

Mission Intrusiveness as Peacebuilders' Leverage in Post-Conflict Democratization Processes

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ABSTRACT

The paper will present insights and results of a comprehensive research project on post-conflict democratization that are based on nine in-depth case studies.¹ Preliminary results from the first stage of the project indicate that structural variables – including the legacy of the war, neighborhood effects, the size of peace missions, and the amounts of aid – are not per se strongly correlated with the outcome of post-conflict democratization. Instead, however, it can be shown that these variables affect the interaction process between domestic elites and peacebuilders on the path toward democracy. Peacebuilding is understood as a continuous bargaining process between local and external actors over the contents of the peace and the reform process that should lead to a liberal democracy. The argument is brought forward that the ‘footprint’ of a peace mission is the most visible and ostentatious form of leverage that peacebuilders bring into the bargaining arena for post-conflict democratization. Peacebuilders will attempt to use this leverage for pushing the status quo towards democracy. Throughout this process, they are faced with two types of local resistance: Resistance against the intrusiveness of the peace mission itself and resistance against the democratization agenda. The outcome of the democratization process is contingent upon the peacebuilders’ ability to guarantee or enforce the new rules of the democratic game against these challenges.

Key words: Peacebuilding, democratization, peace missions, bargaining.

¹ See Zuercher, Christoph; Roehner, Nora; Riese, Sarah (2009): External Democracy Promotion in Post-Conflict Zones: A Comparative-Analytical Framework. *Taiwan Journal of Democracy* 5(1): 1-26. The case studies are Afghanistan, Bosnia, East Timor, Kosovo, Macedonia, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, and Tajikistan.

1. INTRODUCTION

There have been fundamental changes in the nature of peace missions in the last two decades. External actors have expanded their agendas and have taken on far-reaching responsibilities in post-conflict situations. This trend can be explained by a number of factors, including the altered nature of the conflicts from interstate to predominantly intrastate conflicts, the erosion of state sovereignty, and a 'responsibility to protect' by the international community together with an increased cooperation with and within the UN Security Council (Caplan, 2005).

External actors aim at more than just ending the war and establishing an environment of safety and security. For twenty years now, democratization has been firmly anchored in peacebuilding and has led to ever more ambitious and demanding agendas. In all modern peace missions, democratization has become an implicit or explicit objective. Specific tasks include building political parties, supporting a free press and critical civil society, and establishing a legal and constitutional framework for elections (Dobbins et al., 2007: xxiii; Drews, 2001: 59). These measures are intended to reinforce democracy from without – while it must still be built from within, as Durch (2006: 20) argues.

Peace missions that are designed for implementing these ambitious peacebuilding and democratization mandates need appropriate capacities. Consequently, modern peace missions have become larger in terms of their duration, the number of staff deployed – both troops and civilian personnel – and overall financial resources. Also, they were increasingly vested with wide-ranging authorities. The post-conflict reconstruction of governance structures in some cases goes hand in hand with a temporary take-over of government functions and administrative control over the state or territory.

But although this is a widely acknowledged policy assumption, sheer size is not everything. The track record of the large, costly and high-capacity missions is mixed. With the prominent exception of Afghanistan, these missions have brought an end to large-scale violence but they were overall not successful at establishing self-sustained liberal democracies. A number of studies have come to the same results (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000; Fortna, 2008b). The figure below shows that there is no direct link between the intrusiveness of peace missions and democratic outcomes for the cases in the sample. The outcome of peacebuilding is therefore not a linear function of the resources and the leverage that the peacebuilders bring with them.

[Figure 1 here]

This paper argues that democratization outcomes must rather be understood as equilibrium outcomes of a bargaining game between state elites and peacebuilders that takes place throughout the intervention period. When peacebuilders arrive in a post-conflict state, they are met by a local political elite, which may share some aspects of the peacebuilders vision of democracy but not others. On the surface, peacebuilders and local elites have a common objective – creating security and building peace. But this objective is loosely enough defined to trigger a constant bargaining over the exact contents of the peace, over allocation of resources, over who has the control over the process, over priorities, and, most importantly, over the contents of reform polices. Even for UN missions that are conducted under a chapter VII mandate, which does not require any consent of the government, the daily life of peacebuilders,

from high level management to field officers, is a constant negotiation with local elites. In that process, peacebuilders are expected to gain the cooperation of the recipients of the intervention in order to ensure that the intervened gain “ownership.”

