of an international regulation as suffering from illegitimate principles and untrustworthy authority, and normative motivations to action. Noteworthy, the analysis indicate that this experience also armours social motivations to action in the sense that the appropriate leadership towards societal progress is carried out “against all odds” in the presence of unjust external pressure.

¹ Chubin, Shahram (2006) *Iran's Nuclear Ambitions*, Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Sadjadpour, Karim (2008) “Reading Khamenei: The World View of Iran’s Most Powerful Leader” Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Dalton, Richard (2009) “Iran: Breaking the Nuclear Deadlock” London: *Chatham House*.

² IAEA. GOV/2003/40: 7

³ IAEA. GOV/2008/15; GOV/ 2008/38; GOV/2008/59.

⁴ IAEA. INFCIRC/737. See also Soltanieh in Beeman (2008); Ahmedinejad in Alexander & Hoenig (2008).

⁵ Sagan, Scott D “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a Bomb” *International Security* Vol. 21(3):54-86, Autumn 1996; Perkovich, George (2000) *India's Nuclear Bomb*, London: University of California Press; Singh, Sonali, Christopher R.Way (2004) “The Correlates of Nuclear Proliferation: A Quantitative Test” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* Vol.48:859-885; Chubin, Shahram (2006) *Iran's Nuclear Ambitions*, Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Hymans, Jaques E.C. (2006) *The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation*, New York: Cambridge University Press; Howlett, Daryl (2008) “Nuclear Proliferation” in Baylis, Smith & Owens (eds) *Globalization of World Politics* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

⁶ Snyder et al (2002) *Foreign Policy Decision Making Revisited*, New York: Palgrave McMillan, p.116.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Sagan, Scott D “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a Bomb” *International Security* Vol. 21(3):54-86, Autumn 1996.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ganguly, Sumit (1999) “India’s Pathway to Pokhran II”, *International Security*, Vol. 23, No. 4:148-177.

¹¹ Perkovich, George (2000) *India’s Nuclear Bomb* London: University of California Press.

¹² Abraham, Itty (1998) *The Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb* London: Zed Books Ltd.

¹³ Chubin, Shahram (2006) *Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions* Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

¹⁴ Khan, Saira (2002) *Nuclear Proliferation Dynamics in Protracted Conflict Regions: A Comparative Study of South Asia and the Middle East* Aldershot Ashgate, p. 237.

¹⁵ Ibid. Khan acknowledges that there might be additional drives to acquire nuclear weapons, such as the quest for regional power and international prestige, but argue they are unlikely to be reached – which is not very convincing evidence that such objective thereby is absent among the political leadership.

¹⁶ Hymans, 2006:5

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ . Jo, Doong-Joon & Erik Gartzke (2007) “Determinants of Nuclear Proliferation. A Quantitative Model” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol.51(1):185.

¹⁹ Jo & Gartzke 2007: See also Singh, Sonali, Christopher R.Way (2004) “The Correlates of Nuclear Proliferation: A Quantitative Test” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* Vol.48:859-885; Gartzke, Erik & Mathew Kroenig (2009) “A Strategic Approach to Nuclear Proliferation” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 53:151-160; Kroenig, Matthew (2009) “Importing the Bomb: Sensitive Nuclear Assistance and Nuclear Proliferation” *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* Vol.53:161-180 ; Gartzke, Erik, Doong-Joon Jo (2009) “Bargaining, Nuclear Proliferation, and Interstate Disputes” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* Vol.53:209-233; Fuhrman, Matthew (2009) “Taking a Walk on the Supply Side: The Determinants of Civilian Nuclear Cooperation” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* Vol.53:181-208; Horowitz, Michael (2009) “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons and International Conflict: Does Experience Matter?” *The Journal of Conflicts Resolution*” Vol. 53:234-257; Beardsley, Kyle, Victor Asal (2009) “Winning with the Bomb” *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* Vol.53:278-301.

²⁰ Jo & Gartzke 2007:168.

²¹ Müller, Harald (2010) “On Causality, Contingency, Coding and Academic Ethics: Developing Policy Advice in the Field of Proliferation”, paper presented at International Studies Association Annual Convention, February 2010.

²² Finnemore, Martha & Kathryn Sikkink (1998) “International Norms Dynamic and Political Change”, *International Security*, Vol. 52, No. 4: 887-917.

²³ Finnemore & Sikkink 1998:895ff

²⁴ Snyder et al. 2002: 114f; See also Herman & Fischerkeller 1996:163.

