

Strategic Narratives of War: Fear of Entrapment and Abandonment During Protracted Conflict

Laura Roselle
Elon University and Duke University
lroselle@elon.edu

SGIR, Stockholm, September 2010

Please do not cite without permission.

The end of the Cold War has precipitated an increasingly prominent role for scholarship on communication that affects the conduct of international relations, and in particular, with the importance of communication in IR. Some scholars have been concerned with the instrumental use of communication and/or rhetoric to legitimize policy (Roselle, 2006) or to mobilize domestic publics (Brown, 2005). Others are concerned with the (re)construction of identity claims in international relations (Hopf, 2005). This paper focuses on strategic narratives and alliance relationships.

During protracted conflict, political leaders face numerous challenges associated with political communication. One serious challenge involves maintaining alliances. Narratives are important in this process as they set out the story of why a state is involved in a conflict, who is with the state and against the state, and how the conflict will be resolved (Antoniades, Miskimmon and O'Loughlin, 2010). Narratives serve as the bridge between images of other states and foreign policy behavior (Skonieczny, 2009). This paper focuses specifically on how allies are depicted in strategic narratives during limited war. Previous research shows that alliances are relationships that can be affected by interactions at the international and domestic levels. This paper accepts the literature's implicit (and sometimes explicit) assumption that communication is central to the maintenance of alliances and suggests that strategic narratives play a central role in certain patterned ways. Specifically the paper analyzes US strategic narratives about allies with particular focus on the United Kingdom and the government of Afghanistan and addresses two sets of questions:

1. How are broader narratives about alliances formed? To answer this question, the cases of US alliance with the United Kingdom and US alliance with Afghanistan are analyzed to assess the role of elite press, other media and blogs to highlight the dynamics of alliance construction in a new media environment. In particular the focus is on the construction of fear of abandonment and fear of entrapment – central concepts associated with the study of alliances. The construction of the fear of UK abandonment during the British 2010 election is one case. The construction of the fear of entrapment by an Afghan government identified as supporting corruption in 2009-2010 serves as the second case. This analysis shows how the new media environment allows for non-US sources and non-governmental sources (including blogs) to affect the construction of communication about alliances.

2. What factors affect differences in political leaders' strategic narratives about allies? Or does the same leader use different narratives in response to different external events? To answer this question, the strategic narratives of the Obama Administration are studied in the cases described above. The study finds that there are differences in strategic narratives related to events that are associated with particular kinds of fears but only under certain conditions. Constructed fears of abandonment lead to strategic narratives that emphasize the strength and history of the alliance and joint goals or interests. Constructed fears of entrapment lead to strategic narratives characterized by movement away from allies, but not when allies are considered unrestrainable. More generally, leadership narratives are structured by underlying narratives about US foreign policy behavior and alliance structure. The cases highlight the difficulties in incorporating allies or partners into the prominent great power narratives of war, especially in an age of new media.

Alliances

The study of alliances is central to world politics as alliances speak to the ability of states to cooperate, particularly during conflict (Weitsman, 2004; 2010; Snyder, 1997). Much of the literature on alliances in international relations concentrates on alliance formation and is conducted through a realist lens that emphasizes the distribution of

power within the system and resulting behavior such as balance, tethering, and bandwagoning. Research has also been done on variability in the reliability of alliance agreements (Kegley & Raymond, 1990). Less work has been done on the maintenance of alliances, especially over a longer period of time and during a protracted conflict. Yet, the literature does suggest that strategic communication is central to the formation and maintenance of alliances and this paper seeks to address how strategic narratives function in alliance relationships. This paper, then, focuses on the (re)construction of alliances over time, and speaks to Weitsman's (2010) point that in regard to research on alliances "[c]onstruivist and identity-based arguments are becoming more prevalent and will likely continue to be an important research focus in the coming years" (Weitsman, 2010).

Alliances during conflict by definition are relationships that facilitate coordinated efforts to wage war, so perhaps most important to the alliance relationship during conflict is alliance cohesion. Alliances and/or coalitions complicate war waging because "there must be interoperability – not just in terms of weaponry, but also in terms of language, communications, doctrine, and the exchange of information" (Weitsman, 2010). In the case of the conflict in Afghanistan, for example, the United States is aligned with the Afghan government and is, of course, allied with the United Kingdom as the most actively involved member of the NATO alliance in Afghanistan; thus this paper will address two major alliances of importance associated with waging war in Afghanistan: maintenance of U.S.-Afghan relations and maintenance of the alliance with the United Kingdom (a central NATO ally) fighting in Afghanistan.¹

Alliance Management

Snyder discusses the management of alliances at length in his seminal work (1997) and elaborates on the alliance security dilemma (180). Arguing that over the longer term alliance partners' "attention centers less on particular interests and conflicts

¹ For a description of the role of NATO in Afghanistan see http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_8189.htm

Although the alliance or partnership with Pakistan is also very important here, this is beyond the scope of this paper.

with an adversary and more on the manipulation of apparent commitment to the alliance to offset shifts in dependence relationships between the allies themselves” (180), Snyder highlights the importance of understanding what he calls the security-autonomy trade-off and the tension between the fear of abandonment and the fear of entrapment (180-181). Especially over the long-term, so certainly in prolonged or protracted conflict situations, Snyder claims that on the one hand states may fear that their allies will abandon the alliance for any number of reasons. On the other hand, as time goes on, states may fear that they are becoming entrapped by the alliance itself. Domestic political considerations may change in states and/or external events may shift conditions related to the conflict and contribute to changes in the dynamics of alliance relationships over time.

Snyder suggests that fear of abandonment can be addressed by increasing one’s commitment (181) to the partner, but this may also increase the possibility of entrapment – hence the dilemma. The literature on fears of entrapment and abandonment suggest that states react in patterned ways to alleviate these fears. Snyder, for example, asserts that fear of abandonment leads to “movement toward the ally” (313). Specifically this includes making or reiterating explicit alliance pledges (308), alliance revisions (309) and appealing or moving closer to an ally’s position (310). States that fear entrapment² “will either loosen their general alliance commitment or withhold support from their allies”(Snyder, 315). Snyder does make the caveat that states that fear entrapment will give firm commitments when the ally is unrestrainable (185). The case studies presented below test these assumptions in regard to leadership strategic narratives.

The severity of the alliance security dilemma is determined by three factors, according to Snyder – interests, dependence, and commitment. Kegley and Raymond, for their part, also focus on interests, arguing that changes in alliances are related directly to changes in conditions related to interest diversion (254) and that “uncertainty will increase the longer the alliance remains in force” (Kegley & Raymond, 61). The focus on bargaining and interests sidesteps the important question of how interests (and dependence and commitment) are understood and this squarely highlights the importance of the (re)construction of alliance relationships and the importance of communication.

