

# Janus-Faced Democracy?

## A Fuzzy-Set Analysis of Democratic Foreign Policy and the Use of Military Force

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*Abstract* The attention devoted to the interdemocratic peace proposition stands in contrast to a lack of studies that comparatively investigate the use of military force by democracies against non-democratic regimes and non-state actors. Salient questions have remained unanswered: Under which conditions do democratic institutions serve as constraints on executive use of military force and when is their effect negligible? To what extent do partisan differences matter in decisions on the use of military force? And how do different institutional frameworks influence the participation of democracies in military operations? This paper develops a theoretical framework for a fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fs/QCA) and presents preliminary results based on an analysis of 14 democracies and their respective involvement in eight military operations between 1990 and 2006. The findings seem to indicate that the absence of strong parliaments (in terms of security policy) and the presence of rightist government are components of necessary conditions for military involvement of consolidated democracies. The analysis suggests that different pathways towards the use of military force exist, depending on the institutional, political, and contextual factors of the respective democracy.

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## 1. Introduction

Law-like propositions are hard to find in international politics. This could explain the sustained scholarly attention devoted to the “interdemocratic peace” proposition, which holds, in a nutshell, that “democracies do not fight each other” (George and Bennett 2005; Ray 2003). The merits of the academic debate surrounding the democratic peace notwithstanding, its often narrow focus on the questions of *whether* and, to a lesser extent, *why* democracies don’t go to war against each other has obstructed the view for conflicts that involve democracies but take place outside the democratic “zone of peace” (MacMillan 1996). In particular, there is a lack of studies that comparatively investigate the use of military force by democracies against non-democratic regimes and non-state actors. The “dual finding” (Geis 2001) of interdemocratic peace and democratic belligerence remains under-theorized. While the phenomenon has been noted in the broader context of the democratic peace (Czempiel 1996; Doyle 1986; Owen 1997), few sustained attempts at a systematic comparative study have been made (Daase 2006; Risse-Kappen 1995).<sup>1</sup> Recently, authors have addressed the phenomenon under the rubric of “liberal wars” (Freedman 2005; Vasquez 2005), or as “democratic wars” (Dunne 2009; Geis, Brock, and Müller 2006), yet the focus often remains narrowly on specific conflicts, such as the military intervention in Kosovo in 1999,<sup>2</sup> or the Iraq War of 2003 (e.g., Gordon and Shapiro 2004).

This paper, in contrast, seeks to systematically investigate patterns of democratic conflict behavior and account for institutional and contextual differences between democratic regimes. Under which conditions do political institutions constrain or enable executive use of military force? To what extent do partisan differences matter in troop deployment decisions? By “unpacking democracy” (Elman 2000), examining partisan politics, and taking into account relevant contextual factors, a richer depiction of existing varieties of democratic polities and their involvement in military conflict shall be gained, thus addressing some of the areas that have been neglected in the democratic peace literature (Huth and Allee 2002, 11) and, hopefully, contributing to a renewed focus on contemporary issues of empirical relevance that have remained theoretically underdeveloped.

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<sup>1</sup> For an exception see the edited volume by Anna Geis, Harald Müller, and Wolfgang Wagner (2007).

<sup>2</sup> Kosovo remains, according to John Vasquez, the “quintessential liberal war of our time” (2005, 311).

## **2. Democratic Institutions, Politics and the Use of Military Force**

Most studies on the relation between democracy and the use of military force are primarily interested in the benefits and drawbacks of democratic regimes vis-à-vis other regime types. Research in this area has yielded a host of findings, the most well-known of which is the interdemocratic peace proposition.<sup>3</sup> What I deem problematic about many studies in International Relations (IR), however, is the lack of differentiation between democratic subtypes. In order to examine the mechanisms that are assumed to influence foreign policy behavior, the black box of ‘democracy’ has to be opened. Among comparativists, on the other hand, scholarship on democratic subtypes abounds, but here the focus rather lies on the prospects of successful democratization instead of examining the nexus between democratic institutions and foreign and security policy (e.g., Grimm and Merkel 2008).

The following section will briefly line out existing arguments on factors seen as key influences on the foreign policy decision-making in consolidated democracies. Section three will then introduce the research design and case selection. Finally, some preliminary results on military operations conducted by ad hoc coalitions and regional organizations across 14 democracies will be presented.

### ***2.1 Democratic Subtypes***

At a basic level democratic polities can be distinguished by their constitutional structure and the sources of executive authority, yielding two ideal types: parliamentary and presidential democracies. Executives in parliamentary systems rely on legislative confidence, while presidents receive their authority from the electorate and separately from the legislature. In practice, a variety of democratic regimes exist that do not fall neatly into either category. Semi-presidentialism is arguably the most difficult to classify “hybrid form” of government, as it combines elements of parliamentarism and presidentialism in a “dual executive” with a directly elected president and a prime minister reliant on legislative confidence (Shugart 2008, 349). A further distinction can be made on the basis of the electoral system, an institutional feature that is acknowledged to have a mediated influence on the party system, as majoritarian rules tend to favor two-party systems while proportional representation (PR) fosters multiparty systems (Duverger 1951; Nohlen 2009).<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Ray (2003, 221) provides an overview of probabilistic hypotheses regarding the mean effect of democracy as a regime type on interstate interactions.

<sup>4</sup> Some authors also find evidence in support of the hypothesis that democracies with PR systems are less likely to engage in the use of military force (Leblang and Chan 2003).

Institutional differences between democratic regimes have been neglected in the mainstream literature on democracy and the use of military force. A few studies analyzing democratic conflict behavior have examined basic distinctions between regime types but their results remained inconclusive. David Auerswald (1999; 2000) proposes an institutional argument built on the assumption that executives are primarily seeking to hold office before considering policy implementation. The institutional characteristics that determine the probability of whether force will be used in a dispute are, according to Auerswald, “accountability” and “agenda control.” The first is understood as executive accountability toward the electorate, as in presidential systems, but also toward the legislature, as in the case of confidence votes in parliamentary systems (1999, 471–3). Agenda control, on the other hand, “measures an executive’s ability to limit legislative input into conflict decisions; that is, it refers to the executive’s ability to initiate or resist combat without being challenged or overturned by the legislature” (1999, 473). Based on their institutional characteristics Auerswald regards “strong presidential systems,” i.e. the French Fifth Republic and similar systems, under an executive with fixed tenure and a legislature that has little influence on matters of foreign policy as the most likely to use force. Majority parliamentary governments follow, but their executives are more cautious since they rely on legislative confidence. Also more hesitant according to Auerswald are “weak presidential systems,” like the United States, where the president has only partial agenda control and legislative interference is possible, albeit limited in scope. The least willing to use military force in this typology are coalition parliamentary governments, due to the domestic constraints under which they operate (Auerswald 1999, 498).

