

Tossing Initiatives: Strategic Behavior of the European Commission towards EU Council Presidencies

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by

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Abstract

International bureaucracies (IB) as actors in international organizations have received increased attention from scholars in international relations in recent years. Research has been focused on analyzing characteristics of individual IBs as e.g. normative entrepreneurs, providers of expertise or actors in principal-agent relationships. Institutional conditions within international organizations conducive to IB agency or characteristics of individual actors (most notably governments) IBs are interacting with have however been of lesser interest. In this paper I present a model capturing transaction-cost related effects of bargaining within international organizations from a game-theoretic perspective. From this model I derive a set of hypotheses addressing both the institutional and actor-specific issues mentioned above. I apply this model to a set of actors and institutional features of the decision-making process within the European Union. I explore whether the European Commission as an IB acts strategically towards individual EU member states holding the office of the council presidency by an Event History Analysis on Commission behavior with regard to the initiation of legislative proposals. I use a novel dataset derived from the PreLex database comprising of roughly 15,000 proposals initiated from 1979 to 2009. The dataset thus covers virtually all proposals issued over this period. I find the Commission to indeed act strategically by using its exclusive right to initiate legislative proposals to privilege presidency terms of small member states over terms of large member states for issuing initiatives. Using data from the DEU dataset I finally show that the Commission profits from issuing initiatives this way. These findings add to empirical insights into the use of the council presidency as an institution for actors involved in the process of EU decision-making. Demonstrating the Commission to act strategically towards individual governments using institutions crucial to this process, my findings also address the issue of explaining strategic behavior of international bureaucracies and the extent to which institutional features work to the benefit of them.

Introduction

The European Commission's virtual monopoly on issuing policy proposals is one of the more prominent features of the European Union as an international organization (Hawkins, et al. 2006, Pollack 2006: 35). There is hardly any other supranational bureaucracy that enjoys such control over both substance of policy proposals and timing of the initiation of decision-making processes. The impact of Commission behavior as an agenda-setter in terms of formulating and thus prescribing policies has (unsurprisingly) raised scientific interest ever since the establishment of approaches addressing agenda-setting in the EU (see e.g. Pollack 2003: 51f., Tallberg 2000: 849, Thomson, et al. 2006).

But, once issued Commission proposals are just that: proposals. It is then up to the member states and, if provisions apply, to the European Parliament (EP) to decide. And it is up to the government holding the council presidency to carry a proposal through the Council machinery towards adoption, amendment or rejection. Assuming the Commission to be a rational unitary actor one would expect it to take this into account when issuing initiatives – both in terms of substance and of timing.

There is now quite a comprehensive literature on the *substance* of proposals, i.e. on how the Commission shapes the contents of its proposals in advance of the actual decision-making process (see e.g. König and Junge 2009, Steunenbergh 1994, Sullivan and Selck 2007). One would however expect the Commission to adjust the *timing* of initiatives to expected obstacles to realization of its preferences as well. A most fundamental obstacle would be actions of the government holding the office of the presidency, in instances where its preferences diverge from those of the Commission. The effects of the council presidency as an institution with regard to furthering or hampering the government in office in realizing its preferences over possible outcomes have also been investigated, but not with much regard to the Commission (see e.g. Beach 2004, Schalk, et al. 2007, Tallberg 2006, Warntjen 2008).

Governments however not only differ in preferred outcomes. They also differ in capabilities. The most prominent of these immediately derives from the institutional setting in the EU: under Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) each government disposes of a specific number of votes allocated to it by the treaties. Measurements, e.g. the Shapley-Shubik Index, allow for transforming these votes into scores, taking these scores as indicators of voting power and then testing for effects of this kind of capabilities. This has also been done recently (see e.g. Achen 2006, Mattila 2006, Schure and Verdun 2008). But capabilities are not confined to institutional privilege. At a

very basic level, capabilities as a source of power derive from resources available to a government. For the most part this has been addressed only with the notion of “size” of EU member states relative to each other. Several such “sizes” have been identified, e.g. “big”, “large”, “medium” or “small” and there is now some literature on how “size” is related to individual governments’ success in EU policymaking or to their centrality within the council as a network (Jensen and Naurin 2010, Thomson 2008, Thorhallson 2006).

Interestingly though, these “sizes” do not seem to be related in the literature to a general theoretical framework. One might indeed wonder what we learn from knowing that, say, the Finnish government represents a “small” member state or the Dutch government disposes of capabilities ascribed to a “medium” sized state. What does this mean for the Commission as an actor in its dealings with governments? Would it, for instance, matter to the Commission whether it perceives the government of a “small” state to prefer a certain proposal over the status quo while some “large” government does not? In case of divergent preferences of the Commission and some government: would the Commission strategically try to avoid having to deal with a “large” state? As regards *timing* of initiatives then: would the Commission prefer to initiate a proposal during the term of a “large” government’s presidency, since it hopes for a swift decision-making process propelled by a “large” government’s immense capabilities? Or would it rather wait until a “small” government takes office, since constraints in capabilities might lead this government to less fervently try to pursue its own interest?

In the following I address these questions using the concept of “Great Powers” (GP). This notion is quite common among students of international relations (IR). It serves as a means to distinguish states we would expect to matter in international politics from those we would not. With a reference to the literature I then identify the British, French and German governments as representing GPs in the European Union. All other governments are conceived of as “Small states”.

Starting from this, I construct a simple game-theoretic model, where the Commission is understood as behaving strategically in using its monopoly over initiating decision-making processes to further its own interest. I investigate into the extent to which a distinction among GPs and Small states in the council presidency affects this behavior. This distinction is made in terms of divergent capabilities of governments to affect decision-making processes. Notably, the model accounts for different levels of divergence in preferences of the Commission and the government in office and foresees the Commission to behave accordingly.

I then derive a set of hypotheses. These hypotheses address three observations expected to occur, if the Commission does indeed behave strategically as implied by the model: 1) timing of initiatives should vary with respect to GPs holding the council presidency; 2) temporal patterns of decision-making processes as a whole should vary in line with timing; and 3) outcomes of decision-making processes with regard to Commission preferences should vary in line with timing.

I proceed by testing these hypotheses. With regard to expected observations 1) and 2) I use data derived from the PreLex database (König, et al. 2006, Kovats and Werner 2010), covering 15,137 Commission initiatives on legally binding acts issued between January 1975 and December 2009. I indeed observe differences in timing of initiatives as expected. I then conduct an Event History Analysis (EHA), testing for “types” of council presidencies along the temporal order of presidency terms with regard to GPs in office. A series of Wilcoxon-Breslow tests reveals a pattern according to these types to be statistically significant.