² Fear of entrapment and abandonment can exist simultaneously. Snyder’s discussion pertains to the relative strength of each.

Constructivists would point out that if interests are constructed, then interest diversion is constructed as well, for example. In other words similar changes in conditions may or may not lead to the identification of interest diversion. Likewise, Snyder suggests that risk of entrapment, for example, is “sensitive to the degree of commonality or disjunction between allies’ interests” (182), and so fears of entrapment and abandonment are constructed as well. In other words, the same situation or event will not necessarily lead to fears of entrapment or abandonment. It is important to understand how these fears are constructed and this paper seeks to address this gap in the literature.

That said, while not explaining fully how interests are constructed, Snyder and others who study alliance relationships certainly recognize the importance of communication to alliance maintenance. So even within his conceptual framework focusing on bargaining he suggests that:

Between allies, bargaining power will turn on perceptions of their comparative dependence, commitments, and intensity of interests in whatever they are bargaining about. ... The principal function of actual bargaining communications is to modify others’ perceptions of these relationships and of one’s own behavior, so as to enhance one’s own bargaining power.” (Snyder, 1997, 37)

Snyder is not alone. Other international relations scholars note the importance of communication to alliance relationships:

“bargaining power accrues not necessarily to the party possessing superior resources generally, but the party which possesses issue-specific resources, is able to communicate its resolve clearly and convincingly, and is able to exploit asymmetries in its relations” (Jonsson, 1981, quoted in Kegley and Raymond, 1990, 55)

Kegley and Raymond suggest that the most common technique to maintain coalition solidarity is persuasion (56). Thus, without understanding communication processes we cannot understand alliance maintenance. The literature on strategic narratives focuses squarely on the communication processes of foreign policy behavior.

Strategic narratives

Strategic narratives are defined as narratives “forged by a state with the express purpose of influencing the foreign policy behavior of other actors” (O’Loughlin) and are frameworks constructed to allow people to make sense of the world, policies, events, and interactions (Freedman, 2006; Kaldor, Martin and Selchow, 2007b; Antoniadis, Miskimmon & O’Loughlin, 2010). Freedman (2006, 22), who has encouraged thinking and research on strategic narratives, suggests that narratives are “compelling story lines which can explain events convincingly and from which inferences can be drawn.” Some scholars use ‘narratives’ and ‘stories’ interchangeably, underscoring the structure and important cultural underpinnings inherent here. The structure of stories implies a temporality – a movement through time – suggesting a link to the past (history), a purpose or meaning, and a conclusion, lesson, or proscription for the future. Stories have been and are important to people as conceptual organizing tools that allow individuals to understand one another within a particular context. Cultural anthropology, the study of folklore, and work in social cognition (Costabile & Klein, 2008) point to the importance of stories within particular cultures and societies. In fact, Costabile and Klein (2008, 420) have shown that: “narrative construction may be an adaptive strategy to explain the causes of past events and to anticipate future happenings.”

The importance of narratives as strategic reminds one of Edelman’s observation that “... language usage is strategic. It is always part of a course of action to enable people to live with themselves and with what they do and to marshal support for causes” (Edelman, 1988,108). There is a long history within political communication that has addressed the importance of strategic communication specifically in the area of communication and foreign policy and international relations (Roselle, 2010). This research has included work on framing, indexing, agenda-setting, etc. Political actors can and do use communicated messages in a strategic manner to shape debates, agendas and policy choices. Freeman (2006, 22) suggests that narratives “are strategic because they do not arise spontaneously but are deliberately constructed or reinforced out of the ideas and thoughts that are already current.” This is similar to the idea that “[n]arratives are composed for particular audiences at moments in history, and they draw on taken-for-granted discourses and values circulating in a particular culture” (Riessman, 3). In the realm of international relations, Antoniadis, Miskimmon and O’Loughlin assert that

“[g]reat powers use strategic narratives to establish and maintain influence in the international system and to shape the system itself” (2010, 1). Prior narratives are important because they may shape present and future narratives. For example, a narrative that stresses the role of great powers in the international system sets out particular actions as proper and right within the system (Roselle, 2006). Thus, the analysis of President Obama’s strategic narratives will take into account how great power identity shapes these narratives. One might expect, for example, that great power identity would affect strategic narratives about alliances by emphasizing the role of the alliance in maintaining, building, or supporting international order under the leadership of the United States.

Some scholars make a distinction between narratives and framing or spin (Douglas, 2008) in the context of understanding international relations. Douglas, for example, argues that:

“What makes such efforts ‘narratives’ instead of plain ‘stories,’ domestic ‘spin,’ or ‘propaganda’ is the fact that they are less retrospective explanations than they are forward-looking conceptual frameworks for explaining and interpreting events yet to come. They are also separate from ‘spin’ or artful rhetoric in that they are not ‘framing’ the discussion of an event for temporary advantage, but rather attempt to follow a certain self-referential logic which must string together a host of events, pose a causal relationship between them, and then use this to hypothesize about the best way forward to success.” (Douglas, 2008, 4)

This distinction suggests that narratives contain stories – including characters (actors) with goals and motivations, actions, setting, sequence, plot, and made rich by sensory details and point of view – but narratives also contain broader and implicit messages or communication about future goals, perceived interests, and action. Thus strategic narratives, to the degree that they are understood and accepted, can constrain choices in the international sphere and guide behavior. Perhaps this is best exemplified by some choices made by the Soviet government after the shift in Soviet strategic narratives about the international system and the role of the Soviet Union (and other states) within the system (English, 2000; Hopf, 2002).³

³ The argument here is not that strategic narratives changed Soviet behavior, but that the change in strategic narratives might have constrained choices.

The most important reason for adopting the conceptual framework of strategic narrative rather than framing is that the structure of narratives involves a focus on temporality and space (Tversky, 2004). These two concepts are particularly important in the study of international relations and foreign policy. Temporality is important to decision making about tomorrow and space is important to understanding the structure of the system itself.⁴

Component parts of narratives

Kenneth Burke, in his classic *Grammar of Motives* (1969), noted that narrative requires an actor, an action, a goal or intention, a scene, and an instrument. This can be simplified into two categories: actor and plot (containing action and goals). Actors are comprised of those groups, individuals, or entities that perform the action in the narrative. Are actors people or groups, states, international organizations, or other types of political organizations? This study focuses on narratives about allies. The study of plot is central to the importance of narratives and highlights the difference between narratives and some definitions of frames. A plot suggests action that is purposeful and driven by values and motivations. In addition there is a recognition that time and timing are important. Plot sets out the relationships between and among actors, the actions that are taken, and the motivations involved. In the case studies that follow the narrative about alliance relationships is assessed.

