

Paper to be Presented at
SGIR 7th Pan European International Relations Conference
Stockholm, 9-11 September 2010

Participation in International Organisations and Learning Process:
Early Elaborations on Turkey's Experience at the UN Security Council⁺

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Abstract: *Turkey has been elected for a temporary seat at the UN Security Council for the years 2009-2010, which presents an opportunity for Turkey to experience a responsible position in the most influential decision making body of the UN, while facing the challenge of having to adopt a position on many global problems and issues in world affairs. There is an important literature on the influence of international organisations on the identity and interest definitions of their member states, as the result of a social learning process and behavioural adaptation. Through such a perspective, this paper aims at an early elaboration on the Turkish example at the UN Security Council. Existing literature on Turkish foreign policy mainly attributes the ongoing change in Turkish foreign policy to a process of Europeanisation which takes place due to Turkey's EU candidacy. Turkey's election for a temporary seat the UN Security Council is in line with the foreign policy aims of the AKP and also makes a positive contribution to its Europeanisation process. Turkey's membership of the UN Security Council has required an intensive effort on the side of the Turkish foreign ministry to develop and sustain relations with many countries ranging from Africa to Latin America which were traditionally not in the realm of daily foreign policy agenda. This paper focuses on the positions adopted by Turkey on selected issues on the agenda of the UN Security Council, like the Security Council reform, peacekeeping operations, Middle East Peace Process, and Iran's nuclear capabilities, some of which are of general concern to Turkey and some of which are considered vital for "national interests". The paper, firstly, compares Turkey's position on these matters with its positions prior to 2009 and searches for any changes in these positions. Secondly, the paper analyses the factors (preferences of the government, tendencies of the diplomatic corps, influences of allies and neighbouring*

⁺ This paper presents the very early elaborations of a newly embarked research. Please be aware that findings may change in time.

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countries, political and ethical pressures of occupying a responsible seat, etc.) that may have contributed to the shaping of Turkey's positions on these matters with regard to both issues of general concern and issues that have a bearing on the "national interests". The aim of the paper is to display the influence of the UN Security Council membership on Turkish foreign policy in general and also to contribute to debates on the processes of social learning and behavioural adaptation in international organisations through an analysis of the Turkish case. This paper will present the results of a preliminary research and also present questions for a further research agenda on this topic.

I. Introduction:

In the first decade of the 21st century, Turkey has acquired many prestigious seats in the international fora. The temporary seat at the UN Security Council is at the peak of these. Other positions have been the position of secretary-general of the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC), and chairmanship of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. It is possible to think of several reasons for the new activism in Turkish foreign policy. For sure, Turkey has had a paradoxical relationship with the OIC-due to the status of Islam in Turkey- and had souring relations with Europe from time to time due to either human rights issues or the vagueness of Turkey's European prospects. The UN Security Council membership had long been forgotten as an ideal since it was believed that Turkey would not be able to get enough support in the General Assembly for election into the seat due to long-prevailing problems in its foreign relations.

It is a fact that the AKP government has been looking for prestige in its foreign policy pursuit. Based on a new foreign policy doctrine of 'strategic depth', the current foreign minister Ahmet Davutoğlu has criticised the traditional Turkish foreign policy for maintaining a problematic relationship with almost all of Turkey's neighbours. Thus, the new government had a plan to re-formulate Turkey's interest in its neighbouring regions and aimed at a resolution of the problematic relationship by a move of de-securitising the foreign policy agenda and opening a phase of negotiations with neighbours, ranging from the redefinition of the position regarding the Cyprus problem, relations with Armenia and building on the already established track of reconciliation with Greece.

The actual resolution of disputes has not taken place yet, but it is possible to see that Turkey does not regard its geography as a given curse any more and tries to build on historical and cultural ties around its region, building most efficiently on relations with the Middle

Eastern countries. The AKP leaders claim that their activism in the Middle East is due to the concern to compensate for the decades lost after the establishment of the Republic, while sceptics would claim that it is due to the Islamist background of the AKP's leaders that favoured intensification of relations with the Muslim countries of the Middle East over enhancing ties with Europe. It is also a stated fact that the AKP leaders hope to gain a stronger hand by holding prestige and strength both in the Middle East and Europe as a leverage that would play into its hand in its relations with the other one. Thus the claim for a seat at the UN Security Council is an important step in realising this goal. It should be remembered that Ollie Rehn, the former Commissioner for Enlargement of the EU, stated in his congratulatory message that it would certainly be a gain for Europe if Turkey promoted its shared values at the UN Security Council. Whether Turkey has done so is one of the main questions that this research will focus on. But firstly the paper will introduce a theoretical ground on which to discuss the influence of international organisations on the behaviours of its members and then evaluate Turkey's membership in the Security Council on this basis.

