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Section 8: Security and Ethics

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A DISCIPLINARY HISTORY OF A DISCURSIVE SEDUCTION: THE U.S. AMERICAN¹ IR SCHOLARSHIP AND THE U.S. AMERICAN SCHOLARLY COLD WAR SECURITY DISCOURSE

Abstract: Since the end of the Second World War, there has been particular scholarly discursive formation of security in the IR discipline in the United States. This Cold War scholarly discursive formation still determines how scholars understand and theorize international security. Considering this thought system as making certain lines of action and certain choices possible for the foreign policy elite, this discursive structure is mapped through the textual analysis of the scholarly argumentation on international security since the end of the Second World War.

The analysis of scholarly Cold War security discourse to grasp the discursive system of thought and argumentation within the IR discipline offers an alternative reading of the U.S. American Cold War era IR and international security theories. My argument is that while research on international security is presented in IR theorizing as scientific progress based on a set of rules for the formation of valid statements on security and functioning through ontological, ethical and historiographical differentiation of reality, this representation of research and theorizing is but a tale of power, seduction and fall. The narrative of the scholarly responsibility, for the sake of more rational and better foreign policy, tells more than the ethical considerations of scholars. The narrative reveals that once seduced by the power of knowledge, scholars are engaged in deep submissive relationship with their dominative security discourse. Justifying their voluntary submission by turning their research object to their ethics, scholars keep producing particular type of knowledge. By using international security both as the aim and as the justification of all theorizing and research, scholars continue to maintain particular Cold War discursive thought system, which is based on the separation of secure domestic and dangerous international sphere.

¹ Throughout this paper I use the adjective of “U.S. American” to refer specifically to the United States of America. Since there is no better adjective in use to refer specifically to this particular origin or place of residence of scholars, I have to use this adjective, because one can argue that Canadians or Argentineans are “Americans” as well. One possible option is to use the adjective of “US’ian,” but since it is such a novelty and not in use, I use here the established and accepted adjective of “U.S. American” to refer to scholars whose origin or permanent place of residence and work is in the United States of America.

INTRODUCTION

There is particular international security discourse in the IR discipline. It was born in the United States at the eve of Cold War. Prelude for its emergence, or so the disciplinary story tells, began in the battles of First World War, when bloody horror, angry frustration and undying hope for better future generated ideas about rational and scientific ways for avoiding wars and promoting peace. Though, none could foresee for what the foundation was laid.

The emergence of specific system of thought on international security into academic International Relations research was not noticed perhaps for the reason that security discourse was so obvious and so normal that it was rendered as a natural part of theorizing on international relations. After all, war experiences made it natural and normal to be afraid and to reach safety and security. Thus, there was nothing wrong with intensive talking and theorizing on security. This discourse – being scientific and expert discourse – further justified these feelings of fear. For we all believe into science's ability to offer expert knowledge to solve our problems and resolve our fears. We all believe that scientific enquiry is objective, and that scientists and scholars tell us the truth. Thus, we expect that science tells us the truth about international security, too.

What it is this discursive thought system I am referring to? How it looks like? What it does? How does it influence the U.S. foreign policy? Or more precisely: Why the scholarly discursive thinking system is considered here as determining of how scholars perceive and theoretize international security today and on what basis do I argue that it still influences the U.S. foreign policy? I think that sometimes the most simple and most obvious answer is the correct one and that there is no wily conspiracy behind scholarly discourses on international security. Scholarly discourses do all that because of the claimed and widely accepted *expertness* of IR scholars in matters of concepts and theories on international relations, national security and international security.

It is because of their status as scientific experts – as the ones, who claim of knowing the truth on international security and who claim of being able to achieve such security knowledge through the theoretizing and use of special conceptual networks. This position of expertness, however, is not given from somewhere, but it is built together with political apparatus, state administration and military establishment, whose postulate that war and security are only military concern, changed after Second World War to the form that war is too important to be left in the hands of generals only. Thus, it was believed that civilians (a category that contains also academic research) have something to offer for the foreign and security policy. Within this discourse on war and security, the international sphere is considered as highly dangerous environment compared to the domestic one, where rules and norms of action guarantee security. In the international sphere, national security is

constantly at stake not because of the lack of such norms and rules in international relations, but because of the lack of universal warrantor, who would guarantee that norms will be followed properly. Therefore, everything must be done in politics, in military and in academic research to achieve security also in international sphere.

This imperative seems to be rational and logical explanation for the emergence of particular discourses on international security into IR's self-description, but it is not, for it takes its claims on dangerousness of international relations also as a justification for its existence. It is Janus-faced disciplinary claim of scholars, with one side in the light and the other side in the shadow. The side in the light shows the justified and real concern of scholars with national and international security. The side in the shadows hides the ugly (or perhaps beautiful and tempting) game of domination and submission that this special thought system is playing with its subordinates – a play that is taking place within the academic world. Thus, it is my intention here to analyse especially the side in the darkness and, ultimately, let both sides of Janus-faced expert discourse to be visible. The story of seduction and fall will then be told from the shadows.