As with every bargaining process, the outcome is determined by what the parties want and how much resources and determination they can mobilize to achieve their goals. Peacebuilders want to implement reforms that lead to a liberal peace: they want to deliver services and assistance that will create new institutions that (re)distribute political and economic power in a transparent, accountable and democratic way. Their leverage stems from the resources that they bring, including troops and coercive capacities, financial aid, and certain decision-making authorities. These measures can be used positively and negatively: as a credible guarantee for those local elites who are genuinely interested in democracy to take a risk or as an effective enforcement mechanism or a credible threat for non-democratizers to ensure compliance with democratic rules.

Local elites, in contrast, want to preserve their political power and ensure that the peacebuilding process either enhances or at least does not harm their political and economic interests. It is possible that local elites perceive it in their best interest to fully align with the peacebuilders' vision, as it was, for example, the case in Namibia. However, it is more likely that local elites have priorities which differ from those of the peacebuilders. Local elites may welcome peace – but not democracy – for various reasons: first, democratic rules endanger the militarily strongest party's grip on power because it may lose in elections what was won in battle; second, democratic reforms may endanger their ways of extortion, including racketeering, smuggling, illegal private taxing, drug cultivation, and corruption; and third, democratic procedures and good governance threaten patron-client networks, which are the very foundation on which the authority and often the survival of most regimes in post-conflict states is built (Zuercher et al., forthcoming). Democratization can therefore be very costly for local elites; these costs are ‘adaptation costs’.

Based on the nine case studies, the study finds that there are instances at some stage in the interaction process in which domestic political elites seek to challenge the democratization plan. One can identify two distinct processes. In the first mechanism, the resistance of the local elites is directed at the intrusiveness of the peace mission as such. Especially when the democratization effort is part of a post-conflict intervention after a war for independence, interference into the domestic affairs of the newly independent state is perceived as very intruding. Local elites have fought a bloody war to achieve sovereignty and self-determination and may react very impatiently to external impediments to their strife for local ownership. In the second mechanism, domestic resistance is directed against peacebuilders' democratization agenda. The higher the adaptation costs of the local elites, the more leverage peacebuilders need to push through their democratization agenda against the domestic opposition.

In both cases, the only real material and symbolic resource that local state elites have at their disposal for challenging the democratization agenda is the threat or the actual use of renewed violence. Violence is used as a ‘wild card’ by local elites to express their resistance. In responding to those challenges, peacebuilders will first use their coercive capacities for restoring public order and security. Then, they will have to weigh their democratization objectives against security requirements (Jarstad, 2008) and will be forced to compromise their noble intentions. It is assumed that the leverage of peacebuilders over domestic actors diminishes over time, so that

peacebuilders will be forced to make greater concessions at later stages in the peacebuilding process.

In what follows, a measure will be introduced for operationalizing the intrusiveness of peace missions. The descriptives of the nine cases under study show that the more recent peace missions in Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, and Afghanistan were much more intrusive than earlier missions, e.g. in Namibia, Mozambique, or Rwanda. The main part of the paper will then analyze in detail the bargaining processes between local elites and peacebuilders.

2. THE INTRUSIVENESS OF PEACE MISSIONS

Mission intrusiveness is conceptualized as a combined measure of the scale and scope of a peace mission. The scale of peace missions is an expression of its 'visibility' or 'presence'. The more visible a peace mission is to the parties of the conflict and to the people, the more it can bring in the weight and authority of the international community and therefore act as a credible guarantor for those endorsing the peacebuilding agenda and as an enforcer for those rejecting it. The scale of a peace mission is operationalized as an index of its duration, the number of military and civilian personnel, and the total expenditures. In order to distinguish missions in countries with a large population from missions in small countries, the score is weighted by the population. Hence, the scale of a peace mission is calculated as:

$$\text{Scale} = (\text{Duration} * \text{Personnel} * \text{Resources} *) / \text{Population}$$

The table below presents the scores of the missions on the individual dimensions of the index and the final score for quantitative intrusiveness in the last column.

[Table 1 here]

Next, the scale of a peace mission, i.e. the level of external engagement in the post-conflict state will be operationalized. As was indicated above, democratization has been an implicit or explicit objective in all modern peace missions. And the more a peace missions has features of an international interim administration, the more decision-making powers peacebuilders enjoy and the more discretion they have for pushing through their democratization agenda.

Although democratization was only an explicit goal of the more recent interventions in the sample, it was implicitly part of all the mandates. Election monitoring, which is democratization in a very narrow understanding, was an integral part of all missions.² In Namibia and Mozambique, the administration and supervision was the main objective of the missions and electoral observers were mainly recruited from the UN system (Hartmann, 2009; Manning and

² Except in Rwanda where the first elections took place many years after the war and the genocide, in 2001 and 2003.

