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The evolution of European security identity in EC / EU institutions in the (post-)Cold War period

Western European integration in the post World War II period is often studied as a phenomenon detached from the international political developments of that time and in particular separate from the Cold War security considerations. Particularly the study of the common institutions of the European Community seems to conclude that East-West tensions were not key factors shaping them. This claim is sustained by the fact that, throughout the period, much of the work of the Communities concentrated on economic issues.

In contrast to this view, this paper argues that although the daily business of the institutions did not revolve around security and defence issues that were mostly dealt within the framework of NATO, the ideas represented by the ideological struggle were influential also within the Communities. The role of ideas in the development of European security identity is particularly manifest in the so called critical junctures of the integration history when competing notions of Europeanness were present. In the view of this paper the three most significant moments of this ideational contestation in recent European history were at the end of World War II and the beginning of European integration; at the end of the Cold War and the enlargement of the EU and in the post-9/11 period that has seen the emergence of new security discourse.

The paper's main argument is that shared ideas on European identity and the understanding of European security evolved not only in national discourses but also within the European institutions. As a consequence they also played a role in the emergence of the Common Foreign and Security Policy in the 1990s.

Introduction

The European Union (EU) today is an international organization taking tentative steps in the field of external security. The recent (2009-2010) institutional changes in the Union's structure serve as a strong testimony of its conscious will to develop this capacity. Thus the Union today has a Foreign Minister, and a "foreign ministry", i.e. the External Action Service, is being formed. Most commonly, the beginning of this development is placed at the end of the Cold War in 1989-1991. Many authors agree that the great geo-political transformation inevitably forced also the European Union to be more active in matters of security. Indeed, scholarly attention has been mostly directed towards analysing the "new categories of security threats" that have emerged in the post-Cold War period (see e.g. Lawrence 1996, Kirchner and Sperling 2007). Before 1989, it is argued, the West European cooperative project had concentrated on regulating the relations of its member countries in matters of economy and trade without paying much attention to outside world.

This paper advances a different argument and pays more attention to the security aspects of the European integration project on a longer time scale. The main claim is that, since its very beginnings, perceptions of security have played a major role in the development of the community. At the centre of interest are in particular the ways in which individual understandings of security that may have differed from national considerations have contributed to the construction of a new "communal" security identity. I believe that shared security and threat perceptions have been one of the corner stones upon which the community progressively built its identity and also its practices. In order to verify this claim, the present paper undertakes the task of studying security-related considerations of the political elite who has been influential at different phases of the integration process. The study is not linear and thus will not analyse with an equal depth the whole 60 years of integration history. Instead, the paper will provide evidence to its claim by studying in detail certain key periods which testify of the high priority given to security concerns.

Before entering the subject matter as such, however, it is important to define how this paper understands and studies security. In order to be correctly understood it is useful to situate oneself in relation to the divide between realist and constructivist approaches of political science. In the end, a lot of the interpretational differences between the paper and the research it criticises stem from a different understanding of security.

Defining and studying security

Making a distinction between traditional and "new" approaches to security studies starts to be rather commonplace in security-oriented political scientific research. As pointed out by Michael Williams (2003: 511): "Over the past decade, the field of security studies has become one of the most dynamic and contested areas in International Relations. In particular, it has become perhaps the primary forum in which broadly social constructivist approaches have challenged traditional – largely Realist and neoRealist – theories on their 'home turf' [...]". Usually the term of traditional security studies is reserved to approaches that mostly focus on material characteristics of security. They see security-related issues as objective empirical phenomena, that can be studied independently of the context in which they appear. As a contrast, "new" approaches to security base their argument on a different definition of security. They conceptualise it as bound by the context and formed by the discourse of powerful actors. The "new" theories that include for instance feminism, normative theory and post-structuralism are sometimes assembled under the label of "critical theories" because of their generally critical attitude towards the (neo-)realist paradigm. However, because of the empirical inclination of this paper, only a brief description of the main epistemological bases of the different "critical" or post-positivist approaches will be given. The main concern of this chapter is to define the specific theoretical and methodological tools that will be applied to the concrete case of this paper, namely the role of security perceptions for European integration.

Post-positivist approaches such as constructivism underline the constructed nature of all social reality, including security. Thus in the post-positivist view security cannot receive a generalizable definition. Instead, post-positivists define territorial security as a *socio-spatial consciousness* (Laitinen 2003). In other words, the meaning of security can only be understood in the specific context in which it has been used thus directing research towards the "collective forms of consciousness and ideologies which have been constituted in the *course of the history of a specific territorial unit*" (Laitinen 2003: 16, emphasis added). Conceptualising security as socially and spatially bound directs the research towards the analysis of practical and mental traditions, practices and continuum that result in a shared perception of security. As a consequence, "critical" security research has to pay more attention to less explicit manifestations of security than the traditional approaches usually do.

Significant research in this direction has been developed by researchers of the Copenhagen School of International Relations. In the constructivist logic, the theory developed by the school claims that security does not have a fixed meaning but is recognized as a social and intersubjective constitution in the form of speech acts. The most notable contribution of the school is the concept of

securitisation which helps to understand security as subjective and context-bound instead of being objective and universal. Securitisation is the term used to describe a process through which an issue becomes a security issue. As the authors of this theory argue, this process happens not because of a real existential threat but because a certain issue is successfully presented and named as such by a relevant actor (Buzan et al. 1998: 24). This definition of security thus maintains that the security agenda of states or other actors is plastic and contingent on the preferences and perceptions of elites (Kirchner and Sperling 2007: 12). Defining security as speech act, as something that only comes into existence through a process of naming, inevitably directs research towards the instances where this naming takes place. In other words, the study of the securitisation process implies the study of discourses through which a certain understanding of security is formed. As a matter of fact, discourses are the prime object of study of the Copenhagen school.

The research agenda of the Copenhagen school does not, however, entirely correspond with the purposes of this research, and I use the concepts developed in the securitisation theory mostly as methodological tools. The main problem comes from the way the concept of security is understood. In the securitisation theory security is seen as something inherently negative, as a mechanism to maintain certain power structures of domination: "The invocation of security has been the key to legitimising the use of force, and more generally opening the way for the state to mobilise or to take special power — eg. using conscription, secrecy, and other means only legitimate when dealing with 'security matters'" (Wæver 2004: 8). This viewpoint stems from the systemic orientation of the theory. Indeed, it mainly concentrates on explaining security practices at the level of large organized institutions such as states. The focus of this paper is different. The paper takes a less state-centric position and is more interested in the individual perceptions of security that guide the actions of people. Thus, it will not describe the ways in which certain policies have become securitised in the context of European integration. The objective is rather to find out how the individual (or at times shared) perceptions of security have influenced the evolution of the integration process. Also, my work operates on a lower level of generality as it does not describe large structural trends of security perception like those presented for instance by Neumann (see e.g. 1999).