Finally, I address expected observation 3) with a series of tests using robust Ordered Logistic Regression (OLR) on data from the DEU dataset (Bailer 2006, Thomson, et al. 2006). This dataset contains 162 items negotiated upon in 66 Commission proposals. I find that outcomes significantly vary in favor of the Commission’s position if a proposal is initiated under a presidency preceding or following a GP presidency. I also find that outcomes vary to the Commission’s detriment if this proposal is decided upon in council under a GP’s presidency, if there is dissent between the Commission and the individual government over outcomes. In line with the notion of GPs, the latter findings do not hold for Small-state terms.

Observations thus show that the Commission does adjust timing to GPs holding the presidency; that this has an effect on decision-making processes in the EU; and that such timing is useful for the Commission. I infer from these observations that the Commission can indeed be conceived of as acting strategically towards GPs when initiating proposals.

I conclude with some remarks on a couple of empirical and theoretical implications of these findings.

IR Theory, Great Powers and the Commission in European integration

The notion of “Great Power” as a means to identify certain states as prevalent actors in international politics is well known in IR theories. Stemming from a structural realist account (Waltz 1979: 131) this notion is in fact one of the few concepts shared by the more influential theories

under the rationalist paradigm, most notably regime theory (Barnett and Duvall 2005: 50ff., Keohane 2005: x, 43). In this vein, one would argue, that GPs matter for analyzing European integration as well.

These insights have primarily been applied to European integration via intergovernmentalist approaches (see e. g. Moravcsik 1993: 480f., 1998: 9, 493, Moravcsik and Nicolaïdis 1999). In his study on five sets of treaty-amending agreements understood as fundamental for European integration, Moravcsik (1998: 2) explicitly focuses on policies of the British, French and German governments under a Regime-theoretic framework. According to him, the direction of European integration as a process is in fact set by several Grand bargains among these three governments. These bargains are assumed to be decisive for determining how to split the gains resulting from the establishment of certain international institutions as, inter alia, a customs union, common rules on redistributive policies, or a common market. The extent, to which governments pool or delegate sovereignty in related policy areas determines the extent of “integration” as a specific way of institutionalizing international cooperation. Once consensus has been reached on the general direction of integration, governments are interested in reducing transaction costs to a level conducive to upholding cooperation. This is accomplished by a continuous process of creating further institutions for implementation and interpretation of this consensus. According to Moravcsik, governments have delegated agenda-setting to the Commission in order to render this process as efficient as possible (Moravcsik 1998: 67f.). From his point of view however, the Commission is hardly more than an instrument for reducing member states’ transaction costs. In “every-day” decision-making, the Commission “as a neutral arbiter (...) provides an authoritative means of reducing the number of proposals to be considered” (Moravcsik 1993: 511).

Considering the Commission to be a “neutral arbiter” however leads us to deny it any propensity to hold intrinsic preferences as an international bureaucracy. This impedes any inquiry into autonomous Commission behavior of more than epiphenomenal interest by assumption. On these grounds, the intergovernmentalist approach has been denounced as overly simplistic given the EU’s institutional setting virtually from its inception (Garrett and Tsebelis 1996: 270, Wincott 1995: 606). Moravcsik has consequentially been quick to limit interest of his hypotheses to treaty-amending negotiations (Moravcsik 1993: 474, 1998: 496).

Still, if GPs matter at Grand bargains, they should also matter in decision-making between bargains. If agenda-setting matters in shaping the decision-making process the way Moravcsik envisions, GP influence in “every-day” decision-making should furthermore be amplified to the de-

gree individual governments are privileged institutionally in terms of rights related to this process. Such rights notably belong to the office of the council presidency. This office is held for a term of six months by each government in turn. The government in office has a tremendously advantageous position in steering proposals through the Council. It has the right to assign the vast majority of proposals to individual Council working groups, and to steer discussions in Council working groups and in the Committee of Permanent Representatives (Coreper). Notably, it has the sole right to issue conclusions on discussions in working groups, eventually recommending a proposal to be transmitted to Coreper either as a pre-agreed matter or as subject of further debate. It has virtually the same rights in Coreper with regard to the plenary of ministers in Council. It is also the only government allowed to submit a proposal for decision in plenary on its own.¹ These rights amount to what Mark Pollack characterizes as informal agenda-setting (Pollack 2003: 47ff.).

On the other hand, the right to formulate a proposal in the first place and to introduce it into the decision-making process lies, for the vast majority of policies, with the Commission. As Pollack (2003: 83f.) notes, this makes for a certain agenda-setting power of the Commission as well, hampered however by the rules on subsequent decision-making. Agenda-setting is thus split between the Commission and the government holding the presidency.


Assuming the Commission to be vested with an own unique set of preferences as an international bureaucracy and to dispose of the institutional capabilities mentioned and taking the notion of GPs into account, one would expect decision-making processes in the Council to be characterized by a pattern of interactions among these units as actors. This pattern would typically reflect interactions of the governments of Britain, France and Germany, and the Commission. This would be especially striking, whenever either of these governments holds the presidency. I investigate into this with the following model.

The Model

I now first describe the structure and the players of the model (see Figure 1). I then characterize its equilibria. Finally, I derive a set of hypotheses as a means to empirically test the extent to which these equilibria are reflected in reality.

¹Else, this can only be done by an absolute majority of governments.

Figure 1: The games G1 and G2



The model consists of two games. In game G1, the Commission (player C) plays against a GP (GP) holding the presidency. In game G2, C plays against a Small state (Sms) holding this office. Outcomes of games are either y or z. Ex ante, C, GP and Sms always prefer z over y. Both Games are depicted in extensive form in Figure 1.

Each game starts with two consecutive moves of a player called “Chance”. Chance first decides whether GP receives a punishment d in case of z materializing (“dissent”), such that GP prefers y over (z-d); or Chance does not (“harmony”), such that GP prefers z over y. Chance takes either decision with probability 0.5. Chance then decides in the same way whether Sms receives d, if z materializes, or not. The next move in both games is C’s only move. C can either propose z as the outcome (“initiate”), or it can do nothing (“wait”). If C waits, C and (in G1) GP or (in G2) Sms receive payoffs as given in Figure 1. In G1, these payoffs mirror what C and GP would receive, if C was playing G2 under the condition that it indeed initiates. In G2, they are what C and Sms would receive, if C was playing G1 under this condition. For the whole model, C thus essentially chooses whether to initiate a proposal in G1 or G2, i.e. whether to indeed play with GP or with Sms.

In G1, GP can then either retain C’s proposal (“retain”). Outcome z will then result with probability $p=0.75$ and y with probability $(1-p)=0.25$. Depending on Chance’s first move, C and GP both receive payoffs identical to these probabilities multiplied by z, (z-d), or y: $[0.75z+0.25y]$ in the case of harmony. In dissent, C receives $[0.75z+0.25y]$ and GP receives $[0.75(z-d)+0.25y]$. Or GP can change the proposal (“change”) with y as the outcome with probability $(1-q)=0.75$ and z with probability $q=0.25$. Payoffs in harmony are then $[0.25z+0.75y]$ for both players and, in dissent, $[0.25z+0.75y]$ for C and $[0.25(z-d)+0.75y]$ for GP.

