

Beyond the Technical Problems of Multidimensional Peacekeeping: The Disconnect Between the Peacebuilding Norm and United Nations Operations

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Slot SC-45, 'Peacekeeping and peacebuilding'
Saturday 11 September 2010, 2-3.45 pm

While the international community has endorsed a peacebuilding norm, the United Nations operations are at best leaving behind weak and unstable states. Despite the fact that the UN and other humanitarian actors are increasingly struggling to keep, build and enforce peace and security on the ground, the UN Security Council continues to authorize not only more but also wider peacekeeping operations.

Thus, rather than assuming that the problems of multidimensional peacekeeping are only technical, I suggest that we revisit the understanding of success to see whether there has been any changes in the policies and concepts that inform, rule and justify this practice, which can help us understand a recent positive wave in the peacekeeping discourse and literature. More precisely, I suggest that we look at the conclusions drawn about the effects of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in former Yugoslavia, in light of the problems that the countries to which this operation was deployed have experienced since.

Against this background, I argue that rather than being informed and justified by practice, multidimensional peacekeeping operations are a product of reviews and evaluations that are made in theory independent of their particular context. This reveals that multidimensional peacekeeping operations are not only suffering from technical problems, but also from a disconnect between theory and reality that in practice transcribes to an incompatibility between the system, and the discourse, of collective security.

Draft Version

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In the last decade, both international practitioners and scholars have come to the conclusion that despite some devastating failures of multidimensional peacekeeping since the end of the Cold War, these operations have positive effects which makes them worthwhile pursuit. Broadly speaking these conclusions are based on observations about the decrease of inter-state wars and traditional violence, the increase of negotiated peace agreements, and the unprecedented levels of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping.¹ However, if we look to practice, we will find that not only is the UN struggling to address intra-state wars and civil violence but also, these non-traditional threats cause confusion and disagreements within the international community. Long-term deep and wide international involvement in weak states indicates that the success of multidimensional peacekeeping operations comes at the cost of building self-sustainable peace and state sovereignty. This suggests that the positive effects of multidimensional peacekeeping are more about the international community's commitment to the peacebuilding norm in theory than about the actual implementation of this norm in practice. As such, I revisit the notion of success on the basis of which the UN lessons learned and the peacekeeping literature draw conclusions about the positive effects of multidimensional peacekeeping. I consider to what extent it is representative of the wide and deep peacebuilding norm that is at the heart of the reinvention collective security for the global world, and draw some preliminary conclusions about what this means for practice.² In other words, what justifies the peacebuilding norm and informs multidimensional peacekeeping, and what are its practical implications for the UN and collective security?

¹ *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2008*, Center on International Cooperation, New York University, with the support of the Peacekeeping Peace Practices Section, the United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations (New York, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2008) See also for example Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, *Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2006), especially p. 3, footnote 3, and Roland Paris, *At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004).

² By collective security I mean, the common ground that states create between them for which, they agree to partially centralize their security arrangements by vesting the enforcement of sanctions against breaches of peace in an international forum. It is at the same time a system of mechanisms and organizational structures that regulate and maintain certain international processes between the members of the collective, and a practice that takes place within this system. James A. Sutterlin, 'The UN in a New World Order', *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 70, Number 1, 1991, pp. 69-83; Robert Jervis, 'A Political Science Perspective on the Balance of Power and the Concert', *The American Historical Review*, Volume 97, Number 3, June 1992, pp. 716-721; Andrew Bennett, Joseph Leggold, 'Reinventing Collective Security after the Cold War and Gulf Conflict', *Political Science Quarterly*, Volume 108, Number 2, 1993, pp. 213-237; Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, 'The Promise of Collective Security', *International Security*, Volume 20, Number 1, Summer 1995, pp. 52-61; Hans Kelsen, *International Law Studies: Collective Security under International Law* (New Jersey, The Lawbook Exchange, 2001); Charles A. Kupchan, Emanuel Adler, Jean-Marc Coicaud, and Yuen Foon Khong eds., *Power in Transition: the Peaceful Change of International Order* (Tokyo, United Nations University Press, 2001).

Peacekeeping has traditionally been analyzed by mapping the extent to which the UN is ‘sav[ing] succeeding generations from the scourge of war’ between states.³ But since the operations have now acquired a role to regulate claims for self-determination and violations of human rights within states as well, the problem-solving analysis has to be replaced or at least complemented by sophisticated analytical tools that can also analyze what these shifts in the discourse imply for practice.⁴ Whilst security and peace studies and the UN recognize that peacekeeping has undergone fundamental shifts, the analyses largely overlook aspects with regards to the long-term consolidation of self-sustainable peace processes across states.⁵ The UN’s mandate performance is reviewed, or the peace in post-conflict states is evaluated five years after the termination of multidimensional peacekeeping operations. The literature evaluates peace with types and indicators that are established on the basis of war-peace dichotomies, whilst the UN reviews predominantly institutional and organizational learning. Neither, connect the internal process of the conflict or post-conflict state with the internal processes of the UN. As a result, the outcome is either case-specific or extremely broad, descriptive, historical narratives that fail to take into account the role of multidimensional peacekeeping as a project larger than the operation itself which is to set off self-sustaining peacebuilding processes across states to stabilize the world at large.⁶

Against this background, I argue that until we are able to analyse the extent to which the UN is providing security and contributing to peace, not only within and between states but also across states, the expansion of UN peacekeeping will be informed and justified by conclusions that have been drawn in abstractum. Assumptions about states’ internal affairs will be made on the basis of states external affairs, ignoring the complications that this implies for practice.⁷ Therefore, I try to get a better idea of

³ The question is based on the first paragraph of the Preamble of the UN Charter. It reads: “We the peoples of the United Nations determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war”. Charter of the United Nations (New York, United Nations Department of Public Information, 1945).

⁴ For a comprehensive account of the peacekeeping literature see Virginia Page Fortna and Lise Morjé Howard, ‘Pitfalls and Prospects in the Peacekeeping Literature’, *Annual Review of Political Science*, Volume 11, 2008, pp. 283-301.

⁵ For more about the relationship between the redefinition of peacekeeping and the shifts in the normative framework of international practice see for example Michael Pugh, ‘Peacekeeping and Critical Theory’, *International Peacekeeping*, Volume 11, Number 1, Spring 2004, pp. 39-58.

⁶ For more about world order and the problem of collective security see for example Michael Cox, ‘Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory’, *Millennium*, Volume 10, Number 2, 1981, pp. 126-155, Mark Duffield, *Global Governance and the New Wars: The Meaning of Development and Security* (London, Zed Books, 2001) and Michael Pugh, ‘Peacekeeping and Critical Theory’, *International Peacekeeping*, Volume 11, Number 1, Spring 2004, pp. 39-58.

⁷ See for example Hugh Miall, *The Peacemaker: Peaceful Settlement of Disputes since 1945* (New York, St Martin’s, 1992), Paul Diehl, *International Peacekeeping* (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), William J. Durch ed., *Twenty-First-Century Peace Operations* (Washington, The United States Institute of Peace and The

the analytical gap in the assessment of collective security which stems from a disconnect between the discourse and the practice, and consider how this gap can be overcome, as well as what its consequences are for practice. By comparing the peacebuilding norm to the experience of multidimensional peacekeeping operations, informing theory by practice, I add a third type of success to the two types of success of multidimensional peacekeeping that are most commonly evaluated—conceptual and practical. I outline a triangular analytical framework with three separate yet interlinked categories; conceptual, practical and projectual success. With the help of these three types, I hope to gain some clarity with regards to whether a weak post-conflict state that is not suffering from civil war, but neither benefiting from a sovereign peace, represents a threat to collective security or the stability of the world. In other words, I use the evaluation of multidimensional peacekeeping as a way to analyse the challenges of collective security in the global world.

First I look at how the UN has reviewed peacekeeping since the deployment of the first operation. Rather than settling on a definition of successful peacekeeping, the UN has developed a set of revisionary processes through which, success is continuously redefined. These processes generate lessons learned that inform and justify multidimensional peacekeeping and the reinvention of collective security. How are these lessons learned, and what are their role in collective security? Second, I turn to the peacekeeping literature that has developed together with the UN reviews. Based on three findings that has developed in the literature, the evaluations predominantly depart from a general consensus about the positive effects of multidimensional peacekeeping whereby the operations ensure a certain level of stability which makes peacebuilding more likely to occur, although not guaranteed. Where does this consensus or positive wave come from and what are its practical consequences? Third and finally, I argue that this leaves us with a limited analytical framework of multidimensional peacekeeping.⁸ Trying to connect the

Henry L. Stimson Center, 2006), and Peter Wallensteen and Margareta Sollenberg, 'Armed Conflict, 1989-2000', *Journal of Peace Research*, Volume 38, number 5, September 2001, pp. 629-644.

⁸ Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, *Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2006) is the perhaps best known and most encompassing study of post-Cold War peacekeeping, conducted from a liberal point of view. Roland Paris is more critical of current peacekeeping practices, advancing his own vision of how peace is better built after civil war through what he calls 'institutionalization before liberalization'. Roland Paris, *At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004). Finally Michael Barnett also criticises liberal peacebuilding and proposes a third way in which to help states recover from war and foster stability and legitimacy. Like Paris, he also underlines the importance of stable institutions but he also emphasizes that these are best established through the republican principles of deliberation, constitutionalism and representation. In other words, his approach is even more open to improvisation and local varieties as he notes that republican peacebuilding does not necessarily result in the liberal model, and that this alone does

discourse and practice of UN peacekeeping, I outline a triangular analytical framework, and consider how to operationalize this framework by carrying out a brief preliminary review of one of the multidimensional peacekeeping operations that pioneered this practice in the 1990's, namely the United Nations Protection Force for former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR).

1. The UN reviews of peacekeeping: international revisionary processes

Since the international community is not expecting war to disappear all together, UN peacekeeping is just as much about ensuring the member-states of their mutual commitment to peace, as it is about actually keeping, building and consolidating peace. Thus an important part of the aim and role of UN peacekeeping is about disseminating information about its success, which allows the international community to establish shared understandings about the stabilization of world order. To this end, the UN has since the end of the Cold War invested an increasing amount of time and effort in generating lessons learned—that is, conclusions about the success of UN peacekeeping operations, and recommendations for how to avoid the errors of the past from repeating themselves in the future.⁹

As there is no definition of peacekeeping in the UN Charter, and the UN itself explains that peacekeeping by nature defies simple definition, what constitutes success is continuously redefined in a dialectic process between practice and theory. On the one hand, what constitutes success is dependent on the specific crisis and mandate, and on the other, on the lessons learned from past operations and the overall doctrine. While the contingency of the understanding of success helps the UN to create more realistic expectations, it also makes it difficult to draw useful general conclusions about the effects of peacekeeping across operations.¹⁰

Before we look specifically at the UN's lessons learned, we briefly revisit the development of multidimensional peacekeeping and the peacebuilding norm in order to get an idea about the general strategy and overall aim and role of these operations. Then, we take a look at the evolution of the UN's systematic review of peacekeeping operations

not mean that the mode has failed. Michael Barnett, 'Building a Republican Peace: Stabilizing States after War', *International Security*, Volume 30, Number 4, Spring 2006, pp. 87-112.