ON THE ANALYSIS OF SYSTEMS OF THOUGHT

Foucauldian archaeological-genealogical analysis of systems of thought is considered here as most fruitful theoretico-methodological framework to study IR scholarly Cold War international security discourse, because archaeology, as the method “specific to the analysis of local discursivities,” enables the description of discursive structures and discursive statements that are considered as ‘normal’ and for that reason are not questioned at all. Genealogy, then, as “the tactic which, once it has described these local discursivities, brings into play desubjugated knowledges that have been released from them” (Foucault 2003, 10–11), enables the juxtaposition of two oppositional knowledges, powerful and powerless, to free both of them from established power positions of this particular system of subjection and to make them equal for the further fight over the truth on security.

While the U.S. American scholarly Cold War international security discourse is considered here as based on a special system of thought, the Foucauldian notion of three axes in power/knowledge relationships offers most useful framework for grasping the interrelations of power and knowledge that constitute scholars as experts of theorization on international security and complicated international relations. It follows that through the notion of *expertness*, scholars are seduced deeper into discursive power/knowledge relations. Firstly, by following ‘security’ as code of ethics, scholars claim that security in itself obliges all possible research done in its name. Secondly, by the (unwittingly) voluntary submission of scholarly activity to the established rules and norms of IR

research and theorizing, the embodiment of discursive structure of international security – sometimes only to belong into mainstream, sometimes in order to get finances and tenure (in these cases one cannot afford of being dissident) – these discursive power/knowledge relations are maintained as valid norms of accepted social behaviour and not as what they are, distorted one-sided domination-submission power relations.


Foucauldian archaeological-genealogical analysis of discursive power/knowledge relationships focuses on three axes (Picture 1) through which the expertness of scholars can be exposed not only in the narratives of scholars, but also in the public and political narratives on scholarly expert position. First methodological precaution must be mentioned immediately. For the reason that I am focusing here on the stories of the U.S. American IR scholars only, political and public narratives about the expertness of academic scholarship and about the expert position of scholarly research on international security (though these narratives might be important, too, in different research arrangement), are not included to the research material² of this analysis.

The axes of knowledge (truth about security in international sphere), power (appropriated truth about international security as a norm for further thinking) and ethics (appropriated and unquestionably accepted truth about international security as an ethical code and a moral

² Primary sources are articles of the U.S. American scholars of IR in these academic publications (with the time scale): *World Politics* (1948-2002), *International Organization* (1947-2002), *International Studies Quarterly* (starting from 1957, when it was published as *Background on World Politics*, continued in 1962 as *Background*, and from 1967 it is published with the current name, overall time scale thus 1957-2002), *Journal of Conflict Resolution* (first issue was published in 1957 as *Conflict Resolution*, then continued with the current name, overall time scale thus 1957-2002), and *International Security* (1976-2002). I went through all articles, but chose only those, which were written by U.S. American scholars identifying themselves as “International Relations scholars.” This reduced my primary research material from 6314 articles to 2371 articles (into which I still included also “Political Science scholars” and those, who identified themselves as “working at the department of Political Science/International Relations”) and further to 253 articles, which then were specifically “IR” ones. This specific focus on “IR” is justified, because the security discourse that I am referring to is specifically the IR one. The importance of “security” in the international relations and for the IR research is determined by the claims of the IR discipline on the particular nature of international relations, where there is no higher power above sovereign states (see, for example Wolfers 1949 and Wolfers 1951 on multistate system and on ‘necessity of state’; see also Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 1981, 18-19, where they define the international relations of not being the foreign policy of states, because foreign policy is made within one country, but international relations take place outside, somewhere between two or more countries, which gives to international relations a shade of unpredictability). Further codification of articles classified them as “foundational for security discourse/root discourse” and “non-foundational for security discourse/treetop discourse”. The first group then is of my special analytical interest, whereas second group is considered only as “control-group” that verifies findings in root-discursive articles. Root-discursive articles were further analysed by three analytical devices: archaeological (which answers to the question of how security was made scientific object and how such object emerged that required specifically scientific analysis and truth claims), genealogical (which answers to the question of how IR came to be an expert discipline to conduct the research on security and how it was decided and justified that IR scholars are experts of research on security) and ethical (which answers to the question of how security turned from research object to the uppermost justification of that same research and how it was considered and accepted as ethics of scholarly research creating thus relations of submission).

commitment) let us with schematic of the triangle. Based on these above mentioned theoretico-methodological assumptions and considerations, following questions were asked: What type of power is it that is capable of producing discourses of truth, security and ethic, which are so powerful throughout the academic IR society and have so powerful effects on scholarly self? What is this code of ethics that power implements through scholarly activity to produce the discourse of Cold War international security (I mean ‘international security’ as the scientific truth and scholarly ethics) and to produce the Cold War scholarly subjects on international security? And more: How the relationship with the discursive thought systems of IR and, thus, the scholarly subjectivity manufactured by this relationship, are expressed in their writings? The question is, therefore, not of how and why scholars can agree to being subjugated by Cold War international security truth regime, but of how actual relations of subjugation within the Cold War international security truth regime manufacture scholarly subjects on international security.

Picture 1. Axes of knowledge, power and ethics.



Therefore, it is my intention to analyse discursive power and relationships of power/knowledge within the U.S. American scholarly Cold War international security discourses through the description of power-effects³ and truth-effects⁴ of the scholarly Cold War international security discourse on the U.S. American scholarship. These power-effects and truth-effects can be located

³ Power-effects are visible in statements by which the security discourse’s theoretical unity is restored (e.g. statements that help to maintain the image of international relations as relations of competition between states or national governments and international as anarchic environment due to the principles of sovereignty).