Another feature of the securitisation theory that is not adopted in this study is its normative and at times even emancipatory agenda. This tendency logically derives from the theory's perception of security as a something negative, as "a failure to deal with issues as normal politics" (Wæver 2004: 8). This conceptualisation conducts the theory to propose a solution to what it regards as a problem. Indeed, the theory has developed the concept of *de*-securitisation that it presents as a solution to excessive political uses of security: "Ideally, politics should be able to unfold according to normal procedures without this extraordinary elevation of specific 'threats' to a

pre-political immediacy. De-securitisation is the optimal long-range option, since it means not to have issues phrased as 'threats against which we have countermeasures' but to move them out of this threat-defence sequence and into the ordinary public sphere [...]" (ibid.). Once again this paper detaches itself from the securitisation theory, as it does not seek to prescribe a solution to problems but rather tries to maintain a more neutral approach towards its object of study.

Despite these differences, the Copenhagen school approach is nonetheless useful for this paper because of its innovative research method. The school puts strong emphasis on discovering the ways in which language is used to formulate security policies and, by extension, the ways in which it modifies the identities of those who are the targets of the discourse: "To register the act of something being securitised, [...] it is to understand the processes of constructing a shared understanding of what is to be considered and collectively responded to as a threat. The process of securitisation is *a speech act*. It is not interesting as a sign referring to something more real: it is the utterance itself that is the act" (ibid. emphasis in original). Like the securitisation theory, this paper is also interested in the linguistic manifestations of security thought. The central object of study are the discourses that portray the thoughts of policy practitioners vis-à-vis security issues. As explained above, this paper is interested to know how security perceptions affect individuals and the policy-decision they make. Thus it is interested in *identity-construction* on a personal but also at the communal level. Discourse analysis is thus a particularly suitable method as the evolution of a European identity (or any identity for that matter) can be read as a narrative, a developing story that has been created with the help of a coherent conceptual apparatus (Stråth 2002).

The approach of this paper can thus be seen as also belonging to the constructivist strand of International Relations that emphasise the psychological dimension of political action. Political entities such as the European Union are not seen as acting agents in themselves but as reflecting the psychological dispositions of the individuals that make up those entities. This position is aptly summarised by Adler (1997: 322) who explains that: "Constructivism shows that even our more enduring institutions are based on collective understandings; that they are reified structures that were once upon a time conceived ex nihilo by human consciousness; and that these understandings were subsequently diffused and consolidated until they were taken for granted." By studying the discourses that have been formulated by EU politicians the aim of this paper is to discover the ideological or ideational basis on which the political community has been built. I believe that the European Union is particularly suitable for this type of psychological analysis since it is a relatively new polity and its history has been well documented. Thus it should be possible to find out what thoughts, concerns and threats have motivated the people who have been involved in its development.

Finally, and as explained before, this paper will only focus on the security-related thought of EU integration. I believe it is particularly important to study security perceptions of people who are involved in the planning and development of a new political community (even if the original plans do not envisage very extended forms of cooperation). The reason for this is that the construction of a political community implies a set of common representations (Neumann 1998). Common representations can be of two main types: positive ones emphasising the common features of the members or negative ones contrasting the collective to something that is perceived as different and threatening. Thus threat perceptions that construct the members of a community as belonging together because they jointly do not belong to a certain other group form an essential element of common identities. This is not to say that threat and security perceptions are necessarily fixed and unchanged over time. Indeed, as the case of European integration will show, threat perceptions emanating from different sources can contribute to the construction and development of a single political community.

European integration studies and security issues

A lot of present research on European Union defines security explicitly or implicitly in terms of existing EU security institutions and practices. For this type of research the creation of a new policy field entitled "Security and Defence Policy" is a proof of existing security policy. In the same logic, the European Security Strategy of 2003, the Union's growing number of external military missions and the increasing institutionalization of the policies are used as a basis for studying the EU's nature as a security actor (e.g. Biscop 2004). All these examples are understood as undeniable proof of the Union's activity. What is generally discussed is the scope, the impact and the success of the actions it takes. Explaining the European Union's character through actions itself decides to take in the field of security bears, however, the risk of limiting the attention to approved or official EU discourse. This focus tends to discard unofficial or not yet institutionalized discourse as irrelevant.

The present paper argues the opposite. For this paper, the outspoken efforts of the Union in creating a security identity are not of primary interest. Its main concern is to show the strong influence of security-related consideration even when official actions have not yet been taken to meet these concerns. This viewpoint is borrowed from the premises of critical security studies according to which security is best understood in relation to human beings and only by extension in relation to states and other similar institutions. The critical approach encourages research to break out from the conceptual framework dictated by the state and observe the social construction of threat and security imagery undertaken by individuals. So, instead of basing the research on material provided by the object under study, this paper approaches the EU through a theoretical

framework on security issues (see above). This way of approaching the subject will hopefully broaden the scope of what is understood as "security" in the European integration and will provide insights on issues previously understudied or ignored. In order to achieve this aim, this study has conducted empirical analysis of security perceptions of people who have actively contributed to the development of European integration. The focus is precisely on analysing the perceptions of security as they existed in the minds of the contemporaries, and the objective is not to retrospectively assess their validity (as is done in some historical studies e.g. Milward 1992).

As explained in the introduction, the study does not aim to be chronological but rather illustrative of the method explained above. Thus not all politicians involved in European integration period have been studied and not the whole time period from the end of 1940s to present day has been covered. Instead, the paper focuses on a limited number of documentation in periods that can objectively be defined as "critical" for integration history. Since the object of study is the construction of an institution, logically the most critical moments in its history are those of contestation. In the case of European integration the moments of strongest contestation of existing order can, first of all, be witnessed at the creation stages of the new community (from the end of 1940s to the beginning of 1950s). Despite a consensus on a very general level of the desirability of a continental political community, that period witnessed strong contesting discourses on the more precise form the institution should take. As will be shown in the empirical chapter, debates about the type of cooperation or polity that was desirable in Europe almost invariably were motivated by some kind of fear. The causes of these fears were, however, not necessarily always those that have been ascribed to this period in subsequent history-writing. Analysis of the fear / security discourse of the early years of integration will form the first part of the empirical chapter. PARSONS CH1

The first period of internal debate ended roughly speaking when the plans to form a European defence community failed to materialise (in 1954). The more turbulent era was replaced with a period of relative stability from the point of view of contestedness of the institution. In other words it was consolidated. Although in the period from late 1950s to late 1980s threat perceptions did not disappear, they were not essential to the existence of the community. A change in this situation happened at the end of the Cold War when the global geo-political transformations threatened to un stabilise the community from its very foundations. Thus the second part of the empirical chapter will analyse the security perceptions of this period. Generally speaking, the post Cold War period was not threatening the existing European institutions in a material way (although the Yugoslav wars had some concrete repercussions). Instead, as the chapter will show, the main threat perceived by EU elite in that period menaced the ideational bases of the community. Actually, the present-day EU policies in the Union's neighbourhood can pretty convincingly be explained

through the threat-imagery that emerged 20 years ago.