⁹ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 'Introduction', *The Blue Helmets: A Review of the United Nations Peace-keeping*, 3rd ed. (New York, United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996), paragraph 76.

¹⁰ See Duane Bratt, 'Assessing the Success of UN Peacekeeping Operations', *The UN, Peace and Force*, ed. by Michael Pugh (London, Frank Cass, 1997), p. 65.

in lessons learned. Finally, we see how the UN is currently in the midst of reforming their lessons learned by institutionalizing revisionary processes that are to continuously define and re-define peacekeeping success.

Multidimensional peacekeeping and the peacebuilding norm: the reinvention of collective security

It was first in the 1950's that the term 'peacekeeping' was introduced to the UN system by the then UN Secretary-General (UNSG), Dag Hammarskjöld. The idea was to interpose independent forces between parties in tension prior to a breakout of violence, to create diplomatic spaces and facilitate international negotiations. Hammarskjöld described it as the non-existent 'Chapter-six-and-a-half' of the Charter, at the crossroads between 'pacific settlement of disputes' (Chapter VI) and more forceful 'action with respect to [...] acts of aggression' (Chapter VII).¹¹ The UN began to take action through truce supervision and encompassing mediational measures. However, the Organization was repeatedly challenged by questions about the circumstances under which such a practice was legitimate for the UN to carry out.¹² To eliminate doubts to this end, general terms of engagement for the practice of collective security were established based on three fundamental principles –consent, impartiality, and a minimum use of force, also known as 'the holy trinity' of peacekeeping. But as the operations multiplied and expanded, the UN gradually became more involved in the actual peace that it was initially only supposed to keep.¹³

¹¹ The term peacekeeping comes with the concept of 'preventive diplomacy', first discussed by UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld. The practice was set out to be mandated only by the agreement of all the UN member-states –that is, through the unanimous vote of the General Assembly. However to cope with the growing practice, peacekeeping was soon removed from the general UN budget and made dependent on the agreement of the more exclusive Security Council and the consensus of the Permanent Five –China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Six officials in the UN Office of Special Political Affairs operated the peacekeeping operations until 1992 when the Department of Peacekeeping Operations was established as one of the main bodies of the UN Secretariat. See the Charter to the United Nations. Charter of the United Nations, signed on 26 June 1945 in San Francisco, Chapter VI and Chapter VII; Secretary-General's Report to the UN General Assembly, September 15th, 1955 (A/2911); *Basic Facts About the United Nations*, updated ed. (New York, the United Nations, 2004); and <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/> (accessed 11 November 2008).

¹² The first formal UN peacekeeping mission was deployed in the Suez crisis in the Sinai (the UN Emergency Force, UNEF I) in 1956. But already in 1948, was a UN mediator and a group of UN military observers placed in Palestine (United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, UNTSO) to supervise the truce between the two newly established states and its neighbors. Also a similar UN Military Observer Group was deployed in India and Pakistan. Both remain active to this day. Moreover, the UN Security Council authorized the US to, under the auspice of the UN flag, command forces in support of South Korea and civilian components in the 1950's. For more about the history of UN peacekeeping see for example Norrie MacQueen, *The United Nations Since 1945: Peacekeeping and the Cold War* (London, Longman, 1999).

¹³ In 1960, one of the largest, most complex, and costly UN Operations, was deployed in Congo (ONUC). For the first time, a civilian component was officially deployed along side troops. The 1970's experienced the least amount of peacekeeping operations in UN history and the trend continued well into the 1980s.

Both international leaders and scholars have compared the significance of the end of the Cold War for collective security to the end of the two World Wars.¹⁴ It was described as an unprecedented window of opportunity for collective security to reinvent itself, in order to once and for all make dialogue the only viable and beneficial means of interaction; “the end of a great-power conflict has caused policy makers and scholars to take collective security seriously”.¹⁵ The UN turned inwards to concretize what the new global world order meant for collective security, and how the international institutions and structures could be adapted. Threats were redefined as processes that could undermine states’ liberal-democratic nature, and were often referred to as risks so as to underline their constant yet contingent nature. UN Member States agreed that a global world calls for reform to enhance international cooperation, extend the shared responsibilities and institutionalize a more proactive sophisticated practice.¹⁶ UN peacekeeping officially shifted from observation to verification, to transitional assistance, to increasingly include asymmetrical threats and structural violence such as weak states, human rights violations and humanitarian emergencies, all of which it was expected to reverse. The operations not only had military but also political and social aims. Preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping came together in encompassing multidimensional operations that increasingly required the UN to intervene into sovereign states. Together with troops, flexible civilian components were deployed that expanded or retreated, and moved from classic to more preservative approaches, to operations of a progressive character as opposed to operations that were to do nothing more, and nothing less than keeping a *status quo*.¹⁷

Only three new missions were deployed (1973, 1974, and 1978). In 1973, the UN Emergency Force (UNEF II), following in the footsteps of UNEF I, which was determined in 1967. In 1974, the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) to maintain and supervise the cease-fire and areas of separation between Israel and Syria, following the Yom Kippur War. In 1978, the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) to confirm Israeli withdrawal, restore international peace and security, and help Lebanese government restore effective authority. General Sir Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World* (London, Allen Lane of Penguin Group, 2005), pp. 274-276. In 1988, the UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group was established, in 1989 the UN Angola Verification Mission I, and also in 1989, the UN Transition Assistance Group in Namibia. Alex J. Bellamy, Paul Williams, and Stuart Griffin, *Understanding Peacekeeping* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004); Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, *Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations* (Princeton and Oxford, Princeton University Press, 2006), pp. 172-183.

¹⁴ Andrew Bennett, Joseph Leggold, ‘Reinventing Collective Security after the Cold War and Gulf Conflict’, *Political Science Quarterly*, Volume 108, Number 2, 1993, p. 222.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 213.

¹⁶ Bruce Russett and James S. Sutterlin, ‘The U.N. in a New World Order’, *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1991; and Ramesh Thakur, *The United Nations Peace and Security: From Collective Security to the Responsibility to Protect* (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2006).

¹⁷ Alex. J Bellamy, Paul Williams, and Stuart Griffin note a triple transformation of UN peacekeeping in the 20th century in terms of quantity, quality, and normativity. By relating the means to the end, a dialectic process is analyzed over and across different types of peacekeeping in a dynamic rather than uni-linear

In 1992, the UNSG defined peacebuilding as a practice at the heart of multidimensional peacekeeping. Peacekeeping was extended to the post-conflict phase. The operations were not only to end war, but also to prevent it from re-erupting. Three years later, the practical definition was re-articulated in a peacebuilding norm, which said that collective security should address the root causes of conflict and *create* the political and socio-economic ‘structures for the institutionalization of peace’.¹⁸ In 2000, the UN member-states officially established peacebuilding as one of the principal practices of collective security together with conflict prevention and peacekeeping.¹⁹ But the reinvention of collective security for the global world culminated at the 60th anniversary of the United Nations. The member-states embraced ‘a vision of collective security’ for the 21st century, expressing a firm commitment to long-term conflict management and humanitarian efforts within and across states, and establishing a ‘responsibility to protect’, and ‘to rebuild’.²⁰ A United Nations Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) and a Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) (supported by a permanent Peacebuilding Fund)

manner. The process is framed in a five-fold typology: peace enforcement, traditional peacekeeping, facilitating the implementation of a political settlement, wider peacekeeping operations, wider peace-support efforts. Alex J. Bellamy, Paul Williams, and Stuart Griffin, *Understanding Peacekeeping* (Cambridge, Polity Press, 2004), pp. 6-7. See also J. Lewis Rasmussen, ‘Peacemaking in the Twenty-first Century: New Rules, New Roles, New Actors’ in I. William Zartman and J. Lewis Rasmussen eds., *Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods and Techniques* (Washington DC, United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997), pp. 38-39.

¹⁸ Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization, Supplement to an *Agenda for Peace*: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations, A/50/60-S/1995/1 (New York, the United Nations, 25 January 1995), paragraph 49. See also Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace*, (New York, United Nations, 1992), and Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace: With the New Supplement and Related UN Declarations*, 2nd ed. (New York, the United Nations, 1995).

¹⁹ The 2000 *Report of the Panel on United Peace Operations*, also known as the Brahimi Report –a landmark for collective security, is the outcome of a High-Level-Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, appointed by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan to after almost fifty years of practice of peace operations reviewed practice and make policy recommendations. *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, A/55/305-S/2000/809 (New York, UN General Assembly/Security Council, 21 August 2000). A year later, the Security Council established a working definition of; “preventing the outbreak, the recurrence or the continuation of armed conflict”. Statement by the President of the Security Council, S/PRST/2001/5 (New York, United Nations, 20 February 2001).

²⁰ The *World Summit* was the annual High-level plenary meeting of the General Assembly that has been held since the Organization was first founded. Many of the Reports that were issued were made against the background of the High-level Panel Report on Threats, Challenge and Change, *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility*, A/59/565 (New York, UN General Assembly, 2 December 2004), paragraph 261-269. See also *In Larger Freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all*, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 21 March 2005 (A/59/2005), especially paragraph 74-86. The ‘responsibility to protect’ and the ‘responsibility to rebuild’ were first investigated by the International Commission on Intervention and State sovereignty in its report that was published by the International Development Research Center in Ottawa in December 2001. *The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty* (Ottawa, International Development Research Centre, 2001). The responsibilities were officially embraced by the UN at the UN’s 60th Anniversary Summit in 2005, reaffirmed, in a Security Council Resolution of 28 April 2006, and as such part of a new rule of customary international law. See *World Summit Outcome*, A/RES/60/1 (New York, United Nations, 24 October 2005); and http://www.un.org/ga/59/hl60_plenarymeeting.html (accessed 8 April 2007).

was set up in the UN Secretariat as a coordinating mechanism and an information hub.²¹ Moreover, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) presented a new reform strategy—*Peace Operations 2010*—whereby a living Report in terms of institutionalized processes of self-assessment and self-evaluation, was from now on to guide and direct UN peacekeeping at headquarters and in the field.²²

Since prevention has been connected with peacekeeping and peacebuilding, multidimensional peacekeeping has developed into an encompassing practice of forming and implementing peace agreements, which predominantly follows a democracy sequencing strategy. By prescribing a certain institutional framework and state rule for transition, the UN tries to form incentive systems that can join conflicting representational claims around collective socio-economic goals, and that can open up the market to an active and participatory civil society.²³ In other words, the Organization is trying to ensure a particular modicum of participatory politics within weak states defined in terms of a dual crisis of security and legitimacy, assuming that it will resolve civil conflict *and* bring about self-sustaining peacebuilding processes that will have stabilizing

²¹ The two concurrent resolutions that established the bodies are the ‘Resolution adopted by the General Assembly 60/1. 2005, *World Summit Outcome*, A/RES/60/1 (New York, United Nations, 24 October 2005), see especially paragraphs 97-105, and ‘Security Council Resolution 1645(2005), S/RES/1645 (New York, United Nations, 20 December 2005). Whereas the Commission was set up more as a political body in the sense that it is made up predominantly by representatives from member-states, the Support Office was set-up as a more bureaucratic body, run by international civil servants. More precisely they were set out to: i) propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery; ii) help ensure predictable financing for early recovery activities and sustained financial investment; iii) extend the time of engagement in post-conflict recovery; and iv) develop best practices on issues that require extensive collaboration among political, military, humanitarian, and development actors. The bodies were inaugurated in June 2006. See, <http://www.un.org/peace/peacebuilding/> (accessed 16 May 2007).