⁴ Truth-effects are visible in statements that inform audience of what is conceived of as true-or-false in academic research.

into the scholarly statements, meaning that it is possible to find explicit discursive power-effects and discursive truth-effects on scholarly reasoning and on scholarly subjectification from the scholarly writings on international security and relations, on discipline and on their own status as academic experts.

Second and third methodological precautions must be mentioned now, one concerning the question of ‘statement’ and the other concerning the question of the importance of individual speakers. Concerning ‘statement’, Foucauldian definition of statement was accepted as the basis of analysis. Foucault tells that a statement is not just a proposition, a sentence or a speech act (Foucault 1992, 82–83; 86), but

[...] it is a function of existence that properly belongs to signs and on the basis of which one may then decide, through analysis or intuition, whether or not they ‘make sense’, according to what rule they follow one another or are juxtaposed, of what they are the sign, and what sort of act is carried out by their formulation (oral or written) (Foucault 1992, 86–87).

Concerning the importance of individual speaker or author, I am following another Foucauldian methodological notion, which he used in “The Birth of the Clinic” (1973). In that book, Foucault was not aiming at history of who said what and why, but a story about the web of specific sentences that were uttered and of *what made it possible for these sentences to be uttered, regardless of who uttered them*. Hence, discourses are to be analysed not in terms of who said and what, but in terms of the conditions, under which these statements expressed through sentences will have a definite truth value and thus are capable of being uttered (see also Hacking 2002, 77–79). For that reason I will not refer here to individual scholars or to particular texts (though I mentioned in the introductory chapter that I have used these as my primary research material). I will not give you here an account of who said what and who is to blame on what for this is not the aim here. Instead, an account is given of the mesh of discursive power/knowledge and power/knowledge relationships within particular truth regime and ultimately, of the transformation of discursive ‘international security’ to scholarly ethics of IR scholars. Departing from the premises that sentences perform only a function of existence for security statements and that this function is determined by discursive unity, there is no need to identify individual sentences or individual statement makers. Rather, there is a must to identify what allowed these sentences or statements to be uttered and what allowed scholars to utter such statements – what are these discursive conditions that made it possible to theorize, to reason on international security and to consider oneself as expert in such theorizing and reasoning.


INTERNATIONAL SECURITY DISCOURSES, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, IR DISCIPLINE AND U.S. AMERICAN IR SCHOLARSHIP

There is specific reversed hierarchical order of two different security discourses (U.S. American national security discourse and the U.S. American scholarly Cold War international security discourse) that are working within the discipline of International Relations (Picture 2.). In this hierarchy, U.S. American scholarly Cold War international security discourse is considered as a minor system of thought and argumentation within the IR discipline. Emerging during Cold War – in the second half of 1950s and early 1960s, called sometimes also strategic studies, national security policy or international security (Booth & Herring 1994, 9) – it is shaping most of the post-Second World War theorizing on international security in the IR discipline (though leaving some narrow margins for alternative views and theories on security, for example peace research or feminist security studies).

This U.S. American scholarly Cold War international security discourse is a discourse that emerged inside of the IR discipline at the same time with the so-called ‘realist’ turn in theorizing about international relations (this turn started already in the 1930s, see, for example, Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff 1981, 3-7). Having a minor position in the discursive hierarchy, this discourse is shaped by the discipline of IR and for that reason, expresses clearly all the basic premises of IR theorizing on international relations by specific chain-like way. First established premise is the *sovereignty* of nation-states, from which follows the second premise, the *equality* of nation-states in international relations. From first and second premises follows third and the most important premise for the security discourse, the *anarchy* in international relations⁵. From this chain-like ordered premise of theorising on international relations – sovereignty-equality-anarchy – accompanied with the emergence of nuclear weaponry and stimulated by the bipolar power relations of the Cold War, grows out the U.S. American scholarly Cold War international security discourse.

⁵ It must be noticed that in the theorizing of IR, the concept anarchy is not meaning total chaos in international relations, but some sort of disorder as compared to the orderly living inside of a sovereign nation-state.

Picture 2. Hierarchy of security discourses, IR discipline and thought system.



The IR discipline, in turn, is shaped by the much earlier and fundamental thought system on security. The formative moment of this thought system in the United States was the series of colonial wars of 1898, where a barely formed nation with a dramatically expanding industrial economy flexed its military-geographical muscle and supranational ambition (Smith 2003, 5). At the same time with the 1898 wars, the consciousness among young nation raised that two oceans, which were thought as protective barriers between American continent and the rest of the world (mostly meaning war-like Europe), were not separating barriers, but instead connecting waterways. It is my hypothesis that this understanding – oceans as, firstly, connecting waterways for expanding markets for the U.S. industrial and agrarian overproduction and for spreading benefits of democracy and consumption life style, and secondly, as not protecting barriers any more – sow the seeds of distinctive U.S. American international security discourse and of distinctive security consciousness in the United States. As the power effects of such security discourse, there emerged firstly, the need to secure hemispheric hegemony, secondly, the need to fulfil the Manifest Destiny and to spread benefits of democracy to other nations and finally, to eliminate all threats to democratic, consumption-oriented global lifestyle.