The focus on two specific periods in integration history, the immediate post-war period and the post Cold War period, does not mean that the security considerations would not have played a role at other times. The choices made in this paper are done mostly for practical reasons and in order to demonstrate the usefulness of the approach. In subsequent research also the more stable Cold War period will be researched from this point of view. The general hypothesis behind this work is indeed that no period in integration history has been free from security-related concerns. However, the sources and nature of the threats have certainly varied. With this paper and following research the aim is to widen the picture of a period in European history which often is depicted as being a-political and not security conscious.

Security concerns that have motivated European integration

At the end of Second World War

The phase of European integration that can be qualified as being most political, is undoubtedly the period when the whole process was launched. Already during the war but particularly right at its close, multiple more or less realistic ideas about the future of the continent were expressed. For instance, the various national resistance movements had shared a vision of a peaceful Europe that could be achieved only through some supranational structure built along federal lines (Urwin 1995: 7-10). Although their at times utopian ideas were tuned down at the end of the war, the biggest Western European conference on the future of Europe was organised by these forces. From 7th to 10th of May 1948 the International Committee of the Movements for European Unity organised an international gathering in the Hague under the name Congress of Europe. The deliberations of the Congress aptly summarise the ideas discussed and disputed during it, and they can also serve as illustration of the broader political climate of Europe that was entering the Cold War.

Firstly, the Congress documents demonstrate a general consensus on the necessity of some kind of a European Union, which is of course not surprising given the explicit aim of the gathering. A closer look to the Congress' discourse reveals the security aspects that guided the discussions¹. The most pressing concern on the participants' mind was quite understandably the question of Germany. It was mainly perceived a political one although it also contained significant economic issues. The political resolution states quite unequivocally that: "the integration of Germany in a

¹ The material of the passage mainly comes from three resolutions produced by the Congress: a political, an economic and social, and a cultural one, as well as from a political declaration called the "Message to Europeans".

United or Federated Europe alone provides a solution to both the economic and political aspects of the German problem" (Congress of Europe 1948: 6). The French attitudes in particular showed obvious concerns for renewed German dominance. Already at this time suggestions were made for directing Germany's industrial capacity, i.e. its coal production, under a European authority (Vermeil 1948). In general terms, the Congress' deliberations clearly demonstrate the hope that European political unity would bring a solution to the industrial supremacy of Germany, that it would balance the production capacities of Germany and its neighbours, and help the country's peaceful reinsertion in the continent's political landscape.

A more abstract threat-imagery, compared to that emanating from the political rehabilitation of Germany, came from the perceived incompatibility of Western European democratic ideals and the totalitarian tendencies demonstrated by Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia. The Congress' deliberations on European values serve thus as a useful testimony on what was seen as the fundamentals of European identity. The political resolution affirms that the planned Union "should be open to all European nations democratically governed and which undertake to respect a Charter of Human Rights" (Congress of Europe 1948: 6). In addition, the cultural resolution states that "human rights are the essential bases of our efforts for a United Europe" (ibid: 10). The will to draw a line between what was considered "us", i.e. a liberal democratic system, and "non-us" or the "other" becomes clear in statements that emphasise the virtues of the chosen political and economic system: "the aim of [a democratic social system] shall be to free men from all types of slavery and economic insecurity, just as political democracy aims at protecting them against the exercise of arbitrary power" (ibid: 6). Indeed, certain views even ascert that the whole project of European unification is essentially an endeavour to secure the human rights of Europeans thus answering to the strongly perceived fear of totalitarianism². According to Denis de Rougemont, Swiss intellectual and the cultural committee's rapporteur, it was necessary to demonstrate the reality of a Europe founded on a common culture and on "a concept of mankind that is different from the Soviet or American or Asian concept" (de Rougemont 1948). The most pronounced threat imagery, however, was apparent in the political declaration aimed to convey the message of the Congress to all Europeans. The declaration warns that "without a freely agreed union our present anarchy will expose us tomorrow to forcible unification whether by the intervention of a foreign empire or usurpation by a political party" (Congress of Europe: 15). Thus the threat perception does not only regard the outside threat posed by Soviet expansionism but also the increasing strength of ideals that were not perceived as being part of a common identity (i.e. Communism).

2 e.g. In an eloquent speech a French delegate Alexandre Marc defends this idea. Following this discussion and a proposal made by Marc the Congress decided to establish a Commission with the double task of drafting a Charter of Human Rights and of laying down a standard concept of democracy.

The fear of Communism can be read at many levels of the Congress' deliberations. The fear of a direct military attack from the Soviet Union was not the biggest concern. Instead, and as showed by the Congress' reference to "usurpation by a political party", the general view in Western Europe was mostly disturbed by a feeling that the Soviets intended to spread their influence by other than military means such as the reinforcement of national Communist parties in European countries (Messenger 2006: 35-36). The concern was made more tangible as the exiled representatives of Central and Eastern Europe elite showed their dissatisfaction with the political situation of their countries. In a resolution addressed to the Honorary Chairman of the Congress, Winston Churchill³, they called on the Security Council of the United Nations to condemn the Soviet regime and Soviet occupation in the countries behind the Iron Curtain. The resolution uses remarkably strong wordings against "the political status imposed upon the peoples of the Eastern half of Europe by means of force, subterfuge, treachery and organised conspiracy of the arbitrary regimes which would be totally unable to maintain themselves in power if the peoples of this area were given the opportunity to express their free will"⁴. As for the West European position on the continental divide, in the rhetoric of the Conference it is presented as a delicate balancing act between the two super-powers. On the one hand, the political resolution states an outspoken commitment to limit the membership of the projected union exclusively to democratic states. On the other hand, the Congress did not express a clear vision as to the inclusion of Eastern European countries in the projected new European architecture. Indeed, the strongest fear of Soviet influence was linked to the German question to which also a lot of thought was devoted. It seems thus that the Congress was essentially concerned with the security of the territories from where the majority of the attendants came from. For the rest of the continent more vague plans on the promotion of democracy had to suffice.

As it turned out, the output resulting from the Congress did not correspond to the high hopes put into it. The Council of Europe that was created after the congress with the task of uniting the Western part of the continent under a single representative body was not successful and was quickly deemed as a mere talking shop. The failure was mostly due to the tensions between federalist and intergovernmentalist views and the resulting compromises. In the end, the Council was essentially an intergovernmental organisation with only few supranational features. However, external

3 As to Churchill, in the key-note address to the Congress he indicated that there might well develop three regional organizations, a Western one lead by the United States, a "vast Soviet Union", and a Council of Europe. The specific mention of Russia as an integral part of the world organization gave the image that United Europe would not just be created as a bulwark against Soviet aggression. This position was seen as softening his earlier standpoint expressed in the famous "Iron Curtain" speech in Fulton, March 1946.

