

Russophobia in Poland? National Fears and the Effects on EU Relations with the Russian Federation

Raymond Taras (Malmö University)

Abstract

International society theory raises the problematic whether the EU and Russia can institute cooperation on the basis of a shared understanding of the rule of law and of other components of the international normative regime. This article examines the hypothesis that the 2004 round of enlargement diminished prospects for EU-Russia cooperation—at least in the short term—by admitting a large Central European state which has exhibited russophobic orientations. While accepting the historical reasons for and logic behind anti-Russian orientations in Poland, the EU's eastern enlargement gave this state an intergovernmental platform to voice its fears (even as its security has been bolstered) about Russia's perceived resurgent threat. Conflict resolution efforts in the region are made more complex by Poland being identified as the EU's "Trojan ass." Instead of forging common ground for cooperation with Russia through new multilateral institutions (such as on security and energy), enlargement opened a Pandora's box of regional hostility and distrust. State sovereignty in Eastern Europe may have been strengthened but, paradoxically, through institutionalizing polyvocality, it has weakened individual member states' ability to manage relations with Russia.

This paper assays shifts in russophobia in Poland since 2004 by examining elite and citizen attitudes towards Russia and Russians. It assumes that "national action scripts," based on an understanding of "who we are," inform foreign policy making. An analysis of Poles' electoral behavior and political attitudes since EU membership points to a shift from the nationalist policies of the Kaczyńskis to the Tusk-led government formed in late 2007. Has this liberal government rewritten the national action script by seeking to normalize relations with the kremlin, in keeping with EU initiatives? Or has Poland's foreign policy approach, reflected in the Polish-Swedish inspired Eastern Initiative, bilateral relations with Ukraine and Georgia, anti-missile defense, and energy security continued to make Poland the spoiler in EU-Russian cooperation efforts?

How universal is Russophobia?

In much of Central and Eastern Europe, russophobia has historically represented the greatest national fear, and the most influential one. It has been the "xenophobia of choice" even though disputes with neighbors (such as Hungary with Slovakia) and antipathies towards people perceived as "strangers" (Roma, Turks, Arabs) also figure in the catalog of national fears.

Outworn stereotypes of different nations abound in popular consciousness. As a centuries-old empire, Russia has attracted more than a fair share of these. The image of Russia's ruthless pursuit of expansionist and imperialist agendas is commonplace. Anatol Lieven observed that "Russophobia today is therefore rooted not in ideological differences but in national hatred.... In these architectures of hatred, selected or invented historical 'facts' about the 'enemy' nation, its culture, and its racial nature are taken out of context and slotted into prearranged intellectual structures to arraign the unchanging wickedness of the other side."¹ Among common disparaging myths about Russia are that its unique

culture dooms it to eternal backwardness, it lacks the cultural requisites for democracy and a market economy, and it is inherently anti-Western.²

A tendency to associate people with the policy of leaders can serve as the basis for xenophobia. Use of “Russians” instead of “Soviets” to identify Eastern Europe’s oppressor after World War II fed russophobia. Since even today many citizens in the region—and in the West too—are skeptical whether Russia has really been desovietized, associating Russians with authoritarian practices continues.

Russophobia may be primarily a political construction, therefore, but it is regularly confounded with an ethnic understanding.³ In insisting on making this distinction, it does not help matters that both tsarist and Soviet foreign policy “continually pushed Russia’s frontiers outward, impervious to considerations of ethnicity.”⁴ What is political and what is ethnic can become blurred.

A partial typology of russophobia might include the following:

1. *prejudice, hostility, or hatred* towards Russian a) political elites; b) culture; c) people;
2. *anxiety or fear* of Russia—its multinational reach, military might, and grand strategy;
3. *pathological fascination or mesmerization* by Russia as a result of a) past trauma inflicted by it; b) bonding with the oppressor; c) self loathing.

The political resurgence of Russia under Vladimir Putin has resurrected russophobia in the West, including in EU states, but it may never have wavered in the east. Journalistic accounts of the mounting Russian threat have proliferated in recent years.⁵ A BBC World Service survey found that Russia’s image was in decline in 2008. Forty-two percent of respondents in 21 countries had a mainly negative view of Russian influence and just 30 percent had a positive one. The proportion increased to 64 percent in the U.S. compared to 36 percent a year earlier. Germans were most negative (70 percent negative) while Chinese were most positive (74 percent favorable opinions) about Russia. Conversely, Russians had become more negative about the U.S. (53 percent in 2007 rising to 65 percent in 2008). Fewer of them viewed EU influence in a positive light (down from 51 to 31 percent between 2007 and 2008).⁶

The Pew Trust’s Global Attitudes Survey has provided additional data shedding light on international fears about Russia. It found increasingly negative opinions of Russia across Europe and few positive ones (limited to three Eastern European countries--Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Ukraine). In 2008, solid majorities in France (82%), Spain (80%), Poland (78%), Germany (60%), and Britain (56%) said they had not much or no confidence in Putin to do the right thing in world affairs. The strength of anti-Russian attitudes remained greater than the strength of anti-American attitudes even at their peak (in 2003-05 after the U.S. invasion of Iraq). Poland represented a special case: when anti-American attitudes (24%) spiked in 2005, nevertheless 61% of Poles held negative views of Russia. Paradoxically, the narrowest gap in negative Polish attitudes towards Russia versus the U.S. was 31% to 16%--in 2010! Arguably, negative views of President Obama accounted for this phenomenon.

On their own, opinion polls do not provide incontrovertible evidence of xenophobia; political and scholarly discourse needs to be taken into account as well. Thus, a British diplomat highlighted the incorrigibility of Russia: “The fall of the Soviet Union did not wipe the slate clean. The Russia that we are dealing with today, with its fear of encirclement, its suspicion of foreigners and natural appetite for autocracy, is as old as the hills, long pre-dating communism. It is a Russia that will never be reassured by the West’s protestations of pacific intent as it pushes NATO and the EU ever eastwards.”⁷

In the U.S., future Vice-President Joseph Biden wrote in the *Wall Street Journal* during the 2008 election campaign that “the Putin administration has managed to undermine Moscow's prestige and bring Russophobia back into fashion.”⁸ His intent was to deplore rather than encourage russophobia, but it was an admission that the phenomenon has had currency in Washington for some time. In a book-length study, a U.S.-based Russia specialist critiqued the influential anti-Russian lobby in Washington and concluded that “Russophobia is not in U.S. national interests and is not supported by the American public.”⁹