²² The Reform Strategy is part of a larger Report of the DPKO following the Brahimi Report, reflecting on the manner in which ‘tasks are performed, achievements accomplished and lessons learnt during the five past years’. The first Report of this kind was published in 2008 –the *Capstone Doctrine*. The focus is on the following five key areas; personnel, doctrine, partnerships, resources, and organization. DPKO endorsed its ‘catalytic role’ in certain peacebuilding activities, but it maintained that it has neither the budget, nor the expertise or mandate, ‘to comprehensively implement effective peacebuilding programmes’. For more about *Peace Operations 2010* see *Overview of the Financing of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Budget Performance for the Period from 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2005 and Budget for the Period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007*, Report of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly, A/60/969 (New York, United Nations, 24 February 2006), paragraphs 6-21. *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support (New York, the United Nations, 18 January 2008), pp. 25-26. ‘Remarks of Mr. Jean-Marie Guéhenno, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, to the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly’ (New York, the United Nations, 19 October 2006), www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/articles/article191006.html (accessed 27 June 2008).

²³ Roland Paris, ‘International peacebuilding and the ‘mission civilisatrice’’, *Review of International Studies*, Volume 28, Issue 4, 2002, pp. 637-656; Roland Paris, ‘Peacekeeping and the Constraints of Global Culture’, *European Journal of International Relations*, Volume 9, Number 3, September 2003; Roland Paris, *At War’s End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict*, (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2004); Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, *Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War* (Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 2005); and Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, *Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations* (Princeton and Oxford, Princeton University Press, 2006).

effects for world order at large.²⁴ The ambitious global project for peace that this represents, has required the UN to develop a wide range of political, developmental, humanitarian and human rights programmes and processes, which depend on operational categories, mandates and structures that are different from any previous international practices or institutions. Broadly speaking, to securitize an interdependent world order, the notion of consent has been replaced with responsibility; impartiality with political state-building aims; and a minimum use of force with an encompassing and deep-going framework of guidance and assistance.²⁵

Reviewing peacekeeping in the post-Cold War: systematizing 40 years of practice

During the Cold War, the UN reviews evolved from *ad hoc* report-writing that qualified success by the 'holy trinity', to a more systematic reviewing of the implementation of the individual peacekeeping mandates. In 1995, a Lessons Learned Unit was established in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. With the aim of making the UN lessons learned into clearer as well as more nuanced policy recommendations regarding the planning, management and execution of multidimensional peacekeeping. Five years later, no more than four Reports had been published and they had only received limited attention. Three of these Reports evaluated the extent to which the multidimensional peacekeeping operations deployed in Somalia, Haiti and Rwanda had been able to implement their mandates, whilst the fourth reviewed the overall experience of multidimensional peacekeeping since the end of the Cold War. They were all more descriptive than analytical and without general benchmarks there was little coherence between and across these Reports. The implementation of the specific mandates was not connected with the implementation of the peacebuilding norm and therefore the extent

²⁴ An alternative model that is receiving increasing attention is democracy gradualism. Within the same framework of a practice of peace agreements, this model aims to put in place several processes that facilitate the building of a democratic state simultaneously rather than in a certain sequence. Whilst democracy sequencing aims to establish electoral democracy, democracy gradualism aims for a libertarian one. See for example Elizabeth Cousens and Chetan Kumar, eds., *Peacebuilding as Politics: Cultivating Peace in Fragile Societies* (Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 2001); Thomas Carothers, "The 'Sequence' Fallacy", *Journal of Democracy*, Volume 18, Number 1, January 2007, pp. 12-27.

²⁵ Kofi Annan, *We the Peoples: the Role of the United Nations in the Twenty-first Century*, A/54/2000 (New York, UN General Assembly, 27 March 2000); Kirsti Samuels and Sebastian von Einsiedel, *The Future of UN State-Building: Strategic and Operational Challenges and the Legacy of Iraq* (New York, International Peace Academy, 2004); Richard Caplan, *International Governance of War-Torn Territories: Rule and Reconstruction* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005); Michael Barnett, Hunjoon Kim, Madelene O'Donnell, and Laura Sitea, 'Peacebuilding: What is in a Name?', *Global Governance*, Volume 13, January 2007, pp. 35-58.

to which multidimensional peacekeeping was actually stabilizing the global world remained unclear.²⁶

In 1996, the DPKO published an 800 page Report of the 41 UN peacekeeping operations deployed so far –*The Blue Helmets: A Review of UN Peacekeeping Operations*.²⁷ Based on a definition of peacekeeping as an instrument that “can serve as catalyst, framework and support mechanism for parties to seek peace and can help when hostile factions are prepared to work toward this common goal”, peacekeeping was evaluated as both a concept and a practice.²⁸ Peacekeeping as a concept refers to the extent to which the peacekeeping mandate complies with the rules of deployment; and peacekeeping as a practice to the extent to which the mandate is implemented. Whilst the mandate performance of each operation is individually reviewed in detail, the Report does not compare the operations with each other and draw conclusions across the many operations. Only in the introduction does the UNSG point out that whilst the UN can be proud of the encompassing practice of collective security that has developed, we have to be wary of the fact that the price of this practice has been higher than expected. On the one hand, UN peacekeeping has brought hope to people in crisis, saved lives and eased suffering. But on the other, the actual outcome of the operations has been quite inconsistent, especially when it comes to long-term consolidation and self-sustainable peace.²⁹

In preparation for the Millennium Summit, the UNSG Kofi-Annan convened a High-Level-Panel on UN Peace Operations to translate the many numerous and varied reviews of UN peacekeeping that had now been made, into specific, concrete and realistic conclusions about multidimensional peacekeeping. In its concluding Report, the Panel underlined that because of a lack of strategic direction, credibility, realism and rigour, as well as means that match the ends, oftentimes the success of these operations are undermined by the fact that their many aims end up competing. Thus the Report

²⁶ Examples of Reports issued by the Lessons Learned Unit of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations include ‘United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH): Mid-Mission Assessment Report, April - February 1996’, (for internal distribution only), ‘The Comprehensive Report on Lessons Learned from United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), April 1992 - March 1995’, ‘Comprehensive Report on Lessons Learned from United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) October 1993 – April 1996’, and ‘Multidisciplinary Peacekeeping: Lessons from Recent Experience’. All available at http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/lessons/llu2_body.htm (accessed 8 January 2008).

²⁷ *The Blue Helmets: A Review of the United Nations Peace-keeping*, 3rd ed. (New York, United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996).

²⁸ This definition is made by the UNSG Boutros-Ghali in the introduction to the Review. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, ‘Introduction’, *The Blue Helmets: A Review of the United Nations Peace-keeping*, 3rd ed. (New York, United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996), pp. 4-5.

²⁹ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, ‘Introduction’, *The Blue Helmets: A Review of the United Nations Peace-keeping*, 3rd ed. (New York, United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996), pp. 3-9.

recommends reform of the decision-making processes and the international institutional machinery for the planning and supporting of peacekeeping operations so that the cumulated field experience with regards to doctrines, plans, procedures and mandates are fed back into long-term development. As such, the key to more success was summarized in generating more realistic expectations on the basis of well-informed international agreements on the aims of multidimensional peacekeeping.³⁰ What had started out as a decade with a focus on concepts and a celebration of the liberal peace, finished with a return to practice, and more precisely, a concern with the relationship between states' internal and external affairs, and the global.

The institutionalization of UN peacekeeping reviews: peacekeeping best practices

If the 1990's was a time for review, then the first decade of the 2000's has been a time for encompassing institutional, organizational as well as strategic or operational, reforms.³¹ Following the Millennium Summit, the Lessons Learned Unit was replaced with a substantially enhanced and revamped Peacekeeping Best Practices Section (PBPS)—later renamed Peacekeeping Best Practices: Policy, Analysis and Lessons Learned for the Peacekeeping Community, and a Policy, Evaluation and Training Division (PETD).³² The PBPS is mandated to conduct a broad range of activities that

³⁰ The Report is the outcome of a High-Level-Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, composed of mainly non-UN staff appointed by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan to after almost fifty years of practice of peace operations review practice and make policy recommendations. It produced a Report known as the Brahimi Report after the Chair of the Panel Lakhdar Brahimi. *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, A/55/305-S/2000/809 (New York, UN General Assembly/Security Council, 21 August 2000). For more about the follow-up on the Report in terms of further recommendations and implementation, see http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/ (accessed 12 February 2008).

³¹ At the Millennium Summit, the DPKO presented a new reform strategy –*Peace Operations 2010* that aims to institutionalize a process of reflection with regards to collective security and the fundamental changes in the needs and tasks with which the Department is faced. Two main types of recommendations are made, one to review the past and the other, to revise the present.□ From this, the DPKO aims to better capitalize on the lessons that can be learnt from experience, as well to improve their understanding of the current state of affair, especially the interdependent relations between peacekeeping and peacebuilding, by engaging in a report-writing exercise of a different kind. It has put in place the framework for the institutionalization of a process of self-assessment and self-evaluation. It has made a living Report the authoritative guide and support for all peacekeeping activity—civilian, police, and military, at headquarters and in the field. The first Report was not published until 2008—the *Capstone Doctrine*, includes recommendations for operations to “result [note, not build] in a sustainable peace”, specifying the areas in which progress is necessary. A particular emphasis is put on strengthening and professionalizing the planning, the management and the conduct of operations. ‘Remarks of Mr. Jean-Marie Guéhenno, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, to the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly’ (New York, the United Nations, 19 October 2006), www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/articles/article191006.html (accessed 27 June 2008). *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support (New York, the United Nations, 18 January 2008).

³² The role of the Section can be summarized as three-fold; capture and summarize the wide range of UN experience with regards to peacekeeping that is available throughout the Organization, translate the knowledge into practical policy advice, and disseminate and promote the adoption and use of these lessons

can be summarized as knowledge management, policy analysis and policy advising with regards to the peacebuilding norm. It is to review multidimensional peacekeeping operations, and compare these with each other, in order to clarify some of the questions with regards to collective security to an interdependent world. The role of the Section can be summarized as three-fold: capture the wide range of UN experience with regards to peacebuilding; summarize and translate this wide experience into coherent information in terms of policy recommendations; and disseminate as well as promote its conclusions at UN headquarters and in the field. In other words, 'encourage a culture of learning and sharing' and contribute to policy development.³³

To this end, the Section tries to improve the integration and coordination of the many aspects relevant to the implementation of the peacebuilding norm, both vertically and horizontally. Vertically, permanent best practices officers are engaged at headquarters as well as in most multidimensional peacekeeping operations in the field. Horizontally, the Section fosters collaboration between UN departments and agencies, as well as with external peacekeeping actors including states, NGO's, and scholars. In September 2005, the Section launched the Best Practices Toolbox with four methodologies for organizational and institutional learning that serve to link lessons learned to guidance and doctrine. These tools are best described as standardizing Report writing exercises. They include: the Handover Note that each UN peacekeeper who is about to leave his or her position has to write for his or her replacement; the End of Assignment Report, which the more senior peacekeepers have to write with regards to the implementation of their mandate and the managerial practices of the UN; the After Action Review that is a collaborative review of a project action conducted at the end of an operation; and the Survey of Practice where a snapshot of similar processes across peacekeeping operations is taken of how overall practionners carry out certain tasks.

learned. In other words, 'encourage a culture of learning and sharing' across states. For more information about the PBPS and the idea of 'lessons learned' See *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, A/55/305-S/2000/809 (New York, UN General Assembly/Security Council, 21 August 2000), paragraphs 229-230. The Section was later also specifically set out to serve the Department of Field Support that was established on the recommendation of UNSG Ban Ki-moon in 2007. For more information see <http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/PBPS/Pages/Public/AboutUs.aspx> (accessed 8 January 2009).