In addition, scholars have noted that specific types of rhetorical devices are important to understand when analyzing narratives. For example, metaphors are extremely important to the structure of strategic narratives (Beer and De Landtsheer, 2004). Metaphors are “commonly combined phrases of habit that generate weak references to independent meanings of separate embedded terms” (Beer and De

⁴ Of course there are a number of ways to define and use ‘framing’ and there are a number of conceptual overlaps with the notion of strategic narratives. Entman (2004, 5), for example, defines framing as “selecting and highlighting some facets of events or issues, and making connections among them so as to promote a particular interpretation, evaluation, and/or solution.” Wolfsfeld (1997, 35) defines an interpretive frame as “central organizing idea[s] for making sense of relevant events and suggesting what is at issue.” Entman’s making of connections and Wolfsfeld’s organizing ideas come close to the development of a narrative.

Landtsheer, 13). Metaphors that structure strategic narratives, then, suggest a cognitive construction that can affect how people think about issues, goals, and policies. As Gregg notes, metaphors, and this paper argues, strategic narrative:

shapes the scheme by which we come to structure and know ourselves and the environment in which we live. It provides us with the schema and orderings that make sense of our experiences. It initiates perception, conception, intention, and action (Gregg, 2004, 60).

Constructing Narratives

The study of strategic narratives is relatively new in the international relations/comparative politics subfields; however, the study of political communication and framing is not and informs the study of narratives conducted here. Wolfsfeld (1997), for example, argues that there is a political contest between political leaders and opposition and that this contest shapes the degree to which mass media affect political conflict. That is, the contestation over media can shape foreign policy because who wins the access and framing battle for media coverage, also shapes the context of foreign policymaking. While political leaders usually have the upper hand in this competition, under certain circumstances challengers can use the media to exert political influence. This is especially true when an issue is more important when access to media is expanded.

Many scholars have noted that the new media environment or ecology of the 21st century has an impact on political communication (Hoskins & O'Loughlin, 2010). Today leaders are less able to control media messages because of the proliferation of media sources and rapid dissemination of information via the internet, cellphones, and other new media. In particular, there is more of an opportunity for non-US stories, non-elite media, and non-governmental sources to affect US media coverage and the broader narrative on alliance relationships. This is important because we know that the media within a state tend to focus on their own state's involvement (Archetti 2008). We also know that non-elite media, including blogs, can provide alternative narratives as can non-governmental individual sources. This literature suggests that we should look at the construction of narratives as multi-faceted, non-linear, and broad in scope.

Alliances and Strategic Narratives

Tying together the literature on alliances, which clearly highlights the importance of communication, and the literature on strategic narratives allows us to develop specific research questions and hypotheses about the dynamics and characteristics of strategic narratives about alliances and allies during conflict.

H1: The alliance security dilemma, characterized by fear of abandonment and fear of entrapment, is constructed in the public realm – at least in part. The construction of the alliance-security dilemma in the US public realm is affected by non-US sources, non-elite media sources, including blogs, and non-governmental sources.

H2: A leader's strategic narrative differs when events are constructed as presenting potential abandonment or entrapment. Alliances constructed in terms of **fear of abandonment** will lead to reiterating alliance commitments, an emphasis on shared interests and policies, and expressing support for allied positions. In the case of the U.S., these strategic narratives will resonate with great power identity by emphasizing the importance of the alliance to the international system and world order.

H3: A leader's strategic narrative differs when events are constructed as presenting potential abandonment or entrapment. When fear of entrapment dictates the nature of the alliance the crucial issue is the degree to which an ally can be restrained. If the ally can be restrained, strategic narratives will emphasize a reduction in the scope of commitment and an emphasis on your own state's interests and policies. If the ally is unrestrainable, strategic narratives will reiterate alliance commitments yet focus on one's own state's interests and policies. In both cases U.S. strategic narratives will resonate with great power identity by emphasizing the means to an end to over-involvement (as defined by the US) and the accomplishment of goals.

Because hypotheses 2 and 3 rely, in part, on the assumption that the United States has a continuing great power identity under President Obama, I first turn to assess evidence that tests that assumption. Before the individual cases are addressed, evidence of the great power narrative of the United States is detailed in an assessment of the National Security Strategies of the United States under Presidents Bush and Obama. Although much has been made of the differences between these presidents - and there are important differences – there are also similarities in a broader narrative about US

international relations. As discussed above, this broader narrative should influence strategic narratives about alliances in specific ways.

The paper then presents case studies of the construction of fears of abandonment and entrapment, and the strategic narratives of the Obama Administration related to US alliance relationships with the UK (2010) and Afghanistan (2009-2010) respectively. The case of the UK shows the construction of fears of abandonment as the US media described the 2010 UK election in part by how it would affect alliance relations or the ‘special relationship’ between the United States and the United Kingdom. News and blogs in the Google news archive are systematically analyzed to assess whether and how they emphasize the end of the ‘special relationship’ between the US and the UK and, in particular, discussions of the UK making foreign policy decisions that are depicted as potentially detrimental to the United States. The timeframe here is from inauguration day, January 20, 2009 through the visit of Prime Minister David Cameron to Washington on July 20, 2010. The case of Afghanistan is one that allows the tracing of fears of entrapment, especially after the 2009 release of information on Afghan government corruption under President Hamid Karzi and questions about fraud in the August 2009 presidential election. News and blogs in the Google news archive are systematically analyzed to assess whether and how they emphasize being trapped or stuck in an alliance with the Afghan government and explanations for why this is. The timeframe for this case is from President Obama’s inauguration in January 2009 until the visit of President Karzai to Washington on May 12, 2010.

In the individual cases themselves, first, a google archive advanced search was used to trace trends in news and blogs coverage of the US-Afghan and US-UK alliance. The broad trends were then examined to determine what media presented the alliance in ways that emphasized fears of entrapment or abandonment. Specifically, country of origin, media source, and news source were analyzed to see how and when discussion of abandonment or entrapment was raised and discussed. The focus is on US media, but one cannot understand US coverage without understanding how foreign events and media coverage contribute to the overall narrative.

