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**HISTORICAL ANALOGIES IN FOREIGN POLICY: REFERENCES TO THE
COLD WAR IN THE RHETORIC OF UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA**

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Abstract

This paper explores rhetoric of United States and Russia during the period of 2007–2010 and identifies the uses of Cold War historical analogy in debates over the U.S. missile shield in Eastern Europe and Russian-Georgian military crisis in 2008. The aim of this paper is to identify whether another Cold War between United States and Russia is taking place. The paper looks to the limits that the Cold War historical analogy sets on United States and Russia's foreign policy choices and explains how discursive formations that emanate from the Cold War historical analogy constitute relations between United States and Russia.

This paper makes two contributions. First, while much attention has been given to the use of historical analogies in foreign policy, this paper shows how premises of rule-oriented constructivism and speech act theory can be applied to the analysis of historical analogies and how it can help explain foreign policy process. Second, it contributes to the discussions whether there is another Cold War between U.S. and Russia by applying framework for historical analogies analysis to this case study. It is claimed that although some change in relations between Russia and United States could be seen it does not lead to the overall change of the rules that guide mutual relations in contemporary international system with the Cold War rules, adoption of the aim and perception of Self (identity and interests) from the Cold War game. The minor changes that could be seen are associated with the perceptions of Other (in U.S. case of Russia and in Russia's case of U.S.) as having some sort of Cold War identity and interests guiding its actions.

Introduction

The end of the Cold War between United States and Soviet Union is one of the major discussion topics in International Relations discipline. Some schools of International Relations, namely realism, had encountered criticism for not foreseeing or at least being able to explain the end of the Cold War – one of the major changes in international system. For other schools of International Relations, like constructivism, it was a chance to attract attention to their theoretical premises and explanations.¹ Attempts to explain the end of the Cold War and why did it end in a peaceful way are still taking

¹ See Richard Lebow, Thomas Risse-Kappen (eds.), *International Relations theory and the End of the Cold War*. Columbia University Press, New York, 1995. Richard K. Herrmann, Richard Ned Lebow (eds.), *Ending the Cold War: Interpretations, Causation, and the Study of International Relations*. Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.

place.² However as the third decade after the end of the Cold War is being approached considerations or even warnings about a new Cold War between United States and Russia have appeared in public – political and media³ – discourse as well as academic discussions.

Some of the recent research on United States and Russia's relations also invokes the Cold War historical analogy.⁴ Discussions take place mainly around evaluation of contemporary United States and Russia's relations and comparison with the Cold War standoff. Various references to the Cold War have been made. The reasons for the unfolding of another Cold War are seen in the growth of Russia's economic power, mainly in energy sector, or United States behavior (its perception about being the sole superpower, pressure on Russia, etc.). Others claim that return to Cold War times is impossible and naming bilateral relations between United States and Russia as a Cold War does not correspond to the reality.⁵ Also the notion of the cold war is used to describe contemporary United States and Russia's relations by giving a new definition of cold war.⁶ Some of the arguments are based on the idea that the world is facing not a new Cold War, but a continuation of the old one: the end of the Cold War or mainly the collapse of Soviet Union did not bring a major change because United States kept acting

² *British Journal of Politics & International Relations* dedicated the whole issue – Vol. 11, Issue 2, 2009. Stephen G. Brooks, William C. Wohlforth, „Clarifying the End of the Cold War Debate“. *Cold War History*, Vol. 7, No. 3, August 2007, 447-454. Gavan Duffy, Brian Frederking, “Changing the Rules: A Speech Act Analysis of the End of the Cold War”. *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 53, no. 2, June 2009, 325-347.

³ A comprehensive list of links can be found in – Stephen F. Cohen, *Soviet Fates and Lost Alternatives. From Stalinism to the New Cold War*. Columbia University Press, New York, 2009.

⁴ Explanations based on historical analogies are a common practice by International Relations and History scholars – Jonathan B. Isacoff, “On the Historical Imagination of International Relations: The Case for a ‘Deweyan Reconstruction’”. *Millennium*, Vol. 31, No. 3, 2002, 603-626. Nick Vaughan-Williams, „International Relations and the ‘Problem of History’“. *Millennium*, Vol. 34, No. 1, 2005, 115-136. Markus Kornprobst, “Comparing Apples and Oranges? Leading and Misleading Uses of Historical Analogies”. *Millennium*, Vol. 36, No. 1, 2007, 29-49. Christopher Layne, “Security Studies and the Use of History: Neville Chamberlain's Grand Strategy Revisited”. *Security Studies*, Vol. 17, Issue 3, 2008, 397–437.

⁵ Columbia University, Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies panel discussion “The New Cold War? U.S.-Russian Relations after the Invasion of Georgia”. September 23, 2008. <http://www.columbia.edu/cu/siwps/images/usrus/usrussiapanel.html> [2009 09 10].

⁶ Edward Lucas, *The New Cold War: How the Kremlin Menaces Both Russia and the West*. Bloomsbury Publishing, 2008. Mark MacKinnon, *The New Cold War. Revolutions, Rigged Elections, and Pipeline Politics in Former Soviet Union*. Carroll&Graf, New York, 2007.

according to the Cold War practice and identity of United States continued to develop in an opposition to Russia.⁷

Interestingly enough, probably the first who initiated talks about Cold War were the leaders of United States and Russia by suggesting about renewal of the Cold War or by denying possibility to call their relations as the Cold War. Events that triggered Cold War historical analogy in the language of U.S. and Russia's officials were U.S. plans on missile defense shield in Eastern Europe, Russia's decision to suspend participation in Conventional armed forces in Europe treaty, as well as military conflict between Russia and Georgia in August, 2008.

Hence, is there another Cold War between United States and Russia? The question could be answered by analyzing how do foreign policy decision makers in United States and Russia describe their bilateral relations and possibility of another Cold War. This paper looks to the limits that the Cold War historical analogy puts on United States and Russia's foreign policy choices and explains how speech acts that reproduce Cold War historical analogy constitute relations between United States and Russia. New Cold War between United States and Russia would mean a change of the "game" in international system: emergence of rules and aims of the interaction, roles of agency common to Cold War context. By mapping meanings that are present in this context, one sees a range of possible decisions available to foreign policy makers. Misunderstanding of the context in which actions take place (claiming presence of the Cold War when actors of international system do not perceive their interaction as Cold War or vice versa) may lead to misinterpretation of preferences that actors have, the array of policy options available to them and decisions they could take.

Thus the *first* section of this paper reviews different approaches to the use of historical analogies in public debates of foreign policy decision makers. *Second* section proposes new assumptions for the analysis of historical analogies. Theoretical framework for historical analogies analysis in public debates of decision makers is based on the

⁷ David Grondin "(Re)Writing the 'National Security State': How and Why Realists (Re)Built the(ir) Cold War", Center for United States Studies Occasional Paper, n° 4, Montreal: Center for United States Studies of the Raoul-Dandurand, 2004. Stephen Cohen "Did the Cold War Really End?". Remarks delivered at the Cold War Conference at the Gorbachev Foundation in Moscow on March 1, 2006. Richard Sakwa, "New Cold War? or Twenty Years' Crisis? Russia and International Politics". *International Affairs*, 84: 2, 2008, 241-267. Cohen, *Soviet Fates and Lost Alternatives*.

premises of rule-oriented constructivism. The *third* section presents analysis of Cold War historical analogy in recent rhetoric of decision makers in United States and Russia and how it is invoked to describe rules and actors of interaction in the past and then – rules and actors of interaction in the present. The *fourth* section addresses meanings that United States and Russia bring to their bilateral relations through Cold War historical analogy. Reactions by United States and Russia’s officials over the U.S. plans on missile defense shield in Eastern Europe and during Russian and Georgian military confrontation in 2008 are analyzed. The summary of this analysis is presented in the following – *fifth* – section by commenting on the rules guiding foreign policy of United States and Russia. The paper traces development of Cold War analogy in the recent (2007–2010) speeches, comments and press releases of main officials (heads of state, government and parliament members, highest-level military officials, diplomatic officials in foreign countries and international organizations).

1. Historical analogies in foreign policy decision making

In general historical analogy can be described as a type of reasoning when the past is used as source of information to explain present or future situation. There are several approaches to historical analogies in the rhetoric of policy makers. Cognitive approach assumes that historical analogies are used to evaluate the situation the policy makers are faced with and help make decisions.⁸ As Jervis argues, “[w]hat one learns from key events in international history is an important factor in determining the images that shape the interpretation of incoming information”.⁹ In this case by analyzing

⁸ Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*. Princeton University Press, 1976. Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, *Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers*. Free Press, 1996. Christopher Hemmer, “Historical Analogies and the Definition of Interests: The Iranian Hostage Crisis and Ronald Reagan’s Policy Toward the Hostages in Lebanon”. *Political Psychology*, 20, 1999, 267–80. Marijke Breuning, “The Role of Analogies and Abstract Reasoning in Decision-Making: Evidence from the Debate Over Truman’s Proposal for Development Assistance”. *International Studies Quarterly*, 47, 2003, 229–45. More on these studies – Yuen Foong Khong, *Analogies at War*. Princeton University Press, 1992, 7–8. Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, *Conflict among nations: bargaining, decision making, and system structure in international crises*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977.