In G2, player Sms can retain or change C’s proposal as well. If Sms retains the proposal, z will result with probability $r=0.5$. If Sms changes the proposal, y will result with probability $(1-r)=0.5$. As $r=(1-r)$, Sms and C both receive $[0.5z+0.5y]$ in harmony. In dissent, however, C receives $[0.5z+0.5y]$ and Sms receives $[0.5(z-d)+0.5y]$.

For C and GP (Sms) the game G1 (G2) is thus an exercise in trying to raise or reduce probabilities of identical (in harmony) or divergent outcomes (in dissent). Related subgame-perfect Nash equilibria are depicted as bold lines in Figure 1 for each of the eight subgames following Chance’s moves. Whenever C is in dissent with GP in G1, C waits regardless of harmony or dissent with Sms. Whenever C anticipates dissent with GP in G2, C initiates regardless of harmony or dissent

with *Sms*. The opposite is true for *C*'s behavior towards *Sms*. It is irrelevant to *C* whether *C* is in dissent or in harmony with *Sms* in *G2*. Instead, *C* acts with reference to its anticipation of harmony or dissent with *GP*. And it is irrelevant for *C* in *G1* whether it anticipates dissent or harmony with *Sms*, in the sense that it focuses on *GP* anyway. Thus, *C* always adapts behavior to harmony or dissent with *GP*, in that it chooses when to initiate accordingly. Several hypotheses on Commission behavior towards *GPs* and Small states holding the presidency follow from this.

First, if the Commission is in any way receptive to *GPs* in the council presidency, we should observe temporal patterns of initiatives being related to whether *GPs* hold the presidency or not. Temporal distributions of proposals initiated during terms of *GPs* as council presidency should thus differ from those of Small-state presidencies.

H0a: There is no relationship between a *GP* holding the council presidency and the temporal structure of Commission initiatives.

H1a: The temporal structure of commission initiatives varies with regard to terms of *GPs* holding the council presidency.

Second, the exact time at which a proposal is initiated should affect the temporal structure of decision-making processes as a whole. This is an immediate implication of the model as, otherwise, it could not be determined whether timing matters in influencing this structure. Temporally, we would expect durations of processes to differ according to whether *GPs* hold office at the time a proposal is initiated or not.

H0b: There is no relationship between a *GP* holding the council presidency at the time of a Commission initiative and the temporal structure of the decision-making process started by this initiative.

H1b: The temporal structure of decision-making processes varies with regard to terms of *GPs* holding the council presidency at the time an initiative is adopted by the Commission.

And third, the model also implies adjustments of timing of initiatives to *GP* presidencies to pay for the Commission. One would thus expect outcomes of decision-making processes to be more in line with Commission preferences, if proposals are initiated according to the assumed sensitivity to *GPs* in office, relative to outcomes of processes taken as random.

H0c: There is no relationship between proposals initiated with regard to GPs or Small-states holding the presidency and the Commission realizing its preferred outcome.

H1c: There is a relationship between proposals initiated with regard to GPs or Small-states holding the presidency and the Commission realizing its preferred outcome.

Only if we find, that timing of initiatives differs according to presidency terms of GPs as foreseen by the model, that this relates to temporal patterns of decision-making processes typical of this difference, and that these patterns go along with diverging payoffs for the Commission, would we characterize the way the Commission initiates proposals as strategic behavior with regard to GPs in the EU as foreseen in the model. These are then two more general hypotheses to be tested in conjunction with H0a, H0b, H0c, H1a, H1b and H1c:

H0: The Commission does not behave strategically in initiating policy proposals with regard to GPs holding the council presidency.

H1: The Commission acts strategically in initiating policy proposals with regard to GPs holding the council presidency.

I now proceed with first testing three sets of hypotheses in turn. I then subsume results under H0 and H1.


Commission initiatives: Does timing happen at all?

In the following, I employ data derived from the PreLex database. PreLex keeps record of Commission documents released to other EU bodies, e.g. the Council or the EP. Each document is assigned a “dossier.” Every dossier includes dates of all acts by EU bodies related to this document and maps them into a timeline. Dossiers thus cover a wide variety of activities, ranging from simple transmissions of Commission working papers (consisting of just a single date) to decision-making processes of directives and regulations (consisting of up to 75 dates). All acts are identified by and assigned to individual EU bodies. Data systematically covers community legislation since 1975. PreLex is set up as to allow for quick access to individual dossiers. Thus it is not possible to immediately access data as a uniform dataset. It is, however, possible to algorithmically download data dossier-by-dossier and then build a dataset. I have done this using the software

LawLeecher.² The dataset as a whole encompasses 29,152 cases, covering all dossiers in PreLex issued between January 1969 and December 2009. The following analyses are however restricted to dossiers on binding legislation (decisions, directives and regulations) initiated and finished between 1 January 1975 and 31 December 2009. Dossiers also had to be formally initiated by an Adoption by Commission and had to be finished either by a Formal Adoption by Council, a Signature by Council and EP, or Council Assent. This confined data to 15,137 cases.

If the Commission adapts timing of initiatives according to whether GPs hold the council presidency or not, we should observe numbers of initiatives to vary according to related presidency terms. Unfortunately though, a quick glance at counts of initiatives reveals numbers to vary in general, and drastically so, over time (see Figure 2). Assumptions about any specific (e.g. uniform or linear) distribution of cases would thus be mistaken. It follows, that simply taking means of counts, calculating slopes or the like for *whole* presidency terms over the entire 35-year period does not make sense.

Figure 2: Counts of initiatives by terms of council presidencies, January 1975- December 2009




A closer look at counts of proposals *within* presidency terms however reveals strikingly distinct patterns of Commission activity in initiating proposals (see Figure 3). As cases are defined over

² LawLeecher, a webcrawler, has been developed by the Chair of German and European Politics and Government and the Hasso Plattner-Institute at the University of Potsdam. For documentation see Kovats and Werner 2010 and http://www.uni-potsdam.de/db/lis_regierungssystem_brd/index.php?article_id=460&clang=1.

only 58 presidencies, I limit analysis to descriptive statistics. As it is only about virtually looking at the data for regularities of initiatives and since these initiatives are caused by Commission activity by definition, this should however be sufficient. Any regularities or patterns found here will then be tested quantitatively in the following section on impacts of timing on decision-making processes.

On the one hand, figures both of small-state and GP presidencies concur regarding drops in numbers of initiatives in second months and steep increases in final months. Controlling for half years however reveals this to be due to specific “months”-effects (holidays in Belgium usually are in August and certain regulations, mostly concerning agriculture, typically expire in December). Apart from this, there is not much variance in numbers for Small-state presidencies. GP presidencies however show a clear peak in shares around midterm and considerably lower shares of initiatives at the beginning of terms.