A related argument is made by Miriam Fendius Elman (2000) who suggests “unpacking democracy” to attain better specified causal models and to tackle the problem of conflicting causal claims in the democratic peace debate. Elman’s focus lies on monadic versions of the democratic peace, but her argument can be applied to democratic foreign policy in general. Elman distinguishes four types of democratic regimes, ranging from least to most majoritarian: (1) coalitional parliamentary democracy, (2) presidential democracy, (3) semipresidential democracy, and (4) Westminster parliamentary democracy. Her approach diverges from a purely institutionalist argument, however, as Elman also takes into account the distribution of policy preferences between the executive and legislative branches. Institutions are understood as enabling or constraining conditions for political preferences. For example, in less majoritarian systems “hawkish” executives can be checked by “dovish” legislatures, while hawkish legislatures can push moderate executives towards the use of force

under a similar institutional framework. For her theoretical model Elman distinguishes only between “more” or “less majoritarian” systems, putting Westminster parliamentary and semipresidential systems in the first category and coalitional parliamentary and presidential systems in the second. Elman illustrates her institutional argument with the historical cases of Israeli foreign policy towards Lebanon (1977-1981), an example of an executive kept in check by the legislative, and the U.S. declaration of war on the United Kingdom in 1812 as an incident that shows how, under specific institutional configurations, hawkish legislatures can push moderate executives toward the use of force (Elman 2000, 95).

The studies of Elman and Auerswald are helpful in developing tentative hypotheses on democratic conflict behavior, but their theoretical models lead to conflicting expectations concerning specific regimes types and the role of political preference distribution among relevant actors. This highlights the fact that it does not suffice to distinguish three to four democratic subtypes. Instead, the specific institutional constraints (or a lack thereof) must be identified in order to determine their presumed effect on states’ foreign policy decision-making processes. Within the group of parliamentary systems arrangements differ substantially with regards to executive-legislative relations (Shugart 2008). As Donald Horowitz reminds us in a commentary on reductionist debates on presidentialism versus parliamentarism, a single institutional feature of a political system does not suffice to make an informed argument concerning its general thrust. Rather, it is the “total configuration of institutions proposed for a given country” that must be observed before one can draw conclusions about its nature (Horowitz 1990, 75).

A number of studies that investigate democratic institutions and their effect on the propensity to use force argue that parliamentary systems with PR electoral rules are least likely to use military force due to the institutional constraints and degree of accountability that their executives are subjected to (Auerswald 2000; Chan and Safran 2006; Elman 2000; Leblang and Chan 2003). This democratic subtype can be conceptualized as what Lijphart (1999) terms “consensus democracy” in contrast to “majoritarian democracy” of the Westminster type. In brief, consensus democracies are characterized by a dispersion and limitation of executive power that allows broader societal influence on policy processes and fosters compromise and negotiation (cf. Lijphart 2008).

## ***2.2 Legislative Influence on Foreign Policy***

Recent works on executive-legislative relations have shifted attention to the extent of parliamentary influence on executive decisions on the use of military force (Born et al. 2008;

Choi 2010; Dieterich, Hummel, and Marschall 2009; 2007; Peters, Wagner, and Deitelhoff 2008). In general, three areas of parliamentary oversight can be distinguished: (1) the formal constitutional powers given to parliament, (2) the resources allocated to execute these powers effectively, and (3) the willingness of parliamentarians to fulfill their role as institutional check on the executive (Born and Hänggi 2005).

It is argued that under specific circumstances the degree of parliamentary control can serve to predict the participation in military interventions. In a study on the participation of twenty-five EU member states<sup>5</sup> in the Iraq War of 2003, Sandra Dieterich, Hartwig Hummel, and Stefan Marschall (2009) find their “parliamentary peace” hypothesis largely confirmed: countries with comprehensive parliamentary “war powers” have either not been involved militarily or provided merely logistical support. The studies’ sole outliers are Lithuania and Denmark, countries that contributed to the Iraq War at varying degrees, despite parliaments with “comprehensive” or, at least, “selective” war powers.

The study by Dieterich and colleagues makes an important contribution that underlines the potential weight of parliaments in foreign policy decision-making. However, their findings provide only an explanation for the Iraq War of 2003 – a conflict that can arguably be labeled a deviant case when compared to the entire population of military interventions involving democracies since 1990. What role do parliaments play in more “routine decisions” on the use of military force?<sup>6</sup> Further, the authors assume that parliaments are responsive to what constitutes a “general norm” of war aversion shared by publics across Europe. This might have been the case under the specific circumstances preceding the invasion of Iraq in 2003, but I have doubts whether we can find a similarly strong public consensus during the run-up to other military operations. The focus on parliaments points in the right direction, but it needs to be complemented with a broader view on democratic politics before we can attempt to explain foreign policy decisions.

### ***2.3 Partisan Politics***

Conventional wisdom holds that “politics stops at the water’s edge” (Gowa 1998), or, in other words, partisan politics concentrates on domestic affairs, whereas foreign policy is, or ought to be, governed by a domestic consensus on what is in the ‘national interest’ (Krasner 1978, 6). These *Realpolitik* notions are mirrored in traditional IR approaches that take a domestic consensus on foreign policy issues as a given. In contrast, comparativists traditionally stress

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<sup>5</sup> The study included existing EU member states (as of 2003) as well as prospective members joining the EU in 2004.

<sup>6</sup> On types of decisions and decision-making processes in foreign policy, see Haftendorn (1990, 403).

domestic conflict expressed in political cleavage structures as a central element of governmental analysis (e.g., Lijphart 1999; Lipset and Rokkan 1967). With the emergence of constructivism as an alternative to realist and liberal perspectives ideational factors such as norms, values, and culture received due attention (Katzenstein 1996; Wendt 1999). Rather than assuming *a priori* the existence of an objective “national interest,” constructivists aim to uncover how national preferences are constituted by looking at the processes through which state interests are defined by political actors (Finnemore 1996b).