Malbrough, 2009). Since the mid-1990s, OSCE has established itself as the primary organization for organizing and controlling elections at all levels; it was in charge of election monitoring in all cases in the sample, except in Rwanda, where election monitors came from across Africa and the European Union (Hayman, 2009) and East Timor, where elections have been monitored by states (e.g. Indonesia, Portugal, Japan), international organizations (e.g. CPLP, EU, UN), and local and international civil society organizations (Myrntinen, 2009). The mandates of the highly intrusive missions in East Timor, Bosnia, and Kosovo contained a wide range of concrete democratization measures like political party development, institutional reform of the parliament and the ministries, reform of the judiciary and the security sector, decentralization, media development, reform of the welfare systems, economic reform and many more.

In the cases in the sample where democratization was a stated objective of the interveners, domestic state structures and institutions had partially or totally collapsed due to the conflict (Bosnia, Afghanistan) and / or needed to be rebuilt from scratch in the transition process of newly independent states (Kosovo, East Timor). Since functioning institutions are vital for the implementation of the peace agreement, for the introduction of good governance and right away for the running of the country on a day-to-day basis, external actors have stepped in to provide the necessary framework for such demanding tasks, including all sorts of infrastructure, communication channels, and large monetary resources. International transitional administrations represent the heavy footprint of the international community and its most powerful tool in the quest for peace and security. The idea is that maximum external engagement lays the solid institutional foundation for long-term peace, reconciliation and possibly democracy and that the new elites of the post-conflict state only need to adopt the newly established structures. In the best-case scenario, there would be a smooth hand-over of competencies from the external actors to local actors.

In order to quantify the temporary take-over of government functions by external actors in post-conflict settings, different domestic institutional sectors are examined and external involvement is coded dichotomously. That way, the operationalization of the scope of peace missions indicates the level of external engagement. The more governmental functions are temporarily executed by external actors, the more the peace mission has features of an interim administration.

Eight different aspects of peacebuilding mandates were chosen to construct an index of scope. Classical peacebuilding tasks, like observation of the ceasefire, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of combatants (DDR), or election monitoring are not considered because they are the 'standard tools' of peacebuilding and are rather means for ending the war than for rebuilding the country and constructing democratic state institutions. The following questions were asked.

1. Did peacebuilders enforce peace with military power?
2. Did peacebuilders participate in executive policing?
3. Did peacebuilders engage in security sector reform?
4. Did peacebuilders take on executive powers?
5. Did peacebuilders take on legislative powers?
6. Did peacebuilders shape the new constitution?
7. Did peacebuilders take on judicial powers?
8. Did peacebuilders decisively shape economic policies?

The added number of positive answers to each of these questions is used to create a factor on which peace missions can be classified according their scope. The scores on each of these aspects of peacebuilding and the combined score for the scope of each peace mission in the sample are found in table 2 below.

[Table 2 here]

Comparing the two measures of mission scale and scope, it is found that mission size is in fact linked to the complexity of the mandate; they are correlated at 0.79. This supports the presumption that broad and ambitious statebuilding missions are costly, need more personnel and are deployed for longer periods.

A combined measure of the scale and scope of intrusiveness is therefore a useful indicator of the overall intrusiveness of a peace mission. It is calculated as³:

$$\text{Intrusiveness} = \log[\text{scale} + (\text{scale} * \text{scope})]$$

Figure 2 depicts the peace missions in the sample according to their intrusiveness scores. It can be seen that Kosovo, Bosnia, Afghanistan, and East Timor have hosted the most intrusive peace missions. Although the costs of the mission in Afghanistan and the number of troops are far higher than in all other missions in the sample, the combined intrusiveness score of the mission puts it behind Kosovo and Bosnia due to a lower score for mission scope. Despite their massive contribution in terms of manpower and resources, international actors refrained from establishing an interim administration in Afghanistan and intended to have domestic actors “in the driver’s seat”.

[Figure 2 here]

³ Since the distribution of the product of scale and scope is highly skewed, the natural log is used to center the distribution on the median. The raw score of scale is added to the product of scale and scope to avoid missing values when the product is 0 for Tajikistan where no governmental functions were temporarily executed by external actors and the raw score of scope was therefore 0. These intrusiveness scores are strictly not to be interpreted in absolute terms but rather as an ordinal measure.

3. THE INTERACTION PROCESS

Although it is a value in itself to be able to quantify the size and intrusiveness of peace missions, the more interesting question, of course, is how peacebuilders used that as leverage in the bargaining process with local elites and what the effects are on the democratization outcome. As was pointed out above, in most cases peacebuilders have to deal with challenges by local elites to their peacebuilding and democratization agendas.