³³ For more information about the PBPS and the idea of 'lessons learned' See *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, A/55/305-S/2000/809 (New York, UN General Assembly/Security Council, 21 August 2000), articles 229-230. Moreover, for examples of Reports that have come from the PBPS see *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, A/55/305-S/2000/809 (New York, UN General Assembly/Security Council, 21 August 2000) and David Harland, 'UN Peacekeeping Operations in Post-Conflict Timor-Leste: Accomplishments and Lessons Learned: UNTAET Governance and Public Administration: 1999 to mid-2000' (New York, United Nations Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit, 2005).

Although the tools are made to be used by all UN staff, the two first ‘tools’ are more relevant to those in the field, and the two latter to the UN staff at headquarters.

To ensure the international community that the lessons that are to be learned the long-term development of peacekeeping, the PBS has a wide ranging dissemination plan for both headquarters and the field. One of the most important dissemination channels of the Section is a peacekeeping intranet that is continuously building up an institutional brain-map of peacebuilding and fosters communities of these practices across UN operations and actors. However, the voluntary approach that is taken, asking questions and making suggestions, rather than more forcefully presenting actors with solutions, is falling short of the policy development that the Section is also mandated to carry out. Thus beginning in 2009, the BPS in cooperation with the United Nations Development Programme, began working on a UN practioners handbook for benchmarking peace consolidation efforts. This represents another way in which to improve the overall assessment of the global effects of individual peacekeeping operations. As a way to deal with the relativity problem of what constitutes peacekeeping success, the UN is trying to develop a methodology for how each mission can better establish their own benchmarks. The focus of the handbook is two-fold; the SG planning directory, and the integrated mission planning process.

Thus far, the PBPS toolbox has brought together a wide range of information on topics ranging from child protection, HIV care or the coordination of mine action in peacekeeping operations. The information has been compiled and presented in four types of documents; policy directives, standard operating procedures, guidelines and manuals.³⁴ Throughout the guidance materials figure three types of lessons learned: strategic, operational and technical. On the basis of these, performance matrixes are formed with regards to the many aspects of UN peacekeeping, which the operations can control. Since the Section has concluded that causalities of multidimensional peacekeeping are difficult if not impossible to establish, the focus is on correlations.³⁵ However the conclusions that are made—that is, the lessons learned—are predominantly concerned with organizational and institutional learning in terms of the extent to which, the UN is capitalizing on the resources at its disposal. In other words, success is defined

³⁴ See Report of the Secretary-General: Peacekeeping Best Practices, GA/62/593, 18 December 2007, paragraph 20-22.

³⁵ Since much of the PBPS materials are available only for internal use most of the insights with regards to Peacekeeping Best Practices come from interviews, especially one with Sebastian Lapierre, Head of the Knowledge Management Team at United Nations headquarters conducted in New York, 19 February 2009. See also ‘Peacekeeping Best Practices’, Report of the Secretary-General, GA/62/593, 18 December 2007, paragraph 20-22.

by the processes that take place within the UN, rather than by 'local' peace, and how the operations relate to collective security at large.

2. Evaluating multidimensional peacekeeping: the peacekeeping literature

Together with the UN reviews, a peacekeeping literature has evolved that review peacekeeping operations and issues policy recommendations based on evaluations of whether individual operations keep or build peace. Like the UN, the literature does not expect peacekeeping to actually establish universal peace but to achieve continuous improvement or progress to that end. The literature has developed from descriptive accounts of peacemaking activities based on traditional war-peace dichotomies, to complex statistical models that try to combine quantitative and qualitative tools.³⁶

Whereas the first evaluations of peacekeeping concluded quite pessimistically, the literature has recently come to argue that these operations, despite some obvious failures, are worthwhile pursuit. But without any further specification of the positive effects that make the operations worthwhile pursuit, it seems that rather than being based on progress in the post-conflict states, the recent positive wave relates to a redefinition of success in terms of the overall aim or role of multidimensional peacekeeping in the global world order. In other words, it is the discourse that has shifted, and not necessarily the outcome of its implementation that has changed.

To understand the positive wave in the peacekeeping literature, we first consider how it has developed together with the practice of collective security, adjusting the benchmarks for success to the complexity of addressing intra as opposed to inter-state wars. Second, we identify three findings with regards to the positive effect of multidimensional peacekeeping, which have been established as empirical facts within the peacekeeping literature. Third, we look closer at the current debate in the peacekeeping literature between problem-solving and critical theories.

The peacekeeping literature: from descriptions to analytical models

Security studies has evaluated peacekeeping since the UN's first intervention based on war data and empirical testing. One of the first and better-known evaluations is the

³⁶ See for example Frederick H. Fleitz, *Peacekeeping Fiascoes of the 1990s: Causes, Solutions and US Interests* (Westport, CT Praeger, 2002), Virginia Page Fortna, Dennis C. Jett, *Why Peacekeeping Fails* (New York, St Martin's, 1999), and the special edition of the journal *International Peacekeeping* on 'Peace Operations and Global Order', especially Michael Pugh, 'Peacekeeping and Critical Theory', Volume 11, Issue 1, 2004, pp. 39-58.

Wainhouse compendiums, published in 1966. They outline all the missions undertaken in the first half of the 20th century by the League of Nations, the Organization of American States and the United Nations, and recapture the reviews carried out by the Organizations themselves.³⁷ Using information on some seventy missions Wainhouse notes that “considerable progress has been made in peace observation notwithstanding the absence of advances in the field of disarmament”.³⁸ Based on a notion of success that is defined as an internationally assisted peaceful settlement that ends hostilities between the conflicting parties, Wainhouse establishes a positive correlation between the international institutionalization of collective security and peace observations. He predicts that peacekeeping operations are likely to remain the “indispensable device in moving toward the control of violence in the international community” that they had become.³⁹ However, he also notes that this depends on whether the UN is able to mount a Peace Observation Corps.⁴⁰

Increasingly efforts were put into translating Wainhouse’s conclusions about positive correlations in UN peacemaking into causal mechanisms supported by empirical findings. A peacekeeping literature gradually took shape with types, models and criteria that adhered to the standard definitions and operationalizations of international relations.⁴¹ By the end of the 1960’s, peacekeeping success was most commonly determined by the occurrence and recurrence of war between independent or sovereign states according to types and categories laid down by the Correlates of War (COW) project.⁴² If the parties—states with a population greater than 500,000 in a particular operation—enjoy a fair degree of sovereignty and independence, this was taken as an indication of conceptual success; and if there were less than a 1,000 battle fatalities among all parties involved in a particular operation, this was an indication of practical

³⁷ David W. Wainhouse, *International Peace Observation: A History and a Forecast* (Baltimore, the Johns Hopkins Press, 1966) and David W. Wainhouse, *International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads: National Support—Experience and Prospects* (Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press, 1973).

³⁸ David W. Wainhouse, *International Peace Observation: A History and a Forecast* (Baltimore, the Johns Hopkins Press, 1966), p. 537.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 480-485.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 537.

⁴¹ The aim of establishing a causal theory on peacekeeping is particularly clear in Allan James, *The Politics of Peace-Keeping* (New York, Praeger, 1969).

⁴² The Correlates of War (COW) project was founded in 1963 by David J. Singer at the University of Michigan to systematically accumulate scientific knowledge about war. The project set out to assemble accurate data on the temporal and spatial variation of inter-state wars since the Napoleonic period –that is, since 1816 was applied to identify factors that could explain this variation. The project continues to this day but since 2001 it has been officially transferred to Penn State, and as of January 2005, the project Director is Paul Diehl. See David J Singer and Mervin Small, *The Wages of War 1816-1965: A Statistical Handbook* (New York, Wiley, 1972); see also Paul F. Diehl, ed. *War* (London, Sage, 2005).

success.⁴³ In other words, the meaning of success was taken over pretty much at face value from the COW project rather than being defined based on the aims of the actual mandates, let alone the role of peacekeeping operations in world order.⁴⁴

With changes in UN peacekeeping, criteria based on the traditional war-peace dichotomies became outdated. The more humanitarian aims and goals that emerged could not be integrated in models that classified an operation a success solely on the basis of the absence of traditional wars. Thus, as the Cold War was winding down, the literature turned to the relationship between internal and external conflict. The first conclusions made in this regard indicated that while UN peacekeeping increases the chances for establishing cease-fires in intra-state conflicts, it can do little to prevent these types of wars from re-erupting.⁴⁵ This dual faceted notion of success problematized the evaluation slightly. The ambiguities with regards to what constitutes success left the literature struggling to issue policy recommendations with regards to how the UN could reverse the dysfunction of these operations.⁴⁶ As a result, by the end of the 1990's, some authors even turned to ask if we should 'Give War a Chance', but also when to do so.⁴⁷

Since the end of the Cold War, the literature has focused on multidimensional peacekeeping and new types of war. To some extent it has returned to Wainhouseian problem-solving analysis to identify positive correlations rather than causalities. The first general conclusion that comes out of the post-Cold War literature is that because of the nature of the 'new wars', multidimensional peacekeeping is necessarily more difficult

⁴³ War was defined as more than 1,000 battle fatalities on all sides, and independent states as entities with a population greater than 500 000 that are "sufficiently unencumbered by legal, military, economic, or political constraints to exercise a fair degree of sovereignty and independence." Moreover, the definition of independent states post 1920 extended to also include the requirement of the entity to be member of the League of Nations or the United Nations and received diplomatic missions from one of the two super powers. See David J Singer and Mervin Small, *The Wages of War 1816-1965: A Statistical Handbook* (New York, Wiley, 1972), pp. 20-21 and 35.

⁴⁴ See for example the four volume study of Rosalyn Higgins, *United Nations Peacekeeping: Documents and Commentary* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1969-1981; or Jit Rikhey, *The Theory and Practice of Peacekeeping* (London, Hurst, 1984).

⁴⁵ See for example Ernst B. Haas, Robert Lyle Butterworth, and Joseph S. Nye, *Conflict Management by International Organizations* (Morristown, General Learning, 1972; Jonathan Wilkenfeld and Michael Brecher, 'International Crises, 1945-1975: the UN Dimension', *International Studies Quarterly*, Volume 38, 1984, pp. 45-67. Ernst B. Haas, *Why We Still Need the United Nations: The Collective Management of International Conflict 1945-1984* (Berkley, University of Berkley, 1986).

⁴⁶ See for example Frederick H. Fleitz, *Peacekeeping Fiascoes of the 1990s: Causes, Solutions and US Interests* (Westport, CT Praeger, 2002), Virginia Page Fortna, Dennis C. Jett, *Why Peacekeeping Fails* (New York, St Martin's, 1999), and the special edition of the journal *International Peacekeeping* on 'Peace Operations and Global Order', especially Michael Pugh, 'Peacekeeping and Critical Theory', Volume 11, Issue 1, 2004, pp. 39-58.