Many constructivist studies have difficulties, however, of providing satisfactory explanations for differences between countries and across time. For instance, studies of transnational norms of politically legitimate behavior are, by definition, interested in policy-convergence across countries (e.g., Risse-Kappen 1994; Finnemore 1996a). Cultural approaches can help explain country-specific patterns, but have difficulties in accounting for change (e.g., Berger 1996). Here, Brian Rathbun (2004) makes an important contribution by conceptualizing political parties as “domestic vehicles of international norms” and building a model of party politics that accounts for different ideological persuasions and respective behavior with regards to the use of force. Rathbun moves beyond political left-right dichotomies and distinguishes between an “antimilitarist left”, “inclusive left”, “exclusive right”, and an “instrumental right” (2004, 29). Based on their ideological predispositions and the case-specific and historical context, these factions can arrive at different estimates concerning the perceived utility of military force. Rathbun highlights the value conflicts and preference trade-offs that political parties on the left and on the right face when confronted with a decision on whether to intervene militarily in a crisis situation.<sup>7</sup>

In their study of congressional checks on presidential war powers in the United States William Howell and Jon Pevehouse (2007) provide evidence that broadly supports the “partisan argument” made by Rathbun for France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. The authors argue that the strongest indicator for a heightened propensity of Congress to intervene in an executive’s decision to use military force is the partisan composition of both chambers of Congress. Simply put, “members of a president’s own party are likely to support military action,” while resistance to the use of force comes predominantly from the opposition party (2007, 35). Howell and Pevehouse derive three conditions under which congressional resistance to a military operation is most likely to materialize, the first of which relates to the composition of Congress, while the other two are tied to the conflict itself. Congressional

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<sup>7</sup> Rathbun focuses on cases of military intervention in humanitarian emergencies. This study seeks to test whether his argument is also applicable to other contexts of military intervention.

opposition is expected to mount as (1) “the opposing party to the president’s retains larger and more cohesive governing majorities within Congress”; (2) “military operations grow in size;” and when (3) operations focus on less strategically important targets (Howell and Pevehouse 2007, 33).

## **2.4 Public Opinion**

The idea of ordinary citizens acting as a constraint on government features prominently in democratic theory and arguments on the democratic peace. Kant’s proposition (1996) [1795] that states would cease waging war upon another if the costs concerning life and property were to be paid by the ordinary citizen is appealing in principle, but it opens room for debate whether democracies provide the institutional means to allow for an adequate transfer of societal demands into the political process. A radical democratic perspective holds that as long as the transfer of societal demands is not properly taking place one cannot speak of a truly democratic political system (Czempiel 1996). Other authors criticize that the mechanism of “public constraint” that proponents of the democratic peace suggest is partly undermined by the empirical record and the fact that the costs of war are typically relegated to a “small subset of the population” while the majority of citizens is not personally affected by a military conflict in which their country is engaged (Rosato 2003, 594).<sup>8</sup>

Besides the question whether the public holds a genuine and stable pacific predisposition, it remains disputed whether a causal link exists between public opinion and foreign policy; and, granted that there is a relation, in which direction the causal arrow runs. This is crucial for arguments concerned with the role of parliaments, as the representative body closest to the public, but also for those who focus on executive responsiveness to public opinion. Recent scholarship on the impact of public opinion on foreign policy indicates that these issues remain controversially discussed.<sup>9</sup> Nowadays scholars largely reject the notion that the public is “indifferent” to foreign policy issues or that their attitudes “lack intellectual structure and factual content,” as expressed in a classic study by Gabriel Almond (1950). In fact, it appears that often politicians misinterpret public opinion or simply assume a certain predisposition contrary to empirical evidence. The nexus between public opinion and the political process is analyzed by Steven Kull and I. M. Destler who engage the puzzle that policymakers in the

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<sup>8</sup> This relates to inherent antinomies in existing theories of the democratic peace literature, as Müller (2002, 2004) has shown in great detail.

<sup>9</sup> For concise overviews, see Aldrich (2006), Baum and Potter (2008), and Sobel (2001). A comprehensive treatment of public opinion and its influence on foreign policy processes should also take into account the role of the media as an important third actor between politicians and the public (cf. Howell and Pevehouse 2007, 192–221).

United States tended to perceive “a strong public desire for disengagement” after the end of the Cold War (1999, 24). The authors provide extensive evidence from public opinion surveys that refutes the notion of a “new isolationism” among the general public.

In lack of a comprehensive theory of public opinion and foreign policy it might be worthwhile to revisit the theoretical frame suggested by Thomas Risse-Kappen (Risse-Kappen 1991). In essence, Risse-Kappen argues in favor of a combined approach that regards public opinion in the context of a country’s (1) political system and its degree of centralization, (2) societal structure, and (3) the degree of state influence in coalition-building processes (1991, 486). In combination, these three domestic factors enable or constrain opportunities for public influence on foreign policy decisions. It is argued that strong states with relatively close-knit policy networks offer few opportunities for public influence, while states that are less centralized and allow for a wider input into the political process are also more responsive to public opinion.

## ***2.5 The International Environment***

Traditionally, IR approaches draw on factors relating to international politics, or as neorealists would term it, the structure of the international system (Waltz 1979). For structural realists in the vein of Kenneth Waltz the distribution of material capabilities across units of the international system plays a crucial role in constraining foreign policy decisions. Yet, most neorealist approaches offer little guidance when it comes to specific expectations in states’ foreign policies, and even less so in deriving hypotheses for different kinds of democratic regimes based on their political institutions. For Waltz this seems plainly a problem of different levels of analysis, “[a] theory at one level of generality cannot answer questions about matters at a different level of generality. Failure to notice this is the error on which the criticism rests. Another is to mistake a theory of international politics for a theory of foreign policy” (Waltz 1979, 121).<sup>10</sup> Yet the question remains: do systemic factors affect foreign policy decision making in important ways, or can they be disregarded in foreign policy analysis?

Besides showing concern for the distribution of material capabilities and hegemonic and multipolar orders, realist studies have dealt intensively with the formation of alliances. Here, debates focused on the question of whether states are primarily “balancers,” that ally against an external threat, or “bandwagoners,” that join forces with the dominant power in the system or their respective region (Wohlforth 2008, 141). In Stephen Walt’s refinement of balance of

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<sup>10</sup> For contending views, see Elman (1996) and Fearon (1998).

power theory states are primarily seen as balancers against perceived threats, rather than versus aggregate capabilities (1987, 172).<sup>11</sup> Walt's argument rests on historical evidence drawn from alliance formations in the Middle East during the period of 1955-1979. As such it is only of limited value to derive hypotheses for democratic countries during the post-Cold War era. Unfortunately, this is true for many realist studies on alliance behavior that base their arguments on historical evidence from the nineteenth century (e.g., Snyder 1997, 3). A social-constructivist literature approaches the topic from a different angle, building on what Karl Deutsch coined "pluralistic security communities" (1957). Works in this vein enlarge the scope of analysis beyond security concerns narrowly defined to include aspects of regional integration and transnational community (Adler and Barnett 1998), but due to a perspective that is more interested in macro-social processes it is rather difficult to derive hypotheses on foreign policy behavior from this particular literature.