It is important to note that the media construction of fears of abandonment and entrapment both shapes and is shaped by the strategic narrative of the US President. The

second task of the case studies is to focus more specifically on President Obama's strategic narratives during this time period in order to assess hypotheses 2 and 3. Different emphases in the strategic narratives are expected based on the literature associated with alliance management and the alliance-security dilemma. In the case of the UK, the President's strategic narrative would be expected to emphasize the strength of the alliance, shared and UK interests and policies, and the necessity of the alliance for maintenance of the international system. In the Afghan case, the President's strategic narrative would be expected to emphasize a narrow or focused commitment, US strategic interests and policies, and the necessity of US action as world leader – at least when the US leadership believes it can restrain Afghanistan.

Great Power Identity

In part questions about U.S. strategic narratives derive from questions about the residual effects of decades of confrontation during the Cold War. For much of the 20th century the United States and the Soviet Union were locked in a competition marked by ideological, political and economic differences. Building competing alliance structures, claiming superiority, and encouraging their citizens to see their own state as superior to the other, the US and the Soviet Union claimed great power status in a bi-polar world. In addition, there is some evidence that this great power identity affects behavior today as these two states behave more similarly than differently in areas related to war (Roselle, 2006), terrorism (Oates, 2006) and the assertion of power. Oates (2006), for example, shows that US and Russian responses to terrorism (by leaders, media, and audience) in the immediate post-Cold War period are more similar to each other than to British responses.

An analysis of the National Security Strategies of the United States in 2002, 2006, and 2010 was conducted to determine underlying similarities across presidencies (Bush and Obama).⁵ As Peter Feaver has said:

⁵ The executive branch in the United States periodically issues a document detailing their National Security Strategy. This was mandated by Section 603 of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Department Reorganization Act of 1986, and requires: A comprehensive description and discussion of the foreign policy worldwide commitments and national defense capabilities of the United States; the proposed short-

Precisely because it is a public document, it [the National Security Strategy] must authentically reflect the administration's world-view; it is not a fortune cookie prediction of what the administration will do in any particular setting, but it is an authoritative statement of the principles that guide the president (Feaver, 2010). The President pays particular attention to the National Security Strategy, as do the rest of the government and the military. It sets out the narrative of the United States from the executive's perspective, and carries significant weight even if others in society may challenge its narrative. Under President George W. Bush two such documents were released – one in 2002 in the aftermath of 9/11 and one in 2006 after intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan had carried on for years. Under President Obama, a new national security strategy was released 27 May 2010.

While there are a number of differences across the security strategy documents, in fact, the strategic narratives under Bush and Obama are similar in a number of areas. These include the primacy of states as actors in the international system in conflict with destabilizing non-state actors, the increasing complexity of the international system, and the United States as a leader of the international system. The narrative that tells the story of the United States as the leader of the free world, in an increasingly complex world, is expected to carry through from President Bush to President Obama.

In 2002, the focus is clearly on the United States as “the United States enjoys a position of unparalleled military strength and great economic and political influence” (National Security Strategy, 2002). In 2006 a shift occurs as ‘democracies’ are cited much more often as actors central to the strategic narrative. This ties in to more emphasis in the narrative on democratic states as champions or heroes. Still, in 2006, the United States is the focus as leader of the international system. In 2010 the emphasis shifts again as an emphasis on alliances is much more important – but again US leadership is stressed. The following chart shows the number of references to different types of partners in the international system and the emphasis on US leadership.

term and long-term uses of the elements of national power required to protect and promote the interests and achieve the stated goals and objectives; and to provide an assessment of the capabilities of the United States to implement its national security strategy (quoted in National Strategy Forum Review, chap. 1, 1).

	2002	2006	2010
Alliances/ally/allies	48	9	63
Coalition(s)	11	4	6
Democracies	5	29	9
Friend(s)	26	17	7
Leader(s)(ship)	12	21	69

An analysis of actions, goals, and metaphors across the three national security strategy documents shows a similar emphasis on US leadership in building the international system. For example, in 2002 the US is depicted as building the world, as it has done in the past: "In World War II we fought to make the world safer, then worked to rebuild it." The documents say that the United States will build capabilities, infrastructure, defenses, institutions, democracies, markets, relationships, and agreements. This is directly related to an important action taken by the US in the international system and that is work.⁶ The narrative consistently uses the metaphor of building or construction with the United States as the central actor. Building as a metaphor is tied into the notion of 'work' - evoking resonant ideas about the United States: "*America is successful because of the hard work, creativity, and enterprise of our people*" (2002). The US will work to prevent terrorists from undermining the international system and US security by building up markets and democracies.

Overall, all three documents suggest that the rise of terrorists and the ineffectiveness of deterrence show that the world is more complex and less predictable than during the Cold War. In 2002, pre-emption is depicted as a necessary as option for action as "America will act against such emerging threats before they are fully formed" (2002). The US will act alone, it is clear, even without international support: "While the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone" (2002). In 2006 there is less emphasis on preemption

⁶ Without the quantitative analysis I would have missed the emphasis on this action.

and more on encouraging and supporting democracy in the world, but the underlying assumption of a complicated and unpredictable international system remains.

Under the presidency of Barack Obama, there has been a change in the conduct of foreign policy, including an emphasis on a collaborative approach and working with allies, and to a great degree that is evident in the 2010 National Security Strategy. For example, the document emphasizes respect for allies:

The foundation of United States, regional, and global security will remain America's relations with our allies, and our commitment to their security is unshakable. These relationships must be constantly cultivated, not just because they are indispensable for U.S. interests and national security objectives, but because they are fundamental to our collective security. Alliances are force multipliers: through multinational cooperation and coordination, the sum of our actions is always greater than if we act alone. We will continue to maintain the capacity to defend our allies against old and new threats. We will also continue to closely consult with our allies as well as newly emerging partners and organizations so that we revitalize and expand our cooperation to achieve common objectives. And we will continue to mutually benefit from the collective security provided by strong alliances. (National Security Strategy, 2010)

Yet, even as alliances are celebrated, US leadership is emphasized.

An analysis of national security strategies shows both differences and similarities in broader narratives across the presidencies of George Bush and Barack Obama. President Barack Obama's narrative emphasizes a more 'respectful' US state seeking to work with others in the international system and centers on shared interests and challenges - going well beyond the threat of terrorists. In addition, the Obama Administration promises to reach out to states that have not garnered significant attention in the past. Still, in narratives across the Bush and Obama presidencies US leadership in an unstable and uncertain international system is emphasized. The underlying great power narrative is maintained in each document reviewed. As the 2010 US National Security Strategy asserts: "Going forward, there should be no doubt: the United States of America will continue to underwrite global security" and "Our national security strategy

is, therefore, focused on renewing American leadership.” For Obama this may be a new type of leadership, but it is leadership nonetheless.