The head of the Russia/Eurasia program at the U.K.'s leading foreign policy research institute cautioned about both the continuity and makeover of the former superpower's strategy: “Russia is a power pursuing classical nineteenth/twentieth century aims with twenty-first century means: intelligence and covert penetration, commerce and joint ventures, ‘lobbying structures’ and litigation, energy and downstream investment and, in the former USSR, Russian diasporas and other ‘civilisational’ forms of soft power.”¹⁰ A British academic found that some lobbies in the West had succeeded in making the Cold War objectives of containing and isolating Russia a priority again. To be sure, “The lack of transparency in Russian politics has not helped build trust, but while there are numerous points over which one may take issue with Putin's administration, the relentless negativity in which every action was perceived to be yet another brick in the edifice of an authoritarian order under construction in Russia is fundamentally mistaken.” Nothing less than “The legitimacy of Russia's ambition to be a great power, even a ‘normal’ one, has been questioned.”¹¹

Another Russia expert has referred to the West's general “Eurasiphobia.” This is “the fear felt by those societies that adhere, or aspire, to the rule of the Magna Carta of 1214 towards those that rule by the modern equivalent of the Genghis Khan's Great Yasa of 1206. The fault line between these two in Europe lies precisely in Eastern Europe.”¹² Is this the underlying explanation why Poland, supposedly in the Magna Carta club, fears Genghis-inspired Russia?

Patterns of Polish antipathies

Enlargement brought many political differences to the surface--and amplified them. As Etienne Balibar observed, “A veritable fracture has thus arisen, a sort of cold war after the Cold War...but one which is both plural and mobile, and which is hidden under a thick mythology about ‘clashes of civilizations’ between Eastern and Western Europe, supposedly inherited from religious tradition or from the form of state building, when not simply from the ethnic character of the nations involved.”¹³ Balibar sketches a system of concentric circles leading from the “true” Europe (the advanced western states) to an “outer” one asking to be Europeanized (the eastern part).¹⁴

In the former Soviet bloc that includes EU states, xenophobia has been more closely linked to historical interethnic rivalries and hatreds such as anti-Semitism. But as Balibar contended, all of Europe suffers from phobias “profoundly buried in the collective unconscious that trace back to centuries of religious and colonial conflicts.”¹⁵ Were average Poles exceptional in their russophobic attitudes? Have recent events, specifically, the air crash near Smolensk in April 2010 that decimated Poland's political and military leadership, been exploited to cast greater suspicions about Russia or have they served to warm relations between the two countries, as they appear to have done on the surface?

A longitudinal analysis of survey results indicates important trends in changing national likes and dislikes of Poles. In 1993 Italians, Americans, and French led the list of Poles' preferred nationalities. By 2010, eleven European states were ahead of Americans in Poles' preferences and 15 of the top 17 were EU member states, an indication of the integrative power of the EU (Norway accompanied the U.S. as sole exceptions). Significantly, all 17 were predominantly Catholic or Protestant (Japan ranked eighteenth).

By contrast, in 1993 Romanians ranked as the *least favorite* nation by Poles. When Roma were added to the survey the next year, they immediately overtook them. Three mainly Orthodox nations--Ukrainians, Serbs, and Russians in that order--followed. Belarusians did not fare well either. In 2010, Poles' 15 least liked nations were either non-European (e.g., Chinese, Vietnamese) or, in religious terms, not Catholic or Protestant—and seven were predominantly Eastern Orthodox. Three of the bottom five were Muslim (“Arabs,” Chechens, Turks). In these rankings religion appears to be a more important cleavage than wealth, therefore. The marked distaste for Turks and Arabs points to the presence of Islamophobia—without a robust presence of an Islamic community—in Poland. As in the case of Polish anti-Semitism without the presence of many Jews, such attitudes may constitute a Catholic population’s dislike of “non Western” religions. Polish respondents’ antipathies towards other nations declined significantly over two decades but their least favorite “nations” continued to be the Roma, Arabs, Romanians, Russians, and Turks. Attitudes towards Ukrainians, Serbs, Armenians, Jews, Chinese, and Vietnamese were split just about down the middle. In terms of steadily more positive evaluations by Poles of other nations over time, Russians ranked 30th of 38th in 2010, barely registering a more favorable image (the biggest improvement was recorded by the Spaniards—and this even before the country’s World Cup win).

The main source of Poles’ russophobia is sensitivity to the Russian state’s international behavior. Shortly before the 2008 Russian attack on Georgia, a survey found that 54 percent of Polish respondents believed that Russia was trying to regain influence in Eastern Europe, and just 20 percent said it was not. These views were not out of line with global attitudinal trends. A 2009 report found that “substantially more people now have a negative view of Russia's influence—44 percent negative versus 31 percent positive--and that was before the recent disruption in Russian gas supplies to Europe.” The author explained that “the more it acts like the old Soviet Union, the less people outside its borders seem to like it.”

The plane crash in Smolensk that killed the Polish President and many other prominent leaders had the potential to feed russophobic conspiracy theories. In May 2010, a month after, Poles were asked a series of questions about bilateral relations with Russia. In reply to the question “Which state should Poland fear the most?” one-half identified Russia. This was double the percentage recorded in 1990 for the USSR when it was in its death throes. But it was down from the peak of two-thirds in late 2005. The next most feared country was Germany (17 percent, down from 88 percent in 1990 when the reunification negotiations were in progress). Interestingly, tied for third was a residual category made up of Islamic states like Afghanistan and Iraq—and the United States (seven percent each, a high for the U.S.). One-fifth of Poles said they had no enemy in May 2010. A counterintuitive finding was that older people expressed least fear of Russia while respondents with higher education were more inclined to fear Russia as well as Germany.

In May 2010 just over half of respondents (52 percent) accepted that Polish-Russian relations were neither good nor bad. But 29 percent said they were good—an all-time high—and only 15 percent bad (lowest since 2002). Seventy percent believed friendly relations with their eastern neighbor were possible though 22 percent said they were impossible. Nearly half (48 percent) thought that Polish-Russian relations would improve after the Smolensk tragedy while another 37 percent said they would remain the same. Significant for our study of russophobia, Poles' assessment of Russian authorities' and average Russians' responses and good will gestures towards Poland after the catastrophe were very positive: 32 percent said authorities' reactions exceeded expectations, 40 percent said that of Russian citizens. That they met Polish expectations was recognized by 45 percent (for each category). Two-thirds agreed that Russian authorities' measures to help victims' families were good. The percentage was lower (50 percent) for agreeing that Russian authorities wanted to find the causes of the crash, compared to 34 percent who disagreed.