Despite the inherent difficulties in formulating hypotheses of foreign policy behavior based on alliance membership, a widespread consensus exists among scholars that alliance membership is expected to have a significant impact on states' policy decisions (Howell and Pevehouse 2007, 45). Many authors assume that alliance membership increases the likelihood of participation in military operations and some try to incorporate this expectation into their causal models (Howell and Pevehouse 2007; Viehrig 2010, 82–7). This assumption seems premature, however, if one takes into account the phenomenon of "buck-passing" and unequal burden sharing among alliance members (Bennett, Unger, and Lepgold 1997; Howorth and Keeler 2003). Turkish foreign policy during the 1970s and the stance of the Polish government during the Kosovo intervention illustrate this point.<sup>12</sup> Formal alliance membership can also be interpreted, especially by smaller powers, as a one-sided security guarantee that entails no additional costs or responsibilities. This begs the question whether specific institutional arrangements influence the likelihood of "passing the buck"? David Auerswald formulates a tentative hypothesis, arguing that coalitional parliamentary democracies are most likely to buck-pass while majority parliamentary governments are "better at alliance defense" whereas strong presidential governments are least desirable choices for a security alliance due to their volatile foreign policy behavior (2000, 125–32).

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<sup>11</sup> Walt defines alliances as a "formal or informal relationship of security cooperation between two or more sovereign states" (1987, 1).

<sup>12</sup> For a detailed account, see Auerswald (2000, 128–30).

## ***2.6 The United Nations Security Council***

According to the United Nations (UN) Charter the Security Council holds the primary authority for the maintenance of peace and international security. As such it remains the principal legitimacy-lending body in international politics, despite a plethora of difficulties and challenges that have plagued it since its inception (Lowe et al. 2008). The end of the Cold War marked a turning point for the approach that the UN and its member states took toward responding to international humanitarian crises and threats to peace and security. Traditionally the UN had conceived of peacekeeping in a strictly neutral and limited fashion, based on the consent of the parties involved in a conflict and in accordance with the principle of non-intervention. A changed international environment, however, has led to a much broader conceptualization of the Security Council's role in international conflict resolution (Binder 2009; Doyle and Sambanis 2006). With the shift of emphasis from traditional peacekeeping missions to "robust" peace enforcement operations it became increasingly difficult to distinguish non-coercive from coercive military operations (Findlay 2002). This task is complicated further by overlapping or parallel mandates that prescribe varying degrees of force.

Since the early 1990s democracies have been involved in a number of military interventions that were publicly justified by their governments with reference to humanitarian emergencies. Some of these operations were widely regarded as legitimate uses of force, despite the absence of Security Council authorization. This marks a change with regards to international norms. Some authors argue that the notion that "imminent humanitarian crises justify military intervention" has gained increased international acceptance (Greenwood 2008a, 9). Nevertheless, the concept of "humanitarian intervention" remains contested if recent publications are any indication (Janssen 2008; Münkler and Malowitz 2008a). This begins with the question of how to define the term "humanitarian intervention," for which no standard definition exists (Welsh 2008, 535). In the eyes of Martha Finnemore, "humanitarian intervention must be multilateral if states are to accept it as legitimate and genuinely humanitarian. Further, it must be organized under UN auspices or under explicit UN consent" (1996a, 181). This stands in contrast to the definition provided by Herfried Münkler and Karsten Malowitz, who stretch the concept to include unilateral operations as well as actions without UN sanctions (2008b, 8–9). NATO's military intervention in Kosovo in 1999

illustrates the considerable gray area that exists between the legitimate use of force and illegitimate violations of the UN's non-intervention principle.<sup>13</sup>

### **3. Research Design**

This paper is based on a study that seeks to combine fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fs/QCA) (Ragin 1987, 2000) of an intermediate number of cases with in-depth study of one or two cases via process-tracing (George and Bennett 2005).<sup>14</sup> QCA is a case-oriented approach based on set theoretic thinking, in contrast to statistical approaches that take a correlational perspective.<sup>15</sup> Causal relations are expressed in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, a methodological angle that departs from probabilistic analysis and has gained increased attention in the social sciences as a substantively important view of causation (Collier, Brady, and Seawright 2004, 216).<sup>16</sup> The approach builds on the idea of complex causality: conditions, “variables” in traditional terms, form combinations that are necessary and/or sufficient, while their constituent parts might be neither necessary nor sufficient. This ontological perspective pays tribute to the interaction of conditions, instead of trying to account for net effects of single variables, as is common practice in quantitative approaches.

#### **3.1 Outcome**

The outcome of interest is the political decision to use military force abroad, as in deploying troops to a military operation. The use of force covers a range of military operations on a scale of increasing intensity from military intervention to war fighting. It has to be distinguished from peacekeeping where soldiers serve as impartial mediators and may use force only for self-defense under UN Chapter VI, Art. 33-38. The universe of cases includes all instances where democracies engaged in or prepared to use military force equal to or greater than the level of peace enforcement under UN Chapter VII, Art. 39-51 (cf., Fleck 2008; Greenwood 2008b).

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<sup>13</sup> A rich literature exists on the case of Kosovo and the more general development of international law and a “duty to protect” civilian populations in cases of humanitarian emergencies, see: Akehurst (1984); Damrosch (1993); Chomsky (1999); Henkin (1999) and more recently, Walzer (2005). See also the report issued by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS, 2001) that was adopted at the UN World Summit 2005: <<http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org>> [accessed 10 July 2009].

<sup>14</sup> Cases for process-tracing will be selected once the initial analysis is completed. This paper concentrates on a limited aspect of the fs/QCA analysis.

<sup>15</sup> A review on the “new methodology of qualitative research” is provided by Mahoney (2010).

<sup>16</sup> Goertz (2003) provides an inventory of 150 hypotheses drawn from works of political science and sociology that argue in terms of necessary and sufficient causes.

Fuzzy-set QCA allows for a qualitative coding in degrees of set membership. This means that cases can be assigned values between “0” (full non-membership) and “1” (full membership in the set). The cross-over point of “0.5” is theoretically important, as it separates cases that rather belong to a set from those that lie rather outside the set.