⁹ Jervis, *Perception and Misperception*, 217.

historical analogies invoked by policy makers, foreign policy decisions could be explained.

Other approach maintains that historical analogies serve instrumental purpose and are used to justify decisions that were already made in order to receive support from the public.¹⁰ As history is simply used to reinforce established beliefs decisions made by policymakers cannot be explained by analyzing historical analogies.

Yuen Foong Khong and Yaacov Y. I. Vertzberger have integrated both approaches in models of historical reasoning.¹¹ Khong is interested in “how and why policymakers use historical analogies in their foreign policy decision-making and about the implications of their doing so”.¹² Still they both regard that the primary function of historical analogy is cognitive. The concept of historical analogies is closely related to the concept of “learning from history”¹³ that is compatible with cognitive as well as justifying functions of historical analogies.

It has been noted that very often historical analogies misguide their users. A great focus in the literature on historical analogies is put on how historical reasoning produces misperceptions and wrong policy decisions. The reason for that is an inadequate use of analogies because of the misleading interpretations of history, application of wrong

¹⁰ Annika Brandstrom, Fredrik Bynander and Paul ‘t Hart, “Governing by Looking Back: Historical Analogies and Crisis Management”. *Public Administration*, Vol. 82, No. 1, 2004, 191-210. George Breslauer and Philip Tetlock, *Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1991. Benjamin E. Goldsmith, *Imitation in International Relations Observational Learning, Analogies and Foreign Policy in Russia and Ukraine*. Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.

¹¹ Khong, *Analogies at War*. Yaacov Y. I. Vertzberger, *The World in Their Minds. Information Processing, Cognition, and Perception in Foreign Policy Decisionmaking*. Stanford University Press: Stanford, 1990, 298-308. Jens Meierhenrich makes a different distinction: he calls the use of analogies by policy makers to justify their decisions *rhetoric*. When analogies are treated as playing a cognitive and information processing functions they are seen as *argumentation*. Jens Meierhenrich, “Analogies At War”. *Journal of Conflict and Security Law*, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2006, 1-40.

¹² Khong, *Analogies at War*, 6.

¹³ Ernest R. May, *Lessons of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1973. Jervis, *Perception and Misperception*, 228. Snyder, Diesing, *Conflict among nations*, Ch. 4. Breslauer, Tetlock, *Learning in U.S. and Soviet foreign policy*. Neustadt, May, *Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers*. Christopher Hemmer, *Which Lessons Matter? American Foreign Policy Decision Making in the Middle East, 1979-1987*. State University of New York Press, 2000. Roland Paris, “Kosovo and the Metaphor War”. *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol.117, No. 3, 2002, 423-450. Kevin J. Record, *Making War, Thinking History: Munich, Vietnam, and Presidential Uses of Force from Korea to Kosovo*. Annapolis, MD: US Naval Institute Press. 2002. Mikkel V. Rasmussen, “The History of a Lesson: Versailles, Munich and the Social Construction of the Past”. *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 29, No. 4, 2003, 499-519. David Mendeloff, „‘Pernicious History‘ as a Cause of National Misperceptions: Russia and the 1999 Kosovo War“. *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 43, No. 1, 2008, 31-56.

analogies to the situation in question or the very use of analogies in foreign policy decision making. Attempts were made to understand how historical analogies could be used better in foreign policy decision-making.

Thus all the above mentioned approaches to historical analogies are based on premises used by positivists¹⁴ or “traditionalist historians”¹⁵, first of all, that “there is one international history and it ‘tells us,’ ‘teaches us,’ ‘reveals to us’ certain eternal verities about politics in a world of sovereign states”.¹⁶ Historical facts are found in historical evidences, i.e. facts differ from interpretation *a priori*, they don’t depend on the observer and it is possible to make distinction between facts and values. Attention to different interpretations can be regarded as ahistorical if not anti-historical.¹⁷ In order to identify whether the history is understood correctly and proper lessons are drawn comparisons are made of notions, defined by scholars, with the world to see whether they correspond.

But in general, as it was noted by Nick Vaughan-Williams, the “problem of history”, i.e. “the impossibility of getting historical interpretation one hundred percent right” is ignored.¹⁸ The premises of postpositivists or “critical historiographers” haven’t been integrated in to analysis of historical analogies. According to John Dewey, changes of the present “throw the significance of what happened in the past into a new perspective, thus the need to solve contemporary problems brings new “re-interpretations of the past”.¹⁹ Hence the question becomes not what lessons are learned from history, but what lessons are constituted. Historical analogies in foreign policy process didn’t draw much attention from constructivist perspective. Analogies with the First and Second

¹⁴ Jonathan B. Isacoff, „Pragmatism, History and International Relations“, Kn. Harry Bauer and Elisabetta Brighi (eds.), *Pragmatism in International Relations*. Routledge: London and New York, 2009, 67-70. Also – Isacoff, “On the Historical Imagination of International Relations”, 608-612.

¹⁵ A distinction being made between different approaches on the question “what is history” – Vaughan-Williams, “International Relations and the ‘Problem of History’”, 117. Another classification: those who aim at discovering objective truth, those who think that there are different truths for different groups, and those who aim at integrating both approaches – Gabrielle M. Spiegel (ed.), *Practicing History. New Directions in Historical Writing After the Linguistic Turn*. Routledge: New York, London, 2005.

¹⁶ Christian Reus-Smit, “Reading History Through Constructivist Eyes”. *Millennium*, Vol. 37, No. 2, 2008, 401.

¹⁷ Links to this type of research are presented in – Vaughan-Williams, “International Relations and the ‘Problem of History’”, 123.

¹⁸ Peter Novick, *That Noble Dream: the Objectivity Question and the American Historical Profession*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, 1, in Vaughan-Williams, “International Relations and the ‘Problem of History’”, 117.

¹⁹ Isacoff, “On the Historical Imagination of International Relations”, 616.

World wars during the Balkan war²⁰, analogies with Gulf War and Second World War during the Kosovo war²¹, analogies with Adolf Hitler in references to Saddam Hussein during the Gulf were analyzed.²² Research was done on construction of history and historical memory as well.²³

The conventional approaches to historical analogies are based on the assumption that the world is mirrored in language.²⁴ However it can be argued that historical analogies do not merely reflect the past or the present as a mirror, they constitute the past and the present. As language constructs social reality it is not possible to compare language with objects that it is describing. For example to compare the definition of Cold War that is used in the Cold War historical analogy with the events that took place during the most of the second part of 20th century. As John L. Austin argued, language cannot be correct or incorrect, the important thing is that it has social consequences.²⁵ Thus another way to understand the relationship between word and world is to assume that we cannot get behind our language to compare it with that which it describes thus “*meaning* of both the material and social world and our interactions with it are constituted in language”.²⁶

2. New premises for historical analogies analysis

In this section the main premises of rule-oriented constructivism are presented. Based on these premises, *first*, the role of historical analogies in the foreign policy process is explained. *Second*, framework for the analysis of historical analogies in public speeches of decision makers is proposed.

²⁰ Karin M. Fierke, “Multiple Identities, Interfacing Games: The Social Construction of Western Action in Bosnia”. *European Journal of International Relations*. Vol. 2, No. 4, 1996, 467-497.

²¹ Karin M. Fierke, “The Liberation of Kosovo: Emotion and the Ritual Re-enactment of War”. *Focaal: European Journal of Anthropology*, Vol. 39, 2002, 93-116.

²² Karin M. Fierke, „Links Across the Abyss: Language and Logic In International Relations“. *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 46, No. 3, 2002, 349.

²³ Literature review on constructivist historical inquiry – Reus-Smit, “Reading History Through Constructivist Eyes”, 397. On relation between memory politics and foreign policy – Gonzalo Porcel Quero, “Thus Spoke Franco: The Place of History in the Making of Foreign Policy”, In Vendulka Kubálková, *Foreign Policy in a Constructed World*. M. E. Sharpe, Inc., New York, 2001.

²⁴ The picture view of language was presented in Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus*. In his later work *Philosophical Investigations* he argued that it is impossible to stand outside our language to compare it with that which it describes – Fierke, „Links Across the Abyss: ...“, 331–354.

²⁵ John L. Austin, *How to Do Things with Words*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962.

²⁶ Karin M. Fierke, „Critical Methodology and Constructivism“, in Karin M. Fierke and Knud E. Jorgensen, *Constructing International Relations: The Next Generation*. M.E. Sharpe, 2001, 118.

2.1. Rule-oriented constructivism

The very beginning of rule-oriented constructivism is related with the works of Nicholas Onuf and Friedrich Kratochwil, the Miami International Relations group.²⁷ According to rule-oriented constructivism material world receives meaning within particular structure of rules. In order to explain the role of social rules the metaphor of language games developed by Ludwig Wittgenstein is used. “Language use is like making moves in a game. The structure of meaning and interaction are dependent on rules shared with others”.²⁸ The game is understood as interconnected actions (verbal and nonverbal) within agreed rules. Rules of the game indicate who are the players of the game, what identity and interests do they have, the variety and limits of actions they can take. Following the premise that actions of actors depend on the rules of the game, the difference between ontology and epistemology disappears: “[b]eing in the social world cannot be separated from communicative processes”.²⁹ When rules describe players of the game it is impossible to say something about the player without knowing the rules.