4 Archives historiques de l'Union européenne, Florence, Villa Il Poggiolo. Dépôts, DEP. Mouvement européen. ME 1179.

arguments for the failure of the Council can also be advanced. Indeed, it seems that at its creation, the external threat had not yet reached a level where it would have forced disagreeing governments to find a cooperative solution.

A period of institutional soul-searching

Although the Congress of Europe was organised from the perspective of the end of the Second World War, the world in 1948 had already entered in a new global confrontation. Thus the deliberations of the Congress that very much centred on Germany portrayed two types of concerns. The first one consisted in the fear of Germany *per se*, i.e. the fear of renewed German political and military domination. This position can be seen in particular in the way of thinking of the older generation of French delegates who had a very personal experience of German dominance. This view, far from being marginal, was however receding. Instead a new, more up to date concern started to emerge with the progress of Soviet occupation in the Eastern parts of the continent. This threat also culminated in the German problem. Only in this case the debate concerned its division. Quite sensibly, the Western Allies feared that Eastern occupation zone of Germany would serve as a Soviet bridgehead.

This double concern is also visible in the Western European military cooperation projects of the late 1940s. Although structurally similar, the West European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization were however built on a different ideational base. The first one of them, the West European Union, was created in 1947 between France and Great-Britain and openly targeted at vanquished Germany in order to forestall any new aggression on its part. Indeed, the treaty explicitly states that its signatories are: "Determined to collaborate in measures of mutual assistance in the event of any renewal of German aggression, while considering most desirable the conclusion of a treaty between all the Powers having responsibility for action in relation to Germany with the object of preventing Germany from becoming again a menace to peace [...]" (Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance: 188). By the time of the creation of NATO two years later this threat perception had significantly diminished. Indeed, that alliance was much more strongly motivated by the Soviet threat (Lundestad 1998: 21).

Still this paper argues that the ideational climate was not yet ready for more advanced political cooperation. A hint of this is the proliferation of different cooperation schemes in the late 1940s. In addition to those already mentioned, neither the other organisations with a broad scope such as the OEEC nor the more territorially and sectorally limited ones such as the Franco-Italian customs union and Finebel contained significant ambitions for a political union. Even though military agreements sought to strengthen the ties between Western European powers, there were no

real efforts for creating a more general political supervision for them before the plan on European Defence Community and the European Political Community (1950-1954). In addition, the way in which the dominant discourse on European issues was mostly concerned on the debate between the federalist and the intergovernmentalist approach, shows that outside threats were not significant and that internal political disagreements could dominate the debate. Another plausible explanation is the continuing strong presence of the United States in Europe. As long as Western European countries felt that their security was provided by the US they had little incentive for working more closely together in order to secure their own environment. The geographical expansion of the Cold War meant, however, that the US could not continue to serve as the security guarantor for Europe. Although these claims are difficult to prove empirically, this paper argues that the lack of political will to create a more broad-ranging European community from the offset is a cue in this direction. For the integration process to really take off a whole new way of thinking had to appear.

That new thinking, although almost unnoticeable at the beginning, first emerged with the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community. This paper argues, that the Schuman Plan was embedded in an ideological framework that strived from the very beginning towards a deeper political union. Although the Coal and Steel Community by itself does not serve as a very strong evidence for this claim, the subsequent efforts at creating a European Defence Community and a European Political Community (1950-54) provide more material in its support. The purpose is not to claim that this ideological framework was the only reason for the Schuman Plan's success, however, it can be taken as one significant factor. In addition, the paper does not suggest that the idea of a political union would have been based on some metaphysical notion of age-old European destiny. To the contrary, the will to pursue deeper integration in a supranational fashion was very much embedded in contemporary security and economic considerations.

A new direction for integration – the innovativeness of the Schuman Plan

The success of the Schuman plan has granted it with a superior position in the imaginary of European integration in which it has acquired an almost mythical dimension (Bossuat 2004). Both in present-day political discourse as well as in certain type of research the proposal by the French foreign minister Robert Schuman on 9 May 1950 for the creation of a European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) has been elevated to a level of a continental symbol without paying much attention to the complex contemporary situation in which it was born. As pointed out by van Ham (1993: 3) the retrospectively observed success of the European Community may have overshadowed the haphazard nature of the integration. This paper aims at de-mythologising the

early years of the integration project by showing the multitude of contemporary strategic security and economic concerns that influenced the thoughts of its planners.

The above-presented short review of European ideational climate preceding the declaration has shown a wide range of ideas linked to the general notion of European unity. Thus, in contrast to what has sometimes been claimed, the Schuman plan did certainly not see light in a "rabbit out of the hat" move during a hiking holiday of the French civil servant Jean Monnet (Dinan 2006: 303). Instead, three consistent lines of thought appear when studying the concerns that motivated the drafters of the Schuman plan and other contemporary decision-makers. The first one was of course the will to integrate the coal and steel market of the six participating countries. Besides this most self-evident issue, two other more general concerns can be discerned. The first one concerned the internal power-balance in Europe and in particular the Franco-German relations. The other strong contextual factor came from the broader geopolitical situation of the Cold War. Indeed, the practical matters of coal and steel integration seemed actually less important than the more acute security issues.

The two main issues that drove the integration forward were firstly, the (mainly French) fear of Germany and secondly the more widely spread fear of Cold War confrontation between the West and the Soviet Union. Zurcher (1958: 31) maintains that in the postwar French mind, European union was primarily a means of organizing security against the East and more especially against the treat of a resurgent Germany⁵. This view is clearly visible in the ways in which the necessity of pooling German and French resources together was justified in France. In fact, the mere choice of coal and steel as the nucleus of Franco-German cooperation speaks for itself. In this period coal was still the principal source of energy and steel was a strategic good essential for military industry (although its importance was declining in the nuclear age). France had been dependent on German resources (mainly coal) since the 1890s and the end of the Second World War had not changed this situation (Judt 1996). Thus the numerous post-war efforts of securing French control over the Ruhr coal production can be seen in this context⁶. As a matter of fact, in the early post-war years the French had hoped for a solution of several German mini-states in order to have a better control over it both politically and economically. However, in the wider Cold War context in which Germany became the front line between the East and the West, this solution was impossible. Thus, France, who was unable to oppose the creation of the Federal Republic of Germany in October 1949 had to

5 An example of the French view is portrayed in an article by the French language Belgian newspaper *Phare du Dimanche* on January 30th 1949. Citing Raymond Aron's book *The Great Schism* the paper writes that in present circumstances Germany's unity cannot take place peacefully, that it will cause either the "bolshevisation" of the whole Europe or war or even both (Brissaud 1949).