Figure 3: Distribution of initiatives over months within presidency terms, July 1975 - June 2009




Furthermore, standard deviations of shares by months for Small-state terms are generally lower than for GP terms and controlling for Augusts and Decembers values for initiatives of Small-state term approach Zero (see Table 1). Thus, distribution of initiatives within GP terms is reminiscent of an inverted U. For Small-state terms it is close to uniform.

Table 1: Average shares of initiatives by month by council presidencies and half years (N=58)

Presidency	Month within presidency						Standard deviation	Standard deviation (except 2nd and 6th months)
	First	Second	Third	Fourth	Fifth	Sixth		
All	16.9	12.0	18.7	16.7	16.5	19.4	2.6	1.0
GP, all terms	15.9	12.5	22.8	14.7	15.8	18.2	3.5	3.7
Small state, all terms	17.3	11.8	17.2	17.4	16.7	19.8	2.6	0.3
All, 1st half year terms	13.8	20.2	20.3	15.2	14.5	16.1	2.8	3.0
GP, 1st half year terms	12.1	21.1	23.3	12.9	14.0	16.7	4.6	5.2
Small state, 1st half year terms	14.4	19.8	19.3	16.1	14.7	15.9	2.3	2.2
All, 2nd half year terms	20.0	3.9	17.0	18.2	18.4	22.6	6.6	1.2
GP, 2nd half year terms	19.8	3.9	22.3	16.6	17.7	19.7	6.6	2.5
Small state, 2nd half year terms	20.1	3.8	15.1	18.7	18.6	23.7	6.9	2.1


Boxplots show shares of initiatives during first months of Small-state presidency to usually be higher as compared to GP-terms. This is most pronounced for Small-state presidencies immediately following GP-presidencies (see Figure 4).

Figure 4 : Shares of initiatives issued in first month of presidencies by type of presidency



Also, shares of initiatives issued in final months of Small-state presidencies are above average if the small state in office is succeeded by a GP (see Figure 5).

Figure 5: Shares of initiatives issued in sixth month of presidencies by type of presidency



Shares of proposals issued in the first or final months of presidencies are thus generally higher, if a GP holds the presidency in the preceding or following terms. This results in a pattern of five temporal “types” of presidencies in terms of timing of Commission initiatives: GP presidencies, Small-state presidencies following GP-terms, Small-state-terms preceding GP-terms, Small-state-terms neither preceded nor followed by GP-terms and Small-state-terms both followed and preceded by GP-terms. This pattern of Commission activity correlates with the advent or passing of GPs in office. I thus reject H0a and uphold H1a.

Decision-making processes: Does timing affect it?

Once a proposal is issued, it is up to actors other than the Commission to steer it through the decision-making process. One might thus wonder whether timing of initiatives according to GPs holding the presidency has any effect on the decision-making process at all. If there was an effect, this should become apparent over the course of the whole process. Namely, durations of decision-making processes should vary in consonance with timing. In the preceding section I have identified a pattern of Commission timing according to five types of presidencies. If this pattern also holds over durations of processes, one would conclude duration to be affected by timing.

In the following, I test just this. I conduct an EHA for decision-making processes according to these five types. EHA is a bundle of techniques for identifying causes for events happening over

specified periods of time. One of these techniques is Product-limit Estimation. In Product-limit Estimation, one asks whether specifics generically related to the object of interest affect this object's state in time. Changes in state are interpreted as the dependent variable taking different values. If there is only a single event of interest, if the state of an object can change into only a single other state, and if all objects are in an identical state at the beginning, one speaks of a single episode per object ranging from an origin to a destination state. Once the event, called "failure", occurs states are switched.

For example, proneness of cars to defects is assumed to be affected by the quality of their components. Quality might be related to their brand. Given different brands, one would then expect to observe defects of cars of individual brands to correlate with brand. In Product-limit Estimation, defects of cars are interpreted as the single event of interest, separating their origin state ("working") from their destination state ("broken"). We do not know *ex ante* whether a car's brand does indeed tell us something about its proneness to defect, i.e. whether differences in brands correlate with durations until the event happens. But we could look at these durations car by car and check whether more or less cars of the same brand encounter the event than cars of other brands or all cars over any given period of time, i.e. whether duration of "episodes" is related to brands. Taking brands of cars as a categorical variable it can then be tested whether a change in this variable correlates with differences in frequencies of the event happening sooner or later. This would show in diverging shares of cars not having encountered the event during period ($t= 1, 2, \dots, N$); where N is the period the final car encounters the event. Changes in numbers of cars encountering the event from ($t=n$) to ($t=n+1$) relative to each other are called "transition rate". Transition rates can be identified by subtracting the sum of episodes encountering an event at the end of period ($t=n+1$) from the sum of episodes not having encountered the event at the end of period ($t=n$). This can be depicted graphically by curves showing these sums for all episodes over periods of time by brands as the independent variable of interest. These graphs are called "survivor functions." If transition rates differ from each other significantly we would find them to also differ from a mean transition rate. This can be tested statistically. If tests reveal statistically significant differences in transition rates, one infers that changes in the categorical variable assigned to the specifics of the object indeed matter for the actual period the event occurs. One then considers changes in this variable to be related to the state of the object as the dependent variable. Thus, if cars of different brands show statistically significant differences in transition rates according to brands, one concludes that brand does indeed matter for a car's propensity to go bust.

In the following, I treat the five types of presidencies as such specifics generically related to individual decision-making processes as the objects of interest. I then test H0b against H1b. Data is interpreted as follows. All 15,137 dossiers in the dataset are taken as single episodes. Episodes mirror durations of individual dossiers measured in months, starting from the month of the Commission initiative and ending with the month the dossier is finished by the relevant EU bodies. If both months are identical, duration is set to 1. The origin state is the dossier not being finished. The destination state is the dossier being finished. The event in question is the act of an EU body that finishes a dossier. All cases are assigned a value in the variable “type” according to the type of presidency in office at the time of Commission initiative. Type can thus take five different values and is distributed over all cases as shown in Table 2. Type is the quality of interest, changes in which are hypothesized to have an effect on changes in duration of dossiers.

I first briefly discuss survivor functions of cases categorized by type. I then use a series of Wilcoxon-Breslow tests for assessing whether these five types as values of a categorical variable are related statistically significant to durations of episodes.

Table 2: Summary statistics of PreLex data used for EHA

Type of presidency	Duration					Percentiles (Duration)					
	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.	Skewness	Kurtosis	5%	25%	Median	75%	95%	Maximum
GP	3905	7.55	12.88	5.41	47.19	1	1	3	8	28	176
gp>SMS>gp	326	9.33	12.97	2.68	11.16	1	1	5	10	36	81
sms>SMS>gp	2911	7.55	11.56	4.30	35.93	1	1	3	9	29	180
gp>SMS>sms	3137	7.04	10.62	4.42	31.18	1	2	4	7	25	123
sms>SMS>sms	4858	7.61	12.70	4.63	35.96	1	1	3	8	29	184
(Total)	15137	7.50	12.14	4.78	39.09	1	1	3	8	28	184

With a view to Table 2, there is considerable variation over survivor functions by type both in skewness and in kurtosis. These measures hold information on how the graphs of individual survivor functions are shaped. Shapes of survivor functions are determined by transition rates. Thus, transition rates differ.