Rule-oriented constructivists hold that actors can change rules by performing speech acts. Speech acts might form patterns and result in to regular practices that might be codified as rules. The reverse direction is also possible: rules affect practices and speech acts. John Searle offered five categories of speech acts. Nicholas Onuf regards only three of them as important (as they constitute rules) namely assertives, directives and commissives.³⁰ Assertives express a belief that the hearer shares the same belief (present in speeches, official statements; representative verbs are state, affirm, report, etc.). With rules from assertive speech acts actors convey information about their relationship to the world. Directives express particular ways in which the speaker would like the hearer to act (deployment of missile; representative verbs – ask, command, demand, caution, etc.). Thus with directive rules actors tell others what they must do.

²⁷ Vendulka Kubáľková, „Introduction“, In Vendulka Kubáľková, *Foreign Policy in a Constructed World*. M. E. Sharpe, Inc., New York, 2001, 5.

²⁸ Fierke, „Links Across the Abyss: ...“, 337.

²⁹ Fierke, „Links Across the Abyss: ...“, 343. See more – Mathias Albert, „What Systems Theory Can Tell Us About Constructivism“, In Karin M. Fierke and Knud Erik Jorgensen, *Constructing international relations: the next generation*. N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2001, 93-111.

³⁰ Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, *World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989, 87-91.

Commissives are speech acts stating intention of the speaker to act in a particular way (treaties, agreements; representative verbs – promise, offer.³¹ Commitment rules are promises.

Speech acts (understood broadly as verbal and nonverbal acts that convey meaning by invoking mutually recognized social rules) serve as medium that constitutes agents and structure.³² Rules socially constitute – “cause” – the things people do (when reasons are regarded as causes).³³

The importance of language analysis in trying to understand the use of historical analogies and foreign policy is twofold. *First*, there is no book of rules in social life. Actors by using language identify rules of their interaction: who are the players, what is the aim of the game, what kind of actions are legitimate, etc. *Second*, the language or what do the actors say (verbal actions) together with actions that they take (nonverbal actions) are regarded as moves in the game. By analyzing nonverbal and verbal actions it is possible to identify rules of the game, as those actions are guided by rules.

Thus the main premises of analysis of historical analogies are three. *First*, material world is social and constructed entity and has meaning in particular structure of social rules. *Second*, as reality consists of rules, actors and their actions are governed by those rules. *Third*, structures and actors are mutually constituted. Actors use language and constitute social structure. Social structure promulgates rules and constitutes actors: identities (who they are) and interests (what they want).

2.2. Framework for historical analogies analysis

Based on the premises of rule-oriented constructivism it can be argued that historical analogies constitute rules of interaction in international arena: they describe the rules and aim of the game, identify players and provide a set of possible foreign policy actions.

³¹ Duffy and Frederking, “Changing the Rules ...”, 328-330. Onuf, *World of Our Making ...*, 86-93.

³² Duffy and Frederking, „Changing the Rules: ...“, 326.

³³ Emanuel Adler, „Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics“. *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 3, No. 3, 1997, 329.

Historical analogies reflect how actors of international arena see international system, themselves, other actors and relations with other actors in this system, as well as foreign policy prescriptions. Historical analogies play not only the role of social cognition, but also of social construction. By using historical analogies the meaning of historical event is produced and reproduced. The analysis of historical analogies identifies meanings given to contemporary practices in the international system, reveals cohesion between past and present, as well as change and continuity in the perceptions. Hence the context of international system is constructed by public linguistic constructions. Based on the analysis of the limits set by the use of historical analogies it is possible to show whether Cold War between United States and Russia is possible.

According to the rule-oriented constructivism historical analogies should be seen as medium of foreign policy decision makers to perceive and constitute social reality. The importance of historical analogies is seen first of all in the process of interest formation, and then in the process of how those interests should be pursued.³⁴ Analysis of historical analogies should be based on the perspective that treats language use as analogous to making moves in a game and claims that “we cannot know the world independently of the language we use”.³⁵

As rules define both social structures and actors, the best practice would be to begin research from the rule analysis. Based on the typology of speech acts and rules historical analogies could be understood in the following way (Table 1):

1. *Assertives*:

- 1.1. By using assertive speech acts actors describe the past, themselves and other actors (who they are and what they want) in the past. If conventional meaning of historical event is used the use of historical analogies reveals rules that have been already established. If a new interpretation of the past is given historical analogies reveal attempts to formulate new rules.

³⁴ Hemmer, *Which lessons matter?*, 5.



³⁵ Adler, „Seizing the Middle Ground: ...“, 326.

1.2. By using assertive speech acts actors describe the present³⁶, themselves and other actors (who they are and what they want) in the present through the prism of the past.

1.2.1. If foreign policy actors see similarities between past and present the conclusion can be made that the rules of the past are being transferred to the present. This allows identifying change in actor’s preferences and behavior.

1.2.2. If foreign policy actors see differences between past and present identification of rules in the past allows to conclude, what kind of rules, identities and interests of actors aren’t present in contemporary situation. This allows identifying stability in actor’s preferences and behavior.

Table 1. Framework for historical analogies analysis

Social structure	Rules/ Institutions/ Other regularities		
			
Rules	Assertive	Directive	Commitment
Speech acts	<i>What meaning does the past event have?</i>	<i>What directives are given to other actors by invoking rules of the past event?</i>	<i>What kind of commitments are made by invoking rules of the past event?</i>
	<i>What meaning does the present event have?</i>		
	<i>What meaning does the present event not have?</i>	<i>What directives are not given to other actors by invoking rules of the past event?</i>	<i>What kind of commitments are not made by invoking rules of the past event?</i>
			
Actors and limits of actions	<i>Who are actors of relevant foreign policy process? What identity do they have? What interests do they have?</i>	<i>What is expected from other actors? (What are the limits of their action?)</i>	<i>What promises related to personal practices are made (What are the limits of personal actions?)</i>

³⁶ The present as it is defined by actors.

2. *Directives* reveal expectations that actors have from other actors based on the past experience. For example, what should they or should not do if they want to avoid negative or expect positive actions towards them.
 - 2.1. If foreign policy actors see similarities between past and present, directives to other actors will be based on the rules taken from the past event.
 - 2.2. If foreign policy actors see differences between past and present it can be concluded what kind of directives they will not make.
3. Responsive actions by foreign policy actors or their mutual agreements can be regarded as *commissives* to act in a particular way (based on the conclusions drawn from the past event).
 - 3.1. If foreign policy actors see similarities between past and present commitments will be based on the rules taken from the past.
 - 3.2. If foreign policy actors see differences between past and present it can be concluded what kind of commitments they will not make.

In order to reveal what kind of rules and how they are constituted speech act analysis is used. It reveals how historical events that are used in analogical reasoning are understood, how is contemporary situation and relation between past and present seen. Thus estimating how foreign policy actors frame problems of foreign policy and what kind of limits does this set on their actions. The distinction is made between foreign policy decision making stage (where analysis of verbal actions is important) and decision implementation stage (where analysis of nonverbal actions is important).

3. Cold War historical analogy

This section explores rhetoric of United States and Russia during the period of 2007–2010 on the re-emergence of a new Cold War and identifies use of Cold War historical analogy in debates over the U.S. missile shield in Eastern Europe and Russian-Georgian military crisis in 2008. The relevant speech acts were made by the main actors in foreign policy process, which are: heads of state, members of government and

parliament, highest-level military officials, diplomatic officials in foreign countries and international organizations.

3.1. Descriptions of the past – the Cold War

The aim of this section is to reveal the meanings that policy makers bring in their speech acts on Cold War that took place between United States and Soviet Union during the most of the second part of the 20th century. This will enable to conclude whether United States and Russia perceive their relations as another Cold War. Cold War historical analogy could be an explicit reference to the Cold War, historical events that happened during the Cold War. Or it could be an implicit reference to the features describing the Cold War and regarded as part of the Cold War (for example, a return of great-power politics, arms race, etc. – processes that are regarded as a Cold War practice in the analyzed speech acts on Cold War). Only historical analogies that have no ambiguous interpretation on their relation to Cold War are included in this paper.

It can be seen that the Cold War is perceived in quite similar manner both in United States and Russia: such features as ideological clash, zero-sum game, global conflict, division into spheres of influence are found in the speech acts. In contrast to U.S. officials Russia's politicians make comments on the end of the Cold War by emphasizing that Russia *dismantled* the Soviet Union.

In the speech acts of United States' officials (Table 2) the Cold War is understood as a global and total conflict, when both sides put all their efforts to defeat each other.

Table 2. Speech acts about Cold War. United States perspective.

Assertives:

1. Cold War was a global conflict between United States and Soviet Union that took place in all spheres of life:

- 1a. Cold War was a zero sum game.
- 1b. Cold War was an ideological conflict.
- 1c. During the Cold War there were spheres of influence.
- 1d. Cold War was present because Soviet Union was present.
- 1e. Soviet Union was an enemy of U.S.