It is now possible to turn to the two case studies to assess whether there are the expected differences in presidential strategic narratives in the cases of fear of abandonment and fear of entrapment.


Leadership Strategic Narratives and The Construction of Fears of Abandonment and Entrapment

The construction of fears of abandonment and entrapment in regard to alliance relationships and leadership strategic narratives are analyzed through two cases studies. Two specific alliances are analyzed here: the US-UK alliance in 2010 (potential fear of abandonment) and the US-Afghan alliance in 2010 (potential fear of entrapment).

US-UK alliance politics and strategic narratives – constructing the fear of abandonment

The fear of abandonment was constructed in the US media during 2010 as US bloggers and media raised questions about the British election. The British press focused attention on the state of the US-UK relationship throughout 2009 and 2010. US attention on the US-UK alliances was only focused, however, after Nick Clegg’s impressive electoral debate performance and rise in the polls. Clegg’s assertion that the relationship between the United States and the UK was no longer special was picked up by many in the US media. In particular, conservative bloggers, including those associated with the Heritage Foundation and popular newspapers such as USA Today discussed how likely UK withdrawal from Afghanistan – or abandonment of the US – would be. This came even as the UK media spent considerable time bemoaning the unequal relationship between the US and the UK. President Obama’s strategic narrative consistently emphasized the ‘special relationship’ throughout 2009-2010 but this coincided with a broadening range of allies and partners, and was not emphasized in the US press. This case highlights the importance of the media in constructing a fear of abandonment and shows how President Obama felt it necessary to take advantage of the election of Prime Minister David Cameron to reiterate (again) the importance of the US-UK alliances in accord with hypothesis 3.

An google news search shows the trend in media and blog coverage of the UK-US ‘special relationship’. The terminology ‘special relationship’ has served a rubric or shorthand for UK-US alliance since Prime Minister Winston Churchill popularized the term in his 1946 ‘iron curtain’ speech in Fulton, Missouri.⁷ The use of this term for searching returned a broad sweep of articles related to the contour and context of the UK-US alliance. After the search, individual articles that did not apply were excluded and pertinent articles were read. Specifically, news stories and blogs were analyzed to understand the flow of information about the alliance in the public realm.



In the early months of the Obama presidency, the British press contains a large volume of stories that mention, describe, or analyze the future of the ‘special relationship’ between the United States and United Kingdom. A google search for example, for the period from January 20, 2009

⁷ Dumbrell, John. 2000. *A Special Relationship: Anglo-American relations in the Cold War and after*. Palgrave.

when President Obama was inaugurated to March 1, for example, shows a total of 95 articles that contain a mention of the ‘special relationship,’ but only one article was from a US source, the *Washington Times*.⁸

In early March 2009 there was coverage of the visit of Prime Minister Gordon Brown and President Obama’s remarks reaffirming the ‘special relationship’ in the British press. The *NY Times* noted that this visit was important because there was some question about the US view of the relationship due to “the shift suggested by Robert Gibbs, Obama's press secretary, who said last week that the visit would be an occasion to renew the "special partnership" between the two countries” instead of a ‘special relationship’.⁹ Again, there was significant coverage in the British press, but not in the US press about the alliance. In September 2009 the volume of news mentioning the ‘special relationship’ increased again as President Obama’s critique of the release of convicted Pan Am 103 bomber Abedelbaset al-Megrahi was covered in a few US newspapers and the British press covered the meeting between President Obama and Prime Minister Brown during the G20 meetings in Pittsburgh. The Obama Administration, for their part, expressed annoyance at questions about the ‘special relationship,’ with Press Secretary Robert Gibbs saying: “The notion that there remains anything other than a special relationship between the two countries is silly and absurd,” and calling the claims “a media-generated bunch of silliness.”¹⁰

The next spike in the number of articles about the ‘special relationship’ with the United States is in the British press in March 2010 when the Commons Foreign Affairs committee released a report “said the phrase ‘the special relationship’ did not reflect the ‘modern’ Anglo-American relationship”.¹¹ In particular, the report suggested that the UK should not be so accommodating to the United States: “The UK needs to be less deferential and more willing to say no to the US on those issues where the two countries' interests and values diverge”. These British news articles suggested that the new Obama Administration has committed diplomatic slights against the UK and that the UK should not go along with the United States on any number of different issues. But this coverage was different from the British media storyline of 2009 covering the actions of the Obama administration toward the UK. The British media now were

⁸ <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/feb/20/embassy-row-633251/>

⁹ <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/02/world/americas/02iht-brits.4.20538268.html>

¹⁰ http://news.yahoo.com/s/politico/20090926/pl_politico/27611

¹¹ http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/8590767.stm

reporting on governmental officials who were questioning the nature of the relationship. The sources are different; however, this does not receive extensive coverage in the US until the US media begin to focus on the British election campaign of 2010.

Overall, then, media in the United States did not turn to focus on the UK and the ‘special relationship’ between the United States and the United Kingdom until during and after the election campaign in 2010. And when they did, a potential change in the relationship was depicted as an abandonment of the US in key foreign policy areas. Perhaps most important was the April 24, 2010 editorial in the *Washington Post* that noted:

Yet the United States can hardly afford a weaker or less friendly Britain at a time when it is still fighting two wars and when diplomacy with states such as Iran, North Korea and Syria is failing. Other longtime American allies, from Brazil to Turkey, have begun opposing the Obama administration on Iran and other issues. Though the next British government is unlikely to follow their course, Mr. Obama would be wise to reaffirm the "special relationship."¹²

This sentiment was echoed in other media and in blogs. Particularly important here are the writings done by the Heritage foundation. “The special relationship is ‘in tatters,” says Nile Gardiner, head of the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom at the Heritage Foundation, a think tank in Washington. “I do see ... significant dangers ahead.”¹³ Gardiner’s was a leading voice in the blogs and media during this period although he suggests in conservative blogs that it is the Obama Administration that is abandoning the UK and not the other way around.