Poland is an ethnically and religiously very homogeneous society, with well over 90 percent of inhabitants ethnically Polish and nominally Roman Catholic. If xenophobic politics play a part on the national scene, they are directed at foreign countries, not at the minorities in the country. Dislike of Russians is, therefore, less a manifestation of hostility to the 6,000 Russians who, according to census data, live in Poland; it has everything to do with the long history of bilateral relations.

Polish security policy and Russophobia

Before we conclude that Poland's experience of being Russia's neighbor is reason to speak of Polish russophobic exceptionalism, we should recall other recent examples of what appears to be inordinate fear of Russia. Thus, ethnic tensions in the Baltic rose in 2007 after the Estonian government ordered the removal of a bronze statue of a Soviet soldier--commemorating the defeat of Nazi Germany--from a square in Tallinn. Protests by members of the country's Russian minority led to one death and dozens of injuries. Estonia's president claimed that "The common denominator of last night's criminals was not their nationality, but their desire to riot, vandalize and plunder." The "Bronze Soldier" statue was moved to a cemetery on the outskirts of the capital but the Kremlin sharply attacked what it regarded as a russophobic action.

Since eastern enlargement occurred in 2004, there has been talk of "an incipient culture war in the heart of Europe, a clash of values that has intensified since countries from Central and Eastern Europe that are experiencing an increase in the influence of the Roman Catholic Church joined the European Union." Issues related to the status of Christianity in the secular EU, to women's rights, homosexuality, and other "family" issues have turned into significant cleavages between Western and Eastern European societies. One MEP from Britain described how "New groups have come in from Poland, the Czech Republic, Latvia, and Catholicism is certainly becoming a very angry voice against what it sees as a liberal EU." A gay rights activist, he added: "On women's rights and gay equality, we are fighting battles that we thought we had won years ago."¹⁶

As the largest accession country, Poland had begun to flex its muscles early on, most notably at the 2002 Copenhagen summit finalizing EU enlargement. The country's Catholic conservatism--inspired loosely, at best, by John Paul II's papacy--came into play during the drafting of the European constitution in 2003. Initially supported by Spain and several

other Catholic nations, Poland argued for the inclusion of a reference to Europe's Christian heritage. In the end the idea was rejected partly because Spain--its own culture a mix of Catholic and Islamic heritage--lost its enthusiasm. The following year Poland tried to salvage the candidacy of an Italian nominee to the European Commission whose remarks about women and homosexuality at a European Parliament hearing were widely regarded as offensive. The Poles lost this battle, too. For our purposes, such "culture wars" between West and East have mirrored a similar cleavage found in international politics about how to deal with Russia.

Strong proof of eastern EU states' distinctive views of Russia came in a July 2009 letter signed by many of the regions' postcommunist political leaders. The publication of "An Open Letter to the Obama Administration from Central and Eastern Europe" was timed to follow, just over a week later, the new U.S. President's summit in Moscow with Russia's leaders. The long letter was signed by former leaders of the Czech and Slovak Republics, the three Baltic States, and Romania. Polish signatories were most numerous: ex-presidents Lech Wałęsa and Aleksander Kwaśniewski, together with past defense secretary Janusz Onyszkiewicz and past foreign minister Adam Rotfeld. By contrast, no Hungarian leader signed as that country had little at stake in the debate on Western relations with Russia.

These principals reached the conclusion that their region was no longer at the heart of American foreign policy. To make things worse, in their view, was that "there are fewer and fewer leaders who emerged from the revolutions of 1989 who experienced Washington's key role in securing our democratic transition and anchoring our countries in NATO and EU. A new generation of leaders is emerging who do not have these memories and follow a more 'realistic' policy." The inference was that the anti-Soviet (and arguably anti-Russian) generation was losing influence. This was occurring just as Russian revanchism was increasing:

Russia is back as a revisionist power pursuing a 19th-century agenda with 21st-century tactics and methods. At a global level, Russia has become, on most issues, a status-quo power. But at a regional level and vis-à-vis our nations, it increasingly acts as a revisionist one. It challenges our claims to our own historical experiences. It asserts a privileged position in determining our security choices. It uses overt and covert means of economic warfare, ranging from energy blockades and politically motivated investments to bribery and media manipulation in order to advance its interests and to challenge the transatlantic orientation of Central and Eastern Europe.¹⁷

For the signatories, this was not the time for the U.S. to succumb to the "realism" of another Yalta agreement: "we want to ensure that too narrow an understanding of Western interests does not lead to the wrong concessions to Russia. Today the concern is, for example, that the United States and the major European powers might embrace the Medvedev plan for a 'Concert of Powers' to replace the continent's existing, value-based security structure. The danger is that Russia's creeping intimidation and influence-peddling in the region could over time lead to a de facto neutralization of the region."

The letter proposed "a renaissance of NATO"—the Cold War military pact. The NATO-Russia Council should return to the practice where "NATO member countries enter into dialogue with Moscow with a coordinated position. When it comes to Russia, our experience has been that a more determined and principled policy toward Moscow will not

only strengthen the West's security but will ultimately lead Moscow to follow a more cooperative policy as well.”

Did Polish signatories of the letter conduct a confrontational foreign policy towards Russia when they exercised power? Joanna Gorska reached a counterintuitive finding in her study of Polish relations with Russia between 1989 and 2004.¹⁸ On the issue of removal of Soviet forces from Poland after 1989, relations were largely cooperative, she found. The topic had become a domestic issue in which a conciliatory President Wałęsa squared off against a russophobic Prime Minister, Jan Olszewski. The President succeeded in removing Olszewski from power and the cooperative negotiating model of having Russian forces leave the country was subsequently pursued.

By contrast, Polish officials followed largely a non-cooperative policy towards Russia on NATO membership, mainly based on power calculations. In policy discourse, a majority of Polish politicians prioritized NATO accession as a means of increasing Poland's resources and voice opportunities (influence gains) on the one hand, while preventing dependence on Russia (autonomy gains) on the other. But they also advocated engaging Russia in European security processes in order to minimize influence-seeking from Russia (autonomy gains). The Polish government pressed on with this non-cooperative policy later in the accession process. For example, in the run-up to the NATO summit in Madrid in July 1997, when Poland was invited to join the Atlantic Alliance, Polish officials opposed Russia's preference for establishing a NATO-Russia Council. In sum, there was no tangible cooperation with Russia on Poland's NATO membership bid.