6 Examples of these can be seen in the deliberations of the Congress of Europe (above) and for instance in the creation International Ruhr Authority (which, however, was short-lived: 1949-1952).

come up with an alternative solution (Duchêne 1996: 23-24). It came in the form of a supranationally controlled coal and steel community. The political nature of the proposal was clear from the beginning since, from an economic point of view, coal and steel were not particularly suitable for integration. As a matter of fact, the integration of the member states' coal and steel markets should have been expected to entail an extended period of disequilibrium with substantial political and economic costs (Martin 2006: 127-128). It is not clear to what extent the planners were aware of the possible costs because apparently no particular economic studies of the coal and steel sectors were undertaken in advance of the Schuman plan proposals (Gerbet 1956: 542). Nevertheless, their mere willingness to run such a risk shows that the motives for undertaking such a project were mostly other than economic⁷. Indeed, as pointed out by Duchêne (1996: 23-24) the launch of the Schuman plan in May 1950 broke with all French approaches to Germany since Richelieu by proposing a partnership instead of a confrontation. However, as became clear in later negotiations on European Defence Community, the French were not ready to give *carte blanche* for German rehabilitation but wanted it to proceed according to their plans.

The way of securing French role in decisions over the future of Germany was the placement the resources of both countries (and others who joined them) under a supranational authority. For both strategic architects of the Schuman plan, Schuman himself and the plan's author, civil servant, Jean Monnet, an independent executive was the keystone of the new community (Pinder 1995: 24, Schuman 2005: 104). They both believed that only with a new approach the faith of the other short-lived cooperation schemes could be avoided. However, the plan to control Germany with the means of a supranational authority came with a cost. In order for the Schuman plan to be credible, France had to consent to the idea that the limitations of sovereignty would also concern her. As can be expected, the idea of a supranational community was not universally shared by all European decision-makers. Even in France politicians both on the left (Communists) and on the right (Gaullists) were opposed to the plan. Thus its successful adoption in the politically unstable French fourth republic was a real domestic *tour de force* but also testifies of a strong commitment to the cause (Parsons 2006). The French commitment also helped to persuade even the more sceptic partners. As expressed by J. van den Brink, Dutch minister of economic affairs: "Holland was normally rather suspicious of any proposal from France. We always thought there was some ulterior motive [...]. But when I heard that the French were ready to bring their own coal and steel industry [under the supranational High Authority] [...] this had body, flesh and blood" (Duchêne 1994: 205).

The German containment being essentially a French project, other participants in the post-

⁷ However the prospect of Germany recovering its steel production capacities was also worrying for economic reasons as it would have slumped the prices in Europe. Thus the neighbouring countries' motives to control German re-industrialization were both economic and political (Griffiths 2000: 50-51).

war European reconstruction were more concerned with the global political situation and in particular the growing tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. The US that had originally looked at European integration initiatives rather sceptically started to fully involve itself in European affairs with the launch of the European Recovery Program in 1947. Actually, the US would have wished to see a more rapid integration process to take on in Europe and pressured the participants of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation to act more swiftly. However, it struggled to get either Britain or France take the lead in the project of closer cooperation (Lundestad 1998: 30-31). It can be argued in this context as well that the more pronounced military threat from 1949 onwards sped up European initiatives in the direction preferred by the US. In August 1949 the Soviet Union conducted its first successful nuclear detonation. The West was losing its nuclear monopoly and the events on the Korean peninsula created further tensions. As a consequence, the US National Security Council drafted a new strategic plan to respond to the new threat perspectives (Griffiths 2000: 54). However the most imminent sign of the escalation of the Cold War in Europe was the consolidation of the German division in the autumn of 1949. The two Germanies became the fields of competition between the East and the West. From the US perspective, Europe needed to start taking more responsibility for its own defence (ibid.)

If the fear of German attack was mostly a French concern, the fear of being invaded by Communism either directly or by proxy was mostly felt in countries closest to the Eastern bloc, namely West-Germany and Italy. Not surprisingly, the prevailing view in West-Germany acknowledged the importance of a Western European union. It was seen chiefly as a barrier to any further war but also to the spread of Communism (Milward 1984: 393). Indeed, the post-war German elite led by Chancellor Adenauer was conservative in its view of Germany's role in Europe and was strongly opposed to any close ties with the Soviet Union. Thus the negative view of Soviet Union brought the Germans closer to the other members of the Western camp and made them active supporters of the integration process (Pritchard 1996: 155-156)⁸. The Germans also hoped that a European framework could advance the reunification of their country. Italy for its part felt threatened both by the heavily armed Yugoslavia as well as its own strong Communist party. It saw, however, European integration as subordinate to US involvement on the continent, and its interest in proceeding further along that path was conditional on its national military and economic security (Milward 1992: 332-333). Even Britain, which was mostly concerned with its extra-European

8 The other view that has sometimes been put forth as a reason for Germany's eagerness to join Western European institutions is based on the view that integration provided the best means to overcome the brutal Nazi past. Those explanations see integration as entailing the creation of a new a security community responsible for not allowing Europe's past to become its future (Buzan and Waever 2003: 352-353). However, according to Pritchard (1996: 155-159), a thorough introspection into the Nazi past on the level of the whole society started in Germany only in the mid 1960s and thus was not a significant motivating factor in the decision to join the integration process.

relations with the Commonwealth and the colonies, saw the value of continental cooperation in the face of an East-West confrontation. However, true to its intergovernmental ideology, it contended to advocate for more cooperation in the framework of the OEEC and the newly created North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Henig 1997: 21). As a general trend, though, it can be argued that external military pressure exercised significant influence to the plans of political cooperation in Western Europe.

As a conclusion of the above account, it can firstly be argued that the Schuman plan was not born from one single motivating factor but was rather the product of a significant number of intertwined political, security and economic concerns. Although in appearance a limited plan for a joint market of coal and steel, it was actually embedded in much broader considerations on the power balance in Europe and in the world. The question of Germany's place in Europe, the practical means of managing its rehabilitation, and Europe's position between the superpowers were all present in the minds of the contemporaries. Amazingly, the plan in itself was confined to a very limited sector and could not, on its own, be expected to offer much help in addressing all these issues. So it seems that the key to its success is to be found in the fact that the decision-makers who adopted the plan projected their hopes in further integration once a first small step was taken⁹. This interpretation becomes increasingly plausible as the following years saw the emergence of the ideas on the European Defence Community and the European Political Community. The plan was also very much a product of its time and could probably not have had similar knock-on effect in different political circumstances. It clearly profited from its signatories exasperation with the failure of other contemporary ventures that were either too ambitious (the Council of Europe) or lacked political strength (OEEC). Consequently, this paper argues that the strength of the Schuman declaration and the subsequent plan for a European Coal and Steel Community laid not so much in its economic features but in the fact that the decision-makers who adopted the plan saw in it the potential resolution to many contemporary political and strategic concerns. Laying down the institutional archetype of the union-to-be, the ECSC was an initial promise for continuing progress.