⁴⁷ It was Edward N. Luttwak who in 1999 published an article with the provocative title 'Give War a Chance', which was followed by considerable debate on the subject. See Edward N. Luttwak, 'Give War a Chance', *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 78, Number 4, 1999, pp. 36-44. See also Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations*, Third Ed. (New York, Basic Books, 2000, first published in 1977).

than traditional and therefore also more likely to fail. This has replaced the question about how peacekeeping *prevents war* from recurring, with a question about whether and how peacekeeping *can limit* the risk of the recurrence of civil war. Frameworks with combined rankings of peacekeeping are constructed to identify weak and strong points or aspects of UN peacekeeping. More nuanced understandings of success are evaluated within conflict spectrums that go from complete failure to partial failure, from moderate to complete success.⁴⁸ All together, this means that the literature has concluded that intra-state wars are technically more complicated for collective security to control than first anticipated, and therefore, the benchmarks for success have to be altered accordingly.

The three findings of the peacekeeping literature: civil war and UN peacekeeping

At the turn of the century, the pessimistic trend of the 1990's was reversed by the consensus that although multidimensional peacekeeping operations are not very likely to achieve all of their aims, UN involvement in solving intra-state conflict is a good thing—it still stabilizes the global world. This consensus is based on three quantitative findings: civil wars have increased; civil wars are very likely to reoccur; and the risk of civil war is limited through internationally or more specifically UN brokered and managed cease-fire. Although all three findings have been individually challenged on more than one occasion, they represent a common point of departure for the peacekeeping literature, established as robust empirical facts, in no need of further discussion.⁴⁹ As such, they have also become central to the justification of the reinvention of collective security with the peacebuilding norm and the practice of multidimensional peacekeeping at the centre.⁵⁰

⁴⁸ See for example Duane Bratt, 'Assessing the Success of UN Peacekeeping Operations', *The UN, Peace and Force*, ed. by Michael Pugh (London, Frank Cass, 1997); Larry Diamond, *Developing Democracies: Toward Consolidation* (Baltimore, The John Hopkins University Press, 1999); David Beetham, Sarah Bracking, Iain Kearton, and Stuart Weir, eds., *International IDEA Handbook on Democratic Assessment* (the Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2001); David Beetham, Sarah Bracking, Iain Kearton, Nalini Vittal, and Stuart Weir, eds., *The State of Democracy: Democracy Assessments in Eight Nations Around the World* (the Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2003); Ursula J. van Beek, ed., *Democracy Under Construction: Patterns from Four Countries* (Bloomfield Hills and Oopladen, Barbara Budrich Publishers, 2005).

⁴⁹ See Virginia Page Fortna and Lise Morjé Howard, 'Pitfalls and Prospects in the Peacekeeping Literature', *Annual Review of Political Science*, Volume 11, 2008, p. 289; and for a more critical account see Michael Barnett, Hunjoon Kim, Madelene O'Donnell, and Laura Sitea, 'Peacebuilding: What is in a Name?', *Global Governance*, Volume 13, January 2007, pp. 35-58.

⁵⁰ The High-Level-Panel-Report on Threats, Challenges and Change brought out the high risk of civil war recurrence as one of the main reasons for why the UN needs to be reformed. *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility*, High-Level-Panel Report on Threats, Challenges and Changes (New York, United Nations, 2005), p. 70. A year later, the Secretary-General restated the reasoning with specification as a justification for why he recommended the UN member-states to establish a Peacebuilding Commission. See *In Larger Freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all*, Report of the Secretary-General, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 21 March 2005 (A/59/2005), paragraph 114.

First, the finding that civil wars have increased is most commonly based on the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). Since the mid 1980's, the UCDP has collected and codified data on patterns of both inter- and intra-state war as defined by the COW project. This data shows that whilst inter-state wars have decreased, civil wars have increased. More precisely, the UCDP has established that 94% of the wars in the 1990's were civil wars.⁵¹ Second, the finding that civil war is likely to reoccur within five years of its termination, even if a peace agreement has been signed by all parties involved, comes from Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler's studies on the determinate of the onset of civil war. They first discussed this finding in an article published in 2002 based on African case-studies. Here they argued that "shortly after a conflict on average countries face a 50% risk of renewed conflict during the next five years".⁵² The argument was applied to a larger context in the World Bank Report *Breaking the Conflict Trap* the following year. As such, the finding was extended and updated to all civil wars, be they African or other: '[t]he typical country reaching the end of a civil war faces around a 44 percent risk of returning to conflict within five years'.⁵³

Third and finally, the finding that an internationally brokered cease-fire lowers the risk of the recurrence of civil war is established over a number of different data sets, models and time periods. One of the first studies, however, to establish that UN peacekeeping has a statistically significant effect on the duration of peace after civil war was by Doyle and Sambanis. In an article published in 2000, they examined 124 post-World War II civil wars to test whether international peacebuilding could improve the prospects that a civil war will be resolved. They found that UN peacekeeping is "usually successful in ending the violence". They also argued that UN peacebuilding is "positively correlated with democratization processes after civil war".⁵⁴ In other words, although the UN is more likely to fail than succeed in preventing civil wars from recurring, peacekeeping ensures a certain stability of states that is conducive to peacebuilding, and

⁵¹ For more about this data see for example Peter Wallensteen and Margareta Sollenberg, 'Armed Conflict, 1989-2000', *Journal of Peace Research*, Volume 38, Number 5, 2001, pp. 629-644 and Nils Petter Gleditsch, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg, and Håvard Strand, 'Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset', *Journal of Peace Research*, Volume 39, Number 5, 2002, pp. 615-637. For more see www.pcr.uu.se (accessed 7 January 2009).

⁵² Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, 'On the incidence of Civil War in Africa', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Volume 46, Number 1, 2002, p. 17.

⁵³ Paul Collier, Lani Elliot, Håvard Hegre, Anke Hoeffler, Marta Reynel-Querol and Nicholas Sambanis, *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy* (Washington DC, The World Bank and Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 83.

⁵⁴ Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, 'International peacebuilding: a theoretical and quantitative analysis', *American Political Science Review*, Volume 94, Number 4, 2000, p. 779.

which would not be achieved otherwise.⁵⁵ Together, these three findings have reversed the pessimism and skepticism regarding multidimensional peacekeeping that marked the literature from the 1990s. The disillusionment has been replaced by an interest in secondary questions regarding the effectiveness of various operations and settlements, namely why do some multidimensional peacekeeping and peace agreements prevent civil war from recurring when others do not?⁵⁶ Questions on this topic vary widely, as do the ways in which they are answered.

Recently, a critical strand of thought has appeared in peacekeeping literature that questions the three findings, or ‘facts’, and the resulting implicit assumptions about a positive correlation between peacekeeping and peacebuilding. As such, the literature is dividing into two camps, focusing on ‘problem-solving’ and ‘critical’ theories, respectively. These two camps can be differentiated by their position on three key issues: purpose, the nature of the social world, and the relationship between theory and practice. As we have seen, problem-solving theories are instrumental but involve implicit normative assumptions and do not take the relationship between theory and practice into consideration. Critical theories, on the other hand try to move beyond estimation and form models that take practice into account. But they both have an explicit normative agenda in terms of a clear commitment to a positive peace. Debates between the two are gradually replacing the objective world-view with the idea of world order as being constructed. Increasingly studies set out to uncover the ideological preferences of the dominant theories, investigate their relationship to practice, and form alternative peacebuilding models.⁵⁷

⁵⁵ See Caroline Hartzell, Matthew Hoddie and Donald Rothchild, ‘Stabilizing the peace after civil war’, *International Organization*, Volume 55, Number 1, Winter 2001, pp. 183-208; Virginia Page Fortna, ‘Does peacekeeping keep peace? International intervention and the duration of peace after civil war’, *International Studies Quarterly*, Volume 48, Number 2, 2004, pp. 269-292; *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility*, High-level Panel Report on Threats, Challenges and Change, A/59/565 (New York, UN General Assembly, 2 December 2004).

⁵⁶ Nicholas Sambanis, ‘Partition as a Solution to Ethnic War: An Empirical Critique of the Theoretical Literature’, *World Politics*, Volume 52, Issue 4, July 2000, pp. 437-483; Barbara F. Walter, *Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2002); Virginia Page Fortna and Lise Morjé Howard, ‘Pitfalls and Prospects in the Peacekeeping Literature’, *Annual Review of Political Science*, Volume 11, 2008, p. 289; Anna K. Jarstad and Timothy D. Sisk, eds., *From War to Democracy: Dilemmas of Peacebuilding* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009); and Michaela Mattes and Burgu Savun, ‘Fostering Peace After Civil War: Commitment Problems and Agreement Design’, *International Studies Quarterly*, Volume 53, Issue 3, September 2009, pp. 737-759.

⁵⁷ Alex J. Bellamy, ‘The ‘next stage’ in peace operations theory?’, *International Peacekeeping*, Volume 11, Issue 1, pp. 17-38. For more about critical theory in the peacekeeping literature, see Michael Pugh, ‘Peacekeeping and Critical Theory’, Volume 11, Issue 1, 2004, pp. 39-58. For examples of alternative peacebuilding models, there is Roland Paris’s ‘institutionalization before liberalization’ approach or Michael Barnett’s idea of republican peacebuilding. See Roland Paris, *At War’s End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004), and Michael Barnett, ‘Building a Republican Peace:

The success of multidimensional peacekeeping: the UN might be keeping peace, but is it building it?

Given the three ‘facts’ of post-Cold War peacekeeping literature, the attention is no longer on whether the UN can establish cease-fires but on the actual settlements and their management—that is, on peace agreements and peacebuilding. Two of the most encompassing and well-known peacebuilding studies are those by Michel W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, and by Roland Paris.⁵⁸ While the former is an example of problem-solving theories, the latter is more critical in its approach. The two studies are motivated by the fact that peacekeeping literature to date has been largely unable to make coherent, realistic or useful policy recommendations. However, they disagree on the source of the problem and thus on how to solve it. Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis identify flaws in the neorealist and neoliberal civil war theory. They suggest that social-constructivist studies of peacekeeping are introduced to quantitative research in order to answer: are transitional authorities creating a self-sustaining space for peace within post-conflict states? Roland Paris, on the other hand, critically examines the liberal peace thesis in a more qualitative framework. Based on an analysis of the world polity with the help of international sociology he asks: are the liberal peace assumptions of peacebuilding borne out of practice?

Doyle and Sambanis pinpoint two aspects with regard to peacebuilding that they find have been largely overlooked in the literature; multidimensional peacekeeping is not only about halting violence, but also about building peace in terms of reversing failed state legitimacy, and therefore does not only involve states, but also civilians. These are both aspects that relate to an internal-external dimension that comes with the vision of collective security for the global world and, more precisely, the international aim to build peace within states. Against this background, Doyle and Sambanis set out to build micro/macro-level analytical models that combine neoliberal analysis of collective security at large with constructivist analysis of the interactions in particular conflicts—that is, international relations theory with civil war theory. By comparing the initial causes

Stabilizing States after War’, *International Security*, Volume 30, Number 4, Spring 2006, pp. 87-112. See also Michael Pugh, ‘Peacekeeping and Critical Theory’, Volume 11, Issue 1, 2004, pp. 39-58.