The Cold War is described as a zero-sum game. As it was stated in the speech by the Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice much of the last century United States foreign policy was:

*“hostage to our relationship with the Soviet Union. We viewed everything through that lens, including our relations with other countries. We were locked in a zero-sum, ideological conflict. Every state was to choose sides, and that reduced our options”*³⁷.

The Cold War was an ideological conflict, clash of incompatible values, “us” vs “them” and emotional generalizations like good vs bad. According to U.S. President George W. Bush, these were the “days of satellite states and spheres of influence”³⁸, when great powers interfered into domestic affairs of smaller states in their zone of influence. The enemy (or more broadly defined the *other*) was not only the Soviet Union, but also that part of the world that was subordinated to the influence of Soviet Union. It “was an ideological conflict between the Soviet Union and its clients, and a Western set of values and institutions. ... And that ended in 1991 with the collapse of the Soviet Union”.³⁹ Thus characteristic to the Cold War was the presence of Soviet Union that had certain territory, power, aims, regime type and alternative vision to democratic capitalism.⁴⁰

In the speech acts of Russian officials (Table 3) the Cold War between United States and Soviet Union is described as a total war, a harsh clash between these two states. Features ascribed to the Cold War are ideological contradictions, Soviet threat, Soviet imperialist aspirations, global conflict that pushed aside all the other questions of international politics.

³⁷ Secretary Condoleezza Rice, “Secretary Rice Addresses U.S.-Russia Relations At The German Marshall Fund”. Washington, September 18, 2008. <<http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2008/09/109954.htm>> [2009 05 10].

³⁸ The Wall Street Journal, “Bush: ‘Days of Satellite States’ Are Over”. August 15, 2008. *Source: White House*. <<http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2008/08/15/bush-days-of-satellite-states-are-over/>> [2009 05 10].

³⁹ Secretary Condoleezza Rice, “Remarks With Acting Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Rood”. Warsaw, Poland. August 20, 2008. <<http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2008/08/108754.htm>> [2009 05 10].

⁴⁰ Secretary Condoleezza Rice, “Secretary Rice Addresses U.S.-Russia Relations”.

Table 3. Speech acts about Cold War. Russia's perspective.

Assertives:

2. Cold War was a global conflict between United States and Soviet Union that took place in all spheres of life.

2a. Cold War was an ideological conflict.

2b. Cold War was an economic conflict.

2c. During the Cold War there were spheres of influence.

2d. Cold War was present because Soviet Union was present.

2e. Imperialist ambitions of Soviet Union posed a threat to others.

The world was ideologically and economically divided, according to Russia's President Vladimir Putin:

This global stand-off pushed the sharpest economic and social problems to the margins of the international community's and the world's agenda. And, just like any war, the Cold War left us with live ammunition, figuratively speaking. I am referring to ideological stereotypes, double standards and other typical aspects of Cold War bloc thinking.⁴¹

It is argued that "Russia initiated the dismantling of the USSR. If it were not for Russia's position, the USSR would still exist".⁴² Presence of Soviet Union is regarded as characteristic "feature" of the Cold War as well. There is no broader elaboration on the identity or interests of Soviet Union, only an implicit reference to its imperial ambitions.

Hence in recent public statements of United States and Russia's policy makers the Cold War is seen in a similar manner. Thus the reasons to invoke Cold War historical analogy both in United States and Russia could be the same: perceptions of ideological clash, zero-sum game, global conflict, division into spheres of influence, etc. The limits of foreign policy that are set by the Cold War historical analogy are these: global conflict implied that competition takes place in all spheres; the world is divided into the spheres of influence and the right to act in that sphere belongs to the power that controls certain

⁴¹ Wladimir W. Putin, "Speech at the 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy". October 2, 2007. <http://80.86.3.56/archive/konferenzen/rede.php?menu_2007=&menu_konferenzen=&sprache=en&id=179&> [2009 05 10].

⁴² Vladimir Putin, "Prime Minister Vladimir Putin met with members of the Valdai International Discussion Club". 11 September 2008. <<http://premier.gov.ru/eng/pda/events/597.html>> [2009 05 10].

zone; interaction in international arena is based on the aim to defeat the opponent (negotiation is impossible). No comprehensive references were made on how the Cold War started or how did it end. This is worth noticing as previously United States were criticized for their overemphasis about *winning* the Cold War.⁴³ Russian officials note that it was Russia's decision to end the Cold War by *dismantling* the Soviet Union. Analysis of the descriptions of the past made by U.S. and Russia's officials provides an understanding of how the Cold War is perceived and further in this study enables to estimate whether contemporary mutual relations between these two countries are perceived as a Cold War.

To sum up the above, speech acts of U.S. and Russia's policy makers about the Cold War reveal rules and structures that formed interaction during the Cold War. In assertive speech acts ideological conflict, spheres of influence, presence of Soviet Union etc. (Table 2 and Table 3) represent rules that have been institutionalized in the Cold War structure except for one speech act. Assertive speech act of Russian decision makers on imperialist ambitions of Soviet Union that posed a threat to other actors (2e – Table 3) looks like a move to change perception of the Soviet Union's role in the Cold War game (that had an image of a fighter against imperialist capitalist West).

3.2. Descriptions of the contemporary international system

In this analysis of speech acts about contemporary international system only those statements descriptions were taken into account that were presented either as representing the Cold War practice or as a contrast to it. Analysis of the descriptions of the present made by U.S. and Russia's officials provides an understanding of how contemporary international system is perceived and enables to estimate further in this study whether the mutual relations between United States and Russia are perceived as taking place in this context.

In general, in the speech acts of the United States (Table 4) contemporary international system is seen as more diverse than during the Cold War. There is a broad

⁴³ For example – Cohen, *Soviet Fates and Lost Alternatives*, 171. On theoretical claims about the West "winning" the Cold War – Fierke, „Critical Methodology and Constructivism“, 127-129.

network of ties between states all over the world. Demonstration of power is superseded by competition in global markets. The relationship of United States towards its past is not very clear: there is no comprehensive distancing or glorifying of the past.

Table 4. Speech acts about contemporary international system. United States perspective.

<p><i>Assertives:</i></p> <p>3. Contemporary international system (CIS) offers cooperation on multilateral basis:</p> <p>3a. Interaction is based on the competition in economy.</p> <p>3b. The use of military power is regarded as inappropriate.</p> <p>3c. New geopolitical situation (CEE countries are members of NATO and EU).</p> <p>3d. Russia is not a Soviet Union.</p> <p>3e. Multilateral foreign policy of U.S.</p> <p><i>Directive:</i></p> <p>4. Russia's foreign policy should be based on the norms that are acknowledged in CIS.</p>

Contemporary international system is seen as structured in a different way than during the Cold War. Secretary Rice defined it as:

*“not organized around polarity – multi-, uni-, and certainly not bi-. In this world, there is an imperative for nations to build a network of strong and unique ties to many influential states”.*⁴⁴

Contemporary international system is seen as different from international system that existed during the Cold War because:

*“Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, the Baltic states, Slovenia, Slovakia, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera, are members of NATO and Europe. The Cold War is over”.*⁴⁵

U.S. foreign policy has new (in geographical terms) directions: United States is deepening partnerships in Asia, Africa and Middle East.⁴⁶ Contrary to the Cold War era when foreign policy agenda was subordinated to one immanent threat, in present time

⁴⁴ Secretary Condoleezza Rice, “Secretary Rice Addresses U.S.-Russia Relations”.

⁴⁵ Secretary Condoleezza Rice. “Remarks With Acting Under Secretary of State”.

⁴⁶ Secretary Condoleezza Rice, “Secretary Rice Addresses U.S.-Russia Relations”.

“the United States is liberated to pursue a multidimensional foreign policy”.⁴⁷ The emphasis is put on to the new ways of interaction, while condemning the demonstration and use of military power:

“great power is defined ... by open competition in global markets, trade and development, the independence of nations, respect for human rights, governance by the rule of law, and the defense of freedom”.⁴⁸

There are also new kind of relations between United States and Russia. According to President Bush, [t]he Cold War is over. ... A contentious relationship with Russia is not in America’s interest. And a contentious relationship with America is not in Russia’s interest”.⁴⁹

One of the main “features” of post-Cold War is the absence of Soviet Union itself. Thus the logic follows that the Cold War ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Based on the characteristics of Soviet Union and Russia the conclusion is made that Russia is a different actor than Soviet Union. According to Secretary Rice:

“Russia today is not the Soviet Union – not in the size of its territory, the reach of its power, the scope of its aims, or the nature of the regime. Russia’s leaders today have no pretensions to ideological universality, no alternative vision to democratic capitalism, and no ability to construct a parallel system of client states and rival institutions. The bases of Soviet power are gone”.⁵⁰

In Russia’s perspective (Table 5) new challenges and negative aspects of contemporary international system are more pronounced. Russia sees present international system as dominated by the West and organized according to double standards, such policy leads to insecurity and stimulates arms race in international system. In contrast to United States discourse Russia is distancing from its Cold War past – the Soviet legacy.