Evaluated from this perspective, both security discourses emerge as distinctively ‘U.S. American’, because the central idea and main message of this discourse is “the United States of America [a

sovereign nation] in the world, which has to be made safe for the America [a sovereign nation and a equal state among other sovereign states] and for the American Way of Life.” The entry of the United States into the First World War sealed the discursive ambition for a new world international security order by connecting the Monroe Doctrine, President Wilson’s idea of League of Nations and emerging new world order with the newly emerging power position of the United States as a world power. The impetus to the serious study (as the possible guarantor of security) of international relations (as the assumed source of insecurity) came from this source.

Being established in 1919 (paradoxically, Europeans did it first as the first chair of International Relations was founded in the University of Aberystwyth) as the academic discipline to help by means of scholarly research to avoid further wars and to promote peace, what else than the *science on international security* the discipline of International Relations is? Didn’t the philanthropists, who laid the foundations for the first IR chair, have their enthusiasm and model from Woodrow Wilson’s Inquiry group, which he brought with him to the Versailles’ Peace Conference as his scientific advisory board to give expert advice in matters of relations between nations? It was this mix of eighteenth-century Enlightenment optimism (belief in science’s power), nineteenth-century liberalism (belief in individual freedoms), twentieth-century Wilsonian idealism (belief in the peacefulness and rationality of man) and the foundational idea of ‘America-in-the-world’ (sovereignty and equality of states) and ‘American’ security concerns (insecurity that follows from international anarchy) that have shaped IR as a science on international security since 1919.

IR (in the way we know it now) and its Cold War international security discourses were predominantly developed by the U.S. American scholars, because of the dominance of the United States in social sciences in 1950s and 1960s (Fox & Fox 1961; see also Grosser 1956; Brown 2001, 22 and 30–36; Booth & Herring 1994, 9–10). As a special system of thought on security, IR and its studies on international security were worked out and re-worked mostly in the United States between two world wars, during the World War II and in the beginning of Cold War. This argument on the emergence of both discourses specifically in the United States seems to classify security discourses as having distinctively ethnocentric origin, so that ultimately the IR as discipline, performed since World War II in the western world, could be granted adjectives such as ‘U.S. American’ and ‘English-speaking’ and specifically ‘Western’. The influence of the IR research (made in the universities, think tanks and research institutes in the U.S.) on the discipline of IR was so strong, indeed. Even the fact that a large group of founding fathers of IR in the United States (e.g. Hans Morgenthau, Nicholas Spykman and Arnold Wolfers before World War II; Stanley Hoffmann and Karl Deutsch as post-war appointments of universities in the U.S.) were men, whose origin and scholarly training were European, does not undermine the validity of ethnocentricity

argument of IR and its Cold War security discourse. It only confirms the unity of the western IR and its specifically ‘U.S. American’ security discourse that emerged in full blossoming in the United States and included also other ‘westerners’ and ‘non-westerners’, who moved to the United States and were assimilated and Americanized.

It might be also argued that today’s IR is still “U.S.-American-of-the-kind-it-was-then” because of the discursive power/knowledge relationship that all IR scholars have with their theoretical-methodological knowledge and with the rules and norms of academic community. All IR scholars are trained into these same norms and rules and into same theoretico-methodological knowledge. All IR scholars must read or at least know classic texts of IR and all have to know and accept basic IR theses and propositions. All use and re-use IR concepts and theories and most of IR scholars also rely on their IR theoretical-methodological knowledge. Though, the sharpness of my stigmatization of early IR and Cold War international security discourse as distinctively ‘U.S. American’ is methodological and it is used only for archaeological-genealogical reasons – to describe IR security discourse’s emergence, its power-effects and its power/knowledge relations with the disciplinary field, which discourses and discursive structures at the same time create and re-create within discursive power/knowledge relationships with their scholarly agents. While it can be argued that the place of emergence of IR and its international security research as specific academic discourse and as academic discipline stigmatizes it as ‘U.S. American’, the same characteristic is of no use for the description of today’s IR and its security research (which really is not my aim here) because of two reasons: the emerging consciousness of discursivity of knowledge that challenges the mainstream IR and security knowledge (see, for example, Schmidt 1998, Williams 2005 and Williams 2007) and the spots of “not-so-mainstream-IR-and-security-research” (that have contacts with mainstream, but do not rely on mainstream knowledge and instead, have confidence in their own specific knowledge) throughout the globe (see, for example Tickner & Wæver 2009). Though, the international security discourses are still same throughout the discipline and also the emerging discursive studies on security and international security (e.g. widening and deepening attempts or focusing on human security) rely still on the same premises of sovereignty-equality-anarchy that shape all IR scholarly thinking on international security.

ON HISTORY AND COUNTERHISTORY OF U.S. SCHOLARLY COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY DISCOURSE: AN ANALYSIS OF RELATIONSHIPS OF POWER/KNOWLEDGE

In this section, it is my aim to look closely at “how the various operators of domination support one another, relate to one another, how they converge and reinforce one another in some cases and negate or strive to annul one another in other cases” (Foucault 2003, 45). For example, history or

the practice of recounting history is an operator of power, an intensifier of discursive power (Foucault 2003, 66) because it establishes a relationship between power and those, who are acting from the position of dominance. In terms of IR and its Cold War security discourse, the historiography of political, economic, social or other conflicts allows the coding of major social oppositions (both world wars, Cold War and war on terrorism, for example) into historical form. Such historical form is the Westphalian system of sovereigns (sovereign states), which cements the separation of safe domestic sphere, where the law rules and sovereign is authority, and dangerous international sphere, where there is no higher authority above sovereigns (or sovereign and equal states) and where self-help is the only law in the conditions of such international anarchy.