The election on May 6, 2010 resulted in a hung parliament and the coalition government of the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats. The US press coverage in the aftermath of the election emphasized a ‘new special relationship’ as attention is paid to President Obama’s calls to the new Prime Minister and Obama’s invitation of Cameron to the White House. Blogs too highlighted a new attention by the United States to the alliance. Gardiner, for example, wrote on May 17: “Just one week after David

¹² http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/23/AR2010042304806_pf.html

¹³ http://www.usatoday.com/printedition/news/20100504/britishelection04_st.art.htm

Cameron entered Downing Street, however, the Special Relationship looks back on track as a political force, and is undergoing a distinct revival.”¹⁴ Still issues are raised in the media during June, including the Obama Administration’s criticism of BP and the announcement by PM Cameron to withdraw British troops from Afghanistan. The *Washington Post* noted that:

On Friday [June 25], Cameron announced his intention to withdraw British troops from Afghanistan, where they make up the second-largest national contingent, within five years. While that timeline does not necessarily conflict with Obama’s, it magnified the perception that the mission is unraveling.¹⁵

The visit of newly elected Prime Minister David Cameron to Washington, DC to meet President Barack Obama in July 2010 was important to the alliance between the United States and was taken as an opportunity by President Obama to reinforce and highlight the special relationship between the UK and US. In fact, Reuters said: “The special relationship has been upgraded. It is now ‘extraordinary’, ‘truly special’ and ‘absolutely essential’”.¹⁶ President Obama’s strategic narrative about the US-UK alliance did indeed reinforce the strength of the alliance saying: “Mr. Prime Minister, we can never say it enough. The United States and the United Kingdom enjoy a truly special relationship. ... In short, the United States has no closer ally and no stronger partner than Great Britain. And I appreciate the opportunity to renew our relationship with my partner, Prime Minister Cameron.”¹⁷ This alliance was set within the context of a world that depends on US and UK leadership: “when the United States and the United Kingdom stand together, our people — and people around the world -- are more secure and they are more prosperous”.¹⁸ This case shows how presidential strategic narratives can be affected by the construction of a fear of abandonment in the public realm. It also

¹⁴ <http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/nilegardiner/100040002/the-special-relationship-strikes-back/>

¹⁵ <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/26/AR2010062602032.html>

¹⁶ <http://blogs.reuters.com/frontrow/2010/07/20/washington-extra/>

¹⁷ <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-obama-and-prime-minister-cameron-united-kingdom-joint-press-avail>

¹⁸ <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-obama-and-prime-minister-cameron-united-kingdom-joint-press-avail>

illustrates that particular events – in this case a new government – can provide opportunities for changes in strategic narratives.

US-Afghan alliance politics – constructing the fear of entrapment

Throughout 2009 and continuing in 2010, fears of US entrapment in Afghanistan were constructed in the mass media in the United States. This section focuses on the time frame from 2009-May 2010 to understand how the fear of entrapment was constructed in the US public realm and sets the stage for the analysis of President Obama's strategic narrative during the same time period, culminating in the May 12, 2010 visit of Karzai to Washington. Fears of entrapment were evident in the public realm before Obama's inauguration and Obama's strategic narrative about Afghanistan focused on an increase in military resources in conjunction with a reduction in the scope of the mission and a focus on US interests. In 2009-2010, the depiction of being "stuck" with President Hamid Karzai is clear in a number of different outlets and is amplified over time. This begins with President Obama's inauguration and develops as attention to corruption increases and seems to conflict with the Obama administration's focus on good governance and a focus on diplomatic and development solutions in Afghanistan in addition to a military emphasis. The reelection of Karzai, from August's inconclusive election to months of electoral stalemate until November 2009 when Karzai wins out, focuses more attention on the US-Afghan alliance. President Obama traveled to Afghanistan to meet with President Karzai at the end of March 2010 and challenged Karzai to clean up the corruption that was documented by the United Nations and others. Karzai did not back down – insinuating in April that he might join the Taliban. A trip by President Karzai to the US in May 2010 was meant to smooth over the rough edges of the US-Afghan alliance. This fails, however, and after Karzai's April comments he appears to be unrestrainable. President Obama's strategic narrative shifts after this to emphasize the strength of the alliance and its necessity for the international system. This case, then, supports Snyder's argument that fear of entrapment will lead to distancing except when the ally is perceived to be "unrestrainable".

Barack Obama's strategic narrative about Afghanistan during the 2008 electoral campaign suggested that Afghanistan should be the focus of US military action instead of Iraq, that Afghan military forces should be built up and trained by the US, and that non-military resources were crucial to developing Afghanistan and countering support for al Qaeda and the Taliban. A full year and a half before the election, then Senator Obama set out his views on Afghanistan in a speech entitled, *The War We Have To Win*, at the Wilson Center.¹⁹ Obama begins with recalling the horrors of 9/11 and says "After 9/11, our calling was to write a new chapter in the American story." He said this opportunity was lost when the Bush Administration decided to invade Iraq – "a war against a country that had nothing to do with 9/11." He continues with the metaphor of writing a new chapter, saying: "It is time to turn the page" and "too often since 9/11, the extremists have defined us, not the other way around. When I am President, that will change. We will author our own story." Under his leadership Obama says more troops will be sent to Afghanistan even as US diplomatic efforts are strengthened. Part of Obama's strategic narrative about Afghanistan is a narrowing of the scope of the mission – there is less discussion of building democracy, for example - and an emphasis on US interests. In regard to the Afghan government itself, Obama says, "we must seek better performance from the Afghan government, and support that performance through tough anti-corruption safeguards on aid, and increased international support to develop the rule of law across the country." Obama repeated the basics of his Afghanistan narrative throughout the campaign.

To begin the analysis of the construction of a fear of entrapment, a google archived news search containing stories on Afghanistan and the United States was conducted and a sample of these stories were read in their entirety. A list of phrases and metaphors that suggested a fear of entrapment was constructed. This list included: stuck, quagmire, trapped, and Vietnam.²⁰ Then searches were conducted using these terms and news, blogs, and leadership speeches were read to understand how the story of US entrapment

¹⁹ http://www.barackobama.com/2007/08/01/the_war_we_need_to_win.php

²⁰ Vietnam as an historical analogy is a complicated metaphor. In some contexts the use of the term Vietnam suggests entrapment, but it also suggests a number of other fears including fear of failure.

in Afghanistan was presented. Specific attention was paid to country of media source, type of media source, and identification of individual sources.