Plans for a military community pave the way for deeper political integration

The influence of the external security situation to the development of the integration project did not end with the decision to form a coal and steel community. Actually, the escalating Cold War

⁹ The timing of the declaration can also serve as a hint. May 9th 1950 was of course a symbolic day because it marked five years since the capitulation of Nazi Germany to the Soviet Union. More importantly (and pragmatically), the declaration was made two days ahead of a Western occupying powers' foreign ministers meeting in London thus seizing the political agenda of the meeting (Duchêne 1994: 190; Griffiths 2000: 51).

tensions as well as other more limited internal concerns caused the ideas on the integration project to leap forward with giant steps in the early 1950s. The clearest manifestation of this are the plans for the creation of a European Defence Community and a European Political Community. It could be argued that the circumstances were not ideal for the rapid advancement of the integration project in particular in the field of security and defence. Firstly, the negotiations on the European Coal and Steel Community had not been concluded and thus it was not certain whether the new community would actually be formed. Secondly, Britain had decided to stay out of the ECSC thus depriving it from its political weight. It also continued to advocate the Council of Europe as its preferred platform for cooperation (Griffiths 2000: 62) thus undermining the legitimacy of the new institution that was under construction. Thirdly, France, who had been the driving force behind the ECSC project was continuously struggling to maintain domestic political stability. Indeed, in the turbulent fourth republic, questions of European integration were part of a domestically motivated strategic game and suffered from the short-sightedness of political calculations. And finally, the public opinion had still difficulties to accept the idea of German tanks and soldiers even in the face of an eventual Soviet attack. In addition, the United States that had hitherto economically supported Europe with few conditions, started to appreciate the costs a full-fledged East-West confrontation would bring. Thus, the Truman administration refused to bear the financial burden of enhanced European security and demanded increased European input. All these issues taken together, one would expect that furthering the integration project would not have been the first thing on European's minds.

The fact that even in these unfavourable circumstances serious negotiations on rapid expansion of integration took place shows, on the one hand the commitment of its proponents and, on the other hand, the seriousness of the external pressure. European responses needed to be commensurate with the pressure and in particular with American expectations. In this context surprisingly far-reaching plans for political integration were made. In particular, the plans for a full-fledged political union, the European Political Community that is often overlooked in research, illustrate how far the participating countries were willing to go in the path of supranational community already in 1952-54¹⁰. Due to the external geopolitical pressure, the planning took place in the first instance mainly around the questions of military defence. It is however noteworthy that the whole concept of a defence community became inextricably linked with the idea of a political community.

Again, as in the case of the Schuman plan, ideas on European military integration surfaced

¹⁰ The already signed treaties that would have established both the European Political Community and the European Defence Community were finally not ratified by the French parliament in August 1954 and thus did not enter into force (Spierenburg and Poidevin 1993: 56).

from various places. Accordingly, the various plans also represented the different political concerns of their proponents. In August 1950 the Council of Europe discussed on Churchill's initiative the idea of an institutionalized authority that would address question of politics, human rights, external relations and security. At the same time the US had come to the conclusion that German resources were necessary also on the military side. Secretary of State Dean Acheson displayed this view at the NATO foreign ministers' meeting in September 1950. The US proposals included an integrated command structure for NATO under an American commander, extended US military aid and presence in Europe, and in return the increase of military expenditure in Europe and the acceptance of West German rearmament¹¹ (Griffiths 2000: 55; Lundestad 1998: 43). As a response to the Atlanticist idea but also inspired by the recommendations adopted by the Council of Europe, the French planning commission that had only months earlier drafted the Schuman plan now came up with a plan for the construction of a European army operating within a supranational construction¹². Monnet, who was still head of the commission, was concerned with the perspective of a military powerful Germany as it threatened to undermine the Schuman plan and preferred to place German rearmament in an enlarged framework of the coal and steel project (Spierenburg and Poidevin 1993: 23). The Pléven plan was announced by the French prime minister to the National Assembly on October 24th 1950. It advocated quite clearly for a comprehensive supranational structure: "The army of a united Europe, composed of men coming from different European countries, must, so far as is possible, achieve a complete fusion of the human and material elements which make it up under a single European political and military authority" (Pléven 1950).

Due to the significant differences in the French and the American proposals, the former being much more integrationist and continental, the latter more Atlanticist, negotiations for a future European army started on two parallel tracks: one led by the US and concerning German rearmament and another led by France and based on the Pléven plan (ibid.). Nevertheless, and despite some domestically motivated intricate turns in both French and American positions, the military issues were resolved relatively rapidly (between February and October 1951) and the main focus turned on political questions (Griffiths 2000: 58-59, 63-70). Here again, the ideas expressed during the planning of the Council of Europe and the Schuman plan were influential. Griffiths (ibid: 64-70) describes in great detail the efforts of the European federalist movement and in particular the role of Altiero Spinelli in lobbying for a political supervision of the defence community. The

11 However, the Bureau of German Affairs of the US State department had earlier advocated for a highly integrated European army that would apply the Schuman plan concept to the military field. Internal negotiations between the State and Defence departments later tipped the balance in favour of the more intergovernmental NATO-led cooperation (Trachtenberg and Gehrz 2003: 6-10).

12 At this point it was not yet clear whether a new supranational authority would be created or whether the army would be placed under one of the existing ones: the Assembly of the Council of Europe or the ECSC High Authority.

weakness of the Assembly of the Council of Europe being apparent, the federalists turned towards the six countries that had showed their willingness to at least limited pooling of sovereignty under the Schuman plan. To these countries, the federalist movement suggested in the autumn of 1950 the creation of a federal constituent assembly that would produce a draft treaty for a European political community (ibid: 65). The fact that such a proposal could be made rested entirely on the image the six signatories of the Schuman plan had given of themselves as proponents of a supranational path for Europe. Whether they had envisaged such a role for themselves is unclear, however, the functionalist argument of the spill-over effect can be advanced in this context. In other words, the project of deeper political cooperation to govern the prospected common army resulted from the already existing cooperation in the field of coal and steel. This paper would, in addition, underline the ideational nature of the spill-over effect (at least in this particular case). The Schuman plan negotiations were still under way and there existed no guarantee that they would be successful or that the coal and steel union would work. So there seems to be no other reason for the federalists to propose their ideas to the Six than the belief that their ideas would be shared.

Thus, even before the first concrete step on the path of integration was officially taken (the ECSC treaty only came into force in July 1952) plans for a much more deeply integrated community were already under way. As it turned out, the federalist assumption on the preparedness of the Six appeared to be right. Although they did not manage to push for an intergovernmental conference preparing the new European constitution to be called right away, they secured, with the backing of Italy and France, the establishment of an Ad Hoc Assembly that would prepare the ground first (Griffiths 2000: 65-66). This idea, that distinguished the European Defence Community from all other contemporary plans for military cooperation, was embodied in the treaty's Article 38. The Ad Hoc Assembly was given the task to study the creation of an Assembly of the European Defence Community elected on a democratic basis and particularly bearing in mind that: "The definitive organization [...] should be conceived so as to be capable of constituting one of the elements of an ultimate Federal or confederal structure, based upon the principle of the separation of powers and including, particularly, a bicameral representative system"¹³. The subsequent work of the Ad Hoc Assembly resulted in a "Draft Treaty Embodying the Statute of the European Community" that has been characterised as Europe's first Constitution (Griffiths 2000).