II. Theoretical framework and some research questions:

The influence of international institutions on national foreign policies is a growing area of research, though most of the recent theoretical discussions end up focusing on the EU and the Europeanisation process as examples. With respect to the general transformation of foreign policy in Turkey, a study of the Europeanisation process of Turkey in the pre-accession process is also the main starting point. However, the last two years of Turkish foreign policy and especially Turkey's foreign policy practice at the UN have raised much interest and criticism with respect to its positions on Iran and Israel.

The main question of research is what has been the influence of UN Security Council membership on Turkish foreign policy? In addition to being a new source of prestige, a source of information and a leverage for making its voice heard, has it influenced the substance of Turkish foreign policy at all? Has Turkey been faced with new norms of behaviour and norms in the Security Council? And has Turkey practiced new and different norms during its presence at the UN Security Council than in its relationship with the EU?

The starting point of the research questions is the concept of 'appropriate behaviour'. According to the 'logic of appropriateness' approach, actors are guided by a collective understanding of what constitutes proper, socially acceptable behaviour in a given structure. These collective understandings influence the ways in which actors define their goals and

what they perceive as ‘rational’ action.¹ ‘To act appropriately’ is defined by James March and Johan P. Olsen as to proceed according to the institutionalized practices of a collectivity, based on mutual, and often tacit, understandings of what is true, reasonable, natural, right and good, and involves a learning process.² From an EU perspective, it is the concept of ‘Europeanisation’ that explains the influence of the EU on the behaviours of the member states and the way socialisation works within the EU framework. Europeanisation is understood as the emergence of new rules, norms, practices, and structures of meaning to which member states are exposed and which they have to incorporate into their domestic practices and structures.³

Jeffrey Checkel explains that there may be two ways of following the logic of appropriateness. One is by learning a role and acting in accordance with the expectations. The actors know what is acceptable in a given setting or community. It is conscious role playing, rather than instrumental calculations. This, he calls, Type I socialisation. Type II socialisation takes place when the actors adopt the interests, or even the identity of the community of which they are a part. He builds his analysis on the previous ‘International Relations’ (IR) analyses on the socialising effects of international organisations on the individuals who take part in them. He argues that what starts as behavioural adaptation may later be followed by sustained compliance and can hint at an internalisation or change of preferences. He also points out that political conditionality, as in the EU’s case, is important in the socialisation process since an international institution provides the national government positive incentives on the conditions that it complies with the institution’s norms.⁴

In an earlier work titled ‘Why comply?’⁵, Checkel starts his analysis with the question ‘why do agents comply with the norms embedded in regimes and international institutions? And he states two possible answers; the first one is rationalist, emphasising coercion, cost-benefit calculations and material incentives and the second one is constructivist, emphasising social learning, socialisation and social norms. Based on the constructivist understanding he reminds that norms constitute agents, proving them with a new sense of identity and interest. He highlights the difference from the rationalist explanation of compliance, in which actors

¹ T.A. Börzel and T. Risse 2003. Conceptualizing the Domestic Impact of Europe, in *The Politics of Europeanization*, edited by K. Featherstone, C.M. Radaelli, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 57-80

² J. March and, J. Olsen 2004. The Logic of Appropriateness, *Arena Working Papers* [Online] WP 04/09. Available at: http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/working-papers2004/papers/wp04_9.pdf

³ Börzel and Risse, “Conceptualising...”