⁵⁸ For example, Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis conclude that in the international community’s responses to civil strife in the past twenty years “occasional successes in restoring a legitimate and effective government are matched by striking failures to do so”. Similarly, Roland Paris is also concerned with the weak civil wars and the track record of multidimensional peacekeeping since the vast majority of wars since the end of the Cold War have been civil wars given the fact that “countries with a recent history of civil violence had an almost 50 percent change of slipping back into violence”. Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, *Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2006), p. 1, and Roland Paris, *At War’s End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 3-5.

of war with the post-war failure of peace, Doyle and Sambanis establish three key determinants for peacebuilding: local capacity, international capacity and hostility. Together, these form an ideal model for multidimensional peacekeeping in the form of a peacebuilding triangle. The bigger the triangle, the more successful the peacekeeping operation.

With their peacebuilding triangle, Doyle and Sambanis define peacebuilding success by the estimated risk for failure of the operations. Based on two types of failures—flawed mandate performance and flawed peace process—there can be sovereign peace or participatory peace. Mandate performance is evaluated using quantitative statistical analysis of transitional authorities, both UN and non-UN; if an external transitional authority successfully implements its peacekeeping mandate, then the operation successfully established sovereign peace. The peace process is evaluated by qualitatively analyzing a few select case studies in which the UN has been involved; if the peace process is sustainable, then the operation successfully achieved a participatory peace. With this dual classification of success, Doyle and Sambanis recognize that there can be different types of success and then open up the possibility for relative or partial success, meaning that two operations that did not achieve the same objectives may both be classified a success depending on the particular context. Out of the 121 cases of civil war that they triangulate, 84 operations are classified as participatory peace failures and 68 operations as sovereign peace failures. Thus while an externally supported transitional authority has a 50% chance of establishing a sovereign peace after civil war, it is much more unlikely that it will actually be able to build peace within that state.

Roland Paris departs from the observation that while the design and conduct of peacebuilding has been extensively reviewed since the early 1990s, the literature has done little to critically analyze the conceptual foundations of this ‘new’ practice. This means that a key aspect of peacebuilding is excluded from the evaluations in terms of underlying implicit assumptions about correlations. Thus, according to Paris, the first task is to deconstruct peacebuilding and identify the assumptions about how to build domestic peace that underpin these operations. He asks on what grounds the rapid and encompassing doctrinal shifts in UN peacekeeping have taken place. Behind the technical assistance, he identifies a political and economic organizational model of liberal market democracy that relies upon implicit assumptions about how the liberal peace thesis also remedies civil war. But this positive correlation between peace, development and democracy upon which the peacebuilding logic is based is, according to Paris, not

analyzed in the literature. Only the technicalities involved in the implementation of these ambitious mandates are evaluated based on the necessary resources and so on. Thus, by finding a way in which to evaluate both of these dimensions of success, Paris expects to find aspects of peacebuilding that are generally overlooked in the literature. Once he does so, he revisits the current UN peacebuilding model and suggests an alternative model. In his own words, he ‘discovers theory from data’.

To assess whether liberalization builds peace, Paris analyzes post-conflict states where UN peacebuilding has taken place. The difficulty of isolating and measuring the effect of liberalization on peacebuilding brings Paris to use counterfactual analysis as well. With controlled comparison, he outlines three negative questions on the basis of which the case studies are analyzed. First, to investigate whether marketization fosters the conditions for a stable and lasting peace, he asks: “is fighting caused to resume”? Second, to look closer at the different effects that peacebuilding may have in different states, he asks: “are the pre-existing conditions that lead to civil violence exacerbated by the operation”? And third, to create new hypothesis and theory about peacebuilding he asks: “are new conditions that are likely to spark fighting created by the operation”? Like Doyle and Sambanis, Paris also considers two types of success: traditional peace in terms of the absence of large-scale violence, and stable peace as something that falls between a cease-fire and the resolution of all ills—a functioning government. Based on 11 out of the 14 UN peacekeeping operations deployed from 1989-1999, Paris concludes that while the UN has been quite successful in establishing a traditional peace, it has been much less successful in establishing a stable peace. And what is more, the keeping of a traditional peace more often than not has unintended consequences that not only hinder but also lower the chances for building a positive peace. Thus Paris identifies a certain trade-off at stake in multidimensional peacekeeping between keeping a traditional peace and building a positive peace.

These two evaluations of multidimensional peacekeeping operations clearly mirror the current debates in the peacekeeping literature. They acknowledge the limited success of multidimensional peacekeeping operations in establishing a ‘participatory’ or a stable peace and yet they also establish that there is value in the UN pursuing multidimensional peacekeeping. In other words, they question the current models and approach, only to replace them with altered or new models that end up relying on the same assumptions about a positive correlation between peacekeeping and peacebuilding that they criticize. Thus the disagreements between the two camps that are taking shape

in peacekeeping literature are limited to technical and instrumental matters about how multidimensional peacekeeping is best carried out. Doyle and Sambanis find that the operations have a statistically significant positive impact on post-conflict societies because sovereign peace increases the chances for a participatory peace. Paris, on the other hand, identifies unintended consequences of the operations that hinder the peace that the UN keeps to develop into sustainable peacebuilding processes within that state. But neither of the camps investigate, let alone question, the correlation between peacekeeping and peacebuilding and whether the UN can, in the current system of collective security, build peace within states and what this means for the stabilization of the global world.

3. Evaluating multidimensional peacekeeping: peacekeeping, peacebuilding and world order

With institutional and organizational learning and the patterns of civil war as the main indicators for success, the UN's reviews of its operations largely focus on peacekeeper performance, that is whether the means matched the end and the operation respected international principles. Progressive aims that go beyond the operation in both space and time are excluded. More precisely, it is the long-term peacebuilding processes within the states and their relationship to collective security and peace as a project that fail to be taken into account.

The literature's evaluations of multidimensional peacekeeping are also limited to a compromised understanding of peace as progress, but based on the internal effects of specific post-conflict societies rather than the performance of the UN peacekeeping operation. Although the analysis is extended to the more long-term peacebuilding processes that go beyond the operation and questions about whether peacekeeping actually leads to peacebuilding, it does not take into account what weak peacebuilding processes and long-term international involvement mean for collective security at large and the stabilization of the global world.⁵⁹

⁵⁹ See Alex J. Bellamy, 'The 'next stage' in peace operations theory?', *International Peacekeeping*, Volume 11, Issue 1, pp. 17-38; David Chandler, 'The Limits of Peacebuilding: International Regulation and Civil Society Development in Bosnia', *International Peacekeeping*, Volume 6, Number 1, Spring 1999, pp. 109-125, David Chandler, 'Bosnia: The Democracy Paradox', *Current History*, Volume 100, Number 644, Spring 2001, pp. 114-119, and David Chandler, *Empire in Denial: The Politics of State-building* (London, Pluto Press, 2006), and Michael Pugh, 'Peacekeeping and Critical Theory', Volume 11, Issue 1, 2004; and Oliver P. Richmond, *The Transformation of Peace* (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).

Against this background, I set out an analytical framework for multidimensional peacekeeping in which theory is informed by practice without resorting to counterfactual analysis. First, I summarize why it is important to deepen and extend the analysis of multidimensional peacekeeping. Second, I outline three types of success: conceptual and practical success, as well as peacekeeping as a project for global progress in terms of the stabilization of the world—projectual success. Third and finally, I operationalize of the outlined tri-part analytical framework by conducting a brief analysis of the United Nations protection force for former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR).

The missing link in the analysis of peacekeeping operations: the securitization of the world

While we know that multidimensional operations are likely to conduct successful peacekeeping in terms of helping a state to avoid the recurrence of civil war, the only thing that we know about successful peacebuilding is that the UN is not doing much of it. In fact, rather than peacekeeping and peacebuilding representing mutually reinforcing processes, there seems to be a clash between the many aims and overarching global role of multidimensional peacekeeping operations. Peacekeeping might even come at the expense of peacebuilding. Although this is a topic that is increasingly highlighted in both reviews and evaluations of multidimensional peacekeeping operations, the analysis that follows is somewhat narrow. The focus is on the direct practical results in the specific states, in terms of cease-fires, peace agreements or weak states. Their relationship to each other and to the world beyond the operation, however, is not included. As such, little thought is given to what the consequences of post-conflict states stuck in a deadlock where they neither suffer from civil war nor benefit from full state sovereignty are for collective security. But if multidimensional peacekeeping does not lead to peacebuilding, but to an international culture of dependency and a practice of peace-as-global-governance, do the operations still have stabilizing effects for world order?

Conclusions about the success of multidimensional peacekeeping as either institutional learning, the short-term prevention of civil war recurrence or mandate performance are drawn based on under-problematized notions of success. They fail to take into account the assumptions and agreements about the interdependent nature of states' internal and external affairs that justify multidimensional peacekeeping in the first place—that is, peace within states is key to peace between states and the stabilization of the world. As UNSG Boutros-Ghali pointed out in the post-Cold War reviews of peacekeeping, “[o]perations in the field are only the most visible part of a larger set of

international political affairs”.⁶⁰ It is not only the extent to which the operation fulfills the specific aims outlined in the peacekeeping mandate that determine success. It is also how the operations affect collective security, whether they help stabilize the global world. These two aspects of peacekeeping as progress and as a project are closely interlinked and mutually constitutive.

The role of peacekeeping in collective security has changed with the reinvention of collective security. Based on implicit assumptions about a mutually reinforcing relationship between not only peacekeeping, peacebuilding, but also between these and world order, all the aims of peacemaking outlined in the UN Charter—promoting equality, reaffirming rights, establishing justice and promoting progress—have been brought together in the one project of multidimensional peacekeeping.⁶¹ This opens up a range of complex questions with regard to the internal and external dimensions of interdependent states in terms of a global dimension and collective security. What constitutes success has become more complex and open to interpretation, making the UN more vulnerable to political manipulation.

Whereas during the Cold War, it was clear that when states were not directly involved in war with each other there was peace, the UN Member States and the world have yet to agree on what justifies and stabilizes collective security in the global world. That a multidimensional peacekeeping operation fails to strengthen peace within states does not necessarily represent a failure of collective security. In fact, the recent expansion of DPKO and UN peacekeeping suggests that it is enough for the UN to be involved. Although the operations might not build peace and generate progress within particular states, they seem to reassure the international community that war is and will be contained, for their mutual benefit. Conversely, an operation that is able to prevent genocide is not necessarily a success. If for example the operation engendered lasting international disagreements regarding the operation’s legitimacy, this may undermine collective security and as such, have destabilizing effects for world order. Thus whether collective security is a success or failure also depends on the commonly shared understandings and international agreements about world order.

In order to clarify some of the ambiguities with regard to the relationship between states’ internal affairs and collective security in the global world, we must

⁶⁰ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, ‘Introduction’, *The Blue Helmets: A Review of the United Nations Peace-keeping*, 3rd ed. (New York, United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996), p. 8.