Gorska also reported that the Polish government pursued largely a cooperative energy policy towards Russia, largely because of material power considerations. The majority of Polish politicians supported the objective of obtaining sufficient and regular energy supplies (influence gains) on the one hand, and the objective of supply source diversification (autonomy gains) on the other. To be sure, socialist (postcommunist) and center-right politicians had different approaches, derived mainly from their competing assessments of security pressures from Russia. Which coalition formed the government did shape the nature of relations with Russia. This was seen after 2004 when the preferences of conservative dominant actors steered Poland's energy policy towards Russia in a different direction. The shift towards a non-cooperative policy towards Russia after 2004 could be explained by Polish incumbents' perceptions of increased energy security pressures from its large neighbor.

For Gorska, then, Poland's Russia policy represented primarily power politics calculations. Ideational factors—and we can infer the cultural basis for them—played only a limited part. The realist model proved accurate not only in the “easy” cases of “high” politics, like removing the Red Army from Polish soil, but also in “hard” cases, such as cooperating on a Katyn narrative. By contrast, the explanatory power of liberalism and constructivism was modest; their assumptions were inadequate in explanations of broader patterns in Poland's Russia policy.

The argument of this paper is that ideational constructions played a much greater role in the formulation of Polish foreign policy towards Russia from 2005 through 2007. The social construction of Russia as an adversary was critical to the election, then survival, of the conservative government for these two years. Its russophobic discursive practices helped make Poland the “Trojan ass” of the EU for a time. The overcharged national phobia—towards Russia but also towards Germany, as we describe below—had a positive

effect, in the end. The cathartic experience of nationalist leaders expressing such animosities towards neighbors was the basis upon which liberal and moderate politicians could assume power and bring Poland back into the mainstream of the EU community.

The Kaczyńskis' interregnum and alienation from Europe

In 2005 national elections in Poland brought a conservative Catholic, Lech Kaczyński, to the presidency. Simultaneously his twin brother Jarosław was leader of the party that won the most seats in the legislature and shortly afterwards he became Prime Minister. One of the first actions their administrations took was to abolish the post of minister for women's interests, making Poland a rare European country not having this portfolio. Gay pride marches were banned, not just in Warsaw but in various Polish cities. In foreign policy, relations with both Russia and Germany deteriorated, displaying similarities to the right-wing Colonels' regime of the 1930s.

The exceptionalism of Poland under the Kaczyńskis was not confined to socio-cultural issues. Standing in sharp relief to the EU's reticence and caution, Poland aggressively supported the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2005 and fought hard for the EU to enter into negotiations about eventual membership for that country. Earlier Poland had given full support to the Bush administration's invasion of Iraq and, together with Britain, for a time administered one of its three sectors. This may have been another example of *Realpolitik* and of bandwagoning with the Cold War winner. The same explanation applies to the pre-Kaczyńskis' decision for Poland to furnish a site for a secret C.I.A. prison for terrorism suspects and of taking part in renditions. A Liberal MEP from Britain summarized concerns about the strong American influence on Poland at the time: "We need to put a protective wing around some of our new countries that are quite unused to U.S. bullying."¹⁹ Even Polish public intellectual Adam Michnik had had enough of Polish exceptionalism when the Kaczyńskis acceded to power and deepened the chasm between Poland and much of the EU: Poland's "governing coalition employs a peculiar mix of the conservative rhetoric of George W. Bush and the political practice of Vladimir Putin."²⁰ If anything qualifies as a characteristic of an *outer* Europe, this combination does.

To be fair, Poland's support in the early 2000s for the Bush administration's foreign policy was not unique in Central and East Europe; it seemed predetermined by the region's historical and cultural pathways. Two academics involved in the New European Democracies project reported that "In CEE countries, preemptive or preventive military action tends to be viewed more sympathetically, partly because of their own history with aggressive neighbors. To many western Europeans, however, U.S. preemption disregarded international norms, undermined state sovereignty, and set a disturbing precedent for aggressive action against independent states couched as defensive measures."²¹ In addition, western European leaders regarded military action in Iraq as a failure of diplomacy—an approach that seemed held in less esteem in the CEE capitals.

Possibly the clearest evidence of political elites in old and new Europe working at cross purposes was the volatile relationship between Germany, the largest old European country, and Poland, the largest of the new member-states. Perhaps we should credit Kant for having written a prescient preface to relations between the two nations. The advocate of a perpetual peace, in 1798 Kant noted: "Poland: that is a very strange country.... With them, there are no middle classes and, thus, they have little culture."²²

Bilateral relations deteriorated with the accession of the Kaczyńskis. A particular *cause célèbre* in 2006 involved when Lech (then President, who was to die in Smolensk) cancelling an official visit to Germany after a Berlin newspaper, *Tagesspiegel*, mocked him as “a little potato” who wanted to rule the world. Polish officials demanded that the German government take legal action against the journalists but it refused. The visit was to attend a meeting in Weimar on the 15th anniversary of the founding of the trilateral cooperation forum between Germany, Poland and France. At the last minute the Polish president announced his indisposition due to an alleged gastric ailment, which the media speculated was payback for the critical newspaper article.

Payback for the German newspaper story came in 2007, after the Berlin summit hosted by Chancellor Merkel had approved the EU Reform (which was to become the Lisbon) Treaty. Poland had successfully won a reprieve for its overrepresentation in the European Commission but it had caused much rancor. Shortly after the summit, a leading Polish newsmagazine published a photo of Merkel on its cover, superimposing on her bare breasts suckling the Kaczyńskis. The caption read: “Merkel: Europe's Sow.”

To be sure, *substantive* disagreements plagued Polish-German relations. In 2005 Germany and Russia decided to route a major gas pipeline under the Baltic Sea, therefore outside of Polish control. The Polish defense minister compared the decision to the secret agreement between Hitler and Stalin to carve up Poland in 1939. At subsequent EU summits, the Polish leadership emphasized the urgency of reaching a common energy security treaty for all EU states, which was made more difficult by Russia reaching special energy deals with Germany, Italy, France and the Netherlands.