⁴ J. Checkel, 2005. International Institutions and Socialisation in Europe: Introduction and Framework. *International Organisation*, 59 (4) 801-26

⁵ J. Checkel 2001 Why Comply? Social learning and European Identity Change. *International Organisation*, 55 (3) 553-88

acquire new information and change their strategies despite preserving their preferences, whereas in the constructivist explanation the agent's interests and identities are shaped through and during interaction. He explains that through interaction a process of argumentative persuasion takes place in which a change in the belief, attitude or behaviour of the target person occurs. Checkel also mentions that the learning process is not only externally constituted, but also internally motivated by the newly empowered social actors like NGOs, which seek with principled arguments to persuade and/or shame the political elites.⁶

Although such a process of socialisation and influence is quite evident in the case of Turkey and the EU, whether the two years of participation in UN Security Council has provided an encounter with new norms or practices is a new question. It is thus firstly necessary to determine whether there are certain norms inherent in the functioning of the Security Council. Of course the duty for the preservation of peace and security in the international arena is the primary task of the Council and the members should be expected to uphold and serve these purposes in their actions. However, a realist understanding of international organisation is to see them as an arena for the promotion of national agendas and causes and the UN Security Council is the most influential place to do so. Whether a member country in the Council would promote immediate national interests or whether it will promote wider international principles is mostly dependent on how that country defines its place, mission or role in the world and how it perceives the issues on the agenda (as a matter of rivalry or cooperation), which would mostly change from one issue to the other. The member states may also learn how to promote their national agendas and causes on the Council in time, so there may be an evolutionary change in the behaviour of a member state during the two year period.

III. Turkish Foreign Policy at the UN:

It is important to note at the beginning that Turkey has become a member of the Security Council after 48 years. Turkey had served at the UN Security Council between 1951-52,53-55 and 60-61 (shared term with Poland). Turkey has also served in the Council of the League of Nations two years after its accession to the League. The long period of absence has been a major void in Turkish foreign policy restricting its presence in the international arena due to certain foreign policy problems. However, the election at the General Assembly in 2008 has

⁶ J. Checkel, 2000. Bridging the Rational Choice/Constructivist Gap? Theorising Social Interaction in European Institutions, *Arena Working Papers* [Online], WP00/11. Available at: http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/wp00_11.htm , [accessed: 14 May 2009]

demonstrated that Turkey was supported by a wide range of countries from Latin America to Africa, as well as from the Middle East and the Balkan countries. At the UN, Turkey participates in the meetings of both the “Western Europe and Others Group” and the “Asia Group”, but stands for elections only in the “Western Europe and Others Group”.⁷ So it is expectable that represents “western” values.

The temporary seat at the UN Security Council definitely elevated Turkey’s opposition in the international arena and has raised hopes about Turkey reconciling both the European and Middle Eastern concerns at the Council. It is true that Turkey continued to uphold a position that raised its concerns regarding the situation in Gaza. At the start of Turkey’s term at the UN in 2009, Israel had undermined the peace talks intermediated by Turkey between Syria and Israel by launching an attack in Gaza, which infuriated Turkish leaders and led to an incessant souring of relations between Turkey and Israel ever since. Moreover, Turkey played an active role in negotiations between the West and Iran and initiated a swap agreement with Iran together with Brazil. Turkey was much more active than Lebanon, a co-terminus Security Council member, with respect to opposing further sanctions against Iran. Looking from the Middle East, it is certain that Turkey has not disappointed its friends in the Middle East, but severed its ties with Israel enormously. Despite growing admiration of Turkey in the Arab Middle East⁸ there have been an increasing number of debates in the West about a shift of axis of Turkish foreign policy.⁹

The two major incidents that Turkey had an open and clear position in the Security Council in the period between 2009-2010 have been that with respect to the crisis between Iran and the West, and that regarding the situation in Gaza including the Israeli intervention on ships carrying humanitarian aid. However, Turkey’s position on both of these issues was perceived to be controversial and fed into the discussions about a shift of axis of Turkish foreign policy.

Turkey and Iran’s nuclear capabilities

⁷ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The United Nations Organisation and Turkey,” <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/birlesmis-milletler-teskilati-ve-turkiye.tr.mfa> Accessed: 19.8.2010

⁸ Mensur Akgün, Gökçe Perçinoğlu and Sabiha Senyücel Gündoğar, *Ortadoğu’da Türkiye Algısı* (Perception of Turkey in the Middle East), Tesev Publications, İstanbul, 2009.