Figure 6: Kaplan-Meier-Function depicting transition rates of episodes by type of presidency at the time of initiatives




Figure 6 shows transition rates by types of presidencies for every episode over a period of 12 months following its initiative. With regard to mean durations until the event happens, proposals initiated under Small-state presidencies following GP presidencies change state considerably less often than all other proposals. Proposals initiated under Small-state presidencies succeeded by GP presidencies change state more often than all other proposals. Simply stated: it appears to take decision-making processes longer to be finished, if they are initiated once a GP presidency is over and they are finished more quickly, if a GP is about to get into office. This is what one would expect if H1b was to hold: for timing of Commission proposals to matter, it should lead to differences in durations of processes and these differences should be related to GP presidencies.

I finally conducted a series of tests on differences in transition rates by types of presidencies. These tests estimate whether actual differences in transition rates significantly diverge from (assumed) equality of transition rates if controlled for type. H1b can thus be tested directly against H0b. There are several ways such tests can be constructed. The Wilcoxon-Breslow version puts an emphasis on episodes that switch state at early points in time relative to the maximum duration of all episodes. Thus, tests are especially sensitive to transition rates in the “early” part of survivor functions. In the dataset, most episodes switch states in the first 12 months following initiative, but maximum duration is 184 months (see Table 2). The domain of values that dura-

tions can take is thus populated quite unevenly, with only a small share of episodes taking values higher than 36. Episodes of interest are thus indeed in the early part of the survivor function.

A Wilcoxon-Breslow test for equality of survivor functions for all episodes reveals highly significant differences in survivor functions by type of presidency (see Table 3). H_0b must then be rejected. Thus, a relationship between types of presidencies at the time of initiative and differences of durations in the sense of H_{1b} can indeed be inferred. Timing of initiatives does affect duration of processes.

Table 3: Results of Wilcoxon-Breslow tests for equality of survivor functions, controlling for durations of episodes

Model	Sum of ranks of models by included episodes of durations:										
	All	<25	<13	<7	<4	<3	>1	>2	>6	>12	>20
GP	110165	39364	134237	-17832	405938	-6316	-52176	-148729	32895	43743	-679
gp>SMS>gp	-541043	-330853	-324667	-232794	31784	78560	-401993	-130923	-24899	-30563	-6870
sms>SMS>gp	249488	392308	983914	824804	-179429	175122	-352336	-199021	-101003	42703	1610
gp>SMS>sms	-1102983	-1798537	-2050667	-1933670	-507329	-151150	478174	870936	238747	4546	21384
sms>SMS>sms	1284373	1697718	1257183	1359492	249036	-96216	328331	-392263	-145740	-101429	-15445
N	15137	14153	12596	10620	7947	6328	10903	8809	4517	2541	1384
Chi ²	21.58	32.96	54.35	79.88	17.22	12.14	20.37	22.00	14.43	16.62	5.48
df	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
Prob.>Chi ²	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.002	0.016	0.000	0.000	0.006	0.002	0.241

Controlling for duration, results diverge slightly. If durations are very long or very short, tests lose in significance. For episodes with durations of less than three months significance drops a bit. For episodes with durations over 20 months, tests are not statistically significant. Thus, timing of initiatives according to the model does not account for changes in durations of very long-lasting processes.

Realization of Commission preferences over outcomes: Does timing help it?

If timing of initiatives does affect the decision-making process, one would expect the Commission to use it as an instrument for furthering its interests. This should show in differences in outcomes of decision-making processes in terms of realization of Commission preferences over outcomes.

Such data is not included in PreLex. I therefore use data from the DEU dataset (Thomson, et al. 2006). The DEU dataset holds data on 66 decision-making processes. Each process consists of one or more issues. For each issue two or more possible outcomes were identified, one of them to be chosen collectively by governments and (if Codecision applied) the EP as the actual outcome of each process. For each issue, ideal points of actors, i.e. governments, the EP and the

Commission, were assessed with regard to possible outcomes. Issues were selected as to allow ideal points being ordered relative to each other. Thus, the closer an actor's ideal point lies to the actual outcome, the more successful the actor was in realizing its preferences. In terms of realization of preferences, data can then be ordered on an ordinal scale. Processes took place between 1996 and 2002 and cover presidencies of all types of presidencies as identified above.

A summary of processes is given in Table 4. Processes are classified by terms of presidencies at the time proposals are initiated by the Commission and by terms of presidencies at the time a decision on the actual outcome is taken by relevant EU actors. Hypotheses H0c and H1c however address effects of GP terms and numbers of processes for some types are quite small. In the following I thus subsume types into three classes: GP terms, Small-state terms immediately following or preceding GP terms and all other Small-state terms.

Table 4: Distribution of decision-making processes in the DEU dataset by type of presidency at time initiative and by government holding office at time of agreement

Council Presidency at time of initiative				Council Presidency at time of agreement							Initiatives
Government	Term	GP	Type	LUX-1997/II	GER-1999/I	FIN-1999/II	POR-2000/I	FRA-2000/II	SWE-2001/I	BEL-2001/II	
Italy	1996-I	No	SMS	1	2	2	7	-	3	4	19
Luxembourg	1997-II	No	SMS>gp	-	-	-	1	-	3	-	4
UK	1998-I	Yes	GP	-	10	8	4	-	-	-	22
Austria	1998-II	No	gp>SMS>gp	-	6	7	4	3	3	-	23
Germany	1999-I	Yes	GP	-	4	9	3	1	-	-	17
Finland	1999-II	No	gp>SMS	-	-	4	9	25	8	-	46
Portugal	2000-I	No	SMS>gp	-	-	-	-	8	13	-	21
France	2000-II	Yes	GP	-	-	-	-	-	10	-	10
Agreements				1	22	30	28	37	40	4	162

A further qualification arises from limitations found above regarding maximal durations of processes explained. Durations of quite a couple of processes exceed these limitations (see Table 5). In the following I thus control for processes taking longer than 20 months until agreement.

Table 5: Processes by type of presidency and duration in months

Government	Italy	Luxembourg	UK	Austria	Germany	Finland	Portugal	France	Total
Type	SMS	SMS>gp	GP	gp>SMS>gp	GP	gp>SMS	SMS>gp	GP	
Duration	1996/I	1997/II	1998/I	1998/II	1999/I	1999/II	2000/I	2000/II	
<=20	1	0	18	15	17	46	21	10	128
>20	18	4	4	8	0	0	0	0	34

Most processes also took longer than a single presidency term. One would then expect GPs holding office at the end of a decision-making process to have an effect on the realization of Commission preferences (Schalk et al. 2007). If GPs matter as hypothesized, this should counter ef-

fects of timing of initiatives. In contrast, if a Small-state is in office at the time of agreement, the effect of timing should hold.