⁴⁷ *Op.cit.*

⁴⁸ *Op.cit.*

⁴⁹ The Wall Street Journal, “Bush: ‘Days of Satellite States’ Are Over”.

⁵⁰ Secretary Condoleezza Rice, “Secretary Rice Addresses U.S.-Russia Relations”.

Table 5. Speech acts about contemporary international system. Russia's perspective.

Assertives:

5. Contemporary international system is based on harsh and unequal competition.

5a. The West (United States) dominate in international system.

5b. International law is ignored.

5c. Military power is used without any reservation.

5d. Disagreements with United States do not mean hostilities.

5e. Russia is not Soviet Union.

5f. Multilateral foreign policy of Russia.

Directive:

6. United States ought to behave with Russia as with equal partner.

Thus problems seen in international system are unilateral and frequently illegitimate actions, uncontained use of military force in international relations, disdain for the basic norms of international law. Present international system is seen as dominated by the West, United States imposing economic, political, cultural and educational policies on other nations. It results in the fact that no one feels safe – protected by international law. That is why such policy stimulates arms race: encourages acquiring weapons of mass destruction or organizing terrorist attacks.⁵¹

Present international system is seen as build on double standards. For example, in the case of Kosovo the West “forgot about international law, forgot about the UN resolutions, everything. They did as they wanted”.⁵² According to Prime Minister Putin, members of international system should have

*“common rules of behavior in the world. It is not right to talk up the right to national self-determination in Kosovo and emphasize the principle of territorial integrity in the case of Georgia”.*⁵³

Just as United States, Russia aspires to develop a broad range of international contacts. The role of multilateral diplomacy is seen as significantly increasing. It is thought that as new centres of global economic growth will be converted into political

⁵¹ Putin, “Speech at the 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy”.

⁵² Putin, “Prime Minister Vladimir Putin met with members of the Valdai International Discussion Club”.

⁵³ *Op.cit.*

influence the multipolarity will be strengthened.⁵⁴ Prime Minister Putin claimed that Russia should build “constructive relationship with our partners in Europe and the United States and Asia”.⁵⁵ An emphasis is put on equal partnership between Russia and the West, mainly United States.⁵⁶ According to President Dmitry Medvedev, bilateral relations with United States should be based on “pragmatism and mutual respect”.⁵⁷

Russia does not deny possibility of mutual competition and disagreements in bilateral relations with United States however these disagreements are not seen as overwhelming all other spheres of cooperation or as a reason for the Cold War. Prime Minister Putin:

*“Today we have no ideological contradictions, like in the Cold War; there is no basis for a Cold War. Of course, contradictions may arise. There may be competition and geopolitical interests may diverge. But there is no solid foundation for mutual hostility”.*⁵⁸

In the context of Cold War historical analogy, a distancing from soviet past could be seen in Russia’s discourse. Rhetoric of Putin is very representative in this case:

*“We dismantled that base [in Cuba – D.J.] because our post-Soviet policies changed their nature -- because the nature of our society changed. We don't want a confrontation, we want co-operation”.*⁵⁹

In much of the Russian discourse on Cold War the Soviet Union is seen as the *other*. As Putin claimed during the Cold War the West has “faced a common and presumably very dangerous enemy, the Soviet Union. That enemy is no more”.⁶⁰ He accused the U.S. administration of presenting a distorted image of Russia:

⁵⁴ Putin, “Speech at the 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy”.

⁵⁵ Putin, “Prime Minister Vladimir Putin met with members of the Valdai International Discussion Club”.

⁵⁶ *Op.cit.*

⁵⁷ Dmitry Medvedev, “Interview by the Russian President Dmitry Medvedev with CNN”. Sochi, August 26, 2008. <<http://www.un.int/russia/new/MainRoot/docs/Warfare/statement260808en.htm>> [2009 05 10].

⁵⁸ Putin, “Prime Minister Vladimir Putin met with members of the Valdai International Discussion Club”.

⁵⁹ *Spiegel*, “G-8 Interview With Vladimir Putin. ‘I am a True Democrat’”. June 04, 2007. <<http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,486345,00.html>> [2007 07 28].

⁶⁰ Putin, “Prime Minister Vladimir Putin met with members of the Valdai International Discussion Club”.

*“There is no more Soviet threat but they are trying to resurrect it”.*⁶¹ Soviet Union *“does not exist and the Europeans are not afraid. ... Russia is different, we have none of the imperial ambitions of which some accuse us, and we will never have them”.*⁶²

Hence from the perspective of the United States the contemporary situation in international arena is seen as more miscellaneous than during the Cold War. Present international system is characterized by broad network of ties between states all over the world and based on independence of nations. Demonstration of power is superseded by competition in global markets. For Russia present international system is seen as dominated by the West and organized by double standards, such policy leads to insecurity (as no guaranties are seen in international law) and stimulates arms race. The relationship of United States and Russia towards the past is a little bit different: in case of Russia a distancing from Cold War past – the Soviet legacy – is very obvious (this remark is worth further analysis as the image of Soviet Union in general has been retrieved in Russia during the last years⁶³).

Rules of contemporary international system put the following limits on foreign policy decision making: multilateral international relations, not limited by division into spheres of influence; the use of military power is not tolerated; there should be no hostility U.S. and Russia based on the fact that Russia is not Soviet Union (it has different power and interests than Soviet Union did).

To sum up, speech acts about contemporary international system reveal rules and structures that formed after the end of the Cold War. Some assertive speech acts – new geopolitical situation, Russia not being a Soviet Union, multilateral international relations, etc. (Table 4 and Table 5) – could be more firmly regarded as rules than the others (guidelines of military power use). Directive speech acts – United States

⁶¹ Janet McBride, “Putin Warns West against starting arms race”. Reuters, 11 September 2008. <<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/putin-Warns-west-against-starting-arms-race-926780.html>> [2009 05 10].

⁶² Putin, “Prime Minister Vladimir Putin met with members of the Valdai International Discussion Club”.

⁶³ The Economist, “Soviet words and deeds”. Oct 15th 2009, Moscow. <http://www.economist.com/world/europe/displaystory.cfm?story_id=14667887> [2009 10 28].

expectations from Russia (4 – Table 4) and Russia’s expectations from United States (6 – Table 5) – were adopted from the context related with contemporary international system.

Except for mutual agreement between U.S. and Russia on Russia not being Soviet Union and of multilateral foreign policy of both countries there are more disagreements than agreements on what are the guidelines of interaction in international arena. In general, while U.S. sees more opportunities for cooperation, Russia refers to obstacles for cooperation in international system.

4. Meanings brought into U.S. and Russia’s foreign policy practice

This section will address in greater detail on the meanings that United States and Russia bring to their bilateral relations through Cold War historical analogy. The above mentioned perceptions of the past and the present enable to identify explicit and implicit references to the Cold War and international relations different from the Cold War. Reactions by United States and Russia’s officials over the U.S. plans on missile defense shield in Eastern Europe and during Russian and Georgian military confrontation in 2008 is analyzed. The summary of this analysis will be presented in the following – fifth – section by commenting on the rules guiding as perceived by United States and Russia as guiding their behavior.

4.1. U.S. missile shield in Eastern Europe

The sense of a Cold War-style stand-off was compounded with the United States plans on missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic. U.S. plans resulted in lively debates between United States and Russia in public sphere.

Missile defense system was introduced by U.S. as purely defensive measure, “aimed not at Russia, but at true threats”.⁶⁴ U.S. plans were accompanied by reassurance that there is no division into camps or spheres of influence, according to President Bush:

⁶⁴ President George W. Bush, “Joint Statement with President Klaus and Prime Minister Topolaneck of the Czech Republic, Prague, Czech Republic”. Office of the Press Secretary, June 5, 2007. <<http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/06/20070605-3.html>> [2009 05 10].

*“The Cold War is over. It ended. The people of the Czech Republic don’t have to choose between being a friend of the United States or a friend with Russia, you can be both. We don’t believe in a zero-sum world”.*⁶⁵

According to President Bush, “[t]he system we have proposed is not directed at Russia” and United States “would welcome Russian cooperation on missile defense”.⁶⁶ United States voiced willingness to consult with Russia on foreign policy matters to minimize misunderstandings⁶⁷ as threats made by Russia to target Europe with its military ammunition will not lead to questions being solved.

However the very initiative of missile shield was framed as existential part of the defense system. Secretary Rice pointed out that “[t]he United States needs to be able to move forward to use technology to defend itself”, adding that the United States would not give a foreign country a “veto” on its national security interests.⁶⁸ United States turned down Russia’s proposal to develop missile shield in Azerbaijan and South Russia.⁶⁹

Quite the contrary meaning was given to U.S. missile shield plans by the Russian decision makers. First indirect reaction to U.S. plans on missile shield expressed by Putin claiming that “unipolar world that had been proposed after the Cold War did not take place” and “[u]nilateral and frequently illegitimate actions have not resolved any problems”.⁷⁰

Russian First Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov noticed that placing rockets in Poland and a radar station in the Czech Republic “presents an obvious threat to Russia” and amounts to building a “new Berlin Wall”.⁷¹ Russia’s Foreign Ministry insisted that the interceptors don’t have “any target other than Russian intercontinental ballistic

⁶⁵ *Op.cit.*

⁶⁶ Terence Hunt, “US to Press Ahead With Anti-Missile Plan”. June 9, 2007. <<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/latest/story/0,-6696205,00.html>> [2007 07 28].