⁶¹ Here I refer to the four points that the Preamble of the UN Charter lists as the aims that the peoples are determined to achieve by uniting. See Charter of the United Nations (New York, United Nations Department of Public Information, 1945).

address the analytical gap in the relationship between peacekeeping and peacebuilding, that is the peacebuilding strategy. In other words, we must get a better idea of what costs and trade-offs between the peacekeeping and peacebuilding role and aim of these operations are involved in practice. By addressing the lack of attention given to the relationship between the shifts in the collective security discourse, and what is (or is not) achieved in practice I hope to clarify some of those ambiguities about whether and how multidimensional peacekeeping stabilize the global world. To this end, I outline a wide and deep analytical framework that aims to review and evaluate the aims as well as the role of multidimensional peacekeeping, incorporating both quantitative and qualitative information and connecting processes across borders and boundaries. I evaluate not only the extent to which operations keep peace but also the extent to which they build peace and the relationship between the two. I ask, do post-conflict states that neither suffer from civil war, nor benefit from civil peace, stabilize world order? In other words, does the outcome of multidimensional peacekeeping operations confirm the reinvention of collective security; does it promote human security and consolidate positive peace?⁶²

Three types of peacekeeping success: conceptual, practical and 'projectual'

Since both the conceptual and practical success of multidimensional peacekeeping is already extensively reviewed and evaluated, we can focus on a third type of success of peacekeeping as a project that starts before and goes beyond the individual operations—that is, the role of operations in stabilizing world order. But for 'projectual success' to make sense, it must be evaluated together with conceptual and practical success in an analytical framework that takes their close interdependent relationships into account—that is, the ways in which they complement each other or clash. All three types of success will require their own sets of indicators which will vary from one operation to the next based on changes in the mandates, doctrines and their implementation. To analyze conceptual and practical success we can use the indicators applied in the UN reviews of peacekeeping operations if we complement these with aspects from the recent critical strand of peacekeeping literature. To analyze 'projectual success' we have to join together security and peace studies to connect peacekeeping and peacebuilding, and place them within the larger context of world order. While this is likely to result in a problematized notion of success, it is also expected to explain and clarify correlations in multidimensional peacekeeping and help us ask questions that are not necessarily negative or counterfactual in nature.

⁶² See Roland Paris, *At War's End*, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004).

Conceptual Success – Conceptual success is predominantly evaluated using indicators of the extent to which the aims of the operation and their implementation conform with the peacekeeping doctrine and the terms of engagement. Did the end match the means? Conclusions are drawn based on more qualitative research, mostly conducted in discourse analysis. The mandates, cease-fire agreements, plans for implementing the mandate (Plan of Action) and the peace accords are compared with the peacekeeping doctrine of that time and the international support for the implementation of the mandate or accords (economic and rhetoric). In essence, this type of success has to do with the operation’s legitimacy. What needs to be added is the dynamics between the UN and the Member States, which can explain the mandate to a large extent—that is, what choices, comprises and trade-offs lie beneath the mandates? To this end, we can compare the mandate and its implementation plan with the background material on which they were based, including NGO shadow reports.

Practical Success – Practical success is most commonly evaluated by indicators of the extent to which the operation has actually fulfilled its specific aims. Did the operation implement its mandate(s)? The indicators are more quantitative than those involved in conceptual success, and include data on everything from war recurrence patterns and hostility levels and types, to economic growth and democratization. While peacekeeping aims are measured by numbers of deaths and displacements, hostile incidents and crime rates, factions and human rights abuse, peacebuilding aims are measured by electricity consumption per capita, the annual rate of change in real per capita income, resource dependency, election results and behavior. What we need to add are those aspects of democratization that, from the center of multidimensional peacekeeping mandates, link peacekeeping to peacebuilding within and between states. Did the former lead to the latter? To this end, we draw upon studies in comparative politics that observe and measure democracy consolidation in terms of encompassing shifts in political culture; the internal legitimation of a ‘new’ state is assessed by indicators of institutionalization, and the democratic nature of governments by the depth and authenticity of the commitment to democracy. All in all, it is representation, accountability and responsibility that we add to the analysis in order to include aspects regarding laying the foundations for future self-sustaining peacebuilding processes.⁶³

⁶³ More precise examples of indicators of democratization are: the coherence, capacity and autonomy of institutions; the efficiency of the governments’ in addressing of societal problems; the behavioral and attitudinal embrace of democratic principles and methods by a widening range of actors who assume democratic order; a growth in trust and cooperation among competitors; and a democratic socialization of

Projectual Success – Projectual success must be evaluated using indicators of the extent to which the operation confirms the reinvention of collective security. Rather than asking questions regarding how things were during or at the termination of the operation, this type of success must be established based on what has come to be, both in the post-conflict state that the operation left behind and in the larger context of collective security. Did the operation set off self-sustainable peacebuilding processes, and thus have stabilizing effects for the world? To evaluate the relationship between these two levels in terms of specific and general processes over time, and across borders and boundaries, I suggest that we draw on Lisa Morjé Howard’s analytical framework for post-Cold War peacekeeping. More specifically, on her idea of analyzing organization learning at two mutually constitutive levels: first-level learning is interested in what goes on within each operation once it is established in the post-civil war environment—“ability to engage in multidimensional peacekeeping”; and second-level learning focuses on what goes on at UN headquarters in between operations—“the organization’s overall means, structures, and goals, in response to new understandings of problems and their causes”.⁶⁴ Both levels are understood as social constructions of reality made up of ongoing processes that start before and continue beyond the particular operations.⁶⁵ We take this type of organizational learning and apply it to a two-level analysis of projectual success: (i) peacebuilding in post-conflict societies, and (ii) peace-as-global-governance. On the one hand, we ask questions about post-conflict societies and, more precisely, about implicit assumptions about a ‘symbiosis’ between peacekeeping and peacebuilding. “What does the ‘peace’ that is being installed in conflict zones around the world through

the general population. See Larry Diamond, *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation* (Baltimore, the John Hopkins University Press, 1999), p. 64.

⁶⁴ Using a method of ‘structured focused comparison’ (similar to Roland Paris’s), Howard measures the success of ten of the most complex multidimensional peacekeeping operations deployed between 1989-2008 in two simple yet comprehensive types of success. Rather than conducting counterfactual analysis, ‘unwritten stories of success’ are identified and explained in four necessary (but insufficient) conditions or sources for success: (i) permissive situational factors of the internal dynamics of civil war; (ii) two dimensions of security council interests in the shape of dynamics that lie behind the ‘consensus’ and the ‘intensity’ of the expression of interest; (iii) the ‘rules’ of peacekeeping in terms of the ‘holy trinity’; and (iv) two levels of organizational learning, within the peacekeeping operation in the field, and at headquarters between actors and across operations. The fourth and final condition, organizational learning, is of most interest to us. Lisa Morjé Howard, *UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars* (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2008).

⁶⁵ First-level learning is evaluated by four indicators: the collection and analysis of information; the coordination of the different divisions involved; the engagement with the post-war environment; and the leadership of all parties. Second level learning is evaluated by three indicators: the social construction of reality, actors and success; the ability to engage with the environment of post-intra state conflict; and changes in the organizational structures, such as the procedures, routines, strategies and goals of peacekeeping. Lisa Morjé Howard, *UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars* (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 14-20.

UN peace operations [...] entail?”⁶⁶ Is it self-sustaining? On the other hand, we ask questions about the project of peace-as-global-governance, that is, the implicit assumption that “UN peace operations contribute to the construction of a liberal international order made up of democratic states”. How does the peace that is installed by multidimensional peacekeeping operations relate to collective security and affect world order?⁶⁷ For both types of projectual success, our main interest lies in the transitional period of post-conflict states, which in peace studies is referred to as the zone of peace, preliminary peace, illiberal or virtual peace.⁶⁸

Finally, while most reviews and evaluations are based on a fixed time periods and set geo-political borders, multidimensional peacekeeping has to be evaluated in a framework that qualifies cases based on processes instead of fixed targets. Since the UN is usually present in the post-conflict states long after the termination of a peacekeeping mandate, the operation cannot be considered something of the past while the peacebuilding project is still very much in the making. Although the period of cease-fire and the subsequent five years are important, we must also take into account the current status of these states, as well as the international efforts by actors and agencies and through policies, still involved in these countries. Depending on the particular circumstances, a state that has successfully maintained a cease-fire for more than a decade may be at a similar stage as another state that has enjoyed cease-fire for less than half a decade.

A brief revisit of UNPROFOR: operationalizing the triangular analytical framework

Already upon the termination of UNPROFOR’s mandates, the United Nations Secretary-General (UNSG) Boutros Boutros-Ghali, underlined that while the operation had serious costs—human, political and monetary—it provided the international community with invaluable peacekeeping information and knowledge.⁶⁹ Thus although there is no doubt that UNPROFOR suffered some of the most devastating failures of UN peacekeeping to date, the operation serves as one of the most important models for

⁶⁶ Oliver P. Richmond, *The Transformation of Peace* (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 150.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

⁶⁸ See David Chandler, *From Kosovo to Kabul: Human Rights and International Intervention* (London, Pluto, 2002), Michael Ignatief, *Empire Lite: Nation-building in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan* (London, Vintage, 2003), and Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky, *The Real World Order* (New Jersey, Chatham House Publishers, 1993).

⁶⁹ The UNSG Boutros-Ghali also found that UNPROFOR deserved credit for successfully protecting humanitarian activities, negotiations and assistance in implementing cease-fires and other military arrangements. See Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1026 (1995), S/1995/1031, 13 December 1995.

multidimensional peacekeeping in the global world. It was a truly multidimensional peacekeeping operation, with goals evolving from military and civilian to economic and political that took place at a time when collective security was in the process of defining its role in the global world. The changes it went through and the negotiations, agreements and decisions that were involved in this operation mirror key debates and shifts in what shapes the reinvention of collective security for the global world and justifies multidimensional peacekeeping. Therefore, to get a better understanding of the dominant discourse of collective security I suggest that we revisit the successful termination of this operation within the tri-part analytical framework. We ask what were the aims and role of the operation, how did they change over the course of the operation, and to what extent were they fulfilled? Once we know more about the choices and prioritizations or compromises that were made in order to successfully terminate UNPROFOR's mandate, we can consider what that reveals about the reinvention of collective security and the justificatory background of the explosion of multidimensional peacekeeping.

The violence in the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) first erupted in the republics of Slovenia and Croatia after they both declared independence in June 1991. The eighteen special reports submitted by the UN's Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in the former Yugoslavia, testify of a steady escalation of violence throughout the region, with widespread abuse of the fundamental and human rights of peoples.⁷⁰ By the end of 1992, the UN reported that Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) had become "the most recent explosion in the violent break-up of post-Tito

⁷⁰ The Commission on Human Rights held its first ever special session on former Yugoslavia on 13-14 August 1992 when it also appointed a Special Rapporteur for the region –Tadeusz Mazowiecki. The Special Rapporteur was to investigate firsthand the human rights situation in the former Yugoslavia, particularly in BiH, and systematically gather information with regards to possible human rights violations and war crimes from various sources and make recommendation for how to end as well as prevent these. The recommendations that were issued in the first Report amounted to immediate action be taken by the international community to create safe havens within the republics as well as in the neighbouring countries for the many refugees. A second Special Session on the Human Rights situation was held 30 November-1 December 1992 and Tadeusz Mazowiecki was upon his resignation replaced by Elisabeth Rehn on 27 July 1995. The Commission on Human Rights is one of the UN's oldest standard-setting international institution that has underpinned collective security ever since it concluded its landmark work on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. But it was first in May 1990 that the Economic and Social Council, in its resolution 1990/48 of 25 May 1990, authorized the Commission to meet between its regular sessions, provided that a majority of the members of the Commission so agreed. See Commission Resolution 1992/S-1/1. The reporting continued for many years to come and human rights field offices were set up throughout the region. In 1993 human rights field offices were set up in Zagreb and Skopje, and later on in Sarajevo and Mostar. For more about all the special and periodic reports issued with regards to former Yugoslavia (all together 18) see *The Blue Helmets: A Review of the United Nations Peace-keeping*, 3rd ed. (New York, United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996), pp. 501-505.