⁹ For initial examples of such concerns see, P. Gordon and Ö. Taşpınar, 2008. *Winning Turkey: How America, Europe and Turkey can Revive A Fading Partnership*, Washington DC.:Brookings Institution Press; P. Gordon and Ö. Taşpınar, 2006. Turkey on the Brink, *The Washington Quarterly*, 29 (3), 57-70

The latest 'no' vote by Turkey against further sanctions towards Iran or its stance in the Israeli-Palestine conflict do not result from the wrong policies pursued by the US or the EU. However, it has strengthened the question about what the West has done wrong in its policy towards Turkey. With respect to the sanctions against Iran, it is possible to say that Turkey perceived more threat from a future US intervention in Iran than from a prospective nuclear Iran. Turkey's 'no' vote against sanctions towards Iran has not resulted in a domestic criticism of the government's policy. None of the political parties in Turkey define Iran as an enemy or its nuclear capabilities as a threat, despite the fact that Iran was a major source of threat perception in 1990s due to its aims of regime exportation to Turkey. All political parties, on the other hand, agree that a US intervention in Iran or the intensification of the conflict between Iran and the West is a major source of instability in Turkey's vicinity. At least part of this perception is induced by the fact that despite all previous intelligence reports, no WMDs were found in Iraq, but the country ended up in unreparable turmoil after the US intervention. Turkish policy makers may be questioning the ability of the Iran's nuclear programme, despite the latter's strong wish to be able to acquire nuclear technology capable of producing nuclear weapons. Apart from this perception, calling President Ahmedinedjat 'a friend' may be an act attributable only to the personal feelings of AKP leaders which have definitely played into the perceptions of a shift of axis in Turkish foreign policy. On the other hand, the incessant efforts of Turkey as a member of the UN Security Council to reconcile western fears of Iran and the finding of a solution to the problem of Iran's nuclear capabilities is actually an act of search for peace and stability, which is one of the major aims of the EU in the international arena as well. For these reasons, Turkey's 'no' vote in the UN Security Council should be seen as part of a strategy to preserve the ability to negotiate with Iran in the future. Turkey explains its position of 'no' vote at the UN Security Council resolution on further sanctions against Iran as such: Turkey is against any country in its region to possess nuclear weapons and attributes utmost importance to the goal of attainment of a zone free of WMDs in the Middle East, which is also the aim of the EU's Barcelona Process.

Turkey acknowledges the need for clarification of questions of the international community concerning Iran's nuclear programme. It encourages Iran for full cooperation with IAEA in order to restore confidence.¹⁰ Actually, while explaining the problem as such, Turkey also displays a similar conception of the problem to that of the EU, while the EU defined the problem concerning Iran's nuclear capacity as one of lack of confidence of the US

¹⁰ Explanation of Vote by H.E.Ertuğrul Apakan, Permanent Representative of Turkey at the 6335th Meeting of The Security Council on 9 June 2010, www.un.int/turkey/page_303.html , accessed 5.8.2010

towards Iran and wanted to act as a facilitator as Turkey does today. With respect to nuclear non-proliferation Turkey supports simultaneous efforts for nuclear disarmament¹¹, bringing into question the legitimacy of the nuclear capacity of Israel by declaring to reiterate this argument at the NPT reform conference at the UN in early 2010.

Turkey, Gaza and Israel

Turkey started intermediating for peace between Israel and Syria in 2008. It has raised concerns about the Palestine issue and supported a two state solution before it was elected for the Council seat. After gaining a seat at the Council, Turkey mentions the situation in Gaza in every possible instance at the UN, not only on meetings concerning the situation in the Middle East, but also for example during the Security Council's open debate on protection of civilians in armed conflict. Following Israel's intervention in the humanitarian convoy to Gaza, Turkey also makes constant referrals to the incident. Turkey has called for emergency meeting of the Security Council after the intervention and asked for a resolution condemning the actions of Israel, which was definitely taking advantage of its current position at the UN Security Council.