Obama was inaugurated on January 20, 2009 and the cover story of *Newsweek* magazine on January 31 directly addressed the similarities and differences between Afghanistan and Vietnam.²¹ In early February the comparison between the two conflicts was disputed by Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. His critique of the analogy was echoed in many ways by Frederick Kagan, resident scholar at the neoconservative think tank the American Enterprise Institute in *Newsweek*.²² The Vietnam analogy tied into US fears of entrapment in a war but is also associated with the fear of overreach (see Obama's assertion in September 2009).²³ During Fall of 2009 the number of stories that discuss Afghanistan and Vietnam increased. President Obama himself discussed and rejected much of the comparison in mid-September and the analysis continued as discussion of electoral fraud dragged on from the August 20 election until the November announcement of Karzai as the newly elected President. Also during the fall of 2009 US strategy was Afghanistan is under review.²⁴ In December President Obama announced, in a nationally televised address from the US Military Academy at West Point, that there would be a major escalation of US forces in Afghanistan. In this speech Obama stated: "Our overarching goal remains the same: to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to prevent its capacity to threaten America and our allies in the future".²⁵ The broader goal of building democracy that President Bush would often assert is not the focus here. After this speech the volume of news stories on Afghanistan containing references to Vietnam decreased.

²¹ <http://www.newsweek.com/2009/01/30/obama-s-vietnam.html>

²² <http://www.newsweek.com/2009/02/10/afghanistan-is-not-vietnam.html>

²³ <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/15/world/asia/15policy.html>



²⁴ In this speech Obama says that 30,000 troops will be sent in addition to the 68,000 that were already present in country. He also sets July 2011 as the date for the beginning of a drawdown of US forces.

²⁵ http://www.cfr.org/publication/20871/obamas_address_to_the_nation_on_the_way_for_ward_in_afghanistan_and_pakistan_december_2009.html



Beyond the Vietnam metaphor, corruption was tied to many stories about Afghanistan in the public realm and the chart below shows that the number of news results associated with the words Karzai, corruption, and stuck increased significantly in 2009. Within the 2009-2010 time period, this combination of words was found to be prominent at the end of 2009 and in the period April-June 2010. Attention to corruption was pushed onto the agenda, in part due to the charges of electoral fraud beginning in 2009. Continuing corruption in Afghanistan was depicted as undermining the US mission

in Afghanistan but, especially after resolution of the election resulted in Karzai's continuation as president, the media suggested that the United States was stuck with Karzai and with Afghanistan.



Electoral fraud was certainly not the only type of fraud discussed in the public realm. Even though there were stories about corruption during the entire time period under discussion, the number of stories increases significantly. In October 2009, for example, the *New York Times* broke the story that Ahmed Wali Karzar – brother of the President – had been on the CIA payroll and had possible connections to the drug trade.²⁶ This contributed greatly to the increase in the frequency of stories about Afghan corruption and US entrapment in Afghanistan. As Mark Mazzetti, one of the *NY Times* reporters, said in an interview on National Public Radio: “So the guys that they paid early on, they were then stuck with for quite sometime. And there was a sort of mutual feeling of indebtedness, and so that stuck the United States with some difficult alliances for

²⁶ http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/28/world/asia/28intel.html?_r=1&hp

years”.²⁷ President Obama raised the issue of corruption in his December speech on military escalation in Afghanistan saying: “We’ll support Afghan ministries, governors, and local leaders that combat corruption and deliver for the people. We expect those who are ineffective or corrupt to be held accountable”.²⁸

Many in the news and in blogs recognized that there was a conflict between the widely-reported corruption and the desire to build up security, markets, and laws throughout the country. This led to the common phrase that the US was stuck in Afghanistan. This fear of entrapment is found throughout the period from January 2009 to May 2009 and in a number of sources.

The examples below give a sense of the fear of being stuck or trapped with a corrupt lead in Afghanistan.

“Afghan President Hamid Karzai and his ally, the United States, are hopelessly at odds, and yet they are condemned to the mutual pursuit of success in Afghanistan”. November 16, 2009 column by Susanne Koelbl in *Spiegel Online*²⁹

“I wonder though, who has who by the short hairs. Obama's problem is that once you start dancing with Karzai, it's hard to let go. Obama's success depends on his. And that's a position, given Karzai's track record, that no president would want to be in.” Aaron David Miller, former State Department official, Wilson Center Scholar, March 27, 2010

http://www.politico.com/arena/perm/Aaron_David_Miller_84EDCC07-C702-477C-A3A8-F7FD37472019.html

“The reluctant conclusion of diplomats and Afghan analysts is that for now, they are stuck with him.” *NY Times*, April 4, 2010

²⁷ Mark Mazzetti on Talk of the Nation, 10/28/2009,

<http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=114247634>

²⁸ http://www.cfr.org/publication/20871/obamas_address_to_the_nation_on_the_way_for_ward_in_afghanistan_and_pakistan_december_2009.html

²⁹ <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,661583,00.html>

“Stop upbraiding me, Obama, you’re stuck with me.”

Maureen Dowd, NYTimes, May 11, 2010

<http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/12/opinion/12dowd.html>

“Another American official, Ambassador Tim Carney, put it less delicately: ‘We get into relationships that give the leaders of countries the strength of their weakness.’ In other words, the weak, corrupt, erratic rulers of countries where the U.S. is at war can simply dare the Americans to end their support. ‘We can collapse the whole thing, but that’s all we can do,’ Carney said. ‘What other leverage do we have?’ In other words, we’re stuck with Karzai.”

Statecraft as Psychiatry, George Packer, The New Yorker blog, May 11, 2010

<http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/georgepacker/2010/05/statecraft-as-psychiatry.html#ixzz0woECI2jG>

This depiction of being trapped or stuck with Karzai and Afghanistan is evident in both US and non-US media sources and in blogs of both the left and right. Progressive blogs, for example, bemoan the fact that the United States is still involved in war in Afghanistan and is allied with a corrupt leader.

The Obama Administration attempted to deal with issues of concern during the March 2009 visit of President Obama to Afghanistan. By many accounts, the President kept to his strategic narrative about Afghanistan and the importance of the fight against corruption. The relationship between the allies continued to be strained well into April. In early April the US media contains stories across media platforms about President Karzai’s speech blaming the West for the election fraud and threatening to join the Taliban. For example, CBS News Washington Bureau Chief Chris Isham said that the threat "struck a lightning bolt through Washington."³⁰ This type of episode is exactly the situation under which one might expect a change in strategic narratives. Hypothesis 3 suggests that when allies cannot be controlled or restrained, a new and more conciliatory strategic narrative may be used by leaders.