Through such historiographical differentiation, all conflicts from now on can be articulated, coded and transformed into discourses on security in international relations or into discourses on different threats to the sovereign (or nation-state) and its security. When old forms of struggle then disappear (emperor's army to tsar's army, for example) and new ones emerge (as the cases are with the individual terrorist warfare or with the war on terrorism, for example), there is already a vocabulary of *security in an anarchic international environment*, in terms of which this new set of circumstances could be described and safely incorporated into the old and known narrative on security. This form of coding is both political and discursive instrument, which allows the formulation of theses about the other side identified as a threat to one's own security. Disciplines' theoretic theses about the dangerousness of the other side, in turn, are justifying the existence of the discipline itself and, thus, are restoring the disciplinary discursive unity.

Yet another operator of domination relates to the historiography of conflicts, gaining its power from historiography and intensifying the discursive power relations – that is the ethical differentiation of the role and purpose of IR scholarship emerging in the scholarly statements on international security. A schematic dichotomy of domestic/international conditions, presented above, divides also further perceptions (Foucault 2003, 109), when it is taken as basic premise in scholarly reasoning on international relations and security. Thus, the dichotomy of safe domestic/dangerous international sphere acts as a binary schema that makes it possible for scholars to interpret a whole number of institutions and their evolution over a long period of history in specific divided way. Moreover, it also makes it possible to analyze contemporary institutions in terms of this historic confrontation, (Foucault 2003, 110) thus assigning and justifying the absolute responsibility of scholars (as a sort of historical necessity) to response to a certain social order. In this way, studying *international security* becomes to be seen and apprehended by scholars not as political choice, but as ethical choice and finally, is comprehended as scholarly ethics. In this ethics of security, the

binary schematic of the dichotomy of domestic/international constitutes the web and the key or code of the system and relations of power/knowledge within security discourse.

Traditional history: a story of subjectivity and scientificity

In IR, Security Studies (or International Security Studies) is presented as body of research based on a set of rules for the formation of valid statements on security. For example, the ‘logic of anarchy’ is one of the driving forces of the formation of statements on security that emanates from the dichotomy of domestic/international, which, in turn, bases on the historiographical conception of ‘Westphalian states system’ (which acts as the intensifier of the discursive power). The ‘logic of anarchy’, in turn, allows the adaptation of concepts of *war, conflict, battle, confrontation* and even *co-operation* as descriptions of the different situations in international relations and as political tools to grasp or overcome these situations in foreign policy. Also *multi-state system, power politics, reason of state, survival of a nation, national interest, national identity, bipolarity, deterrence, arms race, arms limitations, containment, rationality or irrationality of political leadership, totalitarian regime, irrationality and lethality of transnational terrorism, conflict resolution* (to mention some, but not all) – all these conceptions are derived from the dichotomy of domestic/international, they all present that particular perspective, through which international relations and security in international relations are perceived, understood and articulated. The dichotomy of domestic/international is, thus, the restorer of discursive unity of security discourse – statements on international security and concepts used in statements start to make sense within it. At the same time they point out the rationality and scientificity of reasoning on international security. Ultimately, they point out the *expertness* of scholars, who have invented these concepts to describe and explain what is going on in international relations and who laid down hypotheses and constructed theories to make abstract security comprehensible.

Thus, these rules for the formation of valid statements of international security are predetermined by the Cold War security discourse, which constructs, maintains and restores discursive unity by assumptions based on the theoretical separation of secure domestic and dangerous international sphere. This dichotomous separation emerges in statements on international security, which then start to make sense in the distinctive discursive formations⁶ of international security. It must be mentioned that for the archaeological-genealogical analysis of international security discourses the differentiation of IR theories here in detail is of no use for they all are theoretized within the same major U.S. American thought system (see picture 2 in page 8). All theories on security in

⁶ By these discursive formations I mean different IR theories on international relations.

international relations are aimed at describing, explaining, interpreting or understanding questions, which are important for us (within that specific discourse), but answers of which are unclear: e.g. questions of the sources, reasons and guilty ones of the violent conflicts or major social oppositions (that is, wars).

Within the Cold War international security discourse all statements on international security – regardless of the theoretical approach of the individual scholar making a statement – are organized according to the discursive plot of Cold War bipolarity (it is important to notice that domestic/international dichotomy is here modified through safe/dangerous and us/them modes into the formula of bipolarity) and according to the plot of the possibility of total nuclear war, which is connected to Cold War through the deadliness of nuclear weapons (ironically, nukes possessed by ‘us’ are not considered as dangerous, but the dangerous ones are the nukes possessed by ‘them’). In post-Cold War period, this dichotomy of domestic/international is respectively modified into the plot of the War on Terrorism and, again, into the plot of the possibility of nuclear war if terrorists or other outlaws obtain nuclear weapons (no surprise that the dangerousness of ‘them’ possessing nukes is in focus, but the dangerousness of ‘us’ possessing nukes remains hidden).