The coding of the outcome is based on the number of troops committed to a military operation, their primary task, and the capacities of the country involved. Thus a score of “1” indicates that a country provided a substantial number of troops (in relation to its capacities) to a conflict and that these troops engaged in combat or were prepared to do so. Thus, a distinction can be made between combat troops that carry the highest personal risk and rear support troops with low personal risk involved for the troops as well as the government sending them. In cases where countries decidedly limited the role of their own forces (e.g., the exclusion from bombing campaigns in the German case during Operation Allied Force) this can be taken into account during the coding of the cases.<sup>17</sup>

### ***3.2 Conditions***

Based on theoretical arguments briefly discussed in the previous sections I derive five conditions that are hypothesized to influence political decisions on the use of military force. The first two of these relate to the partisan politics literature which expects to find a significant difference between political actors depending on their respective policy preferences. The next two conditions refer to institutionalist arguments that highlight executive-legislative relations and the nature of the electoral and party systems in a country. In contrast to partisan and institutional explanations, the fifth condition seeks to take into account power-based arguments by constructing an index value based on demographic, economic, and military factors.

#### *I. Government Placement on a Left-Right Scale*

This condition refers to the placement of a country’s government party or coalition of parties on a left-right scale. It is expected that rightist governments differ in their estimate of the utility of military force from their leftist counterparts (Rathbun 2004). Ideally, this variation in preference structure should be visible in patterns on the use of military force across governments of different political persuasions. The fuzzy-set coding of this condition is based on data drawn from the extensive research of the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP)

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<sup>17</sup> See appendix for the comprehensive list of fuzzy-membership scores and additional coding criteria.

(Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann et al. 2006).<sup>18</sup> The CMP data is generated through content analysis and qualitative coding of party programmes and it allows not just for a general placement of parties on an ideological spectrum but also for movements within parties over time. Thus it provides a more dynamic picture of stated policy preferences than alternative measures that remain static and assign values by party family but do not take into account intra-party shifts and phenomena like “leapfrogging” between parties.

## *II. Government Position on the Use of Military Force*

The CMP data allows for the construction of a “peace” index that weighs three variables concerning policy preferences on the general evaluation of the military, the need to maintain military expenditure and the value of peace and peaceful means of conflict resolution as general goals. In contrast to the general left-right scale this condition should offer an issue-related estimate of stated policy preferences of the relevant actors. Thus, it could potentially help to explain differences between governments that belong to the same party family but pursue very different policies. Like the other CMP-based condition it shares the limitation that party programmes or platforms are sometime a rather crude proxy for the political preferences of governments. Yet, this is one of the few available data sets that cover a wide range of countries in a comparative analytical framework. Nevertheless, the limitations have to be kept in mind when interpreting the results.

## *III. Party System Structure*

A central criterion to distinguish established democracies is by their electoral system and the structure of their party system, the latter being traditionally conceived of as the mediated result of the former. The corresponding ideal types would be a two-party system with single-party majority governments and a multi-party system where coalition governments comprised of two, three, or more parties are the rule. It is expected that these types correspond with different approaches to security policy. Coalition government by definition is characterized by consensus-building across partisan positions whereas single-party majority government tends to favor more polarized politics. The underlying concept is operationalized in terms of a fuzzy-scale of the effective number of parliamentary parties. Lijphart’s two-dimensional “majoritarian-consensus” index was considered as an alternative measure, but due to the fact that it includes ten variables, some entirely unrelated to the aims of this study, it was decided

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<sup>18</sup> A detailed description of the project can be found at: <<http://www.wzb.eu/zkd/dsl/Projekte/projekte-manifesto.en.htm>> [accessed 20 May 2010].

against. A viable alternative measure that was considered but not included is the Gallagher index (least squares index) of disproportionality of the electoral system (Gallagher and Mitchell 2009).

#### *IV. Parliamentary War Powers*

This condition builds on the literature on the “parliamentary peace” and refers to the extent of formal parliamentary influence on foreign policy decisions, troop deployments in particular, and the use of military force. Parliamentary war powers are understood as constitutionally guaranteed rights and the availability of resources to exercise these rights (Born and Hänggi 2005; Born et al. 2008; Dieterich, Hummel, and Marschall 2009). For reasons of better comparability across countries the willingness of members of parliament to actually challenge executive decisions is not considered in this condition. The fuzzy-set coding of the respective countries is based on a reading of the secondary literature and profited greatly from a new data set compiled by Wolfgang Wagner, Dirk Peters, and Cosima Glahn (2010).<sup>19</sup> The ParlCon data set focuses on the presence or absence of an ex ante parliamentary veto right across 49 countries since 1989. Thus, in order to transfer the findings into a fuzzy-scale some qualitative distinctions had to be made. With the exception of Italy, however, most cases are close to the extreme points of the fuzzy-scale.

#### *V. Power Index*

This condition seeks to account for material differences between countries. Although the majority of consolidated democracies are comparably wealthy, significant differences exist in terms of the size of the countries and their population as well as their economic performance, their military expenditure, and the number of armed forces they maintain. Traditional theorists argue that “great powers” are analytically different from other countries, due to their extended scope of interests as well as their freedom of action in international politics (e.g., Reiter and Stam 2002; Russett 2010; Waltz 1979). Yet, it remains unclear what the necessary conditions for “great power” status are. Certainly, the contemporary United States are a great power – but where to draw the line? The Correlates of War project defines the permanent members of the UNSC as “great powers” – but this is an unsatisfactory definition because it is based on an institutional structure that was created in the wake of World War II and does not account for changes since then. I suggest a pragmatic approach to measuring “power” – being aware that

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<sup>19</sup> I thank Wolfgang Wagner for providing me with the ParlCon data set.

it remains an elusive concept. The condition is based on an index comprised of a country's weighted percentages of the sum of population, GDP, military expenditure, and the number of forces.<sup>20</sup>

## *VI. Alternative Explanations*

Foreign policy decisions are complex procedures for which a variety of reasonable hypotheses can be formulated. The conditions selected are based on plausible theoretical expectations but for methodological and research pragmatic reasons others had to be left out. This study aims at contingent generalization across democratic subtypes. Thus, some explanatory approaches are difficult to integrate since they require an in-depth focus on a single case or mechanism. This shortcoming is aimed to be addressed in part through a process-tracing of some of the patterns identified during the fs/QCA analysis.