⁶⁷ The New York Times, “After Rice and Putin Meet, Russia Agrees to Soften Language”, May 16, 2007. <<http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/16/world/europe/16russia.html?ex=1337054400&en=e4dc3aa31677c1ec&ei=5124&partner=permalink&exprod=permalink>> [2007 07 28].

⁶⁸ *Op.cit.*

⁶⁹ *Kommersant*, “US Turns Down Russia’s Missile Shield Offer”. July 09, 2007. <http://www.kommersant.com/p780947/Missile_Defense_US_Rice/>. [2007 07 28].

⁷⁰ Munich Conference on Security Policy, “W.Putin’s Speech at the 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy”. 02/10/2007. <<http://www.securityconference.de/konferenzen/rede.php?sprache=en&id=179&>> [2007 07 28].

⁷¹ Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, „Russia Says U.S. Building 'New Berlin Wall'“. July 8, 2007. <<http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1077508.html>> [2007 07 28].

missiles”.⁷² Russia expressed a belief that missile defense system in Eastern Europe could change the balance of power, resulting in a destabilization of nuclear deterrence and Russia becoming the target of such system. According to President Putin, “there is the unilateral disarmament of Russia” and there is “a pumping-in of new weapons systems into Eastern Europe” by Russia’s partners in Europe, “there is a violation, an imbalance of strategic equilibrium in the world, and in order to provide for the balance we will need to establish systems that would be able to penetrate the missile defense system”.⁷³ Commenting on the missile shield President Medvedev noted that, “our perception is that all these weapon systems are being created around our borders to put further pressure on Russia”.⁷⁴

The prospects of further relations with Russia where seen in a friendly or at least business-like way by United States. It was claimed that “[t]he Cold War is over. We’re now into the 21st century, where we need to deal with the true threats, which are threats of radical extremists who will kill to advance an ideology and the threats of proliferation”.⁷⁵ In this context a wish to have positive relations with Russia was claimed, President Bush emphasized that, “[t]hat’s a complex relationship, no doubt. But there’s a lot of areas where we can work together to deal with common threats”.⁷⁶ As well as direct suggestions were made that Russia could cooperate with United States on a missile defense system.⁷⁷

Russia’s reaction resulted in mixed statements ranging from offers to cooperate to military threatening Europe. President Putin, in a speech regarded by observers as reviving the Cold War, declared that U.S. missile shield in Eastern Europe will lead to

⁷² Kathy Shaidle, “Putin’s Next Domino”. August 22, 2008, <<http://frontpagemagazine.com/Articles/Read.aspx?GUID=D4FABFB0-74CC-43DC-BFC3-1C053820492C>> [2009 05 10].

⁷³ *Spiegel*, “G-8 Interview With Vladimir Putin. ‘I am a True Democrat’”.

⁷⁴ Medvedev, “Interview by the Russian President Dmitry Medvedev with CNN”.

⁷⁵ Klaus-Dieter Frankenberger. “Bush on Missile Defense, Energy and the War On Terror: “We have nothing to hide” (interview). Originally published in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung on June 2, 2007. <http://www.atlantic-community.org/index/Open_Think_Tank_Article/Bush_on_Missile_Defense_Energy_and_the_War_On_Terror:_%22We_have_nothing_to_hide%22> [2009 05 10].

⁷⁶ President G. W. Bush, “Joint Statement with President Klaus and Prime Minister Topolaneek”.

⁷⁷ For example, see Secretary Rice comments in The New York Times, “After Rice and Putin Meet, Russia Agrees to Soften Language”. Terence Hunt, “US to Press Ahead With Anti-Missile Plan”. One of the examples when United States turned down Moscow’s offer of a joint missile shield in Europe see – *Kommersant*, “US Turns Down Russia’s Missile Shield Offer”.

“an inevitable arms race”.⁷⁸ Russia’s Duma warned that US’s plans “are already bringing about a new split in Europe and unleashing another arms race”.⁷⁹ Russia proposed making the missile shield more regional by bringing in NATO and creating a joint early warning missile launch centres. Russia has offered a global integrated missile shield for the protection of the whole of Europe as an alternative to the US National Missile Defense.⁸⁰ First deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov reassured that “[i]f our proposal is not accepted, we will take adequate measures. An asymmetrical and effective response will be found”.⁸¹ Foreign Ministry in a statement said that “we will be forced to react not with diplomatic, but with military-technical methods”.⁸² General Anatoly Nogovitsyn, the Russian armed forces’ deputy chief of staff, warned that “Poland, by deploying [the system] is exposing itself to a strike – 100 per cent”.⁸³ Russia further warned of a new arms race in Europe.⁸⁴ What followed was that Russia didn’t see any other solution as to react in a military way by targeting countries in which missile shield will be deployed.

Secretary Rice criticized Russia’s increasing reliance on military measures to remind the world of its power and Russia’s attitude that seemed to be locked in the Cold War past: “We want a 21st Century partnership with Russia, but at times, Russia seems to think and act in the zero-sum terms of another era”.⁸⁵ During Russian-Georgian military crisis and before going to Poland to sign a deal on U.S. missile shield, Rice criticized Russia’s stance once more noting that “it’s really not responsible language to threaten them [Poland] with a nuclear attack, as some unnamed Russian general apparently did”.⁸⁶

⁷⁸ Putin, “Speech at the 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy”.

⁷⁹ Luke Harding, “Russia threatening new cold war over missile defence”. *The Guardian*, April 11, 2007. <<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/apr/11/usa.topstories3>> [2009 05 10].

⁸⁰ RIA Novosti, “Global missile defense system could be created by 2020 – Ivanov”. July 8, 2007. <<http://en.rian.ru/russia/20070708/68565653.html>> [2007 07 28].

⁸¹ Associated Press, “Putin hopes Russia-US ties to improve”. July 04, 2007. <<http://www.ndtv.com/convergence/ndtv/story.aspx?id=NEWEN20070017737>> [2009 05 10].

⁸² Associated Press, “Russia Warns of Military Response If U.S.-Czech Missile Defense Agreement Approved”. July 8, 2008. <<http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,378065,00.html>> [2009 05 10].

⁸³ Nico Hines, “Russian general says Poland open to nuclear strike”. *The Times*. August 15, 2008. <<http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article4541613.ece>> [2009 05 10].

⁸⁴ Adrian Blomfield and Damien McElroy, “Russia ‘ready for new Cold War’ over Georgia”. 27 Aug 2008. <<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/georgia/2629981/Russia-ready-for-new-Cold-War-over-Georgia.html>> [2009 05 10]. McBride, “Putin Warns West against starting arms race”.

⁸⁵ Alfonso Serrano, “Bush Defends U.S. Missile System In Europe”. Washington, June 1, 2007. <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/06/01/politics/main2875320_page2.shtml> [2009 05 10].

⁸⁶ Secretary Condoleezza Rice, “Remarks En Route to Brussels, Belgium”. August 18, 2008. <<http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2008/08/108552.htm>> [2009 05 10].

After U.S. signed an agreement with Poland, it was noted that cooperation on defense technologies (in addition to the missile defense) shouldn't cause problems for Russians. Secretary Rice maintained:

*“It is not 1988. It’s 2008. Poland is an ally of the United States. Poland is a member of NATO. Poland is a member of the European Union. And so frankly, the strategic circumstances are different than in 1988. This is 2008”.*⁸⁷

Later on Russia's reaction to missile shield system was described by Secretary Rice as reflecting Cold War behavior:

*“It’s also the case that when you threaten Poland, you perhaps forget that it is not 1988. (...) It’s 2008 and the United States has a ... firm treaty guarantee to defend Poland’s territory as if it was the territory of the United States. So it’s probably not wise to throw these threats around”.*⁸⁸

Both these comments were based on assumption that now Poland is ally of United States and United States will pursue cooperation with its allies when they wish to do so. U.S. offered defense cooperation to Russia as well.⁸⁹ This statement is worth further analysis, however it could be maintained here that although this cooperation is deferent from cooperation offered to U.S. allies, it still shows how much relations between U.S. and Russia have hanged since the collapse of Soviet Union.

Attendant actions taken by Russia were eloquent as well. On July 14, 2007, President Putin announced Russia's intention to suspend participation in the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty and in the same year this suspension entered into force. As part of the suspension, Russia declared that it would no longer host CFE inspections or participate in the annual exchange of military information. This would also allow Russia to deploy more troops and military hardware near Western European borders. Secretary Rice expressed concerns about the Russian decision as “CFE is, after

⁸⁷ Secretary Condoleezza Rice, “Remarks With Acting Under Secretary of State”.

⁸⁸ Shaidle, “Putin’s Next Domino”.