Furthermore it could be argued that the importance of individual issues to individual actors matters. I also control for this using the “saliency” measure included in the DEU dataset. Saliency can take values from Zero to 100. The higher these values are, the more important an issue is interpreted to be for an actor (Thomson et al. 2006).

Tests are constructed as follows. I took distances from the Commission’s ideal point for all issues and actual outcomes as absolute differences. Both outcomes and ideal points can take values from Zero to 100. Distances thus also range from Zero to 100. As data are ordinal, the extent to which these distances have an immediate interpretation might however be unclear. I thus treated distances as indicators of values of a variable called “Realization”. Realization can take three values: 3 (“success”), 2 (“intermediate”), and 1 (“failure”). If distances exceeded 65, I assigned a failure. If it was below 34, I assigned a success. Else, I considered realization as intermediate.

I account for effects of GPs in office by taking differences in ideal points between the Commission and the government holding the presidency at the time of agreement as distances. As these differences can also hardly be interpreted as true Euclidean distances, I transformed values into realizations of a variable called “Dissent”. Dissent can take two values: 1 (“existent”), and 0 (“not existent”). If differences exceeded 50, I considered dissent to exist. Else, I considered dissent not to exist. I understand the latter value to equal “harmony” in the sense of the game-theoretical model. A justification for setting values for dissent like this is given in the Appendix.

I then tested two series of models for effects of presidency terms on Realization using robust Ordered Logistic Regression (OLR). OLR is a multinomial model, but additionally allows interpreting changes in the dependent variable as changes in intensity. If the dependent variable can take n intensities, OLR takes $(n-1)$ cutpoints and estimates effects of changes in the independent variable on the dependent variable to take intensities above each cutpoint. It is thus possible to derive statements on general effects of the independent variables on the intensity in the dependent variable, e.g. “if independent variable X’s value is switched from 0 to 1, then dependent variable Y is more likely to take higher values, than if X is 0” instead of statements like “if X is switched, then Y is more likely to take values 2, 3, or 4.”

I first test for effects of presidency terms at the time of initiatives, irrespective of changes in presidencies over the whole decision-making process. A second series also tests for effects of GPs holding office at the time of agreement, additionally controlling for salience.

Table 6: Summary of robust OLR tests for effects of presidency terms of Small states at time of initiative on realization of Commission preferences

Model	I	II	III	IV			
Observations	158	158	158	158			
Chi ² (Wald test)	0.56	10.02	9.98	17.92			
Df	1	2	3	4			
Prob. > Chi ²	0.453	0.007***	0.019**	0.001***			
Pseudo R ²	0.002	0.024	0.027	0.028			
Clusters	66	66	66	66			
Odds ratio/Z-test	OR	OR	P> z	OR	P> z	OR	P> z
a) Initiative during any Small-state presidency	1.31	0.49	0.089*	0.77	0.560	1.12	0.791
b) Term immediately precedes or follows GP	-	3.34	0.002***	2.21	0.026**	2.80	0.003***
c) Duration >20 months	-	-	-	0.59	0.070*	0.38	0.014**
d) Term preceding/following GP >20 months	-	-	-	-	-	0,51	0.161
Cutpoints (log)							
1	-1.226	-1.259		-1.307		-1.346	
2	0.061	0.077		0.037		0.001	

Models are robust estimations in terms of controlling for proposals as clusters of issues using the method as described in e.g. Rogers (1993), which generally is understood as the optimal method available in this respect.

The first series of models investigates effects of Small-state terms at the time of initiative on realization of Commission preferences by types of presidencies and durations of decision-making processes only (see Table 6).


Model I simply looks at whether a Small-state is in office or not. Results show the null hypothesis not being rejected. Thus, it does not suffice for the Commission for furthering its interest to just toss an initiative into the Council machinery during a Small-state's presidency.

Model II also takes types of Small-state presidencies into account according to whether they are immediately followed or preceded by a GP presidency. Model III additionally controls for processes with durations of more than 20 months. Model IV controls for (assumed) interdependence of type of presidency and duration. All of them are statistically significant at the 0.05 level or higher. Z-tests for individual variables however reveal only variable b (terms of Small states immediately preceding or following GP terms) to be statistically significant at the 0.05 level or higher in all models. According to odds ratios in model IV, outcomes of decision-making processes initiated during these terms are about three times as likely to reflect the Commission's preferences as outcomes of processes beginning during any other term. As expected, given limita-

tions found in the EHA above, if processes take longer than 20 months the Commission is only a third as likely to succeed as compared to shorter processes. Interactions between variables b and c, captured by variable d in model IV, are not statistically significant.

Predicted probabilities calculated from values of variable b and values of cutpoints with regard to models I-IV are quite impressive. Probabilities of Commission success for initiatives issued before or after a GP takes office are generally higher than for all other initiatives. For models II and IV they are close to twice as high as compared to all other terms. In this vein, probabilities of failures are only half as low (see Figure 7). This means, that it is better in general for the Commission to initiate a proposal with regard to GPs holding the presidency. In terms of testing H0c versus H1c, I thus retain H1c.

Figure 7: Predicted probabilities for Realization of Commission preferences over outcomes by Model (I-IV)



Models I-IV however only presidency terms at the beginning of decision-making processes. As most processes take more than one presidency term until completion, one would expect terms of other presidencies to also have an effect. From a theoretical point of view, such effects should also be confined to terms of GPs. I therefore conducted a second series of tests.

Models V and VI compare effects on Realization for initiatives issued before or after a GP holding the presidency against effects of Dissent over outcomes between the Commission and the

government in office. In models VII and VIII, importance of issues to the Commission is additionally accounted for by weighting cases by salience.³ Results are summarized in Table 7.

Table 7: Summary of robust OLR tests for effects of presidencies of GPs at time of agreement⁴

Model	V		VI		VII		VIII	
Observations	57		87		57		87	
Chi ² (Wald test)	9.14		7.03		9.38		5.03	
df	2		2		2		2	
Prob. > Chi ²	0.009***		0.029**		0.009***		0.081*	
Pseudo R ²	0.111		0.05		0.103		0.036	
Clusters	23		39		23		39	
Weighted for Salience	No		No		Yes		Yes	
Cutpoints (log)								
1	-1.663		-1.436		-1.708		-1.629	
2	-0.144		0.088		-0.259		0.052	
Odds ratio/Result of Z-tests	OR	P> Z	OR	P> Z	OR	P> Z	OR	P> Z
Initiative	1.554	0.434	2.404	0.038**	1.369	0.585	2.329	0.041**
Dissent (GP)	0.141	0.003***	-	-	0.163	0.006***	-	-
Dissent (Sms)	-	-	0.376	0.107	-	-	0.484	0.292

Models are robust estimations in terms of controlling for proposals as clusters of issues using the method as described in e.g. Rogers (1993), which generally is understood as the optimal method available in this respect.