²⁵ Carlsnaes 2008:97f.

²⁶ Levi, M. (1997). *Consent, Dissent and Patriotism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

; Gezelius, S. (2002). *Do Norms Count? State Regulation and Compliance in a Norwegian Fishing Community* *Acta Sociologica*. Vol 45: 305-314; Gezelius, S. (2004). *Food, Money, and Morals: Compliance Among Natural Resource Harvesters* *Human Ecology*. Vol 32, no 5: 615-633; Tyler, T. (2006) (First published 1999) *Why People Obey the Law*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

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- ²⁷ Chubin 2006:113
- ²⁸ Chubin 2006; see also Dalton, Richard (2009) "Iran: Breaking the Nuclear Deadlock" London: *Chatham House*.
- ²⁹ The Non_Proliferation Treaty, article IV.
- ³⁰ The NPT, article VI.
- ³¹ The NPT has 190 member states, see www.sipri.org.
- ³² Parker, Charles F. (2001) *Controlling Weapons of Mass Destruction: An Evaluation of International Security Regime Significance*, Uppsala: Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis.
- ³³ Rauf, Tariq. Rebecka Johnson (1995), "After the NPT's Indefinite Extension: The Future of the Global Nonproliferation Regime", *The Nonproliferation Review*, p.29.
- ³⁴ Rauf & Johnson 1995; See also Ministry, Dinshaw (1998) "Domestic-International Linkages: India and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty", *The Nonproliferation Review*.
- ³⁵ Johnson, Rebecka (2008) "Is the NPT being Overtaken by Events?" *Disarmament Diplomacy*, Spring 2008.
- ³⁶ Chubin 2006.
- ³⁷ Chubin 2006; Sadjadpour 2008.
- ³⁸ Sadjadpour 2008.
- ³⁹ Kull, Steven et al (2008) "Public Opinion in Iran" Washington: World Public Opinion; see also Richman, Steven et al. (2009) "Iranian Public is not Monolithic: Iranian Divide Over their Government but Unite on Forgoing Nuclear Weapons" Washington: World Public Opinion. Details on the survey are available on the World Public Opinion website.
- ⁴⁰ The US State Department spokesman Richard Boucher, quoted in Chubin (2006:xiv).
- ⁴¹ Chubin 2006; See also Horovitz & Peranteau 2008.
- ⁴² Chubin 2006; Horovitz & Peranteau 2008; See also Kile, Shannon N. (2006) "Nuclear Arms Control and Non-Proliferation" in *SIPRI Yearbook 2006* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- ⁴³ Chubin 2006; See also Alexander & Hoenig 2008.
- ⁴⁴ UN. Ahmedinejad, UNGA, September 2005.
- ⁴⁵ Ibid.
- ⁴⁶ UN. Ahmedinejad in the UNGA, September 2005.
- ⁴⁷ Chubin 2006; Kile 2006; Horovitz & Peranteau 2008
- ⁴⁸ UN. Ahmedinejad, UNGA, September 2006.
- ⁴⁹ IAEA. INFCIRC/711.
- ⁵⁰ Ahmedinejad in the UNGA, September 2007.
- ⁵¹ Ibid.
- ⁵² Ibid.
- ⁵³ IAEA. GOV 2008/15, para. 16.
- ⁵⁴ IAEA. GOV/2008/15, para. 18).
- ⁵⁵ Horovitz & Peranteau 2008; See also Crall, Peter (2008), "ElBaradei Says Iran Stalls IAEA Inquiry", *Arms Control Today*, October 2008.
- ⁵⁶ IAEA. INFCIRC/737.
- ⁵⁷ IAEA. INFCIRC/737.

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- ⁵⁸ IAEA. INFCIRC/737.
- ⁵⁹ IAEA. INFCIRC/739.
- ⁶⁰ IAEA. GOV/2008/15, paras. 18-23; Horovitz & Peranteau 2008:3f.
- ⁶¹ IAEA. GOV/2008/59, para. 19.
- ⁶² UN: Ahmedinajed in the UNGA, September 2008.
- ⁶³ Ibid.
- ⁶⁴ Dalton 2008; Sadjadpour 2008.
- ⁶⁵ www.iaea.org.
- ⁶⁶ IAEA. INFCIRC/761.
- ⁶⁷ Ibid.
- ⁶⁸ Ibid.
- ⁶⁹ IAEA. INFCIRC/761.
- ⁷⁰ UN. Ahmedinejad in the UNGA, September 2009.