That text, and in particular its preamble, presents some interesting insights into the security-perceptions of its drafters. The contemporary fear of Soviet aggression is disguised under the evasive formulations that present Europe as "living", "united" and "free" as well as the guardian of

¹³ European Defence Community Treaty signed at Paris 27 May 1952, transmitted as a message by the President of the United States to the Senate's 82d Congress (2nd session). United States Government Printing Office Washington: 1952.

"civilization" and "our common spiritual heritage" (Ad Hoc Assembly 1953: 55). Obviously, in the mind of the authors all these characteristics distinguished the West from the totalitarian East. The main concerns of the signatories of the treaty appear to be the maintenance of world peace, the preservation of the common spiritual heritage, the expansion of production and the safeguarding of the "dignity, freedom and fundamental equality of men" (ibid.). The actual body text of the treaty is more explicit about its purposes describing the mission and the general aims of the Community as being "to co-operate with other free nations in ensuring the security of member States against all aggression"(ibid: 59).

The eventual crash down of the EDC / EPC project has been explained from different perspectives. The cause most directly influencing the French Assembly's no-vote on August 30th 1954 was the collapse of the French position in Indochina after the battle of Dien Bien Phu (Lundestad 1998: 47, Fleisher 2010). In addition, French anxieties about German rearmament had not eased and also contributed to the refusal of the plans¹⁴. Finally, differences of view among the Six further eroded the communal basis of the plans. The project for military cooperation was most strongly challenged by the Dutch who, although acknowledging the Soviet threat and the necessity of military cooperation, wanted to combine it with concrete plans of economic integration. In the opinion of Dutch prime minister Beyen, the best way of countering both the Soviet threat and the return of Germany to fascism was to increase the standard of living of the population. The fragmentation of Western Europe in small national markets impeded in Beyen's view the possibility of safeguarding the European civilization¹⁵ (Harryvan et al. 1993: 329-330). However, this paper argues that, despite these significant hindrances, the main reason which caused the collapse of the EDC / EPC plans was the easing of Cold War tensions. By the time in 1954 when the draft treaties came to ratification in the French parliament (other participants had already ratified them) the war in Korea had ended, Stalin had died and the US had a new president Eisenhower. Even if none of this affected directly the decision to give up further integration, I would argue that the situation gave the French deputies the room of manoeuvre permitting them to defeat the plan. The external security pressure was not strong enough for overcoming lower-level differences.

The whole episode of EPC / EDC is usually overlooked or only superficially dealt with in accounts of integration history. However, for the purposes of this research debates and discussions around unsuccessful projects present material for analysis at least as interesting as the well-documented "official" history. These unfulfilled projects illustrate in an important way the diversity

14 In 1954 the Indochina war had pulled most of the French troops out of Europe thus aggravating the fears that German troops would dominate the EDC (Hitchcock 1998: 169).

15 Beyen's views about a European economic community were formulated into a plan carrying his name by May 1953. After negotiations based on this plan the European Economic Community was created in 1957. (Harryvan et al. 1993: 332).

of ideas present at the creation of the new political community. In the particular case of EDC / EPC, they show the very strong link between the evolution of the integration project and the contemporary Cold War concerns. It is precisely this link that has been to a certain extent lost in the overly theoretical analysis of the birth of the integration project that tend to detach it from the contemporary context. In addition, it can be argued that even projects that fail to materialise can be informative and enrich our view of the integration process as they portray the ideas that were present. Even if marginalized at the time, in some cases they resurface in later stages of the integration process .

The end of the Cold War and the EC security perceptions

Arguably, the end of the Cold War was a period of an almost equal level of instability as had been the early years of the integration process. The European Community (EC) that had roots in the 1950s integration plans was very much a product of the Cold War and was not prepared to face its end. In the period leading to the end of the bipolar confrontation the EC had turned increasingly towards itself and the development of its economic capabilities. The Community had thus adapted to seeing itself as an essentially economic project and had only recently started gaining new political momentum. This situation is best exemplified by the single market programme launched at the June 1985 European Council aiming at the completion of the internal market by the end of 1992. It was the most important policy objective of the Community in that period and implied notable developments to the Community's decision-making structure (Hix 2005: 239). Although the programme was economic in its essence, it necessitated strong political will in order to succeed. The institutional modifications taken with the 1987 Single European Act show that that will had just been gathered when the disintegration of the Soviet bloc began. As a consequence, the end of the cold war and the dramatic change of the global geo-strategical situation challenged the unprepared EC.

The rapidity of the events that led to the dismantling of the Soviet bloc and broke the assumption of the endurance of the postwar order were a shock for the EC (Tsakaloyannis 1991: 85). The reactions following the events in Eastern Europe demonstrate a new threat perception of the Community. Clearly not fearing for a military invasion, the members of the Western integration project were nonetheless reluctant in welcoming the newly independent states to join the common project. Thus the main threat perception emanated from the perceived difference of the "new" European countries that now claimed their place in the big "European house". The EC leaders were afraid that if taken on board too soon, the significant dissimilarity between themselves and the Eastern European countries (on economical, political and ideational level) would undermine or even

destroy the political construction that had been achieved during the past four decades.

This position can be observed in the ways the Community addressed the events that took place in its neighbourhood from 1989 onwards. Although several West European leaders, notably British prime minister Mrs. Thatcher, made speeches congratulating the end of Soviet oppression and the triumph of liberal capitalist values, the response of the Community itself was much weaker. In the first half of 1989, and particularly at the Madrid European Council in June, the EC did not address the events taking place in Poland and Hungary but instead concentrated on debating issues concerning the internal market (McAllister 1997: 211). This lack of initiative and vision can be at least partly be attributed to the weakness of EC common foreign policy that did not provide sufficient tools for addressing external events and preparing strategies beforehand. The failure of the common foreign policy can be considered as particularly drastic since policies towards eastern Europe had been official foreign policy goals of the EC for decades.

Later in the year the European Commission president, Jacques Delors gave an emblematic speech analysing the contemporary political situation¹⁶:

"Communist Europe is exploding before our eyes. [...] As many European leaders have already stressed, it is our Community [...] that has served as the model and catalyst for these developments. [...] Will the Community prove equal to the challenges of the future? [...] How are we to find a solution except by strengthening the federalist features of the Community [...]; except by pressing ahead with European integration? Only a strong, self-confident Community, a Community which is united and determined, can truly hope to control that process" (Delors 1989).