Turkey used its seat at the UN during the Israeli intervention at the humanitarian convoy effectively. Turkish foreign minister has immediately travelled to New York to attend the Security Council meeting. Turkey has condemned Israel very strongly and made wishes for an effective apology from Israel.¹² After the meeting of the Security Council concerning the situation in the Middle East, the president of the Council made a statement, which announced that the Security Council condemned the acts of Israel and requested the immediate release of the ships as well as the release of civilians held by Israel. It called for a prompt, impartial, credible and transparent investigation conforming to international standards.¹³

The relations between Israel and Turkey have reached a bottom ever since. Putting this aside, Turkey has used its position at the Security Council to its own advantage. It has also used a rather 'European' language, putting international law and human rights to the fore in its arguments. Whether Turkey has used these concepts because it defines its international position as one that upholds these values at every instant or whether they were the right

¹¹ Statement by the Permanent Mission of Turkey at the Thematic Debate of the First Committee of the 64th General Assembly on Nuclear Weapons, New York, 13 October 2009, www.un.int/turkey/page367.html, accessed on 5.8.2010

¹² Statement by H.E. Ahmet Davutoğlu at the Security Council on the Israeli Attack on the Gaza Humanitarian Aid Convoy, 1 June 2010, www.un.int/turkey/page403.html, accessed 5.8.2010

¹³ Statement by the President of the Security Council, 1 June 2010, S/PRST/2010/9

instruments at this particular instant is an important question to determine how much these values have been truly internalised or whether they were seen as the ‘appropriate’ instruments at the service of realpolitik at the Security Council.

Turkey and peacekeeping operations

While dealing with such issues, Turkey makes a strong difference between armed conflict and counter-terrorist activities and stresses the legitimate right of governments to fight terrorism, which is actually a position drawing on the internal difficulties of Turkey. As was seen in the debates in the Security Council, Turkey takes note of the growing tendency in the international arena to stress the importance of non-state armed groups, which Turkey again stresses that it should be dealt with rather carefully.¹⁴ Regardless of this basic and strong position of Turkey, due to its long experience in peace-building missions around the globe, Turkey has also supported participation of all local stake-holders, including civil society, marginalised groups, ex-combatants, professional and women’s organisations in a peace-building process.¹⁵ With respect to peacekeeping operations, Turkey has been an active participant in such operations after the end of the Cold War. Thus, it is possible to say that while talking about armed conflict and peace building, Turkey oscillates between giving advice built on its international expertise and taking pre-caution against any possible naming of Turkey’s terror problem as an armed conflict.

Turkey has long shown an interest in the counter-terrorism activities of the UN and always stressed that terror could not be regarded as the problem of a particular country. It has stated that during its membership in the Security Council, it was planning to take on more in the counter-terrorism activities of their security council, thus hoping further access to information and as a leverage in influencing the agenda for future work on the subject at the UN.¹⁶ Turkey is also currently chairing the Counter Terrorism Committee of the Security Council.

¹⁴ Statement by Fazlı Çorman, Charges D’affaires and Deputy Permanent Representative of Turkey to the UN, Security Council Open Debate on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 7 July 2010, www.un.int/turkey/page407.html, accessed 5. August 2010

¹⁵ Statement by H.E. Ertuğrul Apakan, Permanent Representative of the Mission of the Republic of Turkey to the United Nations, Speech at the Security Council High Level Thematic Debate on Post-conflict Peace Building: Comprehensive Peacebuilding Strategy to Prevent the Recurrence of Conflict, 16 April 2010, www.un.int/turkey/page401.html, accessed 5.8.2010

¹⁶ Statement by H.E. Baki İlkin Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations at the Security Council meeting on “Global Security and International Terrorism”, New York, 9 December 2008, www.un.int/turkey/page279.html, accessed 12.8.2010

Turkey and Security Council Reform

Turkey's position on the Security Council reform has evolved in time. During debates on the reform of the Security Council in which Turkey participated in the form of open discussions, Turkey has not declared much of a solid view except that the decision on the reform of the council should be taken in an inclusive manner and that the council should become more democratic and representative.¹⁷ Turkey's position on the issue became gradually more solid, bringing to the fore the advantages that Turkey should be able to achieve due to its active contribution to peace and stability in its own region. Turkish position has later incorporated the wish that the reform of the Council should go hand in hand with that of the general assembly. Only later uttering what it was that Turkey had envisaged for itself. This is the shaping of a view in time after having learned to use the tools of the Security Council and having discovered how it could be used effectively.