Yugoslavia”.⁷¹ In addition to internal disagreements about the future status of the Republic, BiH was also increasingly suffering from conflicts between external parties. Croatia was supporting groups of Bosnian Croats, the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) of the former SFRY groups of Bosnian Serbs, and the international community Bosniak groups (also referred to as Bosnian Muslims). Located at the very centre of the SFRY, with a population of mixed origins that were widely dispersed over the country, and that did not necessarily share a national identity, BiH came to be something of a central playing board for the violent dissolution of the former SFRY.⁷² It was here that some of the worst violence took place, but also where the violent dissolution of the SFRY was settled.⁷³

The international community struggled to come to terms with the many conflicts that played out as the former SFRY dissolved, how to define and address them. From February 1992 to March 1995, UNPROFOR’s initial mandate was renewed eight times, it expanded more than ten times and it developed at least a dozen cease-fire agreements and peace plans.⁷⁴ It included numerous overlapping military and civilian components, spread out from Croatia in the north-west, through BiH and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) in the south-east. It responded to a wide range of interactions between international, regional and state actors, as well as local and trans-national, governmental and non-governmental actors, and deployed more peacekeeping troops and UN personnel than ever before. UNPROFOR’s aims and role changed according to both how the conflicts developed on the ground, and to the agreements and institutional

⁷¹ See the ‘Opening Statement of Cyrus Vance to the Ministerial Meeting of the Steering Committee’, Report of the Secretary General on the International Conference for Former Yugoslavia, S/25015, 24 December 1992, Annex II.

⁷² In 1991 Slovenia the population was 87.6 percent Slovene and in Croatia 78.1 percent Croat, but in BiH the population was 43.7 percent Muslim (or Bosniak), 31.4 percent Serb, 17.3 percent Croat, and 7.6 percent Yugoslav or other. See Susan L. Woodward, *The Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War* (Washington, Brookings Institution, 1995), pp. 33-34. For more about the longstanding multi-ethnic history of BiH see Steven M. Weine, *When History is a Nightmare: Live and Memories of Ethnic Cleansing in Bosnia-Herzegovina* (New Brunswick, Rutgers University Press, 1999).

⁷³ For the *General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Annexes thereto (collectively by the Peace Agreement* see A/50/79c, S/1995/999, 30 November 1995.

⁷⁴ See letter dated 24 September 1996 from Chairman of the Security Council Commission established pursuant to Resolution 724 (1991) concerning Yugoslavia addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/1996/776, 24 September 1996, paragraph 50. UNPROFOR’s mandate was extended on 30 June 1993 (S/RES/847) until 30 September 1993; on 30 September 1993 (S/RES/869) for 24 hours; on 1 October 1993 (S/RES/870) until 5 October 1993; on 4 October 1993 (S/RES/871) until 31 March 1994; on 31 March 1994 (S/RES/908) until 30 September 1994; and on 30 September 1994 (S/RES/947) until 31 March 1995. For more about the negotiating history see Richard Holbrook, *To End a War* (New York, Random House, 1998); David Owen, *Balkan Odyssey* (New York, Harcourt Brace, 1995); and Bertrand de Rossanet, *Peacemaking and Peacekeeping in Yugoslavia*, Nijhoff Law Specials, Volume 17 (The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1996).

arrangements that the international community were making with regards to the set-up and order of the post-Cold War world—that is, about the reinvention of collective security for the global world. Three overarching changes can be identified in the mandate and aims of UNPROFOR and in how they were implemented, which indicate what type of choices and prioritization and compromises between short-term securitization and long-term consolidation—between peacekeeping and peacebuilding—that are involved in multidimensional peacekeeping.

UNPROFOR was initially deployed to limit the humanitarian sufferings caused by the violent dissolution and democratization of a complex federal republic with a longstanding history of internal friction and authoritarian rule.⁷⁵ First and foremost it set out to achieve conceptual success by addressing the violence in the SFRY without undermining its state sovereignty and breaking with the principle of non-intervention. But when this gave little result in terms of calming and ending the conflicts in ways that were understood to have stabilizing effects on world order, the Security Council became more eager to achieve more practical success, raising the belligerents' military and political costs of fighting. The internal claims for self-determination were recognized in order to allow UNPROFOR to conduct peacekeeping between the internal fractions although this undermined the conceptual success of the force. The aims of UNPROFOR changed from providing humanitarian aid in response to an intra-state war to carry out peacekeeping between at least three new interdependent states within one of its member-states.

As the Security Council was repeatedly forced to renew UNPROFOR's mandate to prevent the progress that was achieved from reversing, the aims of the force were also made wider and deeper. The UN peacekeepers and the international community, but also the warring parties, struggled to understand the aims and role of the multidimensional peacekeeping operation that had evolved by now. Not only was UNPROFOR mandated to conduct peacekeeping between several states, it was also instructed to do so in ways that lead to peacebuilding within and across states. But as the two processes were not necessarily proving to be mutually reinforcing, the Security Council established that despite certain progress, the threat posed by these conflicts persisted. From now on, conceptual and practical success was overridden by the determination to successfully terminate UNPROFOR to reassure the international community of the stabilizing effects

⁷⁵ Carl Bildt, 'Foreword', Wolfgang Biermann and Martin Vadset eds., *United Nations Peacekeeping in Trouble: Lessons Learned from the Former Yugoslavia* (Aldershot, Ashgate, 1998).

of multidimensional peacekeeping for world order. A third shift can be noted, as the Security Council issued mandates that were less open to compromise, and more supportive of enforcing peace, both from below and from above. The aggressors were separated from the victim, and UNPROFOR was authorized to forcefully intervene without the consent of all the warring parties. Thus, the UN ended up practicing peace enforcement rather than peacekeeping. As these peacebuilding processes to this date remain remarkably weak, the price of successfully terminating UNPROFOR in order for the UN to stabilize the global world amounted to both conceptual and practical failures and in hindsight, arguable also projectual success as it is still unclear whether the type of international engagement that UNPROFOR has left behind has more stabilizing than destabilizing effects on world order.

UNPROFOR was successfully terminated despite the fact that the post-conflict states in the region were not strong enough to be independent. Still today many of these states are described as ‘phantom states’, ‘hybrid polities’ or ‘pseudo-state polities’ that suffer from a ‘sovereignty gap’. Since the reinvention of collective security and the expansion of UN peacekeeping is informed and justified by conclusions about the successful termination of past operations including UNPROFOR, the fact that the problems of weak post-intra state conflict states are overlooked, means not only that the international culture of dependency is likely to continue to grow, but also that it is part and parcel of the reinvention of collective security.⁷⁶ In other words, multidimensional peacekeeping requires a practice of peace-as-global-governance that involves complicated and normatively loaded questions in terms of competing and sometimes even conflicting aims. It is forcing the UN to assume a certain independence as an international or global actor in its own right that not only should be able to act without the consent of the host state, but that also has the responsibility to do so. In addition, the expectations on these operations are remarkably high, solving complex state crises where there is no peace to keep, and filling legitimacy voids in weak states with international legal and judicial tools. However, practice shows that the UN is currently not equipped,

⁷⁶ For more about a ‘culture of dependency’ and ‘phantom states’ see David Chandler, ‘The Limits of Peacebuilding: International Regulation and Civil Society Development in Bosnia’, *International Peacekeeping*, Volume 6, Number 1, Spring 1999, pp. 109-125, David Chandler, ‘Bosnia: The Democracy Paradox’, *Current History*, Volume 100, Number 644, Spring 2001, pp. 114-119, and David Chandler, *Empire in Denial: The Politics of State-building* (London, Pluto Press, 2006); for more about ‘hybrid polities’ see David Roberts, ‘Post-conflict Statebuilding and State Legitimacy: From Negative to Positive Peace?’, *Development and Change*, Volume 39, number 4, 2000, pp. 537-555; for more about the ‘sovereignty gap’ see Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart, *Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World* (New York, Oxford University Press, 2008), and for more about ‘pseudo-state polities’ see Michael Pugh, ‘Peacekeeping and Critical Theory’, *International Peacekeeping*, Volume 11, Number 1, Spring 2004, pp. 39-58.

neither technically let alone normatively, to lead and implement such an ambitious project in practice. For the UN to be successful and collective security to have stabilizing effects something has to give, either the discourse or the organizing principles of world order. But first of all, the normative dilemmas of this discourse and the implications that it has for practice have to be acknowledged, analysed and subject to multilateral negotiations and eventually also international agreements.

Conclusion

The brief analysis of the conceptual, practical and projectual success of UNPROFOR, shows that if we assess degrees rather than absolutes, we will find that the more ambitious the peacekeeping mandate, the more the operations have to stretch and bend the terms of engagement. As this means that multidimensional peacekeeping operations are likely to be successful in one area on the expense of another, the conclusions about the positive effects of these operations reflect an unarticulated consensus about their acceptable costs or a certain compromise and prioritization between their many aims that amounts to an international culture of dependency.

The projectual success of UNPROFOR was brought about by peace being enforced from above with air strikes, and from below with international transitional administrations. And more than a decade later, peace is to a large extent still enforced. This implies that the positive effects that the literature and the discourse find multidimensional peacekeeping to have, are different from traditional peacekeeping, and they do not come from 'strong' states and self-sustaining peacebuilding processes.

Thus, the positive effects that outweigh the failures of multidimensional peacekeeping operations are in the process rather than in the outcome of individual operations at a certain place in time—that is, in the reinvention of collective security rather than in the specific post-conflict states and their peacebuilding processes. In other words, although multidimensional peacekeeping operations are likely to undermine the holy trinity, and keep but not build peace within states, they are still seen to have positive effects that outweigh these conceptual and practical failure. This indicates that the positive wave is based on conclusions about how the compromised success of these operations will if not immediately then eventually, lead to peacebuilding processes *across* states that stabilize the world at large.

The practice of peace-as-global-governance that has evolved over the last two decades of multidimensional peacekeeping operations suggests that a weak state that is

dependent on international assistance is less of a threat than an independent weak state. Thus peacekeeping has shifted to involve an important degree of direct governance that requires a system of global governance in its own right. This has blurred the demarcations of where collective security begins and where it ends, and put the UN in charge of proactively defining and qualifying reality in terms of distinguishing legitimate from illegitimate practices and actors.⁷⁷ The problem is however that while the international community has clearly agreed on the peacebuilding norm in theory, it has not agreed upon the UN performing such a role in practice. The Organization is not only forced to make difficult decisions, but also to lead a practice that is likely to undermine its legitimacy.

⁷⁷ See *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility*, High-Level-Panel Report on Threats, Challenges and Changes, (New York, United Nations, 2005), paragraph 262.