Also the narrative of scholarly discursive belonging revolves, regardless of theoretical commitments of individual IR scholars, around the theme of secure domestic/dangerous international dichotomy and according to the plots, which are modified from this dichotomy. Moreover, the narrative is not only telling this dichotomy, but by telling dichotomy it is also predetermined to maintain and restore the unity of security discourse by highlighting some aspects and hiding other aspects (I use here again as illustrative example the representative anecdote of nukes: theirs are deadly, ours are not; our nukes are safe, theirs are not). Thus, the statements on international security make sense only within this discursive framework and any attempt to transfer them to another discourse reveals their partial nature (that is, IR statements on international security do not make sense, for example, within the Buddhist thinking and development of scholarly identity through academic competition does not find understanding among Buddhist monks).

Knowledge and assumptions on social, political and geographical environment (as based on domestic/international and safe/dangerous dichotomies) influence and determine observations and thus also assumptions and knowledge on others (e.g. *the Soviet Union as adversary, Communism as opposite ideology, terrorism as life threat*) and on oneself (*the U.S. as fighting for democracy and freedom, IR scholars as helping foreign political decision-makers to make better decisions and thus, better foreign policy*). As these assumptions are the basis of understanding of international relations, Cold War, too, represents dangerous conditions of foreign policy-making environment. The possibility of the overall nuclear war turns ‘international security’ to be the ultimate goal – security

becomes ethics of research posing a moral 'must' on scholars and through this subjugation discursive unity is restored again. Such discursive subjugation continues even today, because no one has yet questioned assumptions behind this urgency of research aimed at achieving ultimate security. These assumptions – emanating from the image of the anarchic international sphere – still inform most theorizing on international relations, where international sphere is still considered as a place of confrontation and of some sort of disorder (though relations between most states are peaceful and official visits and negotiations are taking place even in times of war). In the theorizing of IR, the image of war-like or competitive relations in international sphere is still the underlying premise. Thus, the theoretical assumption of international relations as relations of contest and confrontation is continuous. It hasn't gone anywhere, it has not changed and more importantly, it has not been seriously challenged, because the research that can challenge it (for example, peace research, which has been handled by 'realists' like an idealistic, but asocial and sometimes even aggressive kid), has left IR and is playing in its own sandbox.

Security, comprehended as scholarly ethics, claims the responsibility of scholars to do everything in their power, firstly, for the sake of national security and secondly, for the sake of international security. It is a new power/knowledge regime of institutionalized regimentation and surveillance that "constitutes and moulds the body (and its conduct) to at least as great (and perhaps, far greater) an extent, though now through the mediation of the soul" (Hay 2002, 190). The U.S. American academic IR International Security Studies of Cold War presents only one, but special story of the scholarly subjectivity, rationality and responsibility for better and more rational foreign policy of the United States.

Counter history: a story of discursive domination and submission

The self-representation of International Security Studies in IR is but another tale of power, seduction and fall. It tells not only the commitment of scholars to the academic research and scientific objectivity, and to the political power of their country and nation, but by exposing the glory of their commitment, the rightness and justified nature of this kind of commitment, it also reveals the other side of the Janus-faced scholarly subjectivity and rationality. Would anyone be committed to or undertakes to do something, if it is not tempting or dazzling or perhaps petrifying? Isn't power, in any form, seductive? Is it not seductive, to be the one (or to belong into these ones) granted with the power to tell what the truth on international security is? Is it not tempting to be an expert? The narrative of scholarly subjectivity, scientificity and expertness reveals also that once seduced by power of knowledge and by political power, scholars keep producing particular type of

knowledge on international security and thus continue to maintain particular Cold War international security discourse.

A counter-story that reveals the Janus-faced reality of claimed objectivity of the Cold War international security is organized around the principle that the triumph of one means the repression and/or submission of others. Hence, we can see the twofold relations of domination. On the one hand, discursive domination and repression (within this discourse the repressed ones are not able to change their underdog position, within this discourse they are excluded permanently and fixed to that position without any possibility to act) and on the other hand, discursive domination and submission (where the subjugated ones submit to the domination and have thus a possibility to act to a some degree, which means that they are obliged to act only strongly under edifice of superior side of this power relationship and according to the discursive rules). It is possible to identify these repressed knowledges, e.g. theoretical inventions that were not allowed to be published, alternative knowledges that were not only marginalized, but silenced (e.g. feminist security studies that were long overlooked by mainstream approaches) from the discursive statements. For example, every statement on international security that maintains the belief in the sovereignty of nation state and thus also maintains the belief in anarchic nature of international relations, denies at the same time the possibility of not-anarchic-nature of international relations (although co-operation, for example, is not strange practice in international relations or in IR theoretizing). Since co-operation exists in international relations and it cannot be wiped out, it is assimilated into discourse by arguing that sovereign states co-operate because of selfish interests. In this way, the destabilizing knowledge is 'silenced' and harnessed to assist the maintaining and stabilization of powerful security discourse.