An important alternative explanation or aspect of foreign policy decision-making that is not included in the study is public opinion. Public opinion is an elusive concept. While most researchers agree that it plays a role in foreign policy decisions and that politicians try to rally the public behind their cause, it is difficult to discern which way the influence between politics, the media, and the general public goes (Kull and Destler 1999; Sobel 2001). What is even more problematic is that in order to include public opinion in the research design one would need reliable and comparable information *preceding* a military operation across countries and conflicts. In cases where this data is not available, one runs the risk of biased inferences based on a comparison of opinion polls conducted prior to an operation with those undertaken weeks or months into a military operation. That is why at the current point of research I have not considered including a detailed analysis of public opinion surveys.

### **3.3 Case Selection**

The units of observation – cases – are neither individual countries nor specific conflicts but combined country/conflict units. Taken together these units indicate a country's political decision on whether or not to use military force in a given opportunity situation, which is marked by an imminent conflict. In this way, the specific circumstances of a country/conflict combination are acknowledged while allowing for cross-case comparison between different countries' responses to the same conflict as well as between responses toward different conflicts by one and the same country.

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<sup>20</sup> See appendix for the raw data and the fuzzy-set calibration criteria.

The theoretical argument to be developed aims to apply to consolidated democracies with established political institutions and a democratic political culture. This scope can potentially include a wide variety of democracies, beyond the OECD world. However, if economic and geographic disparities between the countries become too great, any comparative attempt will face serious obstacles. That is why at the current stage only countries that were OECD member states as of 1990 are included in the study.<sup>21</sup> The conflicts included in the analysis are cases of military intervention as defined earlier. The time frame of observation is the post-Cold War era (1990-2006). Table 3.1 lists the selected military interventions in the given timeframe.<sup>22</sup>

**Table 3.1** Selected Military Operations, 1990-2006

	<i>Conflict region</i>	<i>Start date</i>	<i>Military operation</i>	<i>Frame</i>	<i>UNSC</i>
1	Iraq	01/91	Desert Storm	ad hoc	authorized
2	Somalia	03/93	UNOSOM II	UN	authorized
3	Serbia and Montenegro	03/99	Allied Force	NATO	not authorized
4	Serbia and Montenegro	06/99	KFOR	NATO	authorized
5	Iraq	03/03	Iraqi Freedom	ad hoc	not authorized
6	Iraq	10/03	MNF-Iraq	ad hoc	authorized
7	Bosnia and Herzegovina	12/04	EUFOR Althea	EU	authorized
8	R. D. Congo	07/06	EUFOR R. D. Congo	EU	authorized

#### 4. Preliminary Empirical Results

This section presents some preliminary results of the fuzzy-set analysis conducted so far. Since the research is ongoing a word of caution is due because the results still depend on further testing and the inclusion of additional cases. Currently the truth table consists of 95 cases, containing observations on 14 countries and eight military interventions between 1990 and 2006. In 17 cases military participation was considered theoretically implausible and so these cases were not included as “negative cases,” or observations with non-membership in the outcome (Use of Force). That is why some countries provide only four cases (e.g., Australia and Japan) while others provide the full list of potential cases (e.g., Denmark).<sup>23</sup>

<sup>21</sup> Poland became an OECD member in 1996 and is also included in the study. Additional Eastern European countries will be included at later stages of the research.

<sup>22</sup> This list is not aimed to be comprehensive. Further conflicts will be added.

<sup>23</sup> See appendix.

The military operations analyzed fall into three broad categories: (1) UN peace enforcement operations under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, (2) military operations conducted under the auspices of regional organizations as the EU and NATO, and (3) ad hoc military coalitions outside of existing institutional frameworks, conducted under the command of the respective lead nation. These categories were analyzed separately in order to reduce the heterogeneity within the population of cases. The following sections will in turn discuss the results for military operations conducted by ad hoc coalitions and regional organizations.

#### ***4.1 Military Operations by Ad Hoc Coalitions***

The subset on ad hoc military coalitions consists of 41 cases across 14 countries and their participation in three military conflicts in Iraq: the Persian Gulf War of 1991, the Iraq War of 2003 (invasion phase), and the Multinational Forces in Iraq (MNF-Iraq) from October 2003 onward. A first series of fsQCA analyses<sup>24</sup> indicates that the use of all five conditions (RIGHT, PEAC, MULT, PARL, PWR) yields solution terms with low coverage and overly complex results. Thus, it is decided to temporarily exclude the condition PEAC and continue the analysis with the remaining four conditions to reduce the problem of limited diversity. The condition PEAC is dropped since it provides a specification of political preferences that are, to some extent, already included in RIGHT.<sup>25</sup>

The fsQCA analysis for the remaining conditions (RIGHT, MULT, PARL, PWR) across 41 cases of ad hoc coalition participation reveals four paths and towards the outcome Use of Force.<sup>26</sup> The first two paths require the absence of Parliamentary War Powers in combination with *either* the presence of Rightist Government (Path 1) *or* the presence of a Multi-Party System (Path 2). The second pair of paths requires the presence of Rightist Government *and* the presence of a Multi-Party System *and* Parliamentary War Powers (Path 3), or, as in the two cases involving Poland, the presence of Rightist Government and the absence Parliamentary War Powers *and* the absence of Power. The complex solution uses a consistency cutoff of 0.89. In fuzzy-set notation, the result of this analysis is:

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<sup>24</sup> The initial test for necessity showed that none of the tested conditions is a superset of the use of military force, in the sense that no condition contains membership scores consistently higher than or equal to the scores of the outcome.

<sup>25</sup> Ideally, these conditions should be analyzed in combination. This will be done in later steps during the research process.

<sup>26</sup> The fourth path offers a unique coverage for Poland only: RIGHT\*parl\*pwr → UOF (unique coverage: .03; consistency .99).

$\text{parl} * (\text{RIGHT} + \text{MULT}) + \text{RIGHT} * (\text{MULT} * \text{PARL} + \text{parl} * \text{pwr}) \rightarrow \text{UOF}$   
 (coverage: .72; consistency .93)

This preliminary result points to several interesting findings. First, even in the presence of Parliamentary War Powers a path exists toward the use of military force, granted that a Rightist Government and a Multi-Party System are present (Path 3). This road was taken by Denmark, Italy, and Japan. Second, theoretical expectations are to a large extent supported by the findings: both rightist partisanship and a lack of parliamentary involvement are components of sufficient conditions for the outcome to occur. In other words, they are INUS conditions – “an insufficient but necessary part of a condition which is itself unnecessary but sufficient for the result” (Mackie in Ragin 2008:154). Finally, it is noteworthy that the Power condition appears only in negated form and the least frequented path towards the Use of Force. This could either indicate a concept misspecification or that material capabilities are simply less relevant than alternative factors in the context of ad hoc coalition interventions.