With respect to reform of the Council, Turkey states that a reform of the Council should take place with that of the General Assembly. Turkey supports a reform of the Council to make it more transparent, accountable and inclusive and a council reform should accompany a revitalisation of the general assembly. Its self- confidence and aspiration for more frequent appearance in the Council can be seen in the words,

“In particular those member states that are endowed with the means and capabilities to provide peace and stability in their region and beyond should be allowed to take amore active part in the work of the Council. We would therefore be supportive of the extended representation of such member states on the council. We believe that the ‘intermediate approach’, consisting of renewable or longer term seats could provide such an extended representation. We stand ready to further explore this idea in the subsequent rounds of the intergovernmental negotiations.”¹⁸

This position is exactly what would be expected from a regionally active, middle-size non-permanent member of the Security Council. In the same speech by its permanent representative Turkey also states that representation at the UN security council should not be reflective of a balance of power, but should be based more on values and principles like democracy, multilateralism, accountability and regional representation which are declared as values and principles of the Western Europe and other countries” Group at the UN Security Council that Turkey participates in.¹⁹

¹⁷ Statement by Fazlı Çorman Deputy Representative of Turkey to the UN at the Open Ended Working Group Meeting on Security Council Reform. 10 September 2008, accessed 12.8.2010

¹⁸ Statement by H.E. Ambassador Ertuğrul Apakan, Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations on “Report of the Security Council” and “Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in Membership of the Security Council” at the Joint Debate of the General Assembly, New York, 13 November 2009, www.un.int/turkey/page_372.html, accessed on 5.8.2010

¹⁹ Ibid.

Membership in the Security Council enables a country to become more integrated into the world community. Since the 1990s, membership in the Council is viewed as prize more than ever due to the increasingly active agenda of the council. “For countries that make significant contributions to the UN’s peace and security functions... membership can be construed as a means to ensure that their views are taken into account when the council takes decisions on the use of their assets”²⁰. This is definitely Turkey’s position with respect to the role it models for itself in the international arena. “Member states may wish to join the council to advance a position in a dispute before it.”²¹ For Turkey, these range from Cyprus to Iraq, Iran and even Palestine for Turkey as issues that it would want to ensure that its voice is heard. Promotion of values and norms through the Security Council is an ideal position but its effect is open to debate.²² However, a values-based Security Council is what Turkey promoted in its reform of the UN position. The “values” approach to representation in the Security Council composition is an argument that Turkey is using rather properly as an EU candidate country.

Conclusion

Turkey also participated frequently in the open debates of the Security Council before being elected for a seat there. Turkey is one of the most committed countries to UN peacekeeping operations. Turkey’s training centre in Ankara launched for PfP trains peacekeepers from over 70 countries and is in close cooperation with the training and evaluation centre of the UN Secretariat. These facts show that Turkey is a committed member of the UN, seeking frequent and effective representation at the Security Council. Turkey calls on the UN to enhance its cooperation on peacekeeping missions with regional organisations and mention – not the EU- but the African Union. This mention can be evaluated both as a sign of increased attention of Turkey into Africa - something that started some time during Turkey’s campaign for election to the UN Security Council membership-, but also as a political interest of the new foreign policy of the government coupled with the raising business interest of the Turkish private sector. On the other hand, Turkey has problems in effectively accessing the EU security and defence policy.²³ The military and civilian operations of the EU focus more and

²⁰ Malone, “Eyes on the Prize: the Quest for Non-permanent Seats on the UN Security Council”, *Global Governance*, January-March 2000, vol6, issue 1, pp.3-21

²¹ Malone, “Eyes on the Prize:...”

²² Malone, “Eyes on the Prize:...”

²³ Statement by Mr. Fazlı Çorman, Deputy Permanent Representative of the Republic of Turkey to the United Nations at the General Debate of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, New York, 11 March 2008, accessed: 12.08.2010

more in Africa and Turkey, through the UN may be trying to emphasise Turkey's contributions to peacekeeping efforts there.

The UN Security Council experience has resulted in Turkey a return to power politics, which presents itself definitely as soft power, by seeking legitimacy in international organisations, but also by enforcing its arguments due to status and making use of the status to elevate national or even popular concerns. It has not only made frequent use of the language it has learned in the EU pre-accession process, but also brushed up its peacekeeping contributions and sought an advantageous position in the reform talks due to its contributions for a longer term presence in the Security Council.