Initiative: Initiative during any presidency immediately following or preceding a GP presidency

Dissent (GP): Dissent existent between Commission and the GP that holds the presidency at time of agreement

Dissent (Sms): Dissent existent between Commission and the Small state that holds the presidency at time of agreement

Models V and VII strongly corroborate the anticipated effect of GPs in office. Results are statistically significant at the 0.01 level in general. But partial effects of the time of initiatives (variable b in Models II-IV) are not. Instead, divergences in preferred outcomes among the Commission and the GP in office are estimated to account for variance in the dependent variable. Odd ratios are as one would expect: given dissent, Commission success is only about 10 percent as likely in harmony.


³ At first glance, one might argue in favor of dissent being included as a variable also in models I-IV. This would not be sound however to be done directly, as one would then be forced to differentiate between GP terms and Small-state terms. Such differentiation would then obviously lead to multicollinearity of types of presidency terms as the variable of interest. If done indirectly, via e.g. taking distances to positions of governments of preceding terms, it is unclear due to the structure of the dataset, how to interpret data, as most proposals in the dataset have not been issued in first or final months of the presidency terms of interest.

⁴ Agreement is understood as the time political agreement in Council is reached or (under Codecision) the time of the EP approves the proposal or (in case of no approval) the time of the EP and the governments reaching consensus in the conciliation committee. These acts necessarily take place earlier (usually some days or weeks) than their formal counterparts. This however can lead to different governments holding the presidency at each time. Presidency terms at agreement thus diverge sometimes from presidency terms at formal adoption by Council or at joint signature by Council and EP.

The converse is true for models VI and VIII. Ignoring importance of issues, effects of Small-state terms at the time of agreement on realization of Commission preferences are not statistically significant. Instead, effects of changes in variable b remain statistically significant at virtually the same odds ratios they are in models II-IV. Taking salience into account, significance of the whole model (VIII) drops below the 0.05 level. What remains of explanatory power is held by the time an initiative is issued. This is what had been expected.

Predicted probabilities of these models on Commission success are just as telling (see Figure 8). Given much dissent between the Commission and a GP in office, the Commission is roughly five times as likely to fail in realizing its preferences. This is not true for Small states: for the interesting case of much dissent, probabilities both of failures and of success are nearly identical.

Figure 8: Predicted probabilities for Realization of Commission preferences by Model (V-VIII)



Qualifications to be made in terms of hypotheses are thus marginal: it does not only matter, whether a GP is in office at the time of initiative, but also at the time of agreement. But this is expected from a theoretical perspective.

Conclusion

In the preceding sections I first found numbers of proposals issued by the Commission to vary within presidency terms in accordance with the advent and passing of GPs in the council presidency. Commission activity rises immediately before and after a GP enters and leaves office. The temporal structure of commission initiatives thus varies with regard to terms of GPs holding the council presidency. This is as stated in H1a.

I then conducted a series of EHA using Product-limit Estimation testing for effects of timing on durations of decision-making processes by types of presidencies. These types reflect situations the Commission finds itself in as anticipated by the model. I found durations to significantly vary in this respect. Timing thus has an effect on the decision-making as a whole: the temporal structure of decision-making processes, measured as duration, varies with regard to terms of GPs holding the council presidency. This reflects expectations of H1b.

I finally investigated into effects of presidencies of Small states following or preceding GP terms on the Commission in realizing its preferences over outcomes. I found effects to exist and to point into the expected direction: it pays for the Commission to adapt timing of initiatives to whether a GP holds the presidency or not. But it does not necessarily help to just issue initiatives during terms of Small states. If a GP holds office at the time of agreement, the GP's preferences are privileged over the Commission's irrespective of the type of presidency at the time of initiative. The Commission however fares better, if proposals are issued taking terms of GP presidencies into account. I thus also retain H1c.

Timing of initiatives with regard to GPs holding the presidency can be observed. This has an effect on decision-making processes as a whole. Commission preferences are reflected to a larger extent in outcomes if proposals are initiated with regard to GP presidencies. I thus reject H0 and retain H1. This is in line with the main implication of the game-theoretical model: if the Commission chooses to initiate a proposal over which there is dissent with a GP, it pays to do so during the term of a small state. I infer from this, that the Commission does indeed act strategically in initiating policy proposals with regard to GPs holding the council presidency. The result has some implications both in empirical and in theoretical terms.

Empirically, some interpretations of observations might be subject to closer scrutiny. There is for example the observation that Small-state governments holding the presidency act more in line with Commission proposals than GP governments. At first sight, this could be interpreted as being due to higher degrees of "per-se integration-friendliness" on part of smaller EU states. Under a more resource-based perspective as formulated in the model one might also argue, that governments of these states are just not capable of profiting from the institutional privileges related to the council presidency on their own and thus align with the Commission as a second-best way to use these privileges. Reasons for several formal and informal institutional features of decision-making processes in the EU could also be re-interpreted. This concerns, for example, the "Troika"-setting of presidency terms, certain regularities in assigning specific Commission portfo-

lios to politicians from larger member states, or issue-specific cooperation among larger member states as opposed to long-standing networks between smaller member states.

From a more theoretical angle, I have shown the notion of “Great Powers” not to be confined analytically to the classical realm of “high” politics. Indeed, it might be more interesting to think of the Commission or governments as interacting strategically with a view to this category than with a view to the individual governments of, say France, Denmark, or Greece. A reference to GPs is thus of use in explaining the more sanguine “low” politics of day-to-day EU decision-making. The way agenda-setting has been understood to be split between the Commission and member governments also considerably diverges from what a purely institutionalist reading suggests, in that it is indeed GPs that are privileged. Findings in this paper might then be seen as an encouragement to more comprehensively take note in the study of European integration of insights from IR theories as a complement to explanations from integration research or the comparative perspective. This does not necessarily come as a surprise. The EU might well be an organization of astounding institutional complexity. But this is just as true for other, “typical” international organizations, e.g. the UN or the WTO. If anything, a more comprehensive account of European integration as a process of day-to-day decision-making within an international organization might lead us to just this conclusion.

Appendix

In models V-VIII I apply a measure of “dissent” as described in the section on effects of timing on realization of Commission preferences over outcomes. Dissent can take two values: 0 (no dissent, “harmony”) and 1 (dissent exists). For distances between positions of the Commission and the government holding the presidency at the time the decision on a proposal is taken in Council exceeding 50 units I have assigned 1 and 0 else.

I did so due to the way the game-theoretical model is specified: for Chance’s moves to be random, one would understand “dissent” and “harmony” to be distributed uniformly. I thus assigned each move probability 0.5 and did just so for data.