#### ***4.2 Military Operations by Regional Organizations***

The subset of military interventions under the auspices of regional organizations contains 40 cases across 14 countries and four operations: NATO’s Operation Allied Force against Serbia and Montenegro (Kosovo) between March and June 1999, the subsequent and ongoing KFOR mission, the EU military operation EUFOR Althea that took over from NATO in December of 2004 (ongoing), and EUFOR R. D. Congo, conducted in 2006. For reasons of comparability the fsQCA analysis is continued with the same set of conditions used for the analysis of ad hoc operations (RIGHT, MULT, PARL, PWR).

The fsQCA analysis for regional organization operations reveals a more complex picture than for ad hoc operations. Five distinct paths are discernable. However, three paths require the absence of Parliamentary War Powers [ $\text{parl} * (\text{RIGHT} + \text{mult} + \text{pwr}) \rightarrow \text{UOF}$ ], whereas two paths require the presence of Power [ $\text{PWR} (\text{PARL} * \text{MULT} + \text{mult} * \text{right}) \rightarrow \text{UOF}$ ]. The complex solution uses a consistency cutoff of 0.90. In fuzzy-set notation, the full solution term for this analysis is:

$\text{parl} * (\text{RIGHT} + \text{mult} + \text{pwr}) + \text{PWR} * (\text{PARL} * \text{MULT} + \text{mult} * \text{right}) \rightarrow \text{UOF}$   
 (coverage: .65; consistency .92)

The solution term and its constituent pathways allow for some preliminary conclusions. First, the absence of Parliamentary War Powers is a necessary part of paths towards the Use of Force. In fact, three paths fall into the group comprised of countries with weak parliaments. The unique coverage for the absence of Parliamentary War Powers is .28, meaning that it ‘explains’ 28% of the total number of cases. Second, power-based arguments seem more important in the case of operations under regional frameworks – as in established institutional alliance structures within the EU and NATO than in ad hoc coalitions. This could indicate that more powerful countries have a smaller range of options in deciding whether or not to join an alliance operation whereas in ad hoc coalitions they could potentially abstain if their political leaders choose to. Further, it is noteworthy that even in countries with strong parliaments and a multi-party system, power considerations can potentially outweigh other factors and lead towards the use of military force (Path 4).

## **5. Conclusion**

The preliminary results of the fsQCA analyses conducted so far seem to support existing arguments concerning the importance of political institutions and policy preferences as enabling and constraining conditions for the participation of consolidated democracies in military operations. No single factor determines whether a government chooses to use military force – instead it is the interplay of institutional settings, actors’ preferences, and power considerations that makes certain pathways towards the use of force more or less likely. This finding seems rather important since it qualifies the “parliamentary peace” hypotheses by adding conditions that must be met for the peace to hold. Likewise, power considerations alone do not provide a full account for the cases observed and must be regarded in conjunction with institutional and political factors.

The analyses have also shown that some of the underlying concepts and hypotheses need to be revisited and further tested against additional cases. This should result in a well-tested framework of conditions and a set of democratic pathways towards the use and non-use of force. The next step, then, will be to analyze the mechanisms at work in specific pathways that promise additional theoretical insight. FS/QCA in itself cannot identify causal mechanisms, thus it is required to do process-tracing on select cases.

## 6. Appendix

**Table 6.1** Power Index Construction and Fuzzy-Set Calibration

<i>Country</i>	<i>Population (in millions)</i>	<i>GDP (in bn US\$)</i>	<i>Military Expenditure (in bn US\$)</i>	<i>Number in Armed Forces (in thousands)</i>	<i>Power Index</i>	<i>Fuzzy Value</i>
1 United States	280.77	9.753	373.95	1,500	36.56	1.00
2 Japan	126.73	4.110	39.98	241	8.60	.71
3 Germany	81.70	2.284	33.97	318	6.65	.64
4 France	59.42	1.653	41.96	305	5.99	.62
5 United Kingdom	59.22	1.651	42.42	218	5.33	.59
6 Italy	57.76	1.388	21.86	245	4.56	.56
7 Spain	39.92	775	8,95	175	2.76	.44
8 Poland	38.57	205	4.07	196	2.28	.32
9 Canada	30.51	828	10.29	62	1.92	.25
10 Australia	19.15	460	10.39	56	1.41	.17
11 Sweden	8.82	276	5.38	40	0.85	.10
12 Norway	4.47	204	3.86	27	0.57	.08
13 Denmark	5.27	196	3.05	25	0.53	.08
14 New Zealand	3.80	70	0.96	9	0.21	.06

*Notes:* Power Index percentages express the overall share in the four indicators measured. Indicator numbers reflect the average values for the time period 1990 - 2006. Fuzzy-set values are the result of a calibration procedure using the qualitative anchors [22,3,0], indicating full membership in the set of powerful countries, the crossover point, and full non-membership in the set. *Sources:* IISS (1990 - 2006); SIPRI 2005. Author's calculations.

**Table 6.2** Qualitative Anchors for Calibrated Fuzzy-Set Conditions

<i>Condition</i>	<i>Qualitative Anchors</i>	<i>Full Membership Indicates</i>
Left-Right Index	[ 20 / 0 / -5 ]	Rightist Partisanship
Peace Index	[ 10 / 0 / -2 ]	Peaceful Policy Preferences
Party System	[ 5 / 3 / 2 ]	Multiparty System