A second issue in German-Polish relations concerned recognition of minorities in each country. Adam Krzeminski, longtime editor of a leading Polish weekly, *Polityka*, asked, quite reasonably: “Must mass immigration involve giving minority status to the new ethnic groups in the EU member states? This is currently a bone of contention between Germany and Poland. If hundreds of thousands Poles live in Germany, why shouldn't they have minority status? Allocating such a status to Muslims has already been broached in debates in Germany. The joke is that until now no Polish National Catholic has demanded minority status for the one hundred thousand Poles living in the UK. What's really at stake in the case of Germany is the lack of symmetry. There is a long-established German minority in Poland, for that reason there should also be a Polish minority in Germany.”²³

In 2006 Jarek (short for Jarosław, then Prime Minister and surviving twin) visited Berlin to discuss another controversial issue with chancellor Merkel--a treaty that would rule out private German property claims on Poland stemming from World War II. The subject of restitution claims by ethnic Germans forcibly expelled or displaced from Poland at the end of World War II has been sensitive for both countries. The Potsdam agreement transferred large parts of eastern Germany--east Prussia, Pomerania, and Silesia--to Poland. In total, some 12 million Germans were expelled from territories that are now part of Poland and other East European countries. Close to 700,000 Germans were forced to leave Poland after 1945 alone, leaving their property and possessions behind.

The Merkel government claimed that it was following the agreement reached in 2005 between then chancellor Gerhard Schröder and his Polish counterpart that neither government would support restitution claims pursued by individuals in either country. But when the Kaczyńskis took power, they accused the Confederation of the Displaced (BDV) of becoming a highly-influential lobby group enjoying close ties to Merkel's CDU. Prime

Minister Kaczyński condemned an exhibition held in Berlin in 2006 on the fate of the expelled ethnic Germans on the grounds that it was “equating the victims with the persecutors.”

In late 2006 the restitution controversy was exacerbated when the *Preussische Treuhand* (Prussian Claims Society), which represents a group of Germans expelled from Silesia, filed 22 claims with the European Court of Human Rights accusing Poland of violating the rights of those expelled from their prewar homes when borders were redrawn in 1945. “The expulsion of the German population, according to some international legal experts, amounted to genocide, or at least to crimes against humanity with the purpose of dispossessing them of property without any compensation,” the Prussian Claims Society brief stated. The suit demanded compensation for lost property.

Both Merkel's government and the BDV distanced themselves from this lawsuit but Poland's foreign minister, Anna Fotyga, condemned the claims as “an attempt at reversing moral responsibility for the effects of World War II, which began with the German attack on Poland and caused irreparable losses and sufferings to the Polish state and nation.”²⁴ She even called into question the 1990 treaty between the two countries (which confirmed the post-World War II border and excluded any claims of the German state on territory lost to Poland after the war). The treaty had not dealt with territorial claims made by individuals. As an EU member, Poland would be subject to the decision handed down by the European court. But Jarek suggested that the Polish parliament should declare it would not respect any court verdict calling Poles' rights into question. In his turn, Lech warned that Poland could counter German lawsuits with its own multi-billion Euro claims for destruction suffered under the wartime Nazi occupation of Poland. He added that “obvious anti-Polish sentiment that is often racist” had increased in Germany.

The Weimar summit in late 2006 seemed to ease frictions in Polish-German relations. The main topic between President Kaczyński, Chancellor Merkel, and President Chirac was the energy security of Europe. Kaczyński argued that the fact that this subject was seen not simply as an economic but also a political matter was a success for Poland. The three leaders expressed hope that negotiations with Russia on energy issues and, more broadly, on a new EU-Russia partnership and cooperation agreement, would begin soon. This represented a reversal of Poland's position at the EU's 2006 Helsinki summit when it had vetoed the start of the partnership negotiations because of Russia's embargo on Polish meat and vegetable products. Russia had cited sanitary concerns for the ban but the EU's enlargement commissioner, Olli Rehn, asserted that Russia's food safety concerns were part of “a political game” intended “to put pressure on the EU.”²⁵ Indeed, the EU subsequently emphasized that it would stand together in its dealings with Russia.

Chancellor Merkel succeeded in getting the Polish leadership to sign the Berlin Declaration on the anniversary of the Treaty of Rome. But she was hard pressed to obtain its support for the Reform Treaty in 2007 and had to threaten to exclude Poland altogether from negotiations--making the Treaty an agreement of the other 26 EU states--before a compromise was reached. Rancor had increased on all sides. EC president Barroso had to issue a coded warning to Poland that newcomers had a responsibility to help bridge divides within the union. “It will be in their interest for them to show that their membership of the European Union is not making European Union life more difficult but, on the contrary, they are giving more impetus to the European Union.” He added: “There is no plan B.”²⁶

It comes as no surprise, then, that citizen attitudes in Germany and Poland about each other reflect elite disagreements. When Germans were asked what they most associated with Poland, the top answers were “car theft and crime,” “illegal workers,” and “poverty, backwardness.” In turn, in a 2006 survey 49 percent of Poles questioned said they feared Germany could pose “an economic threat” to Poland in the future. The Kaczyńskis' Germanophobic policies were genuinely popular with a large part of the Polish electorate because they reflected a residual Germanophobia in Polish society that had never disappeared after World War II.

Europe in disarray over Russia: the Kaczyńskis' contribution

The national phobias that the Kaczyńskis exploited turned Poland into a destabilizing force inside the EU. They did not act alone—Czech President Vaclav Klaus was a fellow renegade expressing opposition to EU policies and norms, whether on European integration, climate change, or secularism. But Poland's nationalist foreign policy added strain not just to its bilateral relations with Germany but also to the EU's relations with Russia (something Klaus was agnostic about).

Despite the turbulent relationship with Berlin, then Polish defense minister Radek Sikorski had stated provocatively that “With Germany our relations are broad and deep, it is part of the family. But the relationship with the Russian Federation is different.”²⁷ As if to prove the point, Putin added a new national holiday for Russia which celebrated the expulsion of Polish armies from Moscow in 1612.

The distrust of Russia spilled over into foreign policy differences between Eastern and Western European states. The contrasting perceptions have been summed up this way: “CEE representatives and their publics often perceive western European members of the EU as appeasers of Russia, while western Europeans view CEE members as too hostile toward Moscow.”²⁸

Poland's relations with both Germany and Russia were problematic after the Iraq war. It was a succession of Polish governments that seemed uncritically to support the Bush doctrine (even though many Poles opposed the war and protested against it). In addition, setting aside the question of personal animosities, a factor isolating Warsaw further was the understanding that had been forged between the German and Russian leaderships, eerily reminding it of the eve of World War II. When in 2005 Germany and Russia decided to route a major gas pipeline under the Baltic Sea, outside of Polish control, then defense minister Radek Sikorski compared the decision to the secret agreement between Hitler and Stalin to carve up Poland in 1939.²⁹ As Christopher Chivvis and Thomas Rid suggested, the more it appeared that Germany was Russia's strongest link with the West, the more the German leadership strove to maintain good relations with Moscow.³⁰ In contrast, after gaining accession into the EU, the Kaczyńskis' Cold War-like policies alienated the Kremlin.