⁸⁹ Secretary Condoleezza Rice, “Remarks With Acting Under Secretary of State”.

all, one of the essential pieces of the architecture of a post-Cold War Europe”.⁹⁰ Russia has also sent bombers along the Alaskan coast, tested a new intercontinental ballistic missile and has threatened to station nuclear weapons in Cuba. Russia’s posture to develop its alliance with Cuba provoked images of military and intelligence cooperation between Soviet Union and Cuba during the Cold War as this cooperation during the Cold War brought the world to the brink of nuclear war during Cuban missile crisis in 1962.

The change in administration in U.S. led to decision made by President Obama to scrap implementation of missile defense plans in Eastern Europe and to develop plans to deploy smaller interceptors first aboard ships and later on European soil. United States signed nuclear arms control agreement with Russia that reduces the nuclear stockpiles of both nations. However Russia has stressed its right to withdraw from nuclear arms treaty if U.S. plans for a missile shield developed into a threat.⁹¹ President Obama claimed that he and President Medvedev “are deliberately trying to avoid framing U.S.-Russia relations in zero sum terms, but instead are looking for win-win outcomes”.⁹²

Thus in the speech acts of U.S. decision makers, when they made comments on Russia’s reaction to missile shield, foreign policy problems were framed by invoking Cold War rule of zero-sum game (1a – Table 2) and ideas of contemporary international system that use of military power is inappropriate and Russia is not a Soviet Union (3b, 3d – Table 4). In the speech acts of Russia’s decision makers context of contemporary international system – United States dominate in international system, military power is used in international relations, disagreements with United States do not mean hostilities (5a, 5c, 5d, 6 – Table 5) – is supplemented by the Cold War rule of division into spheres of influence (2c – Table 3).

⁹⁰ Secretary Condoleezza Rice, “Remarks at NATO Headquarters”. Brussels, Belgium, December 7, 2007. <<http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2007/12/96568.htm>> [2009 05 10].

⁹¹ Steve Gutterman, “Obama urges Russian missile defense cooperation: report”. Reuters, June 24, 2010. <<http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE65N3AL20100624>> [2010 07 20].

⁹² Interfax, “Barack Obama: President Medvedev and I are looking for win-win outcomes”. Interview with Barack Obama. <<http://www.interfax.com/interview.asp?id=173222>> [2010 07 20].

4.2. Georgia – Russia military crisis in 2008

In August 2008, armed conflict between Georgia and Russia together with South Ossetia took place. United States reaction was strict and straightforward. Secretary Rice commenting on the situation in Georgia remembered Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968: “[t]his is not 1968 and the invasion of Czechoslovakia, where Russia can threaten its neighbors, occupy a capital, overthrow a government, and get away with it. Things have changed”.⁹³ On a visit to Tbilisi (Georgia) Secretary Rice repeated the same historical analogy.⁹⁴ This way Russia’s actions were condemned as well as it was implied that contrary to that Cold War crisis these days Russia will face a reaction and will have to deal with the consequences of its actions.

Russia has been criticized for reproducing or displaying the Cold War mind-set: “Russia has perhaps not accepted that it is time to move on from the Cold War and it is time to move to a new era in which relations between states are on the basis of equality and sovereignty and economic integration”.⁹⁵ A reference to “spheres of influence” as a feature of the Cold War has been brought to speech acts. President Bush maintained that “The Cold War is over. The days of satellite states and spheres of influence are behind us”.⁹⁶ Attack against neighbour was regarded by Secretary Rice as an “attempt to consign sovereign nations and free peoples to some archaic “sphere of influence””.⁹⁷ This implied that actions not acknowledged in the contemporary international system could be expected from Russia.

U.S. position has been also expressed on other foreign policy modes. *First*, Russia’s reliance on “military power” to accomplish its goals:

*“Russia is a state that is unfortunately using the one tool that it has always used, ... when it wishes to deliver a message, and that’s its military power. That’s not the way to deal in the 21st century”.*⁹⁸

⁹³ Secretary Condoleezza Rice, “Recent Events in Georgia”. Washington, DC, August 13, 2008. <<http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2008/08/108194.htm>> [2009 05 10].

⁹⁴ Alan Philips, “Cold War ghosts haunt western world”. August 20, 2008. <<http://www.thenational.ae/article/20080819/FOREIGN/542491581/-1/NEWS>> [2009 05 10].

⁹⁵ Secretary Condoleezza Rice, “Recent Events in Georgia”.

⁹⁶ The Wall Street Journal, “Bush: ‘Days of Satellite States’ Are Over”.

⁹⁷ Secretary Condoleezza Rice, “Secretary Rice Addresses U.S.-Russia Relations”.

⁹⁸ Secretary Condoleezza Rice, “Remarks En Route to Brussels”.

It was also acknowledged that Russia's efforts to assert power or influence by military means is something that has been seen for a while.⁹⁹ *Second*, it was showed what kind of relationship is regarded as preferable by U.S. In contrast to confrontational foreign policy the hope had been that Russia was going to build its relationships with Europe and the U.S. "on the basis of Russian economic, political, cultural, and other kinds of assets".¹⁰⁰ In the same briefing Secretary Rice elaborated also on defense cooperation with Russia. As a sign that Russia is treated in a different way, unthinkable to Cold War time, NATO-Russia Council, efforts to pull Russia toward World trade organization, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development and the G-8 were named. However Russia's actions towards Georgia have been perceived as perhaps signaling new strategic choice of Russia and resulting in significant damage to Russia's own reputation and suitability for full integration into the international community.

As for the United States stance, it showed what misunderstandings might result in different relations with Russia in general. If Russia uses military power against smaller neighbor it cannot be treated as an equal partner to the United States. Russia "can't act in a way that it did during the Cold War when it was the Soviet Union and ... expect to be treated as a responsible partner".¹⁰¹ Still, Secretary Rice affirmed that U.S. and Russia will continue to have strategic projects of common interest (Iran, North Korea, Levant, Israel, Palestine), this cooperation, according to Rice, "is based on Russian national interest, as it always has been".¹⁰²

Although Secretary Rice made references to Russia's Cold-war mindset, she declined references to the Cold War by stating that even some very strong words from Moscow do not signal a new Cold War as the Cold War "was an ideological conflict between the Soviet Union and its clients, and a Western set of values and institutions. ... And that ended in 1991 with the collapse of the Soviet Union".¹⁰³ Today Russia is not the Soviet Union. One of the things that this means is "that Russia is a far cry in terms of its

⁹⁹ *Op.cit.*

¹⁰⁰ Secretary Condoleezza Rice, "Remarks With Acting Under Secretary of State".

¹⁰¹ Secretary Condoleezza Rice, "Remarks En Route to Brussels".

¹⁰² *Op.cit.*

¹⁰³ Secretary Condoleezza Rice, "Remarks With Acting Under Secretary of State".

geostrategic center from where the Soviet Union was”.¹⁰⁴ The other, according to Secretary Rice, is that Russia has sought integration into diplomatic, political, economic, security institutions of the international system and that path wouldn’t have been open to the Soviet Union.¹⁰⁵ It has sought it “because it is in Russia’s interest, if it is to modernize and become a fully functioning state”, but this is at risk.¹⁰⁶ This suggested that Russia’s actions could result in lesser cooperation from United States.

Commenting on Russia’s actions in Georgia President Medvedev expressed hope that Russia’s partners in the West “would understand the reason for making such a decision and the situation will be calm”.¹⁰⁷ According to him, Russia and United States have disagreements, but “they are not fatal and if we don’t blow up this problem into something its not, if we don’t try to start a new Cold War then it will not take place”.¹⁰⁸ From Russia’s perspective, the prospects of emergence of a new Cold War depend on United States, according to President Medvedev:

*“We are not afraid of anything, the prospect of another Cold War included. Of course, we don’t want that. In this situation, everything depends on the stand of our partners in the world community, our partners in the West”.*¹⁰⁹

President Medvedev emphasized that Russia’s partnership with West, including United States should be based on “pragmatism and mutual respect” and “new leaders of the US be guided by the real interests of the American people rather some farfetched ideological scheme”.¹¹⁰ Russia sees relationship with United States in a broad range by admitting possible contradictions and treats disagreements as an ordinary practice in mutual relations: “[t]here may be competition and geopolitical interests may diverge. But there is no solid foundation for mutual hostility”¹¹¹. But Prime Minister Putin denied possibility of a Cold War, because there are “no ideological contradictions, like in the

¹⁰⁴ Secretary Condoleezza Rice, “Remarks En Route to Brussels”.

¹⁰⁵ Secretary Condoleezza Rice, “Remarks With Acting Under Secretary of State”.

¹⁰⁶ Secretary Condoleezza Rice, “Recent Events in Georgia”.

¹⁰⁷ Russia Today, “Medvedev exclusive: We’re not afraid of Cold War”. August 26, 2008. <http://www.russiatoday.com/Top_News/2008-08-26/Medvedev_exclusive:_We%2%80%99re_not_afraid_of_Cold_War.html> [2009 05 10].

¹⁰⁸ Medvedev, “Interview by the Russian President Dmitry Medvedev with CNN”.

¹⁰⁹ Russia Today, “Medvedev exclusive: We’re not afraid of Cold War”.