In terms of scholarly international security discourses, these relations of domination emerge, firstly, between various systems of truth (theories or theoretical approaches, or perhaps it is clearer to say, discursive formations) on security: the powerful and victorious ones (e.g. classical, political and offensive-defensive realisms, neo-realism) and their subjugated, marginalized and repressed alternatives (other possible theoretical inventions that were not able to make their way to the mainstream consciousness, that immediately after their first appearance were disqualified as non-scientific, nonsense, naïve, and so on, and for that reason, are beyond recall). Secondly, relations of domination emerge also within the victorious system of truth or discourse. When actors (scholars) start to follow the rules of discourse or discursive formation in order to be allowed to act or to be accepted or to act from the position of power, when they accept the norms of discourse or discursive formation, when they adapt to the norms of discourse by claiming their actions as rational, their knowledge as scientific, their beliefs as truth – they are, in fact, in relationship of discursive domination and submission. They are not only subjected to the Cold War international security

discourse, but by submission (voluntary or unwittingly done), they have subjectivized themselves. In other words, they have self-constituted themselves as a class of experts according to the Cold War international security discourse. That is what the incorporation of power relations (Hay 2002, 191) means. The incorporation of power relations into scholarly (expert) self “is not that the beautiful totality of the individual is amputated, repressed, altered by our social order; it is rather that the individual is carefully fabricated in it, according to a whole technique of forces and bodies... to increase both the docility and the utility of all elements of the system” (Foucault 1977, 217).

CONCLUSIONS

This analysis of the power/knowledge relationships at the backstage of U.S. American scholarly Cold War international security discourses was intended to show something of our present scholarly reality, of our present scholarly reasoning and of our present modes of research on international security in IR. It also tried to take a look to the way of how the conditions of formation of the IR Cold War international security discourses and security conceptions determine the logical relations and moral connotations of scholarly security statements then and today. Security in international relations and as the object of IR research is an intrinsically moral topic that involves pressing moral, political and personal issues in itself. Hence, in this analysis of the U.S. scholarly Cold War international security discourses along with special international security conception, which creates strong moral and ethical responsibilities, the U.S. American scholarship was used as one example and object for the analysis and theorizing of IR scholarly international security meta-ethics.

Scholarly Cold War international security discourses were recognized here firstly, as systems of truth, through which IR scholars constitute themselves not only as subjects of international security theorizing and research, but more importantly, as objects of particular knowledge on international security. This means that within this special system of truth, research on international security is not subjective enterprise to produce truth, but it is unwittingly aimed at using upon scholars themselves to put forward already existing knowledge/power relations. Scholarly quest for objective truth about international security, therefore, does not only maintain particular knowledge structures, but more importantly, it turns security knowledge (that has acquired the status of truth) to a scholarly norm. This in turn suggests that IR scholars are not to be seen as free from prejudice, objective and independent explorers, but as disciplinary objects subjugated to the thought system and discursive formations of particular international security. The international security discourses then emerge as a cobweb framework of domination – not only over scholarly quest, but also over further

international security knowledge produced under its edifice. To characterize the intensity and constancy of such relationship of power and knowledge, Foucault says:

[...] let us say that we are obliged to produce the truth by the power that demands truth and needs it in order to function: we are forced to tell the truth, we are constrained, we are condemned to admit the truth or to discover it. Power constantly asks questions and questions us; it constantly investigates and records; it institutionalizes the search for the truth, professionalizes it, and rewards it. We have to produce the truth in the same way, really, that we have to produce wealth, and we have to produce the truth in order to be able to produce wealth. (2003, 24–25.)

Secondly, scholarly Cold War international security discourse was recognized here as power mesh, through which scholars constitute themselves as subjects acting on others and on themselves. As a horde of experts, theorizing for example about the supposed irrationality of the leadership of the Soviet Union, scholars slot this craziness of the Soviet elite into categories that will determine what is to be done with the Soviet Union. Thus, it is less the facts about the Soviet Union or about security in international sphere than the possibility of thinking of the Soviet Union or of security in international sphere in these ways that fix not only fates of the Soviet Union or international security or international sphere, but also the fates of scholars themselves and of the discipline of IR. Similarly with the reasoning about the Soviet Union or about the nature of international sphere, scholars of IR act as experts, when the theories or concepts of the discipline of IR are in question. Slotting theories or concepts on international relations (as well as other scholars of IR) into categories, determines what is to be done with them or how it must be thought about them. Hence, the scholarly subject, “a subject – understood as meaning an individual who is naturally endowed (or endowed by nature) with rights, capabilities and so on – can and must become a subject, this time in the sense of an element that is subjectified in a power relationship” (Foucault 2003, 43).

Thirdly, scholarly Cold War international security discourse was recognized here as ethics, through which scholars constitute themselves as moral agents. This manner of constituting suggests that a transient understanding of international security lurches into scholarly consciousness and fades away, creating new ways to absent scholarly selves from intolerable responsibility emanating from the fact that, after all, only human beings (individuals within governments and not states or governments generally) are ultimate actors and thus responsible for their deeds, whatever these deeds are. This discursive security understanding is leaving scholars with the conceptions of ‘national/international security’ and ‘secure domestic/dangerous international sphere’ as moral justifications of their actions. Produced under the edifice of Cold War discursive formation and thought system on international security these conceptions are legitimizing exercises of both

constraint and liberation of scholarly action and of scholarly subjectification⁷. Hence, these are the uncontrollable conditions of foreign policy making – which are of course the dangerous international sphere and threats to the national and international security that the international sphere consists – that emerge as forceful determinants of any moral actions, blame on these conditions and not on actors. In these fragments of knowledge on security in the international sphere and on the scholarly subjectivity, the scholar is constituted as a certain type of being, becoming able to act on others and on himself in certain ways – as a special type of moral agent with both responsibilities and exculpations (Hacking 2002, 24).