At EU summits, Polish leaders emphasized the importance of reaching a common EU energy security treaty, made more difficult by Russia reaching special bilateral energy deals with Germany, Italy, France and the Netherlands. It even proposed establishing the equivalent of NATO in the energy area in which one member-state would help another if its energy supply was endangered.

At the EU's 2006 Helsinki summit, Poland vetoed the start of EU-Russia partnership negotiations. The reason was Russia's embargo on the import of Polish meat and vegetable

products, ostensibly because of health concerns.³¹ The EU summit put on a show of unity backing Poland but fully normalizing relations with Russia had nevertheless to be put off.

The most troublesome issue in relations between Poland and Russia was the 2007 agreement under which Poland and the Czech Republic were to host U.S. missile interceptors and radar bases in their countries. Russia retaliated by withdrawing from the 1990 Conventional Forces Europe (CFE) Treaty which had set limits on troop levels in Europe. The Kremlin also threatened to station its own missiles in the Kaliningrad region north of Poland.

Polish public opinion did not lend strong support to the missile shield. Even after the Georgia-Russia war in late summer 2008, opponents outnumbered supporters by 46 to 41 percent. By spring 2009, the gap had returned to pre-war figures: 53 percent were against and only 29 percent for the shield.³² Such “pacifist” sentiment did not point to a chronically russophobic Polish public. It also did not reflect public endorsement of a national role conception for Poland as the last line of defense of Western civilization, which the missile shield could be construed to symbolize.

Polish leaders also did not speak with one voice on the desirability of the missile shield, which was leading to threats of tit-for-tat actions by Putin. This was particularly true following the formation of a new government after the parliamentary elections of October 2007. A quarrel within Jarek's coalition had led to an early election: confident that his nationalistic policies were popular, he expected to emerge with a stronger electoral mandate. Instead his party was soundly defeated by a more centrist pro-European one led by Donald Tusk, who succeeded Kaczyński as prime minister. The Polish electorate had shown that it had had enough of the politics of phobias.

Tusk travelled to Moscow a few months later and met his counterpart Putin. He spoke of reconciliation between the two countries: “both sides are fed up with the ‘cold’ atmosphere.” At the World Economic Forum in Davos in 2009, the two met again and agreed to a series of consultative meetings. But a scheduled April 2009 Putin visit to Warsaw involving a “broad formula” to discuss issues of the kind nations conduct with their “most important partners” was put off. Instead the visit was recast as a symbolic trip to mark the 70th anniversary of the outbreak of World War II in Gdańsk in September—an event not unlike Putin’s 2005 visit to Auschwitz to commemorate the liberation of the camp.

One report contended that “Putin’s performance in Poland drew praise from many erstwhile critics of Russia, if not completely fulfilling Polish demands for Russian accountability.”³³ The Russian leader asserted that “Russia has always respected the bravery and heroism of the Polish people, soldiers and officers, who stood up first against Nazism in 1939.” President Kaczyński struck a more confrontational tone on the occasion, describing how Moscow’s invasion of Poland in September 1939 had “stuck a knife in the back of Poland.” While historically accurate, the Polish leader as well as those of a number of other former Soviet bloc nations had effectively equated Soviet actions during the war with Nazi crimes, which was a highly provocative claim.

Warsaw's support for EU and NATO membership for ex-Soviet republics Georgia and Ukraine was strongest under the Kaczyńskis’ rule. Lech’s close relations with those two countries’ presidents, Viktor Yushchenko and Mikael Saakashvili, were an irritant to the kremlin. As many Western states lose their stomach for a quarrel with Russia over these countries, so Poland has ceased to champion their cause so vigorously. It may be that this

furnishes the clearest case of successful policy dissemination from the EU to Poland.

There may be another explanation. An alternative program, though also contentious, was the Eastern Neighborhood Initiative, launched in 2008 by the unlikely alliance of Poland and Sweden (to be sure, both governed by center-right coalitions). Its aim was closer EU relations with former Soviet republics on Russia's borders. By summer 2009, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine had signed up to the initiative. At the EU-Russia summit held in Khabarovsk in 2009, Russian President Dmitri Medvedev warned that Russia did "not want the Eastern Partnership to turn into partnership against Russia.... I would simply not want this partnership to consolidate certain individual states, which are of an anti-Russian bent, with other European states."³⁴

Disagreements between Poland and Russia have continued, therefore. Even though one of the Kaczyńskis lost power after the 2007 elections, their policy on Russia was not immediately reversed. Sikorski, who had been defense minister in Jarek's cabinet, switched parties and portfolios. He now became foreign minister in Tusk's government. He took part in the missile shield signing ceremony in London alongside U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and took time out to scold the British (he has U.K. citizenship). Explaining the rationale for the agreement he referred to history: "The British didn't come through in 1939. You declared war but you didn't go to war. That's why we're demanding capabilities, 'boots on the ground,' not just parchment." He added: "we hope that this time our allies help us to even out the risks."³⁵

Touted as a candidate for NATO secretary-general at that time, Sikorski began to position himself as a moderate by offering reassurances to Russia about the missile shield: "For technical reasons the interceptors cannot affect Russian missiles on this side of the Urals, and we have offered Russia the right to inspect at any time and even industrial monitoring of this site so she could be reassured that there are no modifications to the base and it only has the capabilities we say it does, which is to say, nothing to do with Russia."³⁶ Such conciliatory talk proved too little too late and Sikorski was passed over as NATO head, apparently because of his anti-Russian track record.

Another principal agent in Polish security policy became Bogdan Klich, Sikorski's successor as defense minister. Unconnected to Britain or the U.S. and holding both medical and art history degrees, Klich also took a hard line towards Russia. In early 2008 during a NATO-Russia summit he even accused Putin of threatening to break up Ukraine. In Klich's interpretation, Putin had signaled a return to the concept of a provisional Ukrainian state which had first been mooted in the early 1990s but had then been set aside. Klich also parted ways with the more conciliatory Sikorski about on-site verification by the Russian military of the missile shield. "We didn't say farewell to Soviet soldiers in 1993 so as to welcome back for good Russian officers and soldiers on future military installations on Polish territory."³⁷ On the other hand, within the national security establishment Klich was one of the most skeptical about the operational capability of the missile shield.