¹¹⁰ Medvedev, “Interview by the Russian President Dmitry Medvedev with CNN”.

¹¹¹ Putin, “Prime Minister Vladimir Putin met with members of the Valdai International Discussion Club”.

Cold War”. He indicated that Russia and United States “have many common problems ... : terrorism, non-proliferation of WMD, and infectious diseases which pose a great threat to mankind”.¹¹²

United States is seen as still having Cold War thinking towards Russia. Prime Minister Putin alleged, “[t]he Cold War has long ended but the mentality of the Cold War has stayed firmly in the minds of several U.S. diplomats”.¹¹³ It should be noted that NATO foreign ministers have suspended their cooperation with Russia until it fulfilled the terms of its peace deal with Georgia. Dmitry Rogozin, Russia’s ambassador to NATO, commenting on this decision observed that this means a return to the past and the very „organization comes from „Cold War“ times“. However he added that there will be no new Cold War, although relations between Russia and NATO will change.¹¹⁴ As too Russia’s self perception, Prime Minister Putin identified that “Russia is different, we have none of the imperial ambitions of which some accuse us, and we will never have them”.¹¹⁵

To sum up the above, from United States perspective Russia is seen as having Cold War mindset and being similar to Soviet Union. Even if it differs from Soviet Union because it has other interests and power, it might be similar on identity level. Rules from the Cold War that define limits of interaction are presence of ideological conflict and division into spheres of influence (1b, 1c – Table 2). However in the speech acts of U.S. decision makers Cold War rules are present together with order of contemporary international system: use of military power is regarded as inappropriate, new (in contrast to Cold War) geopolitical situation and multilateral foreign policy of U.S. is present, there is no Soviet Union and cooperative behavior is expected from Russia (3b, 3c, 3d, 3e, 4 – Table 4). Similar trend can be seen in the speech acts of Russian policy makers: ideological confrontation of Cold War (2a – Table 3) is seen in U.S. behavior as well as context of contemporary international system like rules of military power use, ambiguous relations with U.S. (5c, 5d, 6 – Table 5).

¹¹² Putin, “Prime Minister Vladimir Putin met with members of the Valdai International Discussion Club”.

¹¹³ Michael Schwartz, Anne Barnard and Andrew E. Kramer, “Russian Forces Capture Military Base in Georgia”. August 11, 2008. <<http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/12/world/europe/12georgia.html?em>> [2009 05 10].

¹¹⁴ ДНИ, “Запад готовится к новой “холодной войне””. August 20, 2008. <<http://www.dni.ru/polit/2008/8/20/147611.html>> [2009 05 10].

¹¹⁵ Putin, “Prime Minister Vladimir Putin met with members of the Valdai International Discussion Club”.

5. New Cold War between United States and Russia

This section based on the analysis in the fourth section of this paper will elaborate on the recent United States and Russia's rhetoric on the Cold War and identify what kind of speech acts and rules guide behavior of United States and Russia. This paper does not compare the change in speech acts but aims at identifying whether the actors themselves perceive and voice the presence of change in mutual relations and international system.¹¹⁶

United States plans on missile shield and Russia's perception of them as aimed at targeting Russia introduced new modes of action in Russia's foreign and security policy thinking such as arms race, asymmetric response, etc. This in turn evoked new meaning in the U.S. perceptions of Russia's foreign policy practices: Russia might act in zero-sum terms of Cold War era and military threaten U.S. allies. U.S. plans on missile shield were supported by assurances that there are no spheres of influence, there's no zero-sum game (both features ascribed to Cold War in the U.S. discourse). And contrary to the Cold War practice cooperation with Russia was seen as possible.

As it has been showed references to the arms race, asymmetrical response might resemble Cold War practice. Russia's reaction could mark a possible change in its foreign policy as U.S. missile shield was seen as a pretext to arms race and this suggests presence of one feature ascribed to the Cold War. This was accompanied by suspended participation in the CFE treaty and demonstration of its military power. But this change is not of a kind that would fundamentally change U.S.–Russian relations or conditions under which foreign policy decisions are made. It didn't imply confrontation with U.S. in other spheres. In contrast, projects of common cooperation have been underlined by both sides. Perceptions of some level of cooperation between United States and Russia on missile shield system draw much broader range of possible interaction than during the Cold War or according to the Cold War understanding.

During the military crisis in Georgia features ascribed to Cold War – spheres of influence, great power invading a small neighbour (Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in

¹¹⁶ An additional study could pay attention to American and Russian speech acts of the last decades in order to identify change *in* speech acts on relations between United States and Russia and international system. Thus in this paper speech acts on Cold War (as in contrast to (post-) Cold War speech acts) is analyzed only in recent rhetoric.

1968) – have been brought into U.S. discourse. Russia’s actions were given the meaning of the Cold War mind-set. This implied that unconventional actions could be expected from Russia. Along with other examples of behavior this reflected the limits of acceptable and unacceptable practice of foreign policy in present international system. It raised doubts whether Russia will follow the rules of international institutions. As for the United States foreign policy, Russia’s actions could result in lesser cooperation from United States. However, military attack on Georgia was regarded as a “critical moment – but not a deterministic one”.¹¹⁷ It was not a situation of “either or” – either Russia cooperates with West or the old Cold War stand-off is reinstated. Absence of cooperation does not result in Cold War and Russia “being” a Soviet Union. This leads to a conclusion that the thinking in U.S. is not so unambiguously embedded in the Cold War mindset and other frameworks apart from “Cold War” (full confrontation) or “non Cold War” (full cooperation, everything just opposite to Cold War interaction) are possible in relations with Russia.

From U.S. position, there is no reason for the Cold War in this situation because there is no ideological confrontation. It could be argued that this contradiction exists because Russia is seen as having a Cold War mindset, using foreign policy tools that are regarded by U.S. as inadequate. But they do not represent fundamentally different perceptions of international system. Cooperation on projects of common interest is seen as possible between U.S. and Russia, but Russia could not be treated as responsible and equal partner because of its military actions in Georgia. On the other hand Russia called for pragmatic instead of ideological interests in international arena. This, under the Russian perception of Cold War, would indirectly imply perception of U.S. as following a Cold War mindset. As well as a call for distancing from Cold War practice and have a pragmatic negotiation on a case to case basis instead of following longstanding ideational norms. In both cases (U.S. missile shield and military confrontation in Georgia) lack of cooperation from one side was regarded as pushing the relations to more confrontational stance. From Russian perspective this would be U.S. unwillingness to cooperate on missile shield, from United States perspective – lack of cooperation in Russia’s actions during the military crisis in Georgia.

¹¹⁷ Secretary Condoleezza Rice, “Secretary Rice Addresses U.S.-Russia Relations”.

To sum up, although some change in Russia's actions and in U.S. perceptions about Russia could be seen it does not lead to the overall change of the rules that guide mutual relations in contemporary international system with the Cold War rules, adoption of the aim and perception of *self* (identity and interests) from the Cold War game. The minor changes that could be seen are associated with the perceptions of *other* (in U.S. case of Russia and in Russia's case of U.S.) as having some sort of Cold War identity and interests guiding its actions.

Conclusions

In this paper I explored the uses of Cold War historical analogy in the speech acts of U.S. and Russia's foreign policy decision makers. By analyzing what meaning practices in international arena are given and what foreign policy rules they set the question whether there is a new Cold War between United States and Russia was answered.

In recent historical analogies used by United States and Russia's policy makers the Cold War is seen in a similar manner. The assertive speech acts represent rules that have been institutionalized in the Cold War structure with the exception of speech act of Russian decision makers that treats Soviet Union as a threat.

Except for mutual agreement between U.S. and Russia that Russia is not the Soviet Union and that both countries have multilateral foreign policy there are more disagreements than agreements on what are the guidelines of interaction in contemporary international arena. In general, while U.S. sees more opportunities for cooperation, Russia refers to obstacles for cooperation in international system.

Recreation of Cold War interaction between United States and Soviet Union would mean that both United States and Russia take steps according to Cold War rules that as it was showed are understood in the same way in both countries. However United States do not frame relations with Russia in the context of Cold War rules in general, i.e. United States see only some rules of Cold War interaction being transferred into contemporary relations with Russia and only Russia is seen as following those rules. The same is true with Russia: only some rules of Cold War interaction are being transferred

into relations with United States and only United States are seen as following those rules. Thus rules of contemporary international system are not replaced with the rules, aim and perceptions of *self* from the Cold War game. Only perceptions of *other* (in U.S. case of Russia and in Russia's case of U.S.) were invoked from the Cold War game.

U.S. plans on missile shield and Russia's perception of them as aimed at targeting Russia introduced new modes of action in Russia's foreign and security policy thinking such as arms race, asymmetric response, etc. This in turn introduced new meaning in the U.S. perceptions of Russia's foreign policy practices: Russia might act in zero-sum terms of Cold War era by military threatening U.S. allies. During the military crisis between Georgia and Russia, Russia's actions were given the meaning of the Cold War mind-set. It raised doubts whether Russia will follow the rules of international institutions and suggested that Russia's actions could result in lesser cooperation from United States.

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