One could however suspect results as in models V-VIII to depend on just this distance. Would not everything be completely different, if one defined dissent to exist only from distances, say above 65? As with all measures, it sure could. But for the following distances used to delimit existence of dissent it is not: 0, 5, 10, 20, 25, 50, 66, 75, 80, 90, 95, and 99 (see Tables A.1-A.4). For these distances, if applied as a lower threshold for dissent to models VI and VIII, Z-tests deliver

similar results, odds ratios move in the expected directions, and cutpoints allow identical interpretation of predictions as given above. This is also true for most values of distances for models V and VII. However, with dissent defined as virtually anything but identical preferences (distances below 11), these models do not deliver statistically significant results. Setting thresholds at these levels would however amount to assume a virtually universal existence of dissent. But this is not what is assumed in the game-theoretical model.

Table A. 1: Results for model V for distances above 0, 5, 10, 20, 25, 33, 50, 66, 75, 80, 90, 95, and 99 as minimum distances for “dissent” to take value 1

Dissent as from	Prob. >Chi ²	Pseudo R ²	P> Z (Initiative)	OR (Initiative)	P> Z (Dissent)	OR (Dissent)	Cut1	Cut2
>0	0.464	0.001	0.350	1.710	0.826	0.872	-0.855	0.393
>5	0.464	0.001	0.350	1.710	0.826	0.872	-0.855	0.393
>10	0.486	0.009	0.357	0.174	0.939	0.952	-0.787	0.461
>20	0.043**	0.051	0.623	1.310	0.043**	0.307	-1.619	-0.277
>25	0.043**	0.051	0.623	1.310	0.043**	0.307	-1.619	-0.277
>33	0.024**	0.060	0.297	1.694	0.022**	0.283	-1.415	-0.050
>50	0.009***	0.111	0.434	1.550	0.003***	0.141	-1.660	-0.144
>66	0.006***	0.137	0.321	1.906	0.001***	0.092	-1.545	0.055
>75	0.000***	0.200	0.445	1.804	0.000***	0.042	-1.850	-0.010
>80	0.001***	0.170	0.338	2.056	0.000***	0.053	-1.586	0.138
>90	0.001***	0.170	0.338	2.056	0.000***	0.053	-1.586	0.138
>95	0.001***	0.170	0.338	2.056	0.000***	0.053	-1.586	0.138
>99	0.001***	0.170	0.338	2.056	0.000***	0.053	-1.586	0.138

Table A. 2: Results for model VI for distances above 0, 5, 10, 20, 25, 33, 50, 66, 75, 80, 90, 95, and 99 as minimum distances for “dissent” to take value 1

Dissent as from	Prob. >Chi ²	Pseudo R ²	P> Z (Initiative)	OR (Initiative)	P> Z (Dissent)	OR (Dissent)	Cut1	Cut2
>0	0.024**	0.049	0.023**	2.520	0.111	0.438	-1.594	-0.078
>5	0.031**	0.048	0.021**	2.590	0.121	0.451	-1.546	-0.033
>10	0.026**	0.051	0.022**	2.562	0.091*	0.423	-1.581	-0.062
>20	0.018**	0.060	0.019**	2.699	0.040**	0.362	-1.610	-0.070
>25	0.019**	0.058	0.023**	2.556	0.051*	0.371	-1.599	-0.060
>33	0.013**	0.067	0.044**	2.320	0.033**	0.318	-1.679	-0.112
>50	0.030**	0.050	0.038**	2.404	0.107	0.376	-1.436	-0.088
>66	0.025**	0.054	0.026**	2.557	0.100	0.318	-1.399	0.134
>75	0.038**	0.041	0.027**	2.484	0.210	0.418	-1.310	0.189
>80	0.045**	0.046	0.026**	2.546	0.180	0.338	-1.311	0.199
>90	0.058*	0.037	0.027**	2.488	0.315	0.454	-1.259	0.229
>95	0.058*	0.037	0.027**	2.488	0.315	0.454	-1.259	0.229
>99	0.058*	0.037	0.027**	2.488	0.315	0.454	-1.259	0.229

Table A. 3: Results for model VII for distances above 0, 5, 10, 20, 25, 33, 50, 66, 75, 80, 90, 95, and 99 as minimum distances for “dissent” to take value 1

Dissent as from	Prob. >Chi ²	Pseudo R ²	P> Z (Initiative)	OR (Initiative)	P> Z (Dissent)	OR (Dissent)	Cut1	Cut2
>0	0.429	0.011	0.367	1.783	0.864	0.897	-0.734	0.482
>5	0.429	0.011	0.367	1.783	0.864	0.897	-0.734	0.482
>10	0.453	0.010	0.372	1.824	0.967	0.973	-0.663	0.553
>20	0.057*	0.043	0.643	1.308	0.076*	0.346	-1.505	0.219
>25	0.057*	0.043	0.643	1.308	0.076*	0.346	-1.505	0.219
>33	0.022**	0.053	0.378	1.580	0.033**	0.311	-1.380	-0.072
>50	0.009***	0.103	0.585	1.359	0.006***	0.163	-1.707	-0.259
>66	0.010**	0.121	0.361	1.730	0.004***	0.124	-1.519	-0.014
>75	0.000***	0.202	0.596	1.476	0.000***	0.047	-2.000	-0.187
>80	0.000***	0.167	0.430	1.787	0.000***	0.064	-1.635	0.034
>90	0.000***	0.167	0.430	1.787	0.000***	0.064	-1.635	0.034
>95	0.000***	0.167	0.430	1.787	0.000***	0.064	-1.635	0.034
>99	0.000***	0.167	0.430	1.787	0.000***	0.064	-1.635	0.034

Table A. 4: Results for model VIII for distances above 0, 5, 10, 20, 25, 33, 50, 66, 75, 80, 90, 95, and 99 as minimum distances for “dissent” to take value 1

Dissent as from	Prob. >Chi ²	Pseudo R ²	P> Z (Initiative)	OR (Initiative)	P> Z (Dissent)	OR (Dissent)	Cut1	Cut2
>0	0.065*	0.035	0.031**	2.391	0.254	0.546	-1.740	-0.062
>5	0.068*	0.035	0.030**	2.403	0.264	0.553	-1.730	-0.051
>10	0.059*	0.038	0.031**	2.380	0.199	0.508	-1.776	-0.087
>20	0.052*	0.044	0.028**	2.495	0.123	0.448	-1.792	-0.089
>25	0.045**	0.047	0.032**	2.420	0.111	0.423	-1.819	-0.109
>33	0.032**	0.055	0.050*	2.233	0.080*	0.362	-1.895	-0.163
>50	0.081*	0.036	0.041**	2.330	0.292	0.484	-1.629	0.052
>66	0.062*	0.043	0.036**	2.420	0.204	0.377	-1.652	0.049
>75	0.075*	0.036	0.039**	2.316	0.259	0.437	-1.609	0.075
>80	0.075*	0.042	0.043**	2.316	0.200	0.349	-1.633	0.065
>90	0.088*	0.033	0.042**	2.280	0.322	0.457	-1.580	0.097
>95	0.088*	0.033	0.042**	2.280	0.322	0.457	-1.580	0.097
>99	0.088*	0.033	0.042**	2.280	0.322	0.457	-1.580	0.097

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