By contrast, from the time he was elected president in 2005 to his death in 2010, Lech Kaczyński was a spearhead of hostility toward Russia and toward countries deemed soft on Russia.³⁸ One notable example: during the 2008 war in Georgia, he attacked Germany and France for "pliability" and for pursuing a "very typical" relationship with Russia because of their governments' willingness to facilitate "the historical experiences and interests of corporations" looking to make "big money" in Russia.³⁹ Perhaps the most theatrical moment of his anti-Russian behavior was joining with Georgian president

Saakashvili in accusing Russian forces of shooting at them in November 2008 while they were touring the border region between Georgia and South Ossetia.⁴⁰

In sum, since the 2007 elections, divisions have emerged among Polish principal agents formulating policy on Russia. In the absence of Lech's nationalistic, Catholic, and xenophobic—both russophobic and Euroskeptical—rhetoric, Sikorski and Klich seem embroiled in efforts to outmaneuver each other on approaches to Russia, though neither wishes to appear soft on Russia. An added realization on their part is that bandwagoning with President Obama after staking so much on the Bush administration is unlikely to produce political dividends. Establishing a pragmatic *modus vivendi* with the Russian Federation may be the most realistic option, one most closely associated with Prime Minister Tusk.

Among foreign policy principals, Tusk has seemed the most optimistic that relations with Russia can be normalized. At Davos in 2009, he hailed Putin's promise—made after Obama's election in 2008—to not site Russian Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad if the new U.S. administration did not go ahead with plans for installing the missile shield. Tusk also has put great faith in meetings with Kremlin leaders. The grieving images of him and Putin in the forest near Smolensk honoring the memory of the many Polish figures who lost their lives in the plane crash are of historic importance.

It was deeply ironic that Lech Kaczyński and much of the country's leadership should be killed a few kilometers from the site of the 1941 Katyń massacre of Polish officers by the Soviet NKVD. On hearing of the plane crash, Wałęsa cryptically asserted that "A second Katyń has stricken Poland." As emphasized already, Lech himself had always harbored deep suspicions about post-Soviet Russian politics. In fact, this was a reason that he had not even been invited to the seventieth anniversary Katyń commemorations; Putin had only invited Tusk. Up to the day of the crash the Russian foreign ministry claimed that it had not been notified about Kaczyński's plan to attend the ceremony.

The causes of the catastrophe in Smolensk did not polarize opinion to any significant degree. A minor illustration of the persistence of Cold War framing in Russia and the U.S. was media conjecture about possible mechanical causes of the plane crash. In their coverage U.S. media regularly noted that the aircraft was a Russian-built Tu-154. Their Russian counterparts identified verifying that the U.S.-made satellite navigation system including TAWS (Terrain Awareness System) had been functioning properly. But no serious difference in opinion on the event arose between the two countries' governments. It fit into a wider context: in July 2010 the exchange of spies between Russia and the U.S. was treated in lighthearted fashion by both powers and was intended to demonstrate that the "restart" of relations was progressing smoothly.

In the election campaign to replace his brother as president, Jarek positioned himself as a moderate—a function of citizens' expressed political preferences. A champion of a lustration campaign to "out" former communists from influential positions, Jarek even praised 1970s communist leader Edward Gierek. To be sure, he remained skeptical about relations with Russia. In the first debate between the two runoff candidates, Jarek criticized a proposed contract with Russia for ten billion cubic meters of gas annually until 2037 which had been negotiated by the Tusk government. Jarek's more moderate image worked, and he narrowed the gap with the liberal candidate for President, Bronisław Komorowski, a supporter of closer Polish relations with both the EU and Russia. The final result was closer than observers had predicted: 53 to 47 percent in favor of Komorowski.

Conclusion

We return to Balibar's mapping of European cultures, which comprised a system of concentric circles leading from the "true" Europe (the advanced western states) to an "outer" one wishing to be Europeanized (the eastern part).⁴¹ The notion of an outer Europe seemed particularly applicable to Poland during the Kaczyńskis' interregnum when they served as the facilitators of exclusionary, xenophobic Polish nationalism. Under their leadership, Poland became a spoiler straining EU relations with Russia—and among member states. Russophobia was doubly divisive, therefore: it separated its proponents from Russia, as well as its proponents from non like-thinking members of their own alliance systems.

The Polish leadership believed that it was articulating the concerns about Russia held by many of the country's neighbors as well as those of its own citizens. Neither assumption had much empirical backing. Especially in the case of eastern Slav neighbor nations like Ukraine and Belarus, anti-Russian foreign policy was not realistic. In turn, at the first opportunity they had, Poles voted out one of the Kaczyńskis then rejected his bid to succeed his brother as President. Many Polish voters sensed that "like any other inherited hatred, blind, dogmatic hostility toward Russia leads to bad policies."⁴² The double defeats inflicted on Jarek were in no small way recognition of this foreign policy *cul de sac*. While many Poles continue to express a variety of anxieties—including about Russian influence—they seem to reflect reasoned and measured fears rather than irrational ones.

It is political elites who appear more inclined to follow traditional Polish action scripts than the *demos*, viewing Poland as the outpost of Western civilization in Eastern Europe. As a backlash against the influence of the Kaczyńskis, there is evidence that Polish citizens have become more Eurocentric, in the positive sense of the term, while older political elites remain drawn to old battle lines. As Prime Minister Tusk's divided cabinet suggests, not all foreign policy principals recognize that russophobia is not in the country's national interests, nor are all aware that it elicits little public support any more.

It is misleading to use the complex Polish case of its often troubled relations with Russia to argue that Eastern enlargement fettered the ability of EU states to find common ground for cooperation with Russia. Today the EU's fundamental norms have become diffused across many nations—whether they are EU member states, former Soviet republics in Eastern Europe, or not even states. Why this has happened has less to do with EU standard setting and norm enforcement—which often has proved counterproductive—than with the intrinsic appeal of the EU's values. That is because those values are not essentially European but universal. To be sure, national phobias form part of the international political landscape, but they stand in conflict with prevailing international norms of cooperation. As with other hatreds such as anti-Semitism, Islamophobia, and racism, efforts at limiting the destructive influence and divisive consequences of russophobia are the EU's *raison d'être*, as that of its 27 members.