**Table 6.3** Fuzzy-Set Membership Scores for Conditions and Outcome ( $N = 95$ )

<i>Case</i>	<i>Country</i>	<i>Military Operation</i>	<i>Left-Right Index</i>	<i>Peace Index</i>	<i>Party System</i>	<i>Parl. War Powers</i>	<i>Power Index</i>	<i>Use of Military Force</i>
1	Australia	Gulf War	0	.57	.12	0	.17	.70
2		Unosom II	0	.57	.12	0	.17	1.00
3		Iraqi Freedom	.99	0	.18	0	.17	.90
4		MNF-Iraq	.99	0	.18	0	.17	1.00
5	Canada	Gulf War	.65	1.00	.12	0	.25	1.00
6		Unosom II	.65	1.00	.12	0	.25	1.00
7		Allied Force	.72	1.00	.49	0	.25	1.00
8		KFOR	.72	1.00	.49	0	.25	.90
9		Iraqi Freedom	0	.15	.20	0	.25	0
10		MNF-Iraq	0	.15	.20	0	.25	.30
11	Althea	0	.15	.20	0	.25	.70	
12	Denmark	Gulf War	.99	0	.97	1.00	.08	.70
13		Unosom II	.82	0	.88	1.00	.08	0
14		Allied Force	.64	.94	.93	1.00	.08	1.00
15		KFOR	.64	.94	.93	1.00	.08	.90
16		Iraqi Freedom	.99	.16	.94	1.00	.08	.80
17		MNF-Iraq	.99	.16	.94	1.00	.08	.90
18		Althea	.99	.16	.94	1.00	.08	0
19		EUF Congo	.58	.24	.94	1.00	.08	0
20	France	Gulf War	0	.99	.53	0	.62	1.0
21		Unosom II	0	.99	.53	0	.62	1.0
22		Allied Force	.59	.99	.69	0	.62	1.0
23		KFOR	.59	.99	.69	0	.62	1.0
24		Iraqi Freedom	.01	.57	.10	0	.62	.20
25		MNF-Iraq	.01	.57	.10	0	.62	.20
26		Althea	.01	.57	.10	0	.62	.80
27	EUF Congo	.01	.57	.10	0	.62	1.0	
28	Germany	Gulf War	.82	1.0	.35	1.0	.64	.30
29		Unosom II	.01	1.0	.26	1.0	.64	.70
30		Allied Force	.22	.99	.43	1.0	.64	.80
31		KFOR	.22	.99	.43	1.0	.64	1.0
32		Iraqi Freedom	.01	.92	.92	1.0	.64	.20
33		MNF-Iraq	.01	.92	.92	1.0	.64	.20
34		Althea	.01	.92	.92	1.0	.64	1.0
35	EUF Congo	.85	.80	.66	1.0	.64	1.0	
36	Italy	Gulf War	.77	.98	.83	.60	.56	.90
37		Unosom II	.83	.43	.98	.60	.56	1.0
38		Allied Force	.93	.57	.99	.60	.56	1.0
39		KFOR	.93	.57	.99	.60	.56	1.0
40		Iraqi Freedom	.94	.57	.97	.60	.56	.80
41		MNF-Iraq	.94	.57	.97	.60	.56	1.0
42		Althea	.94	.57	.97	.60	.56	1.0
43	EUF Congo	.94	.57	.97	.60	.56	.70	
44	Japan	Gulf War	0	0	.30	1.0	.71	.30
45		Unosom II	0	0	.30	1.0	.71	0
46		Iraqi Freedom	.70	0	.56	1.0	.71	.20
47		MNF-Iraq	.70	0	.56	1.0	.71	.70
48	New Zealand	Gulf War	.05	.57	.02	0	.06	0
49		Unosom II	.05	.57	.02	0	.06	.60
50		Iraqi Freedom	0	.95	.76	0	.06	.60
51		MNF-Iraq	0	.95	.76	0	.06	.70
52		Althea	0	.95	.76	0	.06	.60

**Table 6.3** (continued)

53		Gulf War	0	.32	.86	.80	.08	.60
54		Unosom II	0	.06	.86	.80	.08	.70
55		Allied Force	.02	.75	.88	.80	.08	1.0
56	Norway	KFOR	.02	.75	.88	.80	.08	.90
57		Iraqi Freedom	.34	0	.97	.80	.08	.60
58		MNF-Iraq	.34	0	.97	.80	.08	.70
59		Althea	.34	0	.97	.80	.08	.60
60		Unosom II	.88	.15	1.0	0	.32	0
61		Allied Force	.87	0	.46	0	.32	0
62		KFOR	.87	0	.46	0	.32	.70
63	Poland	Iraqi Freedom	.93	.04	.71	0	.32	.90
64		MNF-Iraq	.93	.04	.71	0	.32	1.0
65		Althea	.93	.04	.71	0	.32	1.0
66		EUF Congo	.28	.45	.87	0	.32	1.0
67		Gulf War	0	.87	.39	0	.44	.60
68		Unosom II	0	.87	.39	0	.44	0
69		Allied Force	.80	0	.30	0	.44	1.0
70	Spain	KFOR	.80	0	.30	0	.44	1.0
71		Iraqi Freedom	.83	0	.17	0	.44	.80
72		MNF-Iraq	.83	0	.17	0	.44	1.0
73		Althea	0	.96	.20	0	.44	1.0
74		EUF Congo	0	.96	.20	0	.44	1.0
75		Gulf War	0	.99	.73	1.0	.10	.60
76		Unosom II	.96	.07	.86	1.0	.10	.60
77		Allied Force	.11	.57	.87	1.0	.10	0
78	Sweden	KFOR	.11	.57	.87	1.0	.10	.70
79		Iraqi Freedom	0	.91	.86	1.0	.10	0
80		MNF-Iraq	0	.91	.86	1.0	.10	0
81		Althea	0	.91	.86	1.0	.10	.80
82		EUF Congo	0	.91	.86	1.0	.10	.80
83		Gulf War	.99	0	.08	0	.59	1.0
84		Unosom II	.99	0	.10	0	.59	0
85		Allied Force	.77	.57	.07	0	.59	1.0
86	United Kingdom	KFOR	.77	.57	.07	0	.59	1.0
87		Iraqi Freedom	.70	.12	.08	0	.59	1.0
88		MNF-Iraq	.70	.12	.08	0	.59	1.0
89		Althea	.70	.12	.08	0	.59	.90
90		Gulf War	.99	0	.01	.20	1.0	1.0
91		Unosom II	.99	.01	.01	.20	1.0	1.0
92	United States	Allied Force	.79	.99	.02	.20	1.0	1.0
93		KFOR	.79	.99	.02	.20	1.0	1.0
94		Iraqi Freedom	.99	0	.05	.20	1.0	1.0
95		MNF-Iraq	.99	0	.05	.20	1.0	1.0

*Notes:* Left-Right Index is calibrated towards rightist government, higher values indicate higher degree of membership; based on CMP category (Rile). Peace Index calibrated towards peaceful policy preferences based on CMP categories (104-106). Party System is calibrated towards multiparty government, based on the effective number of parties (ENP) in parliament. For other conditions see coding criteria. *Sources:* Born and Hänggi (2005); Budge et al. (2001); Dieterich, Hummel, and Marschall (2009); Gallagher and Mitchell (2009); IISS (1990-2006); Klingemann et al. (2006); SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database <<http://www.sipri.org/databases>> [last accessed June 2010]; Wagner, Peters, and Glahn (2010). Author's calculations.

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