I was asking in the beginning of this essay of what type of power is it that is capable of producing discourses of truth, security and ethic, which are so powerful throughout the academic IR society and have so powerful effects on scholarly self? I became convinced that it is dominative power, relations of domination and submission, which exist between scholar and his discursive environment. It is not that discourse has all the power, which it uses to repress scholars. Rather this dominative power is not owned by anyone, but circulates from person to person allowing action and making action possible. In that quality that it allows something and makes something possible, the discursive power is seductive. Security discourse seduces also with the power of *expertness*. It is this position of an *expert* that seduces one to the submission to discursive dominative power.

I was asking also of what is this code of ethics that power implements through scholarly activity to produce the discourse of Cold War international security (I mean ‘security’ as the scientific truth and scholarly ethics) and to produce the Cold War scholarly international security subjects? And more: how such submission to the discursive power of Cold War international security thinking and thus the scholarly subjectivity manufactured by this subjugation is told by scholars themselves?

As I claimed earlier, the narrative of scholarly responsibility for rational and better foreign policy tells more than just the story of ethical considerations of scholars. It tells that once seduced by power, in the relationship of domination and submission with the system of power and knowledge (that is, with the thought system of scholarly Cold War international security and its discourses on security in international relations) and in the self-constituting role of scholarly expert located within this new knowledge, scholars keep producing and maintaining particular type of security knowledge, subjugating at the same time other possible knowledges on international security that are disqualified as non-conceptual, insufficiently elaborated, naïve, hierarchically inferior, below the required level of erudition or scientificity and so on. Thus, the ethical code that scholars follow is also created within discursive relations of domination and submission. It is not about ethics, but

⁷ By subjectification I mean the process of building of self-understanding, the consciousness of who I am and what I do.

about justification. Perhaps it is more precise to say that Cold War ‘security’ as ethics is more an unconscious will to survive in discursive field of academic research and foreign policy without ‘losing one’s face’ than universal principle (because you just cannot survive alive from life, whatever you do).

The story of the U.S. scholarly Cold War International Security Studies presents to the academic and political audience the claim of being a science: “I am a scientist, I am speaking scientific discourse, and I am telling you the truth about international sphere and about security in it.” But in doing such a claim, the U.S. scholarly Cold War international security discourses and U.S. scholars in domination/submission power relationship with it – on the one hand being used by power and on the other hand using power themselves – are trying to put on the throne just one kind of theoretical-political truth on international security and to detach it from all other forms of possible knowledge on international security. Moreover, in doing that, in following the established knowledge on international security, something quite different is done, and can we call that ‘science’?

And I would say: “When I see you trying to prove that [Foucault told about Marxism, but similarly, ‘international security studies’ can used here instead of the concept of Marxism] *‘international security studies’* is a science, to tell the truth, I do not really see you trying to demonstrate once and for all that *‘international security studies’* [Marxism] has a rational structure and that its propositions are therefore the products of verification procedures. I see you, first and foremost, doing something different. I see you connecting to [Marxist] discourse of *‘international security studies’*, and I see you assigning to those who speak that discourse the power-effects that the West has, ever since the Middle Ages, ascribed to a science and reserved for those who speak a scientific discourse.” (Foucault 2003, 10; italics are mine.)

Thus, this self-presentation of IR International Security Studies of Cold War is but another tale of power, seduction and fall, written into and directed by the Cold War international security discourses, and performed by all of us who know and speak the Cold War international security discourses. It is us, scholars, who constitute ourselves and act as scholarly subjects on international security, not the supposedly dangerous international sphere (which classification, as a matter of fact, we have created by ourselves). We are doing this constituting by the mechanisms of power (discursive domination/submission) in which we participate often unwittingly and voluntarily. Thus, should we not be concerned with coming into being and going out of existence of research objects and their powerful effects (like the dichotomy of secure domestic/dangerous international sphere and its effects, the conceptions and practices of national security and international security), which have not existed in any recognizable form until they emerged as objects of scientific enquiry? Instead of debating if there are ‘national security’ and ‘international security’ and what they are, or

who is the subject of security or of whose security we are talking about, should we not focus on the ways in which ‘security’ and ‘dangerous international sphere’ as research objects and as discursive determinants of research are created in IR and then shared with and adapted into foreign policy?

To summarize, the object of study was here the narrative of the scholarly responsibility to study international security for rational and better foreign policy, aimed at telling the story of ethical considerations of scholars participating into political game. This narrative is not intentionally told by scholars or aimed at being a report of what it means to be an IR scholar studying international security. Rather, by writing on their research, their work and their assumptions concerning the nature of international relations and security in international relations, scholars tell more than just about security in international relations or their work on that object. In their writings, scholars also reveal unwittingly and are claiming that “I am speaking such and such discourse, I am speaking this scientific/academic discourse, and I am such and such scientist/scholar.” It is precisely this narrative of maintaining or restoring discursive unity of Cold War international security thought system by scholarly subjectification as scientific expert that was of my interest. In that role of the scientific expert – the one who ‘knows’ and who possesses and is thus able to produce theoretical knowledge and to conceptualize complex situations to simple form (through tight interaction with administration, military and public, of course) – the U.S. American scholarship of IR emerges indeed as the grey eminence behind the reasoning of security and foreign policy. Paradoxically, this eminence is only a puppet of its own simple reasoning.

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