NOTES:

- ¹ Anatol Lieven, "Against Russophobia," *World Policy Journal*, 17, no. 4 (Winter 2000-2001), 28. For an early study of the phenomenon, see John Howard Gleason, *The Genesis of Russophobia in Great Britain: A Study of the Interaction of Policy and Opinion* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1950).
- ² David Foglesong and Gordon M. Hahn, "Ten Myths about Russia: Understanding and Dealing with Russia's Complexity and Ambiguity," in *Problems of Post-Communism*, 49, no. 6 (November-December 2002), 6-9.
- ³ I am grateful to Wojciech Zalewski (Stanford University) for emphasizing these points to me.
- ⁴ Jeffrey Mankoff, *Russian Foreign Policy: The Return of Great Power Politics* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2009), 300.
- ⁵ For an overview of some of these books, see Stephen Boykewich, "Devilish Forces," *Virginia Quarterly Review* (Winter 2009), 224-231. For a critique of negative media reporting about Russia, see Anna Smolchenko, "When Success and Image Don't Mesh," *Moscow Times* (27 June 2008). Reported by *Johnson's Russia List* (2008-122) at <http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/default.cfm>. I am grateful to Nicolai Petro (University of Rhode Island) for providing a bibliography of Western anti-Russian media bias.
- ⁶ "Russia and China 'Approval Down,'" *BBC News* (6 February 2009). Poland was not included in the survey.
- ⁷ Christopher Meyer, "A Return to 1815 is the Way Forward for Europe," *Times* (2 September 2008).
- ⁸ Joseph Biden, *Wall Street Journal* (24 March 2008).
- ⁹ Andrei Tsygankov, *Russophobia: Anti-Russian Lobby and American Foreign Policy* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).
- ¹⁰ "European Interview with James Sherr, Manager of the Russia/Eurasia Programme at Chatham House," *European Interview*, no. 35 (25 May 2009). Fondation Robert Schuman, at http://www.robert-schuman.eu/entretien_europe.php?num=35
- ¹¹ Richard Sakwa, "'New Cold War' or 'Twenty Years' Crisis?' Russia and International Politics," *International Affairs*, (March 2008), 84, no. 2 (March 2008), 249, 253.
- ¹² John Russell, "The Problem with Russian Foreign Policy: Their 'Chechenophobia,' or our 'Eurasiaophobia?'" Unpublished paper presented at the International Studies Association conference, New York (15 February 2009). Russell borrows the Magna Carta versus Great Yasa dichotomy from Yury Afanasiev, "The End of Russia?" *Open Democracy* (21 January 2009), at <http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/russia-theme/the-end-of-russia>. The Great Yasa of 1206 was Genghis Khan's code for the Horde listing punishments for serious crimes. The 1214 Magna Carta enumerated individual freedoms enjoyed by Englishmen.
- ¹³ Étienne Balibar, *We, the People of Europe? Reflections on Transnational Citizenship* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 167.
- ¹⁴ Balibar, *We, the People of Europe?* 169.
- ¹⁵ Balibar, *We, the People of Europe?* 231.
- ¹⁶ Michael Cashman, quoted in Bowley, "Poles on Ramparts."
- ¹⁷ "An Open Letter to the Obama Administration."
- ¹⁸ Joanna A. Gorska, *Dealing with a Juggernaut: Analyzing Poland's Policy Towards Russia, 1989-2004* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2011)
- ¹⁹ Sarah Ludford, quoted in Bowley, "Poles on Ramparts."
- ²⁰ Adam Michnik, "Waiting for Freedom, Messing it Up," *New York Times*, 25 March 2007.
- ²¹ Janusz Bugajski and Ilona Teleki, *Atlantic Bridges: America's New European Allies* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2007), 73.
- ²² Immanuel Kant, "The Contest of Faculties (1798)," in *Kant: Political Writings*, ed. Hans Reiss (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 182-83.

-
- ²³ Adam Krzeminski, "The View from the Vistula," *Sign and Sight* (8 March 2007), <<http://print.signandsight.com/features/1242.html>>
- ²⁴ Mark Landler, "German-Polish relations sink to new low," *International Herald Tribune*, 21 December 2006.
- ²⁵ Quoted in "EU, Russia play down discord after Polish veto," *Agence France Presse*, 24 November 2006.
- ²⁶ "Warning to EU members over treaty," *BBC News* (19 June 2007).
- ²⁷ Jan Cienski, "Relations with Russia: Intent on keeping clear of the bear's embrace," *Financial Times*, 20 December 20, 2006.
- ²⁸ Bugajski and Teleki, *Atlantic Bridges*, 39.
- ²⁹ "Polish Minister Attacks Schröder and Merkel," *Spiegel Online* (1 May 2006), at <http://www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518,413969,00.html>
- ³⁰ See, for example, Christopher S. Chivvis and Thomas Rid, "The Roots of Germany's Russia Policy," *Survival*, 51, no. 2 (April 2009), 105–122.
- ³¹ Quoted in "EU, Russia play down discord after Polish veto," *Agence France Presse* (24 November 2006).
- ³² Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej, "Opinia publiczna o tarczy antyrakietowej" (Warsaw: CBOS, March 2009), BS/45/2009, www.cbos.pl
- ³³ „In a Visit, Putin Tries to Ease Rifts with Poland,” *New York Times* (1 September 2009).
- ³⁴ "Russia Alarmed over New EU Pact," *BBC News* (22 May 2009).
- ³⁵ "Poland and the Missile Shield—An Interview with Radek Sikorski," *Daily Telegraph* (20 August 2008).
- ³⁶ "Poland and the Missile Shield."
- ³⁷ "Klich: Putin groził rozpadem Ukrainy," *Wirtualna Polska* (9 April 2008). At <http://wiadomosci.wp.pl/page,2,title,Klich-Putin-grozil-rozpadem-Ukrainy,wid,9837376,wiadomosc.html>
- ³⁸ Then again, it has been said that Lech was the moderating influence on Jarek who, after the Smolensk tragedy and his subsequent defeat in the presidential election, has expressed more extreme right-wing views on many issues.
- ³⁹ Lech Kaczyński, in *Rzeczpospolita* (16 August 2008), at <http://www.prezydent.pl/x.node?id=18543115>
- ⁴⁰ "Shots Fired' near Georgia Leader," *BBC News* (23 November 2008).
- ⁴¹ Balibar, *We, the People of Europe?* 169.
- ⁴² Lieven, "Against Russophobia," 25.