³⁰ http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-20001867-503544.html



In May President Karzai paid a visit to Washington, DC, marking the end of the time period under review. After the threat to join the Taliban and the apparent inability of the US to restrain President Karzai, President Obama's strategic narrative does shift. In meeting with Karzai in Washington, President Obama took a more conciliatory approach saying:

In his inaugural address, and at the London Conference, President Karzai committed to making good governance a top priority. And I want to acknowledge the progress that has been made, including strengthening anti-corruption efforts, improving governance at provincial and district levels, and progress towards credible parliamentary elections later this year. Of course, President Karzai and I both acknowledge that much more work needs to be done.³¹

Conclusion

The case studies above do support the hypotheses related to the construction of alliance relationships and strategic narratives. News and blog stories set out a broader narrative or story about the nature of US alliances and do, in fact, suggest that abandonment (in the UK case) and entrapment (in the Afghanistan case) are characteristics of the alliance relationships. President Obama's strategic narrative during the visits of Prime Minister David Cameron (July 20, 2010) and President Hamid Karzai (May 12, 2010) show that alliances constructed in terms of fear of abandonment did lead

³¹ <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-obama-and-president-karzai-afghanistan-joint-press-availability>

to reiterating alliance commitments, expressing support for allied positions, an emphasis on shared interests or goals and the importance of the alliance to the international system and world order. In light of a persistent description of the UK-US 'special relationship' as in trouble and potentially threatening to US interests, President Obama used the election of Prime Minister Cameron to bolster and reinforce the alliance in his strategic narrative. In the Afghan case, the alliances was constructed in the public realm in terms of entrapment and this is accompanied by narratives that emphasized loosening of alliance commitment, a reduction in the scope of commitment, an emphasis on US interests or goals and the importance of US involvement and the inability of others in the international system to handle the situation. This changes, however, to a more conciliatory strategic narrative after President Karzai appears to be unrestrainable after making threats to join the Taliban in April 2010. Both cases highlight the importance of great power identity in the United States and in leadership strategic narratives. Finally, the cases show how the public realm does contribute to the construction of alliances to which leaders often feel compelled to respond. This suggests that the increasingly complex media environment (or ecology) and alliance relationships deserve much further study.

Works Cited

- Antoniades, Andreas, Alister Miskimmon and Ben O'Loughlin. 2010. "Great Power Politics and Strategic Narratives." in *CGPE Working Paper* Brighton: Centre for Global Political Economy, University of Sussex.
- Archetti, Christina. 2008. "Unamerican Views: Why US-Developed Models of Press-State Relations Don't Apply to the Rest of the World". *Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture* (WPCC) 5 (3), Media and Foreign Policy Special Issue, 4–26.
- Beer, Francis A. and Christ'l De Landtsheer. 2004. Introduction: Metaphors, politics, and world politics. In Francis Beer and Christ'l De Landtsheer, eds. *Metaphorical World Politics*. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 5-52.
- Brown, Robin. 2005. Getting to War: Communication and Mobilization in the 2002-03 Iraq Crisis. In P. Seib (ed.) *Media and Conflict in the Twenty-First Century*. NY: Palgrave, pp. 57-82.
- Burke, Kenneth. 1969. *A Rhetoric of Motives*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Costabile, Kristi A and Klein. 2008. "Understanding and Predicting Social Events: The effects of narrative construction on inference generation." *Social Cognition* 26(4): 420–437.
- Douglas, Frank (Scott). 2008. The Year After Zarqawi: Strategic Narratives, Peripheral Operations, & Central Visions in the "Long War." Prepared for ISA 2008 Annual Convention in San Francisco.
- Edelman, Murray, 1988. *Constructing the Political Spectacle*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- English, Robert. 2000. *Russia and the Idea of the West: Gorbachev, Intellectuals, and the End of the Cold War*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Entman, R. 2004. *Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and US Foreign Policy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Feaver, Peter. 2010. "Holding Out for the National Security Strategy." *Foreign Policy*. January 20, 2010.
http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/01/20/holding_out_for_the_national_security_strategy
- Freedman, Lawrence. 2006. *The Transformation of Strategic Affairs*. Adelphi Paper 379, IISS/Routledge.

- Gregg, Richard B. 2004. "Embodied Meaning in American Public Discourse during the Cold War" in Francis A. Beer and Christ'l De Landtsheer, eds. *Metaphorical World Politics*. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 59-74.
- "History of the 'National Security Strategy of the United States.'" 2010. *The National Strategy Forum Review: An Online National Security Journal*. Winter 2009 (19:1) National Strategy Forum.
- Hopf, Ted. 2002. *Social Construction of International Politics: Identities and Foreign Policies*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Hoskins, Andrew and Ben O'Loughlin. 2007. *Television and Terror: Conflicting Times and the Crisis of News Discourse*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- Hoskins, Andrew and Ben O'Loughlin. 2010. *The Emergence of Diffused War*. Polity.
- Kaldor, Mary, Mary Martin and Sabine Selchow. 2007b. "Human Security: A New Strategic Narrative for the EU." *International Affairs* 83(2): 273-288.
- Kegley, Charles W. and Gregory A. Raymond. 1990. *When Trust Breaks Down: Alliance Norms and World Politics*. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press.
- Liska, George. 1962. *Nations in Alliance: the Limits of Interdependence*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- National Security Strategy of the United States of America. 2002. Available at <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/>
- National Security Strategy of the United States of America. 2006. Available at <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2006/>
- National Security Strategy of the United States of America. 2010. Available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/homeland-security>
- Oates, Sarah. 2006. Through A Lens Darkly?: Russian Television and Terrorism Coverage in Comparative Perspective. Paper prepared for The Mass Media in Post-Soviet Russia International Conference, April 2006, University of Surrey.
- Riessman, Catherine. 2008. *Narrative Methods for the Human Sciences*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Roselle, Laura. 2010. "Foreign Policy and Communication." *The International Studies Encyclopedia*. Denmark, Robert A. Blackwell Publishing, 2010. Blackwell Reference Online. 24 July 2010

- http://www.isacompendium.com/subscriber/toctnode?id=g9781444336597_chunk_g97814443365978_ss1-22
- 2006. *Media and the Politics of Failure: Great Powers, Communications Strategies, and Military Defeat*. NY: Palgrave.
- Skonieczny, Amy. 2009. *Trade Talk: Narratives of US Identity in the Making of Economic Policy*. Paper prepared for the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. Toronto, Canada, September 3-6, 2009.
- Snyder, Glenn H. 1997. *Alliance Politics*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Tversky, Barbara. 2004. "Narratives of Space, Time, and Life." *Mind & Language* 19(4) September, 380-392.
- Weitsman, Patricia A. 2004. *Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- 2010. "Alliances and War." *The International Studies Encyclopedia*. Denmark, Robert A. Blackwell Publishing. Blackwell Reference Online. 24 July 2010
http://www.isacompendium.com/subscriber/toctnode?id=g9781444336597_chunk_g97814443365973_ss1-5
- Wolfsfeld, Gadi. 1997. *Media and Political Conflict: News from the Middle East*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.