It striking to see how the unity of the existing Community is conceptualised as being quintessential to the present as well as the future development of the continent. Indeed, in this reflection on the future of the EC, the Central and East European countries are presented as the other Europe (the term is actually used by Delors). They are pictured as outsiders looking at the EC as model in the application of pluralist democracy between the member states. The speech implicitly gives the image that opening to the East and achieving the reunification of the continent are not among the main concerns of the Community. As a matter of fact, the prospect of extending the Community appears more as a threat than as an opportunity.

The reluctance of the Community to accept the new geo-political situation was persistent even when it could not hold back the events. For instance the unification of Germany that was discussed in the Strasbourg European Council in December 1989 was made conditional upon the

16 With the speech, entitled "Necessary Union", Mr Delors pleads for the strengthening of Community institutions and the expansion of federalism in response to mostly British scepticism and their insistence on intergovernmental cooperation. The speech was largely read as being a call for the creation of a European union (Nelsen and Stubb 2003: 56).

German commitment to pursue EC integration along federal lines¹⁷. Thus it can be argued that the Community was essentially preoccupied with the preservation of the status quo, with safeguarding what it had constructed in previous decades. This position was so strong that it bitterly disappointed the people freed from the Socialist regimes who had hoped for a swift and open-armed reunification. Indeed the EC did not show significant compassion or solidarity towards the newly independent states. Instead it approached them with very cautious proposals of "political dialogue and cooperation" (European Council 1989). Indeed, it seems that in the immediate aftermath of the 1989 revolutions the European Community held very strongly to its objective of becoming a political union even at the expense of the wishes expressed by Eastern Europeans. In the Community's view: "it is in the interest of all European States that the Community should become stronger and accelerate its progress towards European Union" (ibid.). Thus the self-perception of the Community seems to be clear and undisturbed by the dramatic transformations taking place at its Eastern borders. The *raison d'être* of the Community is crystallised in its ambition to become a strong political union. The turbulence surrounding the Community just made the achievement this goal more difficult. It is thus understandable, that the EC was not overly enthusiastic about welcoming new members, in particular as it had just undergone a difficult process of internal institutional development (the Single European Act aiming at streamlining decision-making and the completion of the single market). Jacques Delors even appeared slightly discouraged when expressing the feelings of the Community in front of the European Parliament: "Why is taking us eight years, of what we regard as intense activity, to create a single market and an organized economic and social area, while our Eastern neighbours have taken no more than a few months to discover the heavy wine of liberty and democracy?" (Delors: 1990).

This view can be sustained with the noticeably long reflection time the Community needed to even formulate some kind of coherent approach towards the Eastern European countries. The Maastricht Treaty of 1992, mostly motivated by the need to enhance the Community's security pillar, resulted from the weakness the Community's foreign policy¹⁸. Thus, the negotiations that lead to the most significant changes in the institutional structure of the Community to date were not primarily triggered by concerns of enlargement. Actually, it was only after this major institutional transformation had been agreed upon and the new European Union had seen light that the question of eastern enlargement started to proceed in a tangible way. The June 1993 Copenhagen European Council laid down for the first time explicit accession criteria for countries

17 This condition, particularly important to the French, tied Germany in practice to the creation of a monetary union (Tsakaloyannis 1991: 88).

18 Evidence of this weakness could be seen in particular with the unfolding of the Gulf crisis (August 1990) and the wars in Yugoslavia (since 1991).

wishing to join the EU. The accession criteria were however criticized for their overly general character and the lack of concrete timetable. Indeed, it took the Union another 18 months before, in the Essen European Council (December 1994), it finally expressed a strategy for the Central and East European countries' accession. So it took the EC / EU in total five years (from 1989 to 1994) to come up with a concrete enlargement strategy in view of the eastern enlargement. Reiterating the arguments put forward in this paper, I would maintain that this process exemplifies the reluctant attitude of the Community and the fact that it was mostly concerned with internal development throughout this period. The Eastern European countries that sought its rapid recognition and a promise of common future shook the comfort of the Community that had gotten used being naturally bound by the Cold War juxtaposition. The countries' whose democratic development was not at all certain posed a real threat to the self-perception of the Community.

Conclusion

This paper has given an overview of the approach explained in the theoretical chapter. The main focus has been in unveiling the threat and security perceptions that have influenced the minds of decision-makers so as to promote the process of European integration. So far my research has focused in the early years of the integration process that also dominated the analysis of this paper. However, this focus has not only been the result of research practices. Indeed, when the goal is to research the creation process of an institution it seems quite logical to proceed in chronological order. The research on the constituting forces of an integration process has generated three general hypothesis for further research.

Firstly, as argued in the beginning of the paper, the security concerns, although present at some level throughout the integration process, have varied in their intensities. Consequently, a hypothesis that can be advanced based on existing knowledge of European integration, is that security concerns have been especially relevant in periods where the system has been perceived as unstable. This has occurred in large measure twice: first when the European institutions were taking shape at the beginning of the 1950s and second, when the consolidated institutions faced the enormous challenge of accommodating the newly liberated countries of Eastern Europe. Following the hypothesis, it would be assumed that the period of relative institutional stability (i.e. the period when the institutions were not challenged by an *outside* factor) would witness a lower level of security-related concerns. In other words, it could be argued that the relatively stable period of the Cold War also limited the room of manoeuvre of European decision-makers thus confining them to

see themselves as well as the potential threats from a fixed perspective.

Secondly, and quite in accordance with general intuition, the paper has shown that although strong security-related concerns have motivated important developments in the integration process the concerns have not stemmed from one "objective" threat. Instead the source of threat-perception has varied individually and over time. This phenomenon is particularly evident in the early years of integration when members taking part in the project all had differing motivations to do so (e.g. France's fear of Germany and Germany's fear of Soviet Union). However, a second hypothesis for further research would assume that once the Community was constituted and consolidated, a *common perception* of its purpose, future and threats would begin to be formed thus replacing the older perceptions that were mostly based on national considerations.

Thirdly, the evolution and the consolidation of the institutional structure that would admittedly create common threat perceptions could also be assumed to modify the type of threats relevant to the community. Thus, while in the early years military invasion was a significant danger for the states that agreed to integrate in the Coal and Steel Community, the later stages of the integration project were mostly fearful of economic competition. This is naturally due to the form that the integration process took after the establishment of the European Economic Community in 1957. Thus third hypothesis would assume that the field in which integration takes place necessarily also influences the threat-perceptions. Thus the arguments stating that the EC, being an economic community, was not essentially motivated by the ongoing Cold War and related security questions can be disputed. Instead, and in accordance to the arguments advanced by Ludlow 2007, the EC "fought" the Cold War in its own economic domain. The challenge posed by the Soviet East in 1955-1970 in the economic field was just as "true" to the EC as the military challenge faced by NATO. It justified the existence of the whole Western system by being its mirror image.

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