In the analysis of the interaction process between peacebuilders and local elites, one needs to distinguish between two distinct types of resistance of the local state elites: resistance against the democratization agenda of the peacebuilders and resistance against the peace mission itself. Both types of resistance are interwoven in practice but analytically, it is useful to examine them separately because mission intrusiveness is only one specific type of leverage that peacebuilders bring into the bargaining arena (alongside aid or neighborhood factors).

In the first mechanism, the *absolute* intrusiveness of peace missions stirs resistance. Irrespective of the stance of domestic elites on the democratization agenda, higher levels of external tutelage per se provoke greater domestic resistance. In highly intrusive peace missions – even if the relations between the peacebuilders and the local elites were very cooperative in the beginning – the internal contradiction that heavy external oversight is intended to produce autonomous and self-governing democratic regimes leads to friction between both actors at some point. Domestic calls for more autonomy are mostly expressed with violence since this is the ‘wild card’ that local elites can always play. In responding to such challenges, peacebuilders are forced to compromise their democracy agendas.

In the second mechanism, the *relative* level of mission intrusiveness compared with the adaptation costs of the local elites is decisive. When the costs of endorsing the new democratic regime are lower than the leverage that the peace missions brings, highly intrusive peace missions are an additional safety measure to the democratization process. If, however, the leverage of peace missions is outweighed by the adaptation costs of the local elites, the mission is not intrusive enough to enforce the new democratic rules, and unless peacebuilders have other means at their disposal to exert influence, the democratization process is deemed to fail.

In the descriptive analysis above, it was found that in Kosovo, Bosnia, Afghanistan, and East Timor, the footprint of the mission was much greater than in the other five cases under study. The intrusiveness of these peace missions gave peacebuilders considerable initial formal leverage. In the other cases, namely Mozambique, Rwanda, Macedonia, Tajikistan, and Namibia, other forms of leverage than mission intrusiveness were used by the external actors. In Mozambique and Rwanda, leverage in the form of aid and aid conditionality were decisive. Both countries depended heavily on donor assistance, and the interaction process and domestic efforts to delay the peace process centered mainly around ways and means to attract and secure more resources and around debates over how these resources would be used. In Macedonia, external leverage was derived from the prospect of EU membership and the coupling of EU pre-membership criteria to the Ohrid Agreement. In Tajikistan, the UN was unwilling to play an intrusive role and hence had no leverage; it was rather the 25,000 Russian troops that had military muscle in the peacekeeping process during the war but not in the democratization process. In Namibia, the peacebuilders drew their leverage from the fact that SWAPO desperately sought independence, which only the international community could grant.

Mechanism 1: Greater mission intrusiveness per se generates greater domestic resistance

Local resistance against peace missions

Greater mission intrusiveness per se generates greater domestic resistance against the peacebuilders and the intervention. While efforts to delay the peace process in the cases of low mission intrusiveness were more symbolic acts in an attempt to gain more resources and funding from the peacebuilders and international donors, resistance in highly intrusive peace missions was aimed directly at the interveners and their strategies.

In their rhetoric, peacebuilders emphasize that local ownership is the goal of any statebuilding and democratization effort and that it is essential to not only integrate local actors into the peace process but to make them the actual owners of this process and to allow them to develop political responsibilities. But considering that transitional administration temporarily suspends a state's sovereignty by assuming government functions, one can make out an obvious contradiction between the means and the ends of the statebuilding and democratization efforts (Chesterman, 2004: 3): international interim governments aim at constructing a new, sovereign state precisely by temporarily annulling that sovereignty. This stirs resistance in the host country against the peacebuilders for trying to establish peace and security – and ultimately democracy – by means of “benevolent autocracy” (Chesterman, 2004: 126ff.).

A detailed analysis of the nine cases in the sample, taking mission intrusiveness as a starting point, reveals that the relations between the peacebuilders and the state elites in the low intrusive cases were generally cooperative. Despite minor instances of challenges by domestic political elites, there were no cases of a renegotiation of the ‘peacebuilding contract’. It is not surprising to find that minor external interference yields no grounds for major domestic resistance. In Namibia, UNTAG and SWAPO fully cooperated since SWAPO had a huge interest in a success of UNTAG and the fulfillment of its mandate to hold free and fair elections on the way to independence. In Rwanda and Mozambique, both the RPF and Frelimo as the government actors embraced the objective of peaceful democracy but they were in need of external financial and technical assistance and had the capacity to slow down the process in order to extract additional international resources and commitment. This strategy worked only partially for Frelimo in Mozambique. Renamo, the opposition party in Mozambique, was more successful: its suspended participation in all peace commissions and the threat to boycott the elections led to the creation of the Renamo Trust Fund of US\$ 17 million. In Macedonia, the relationship between the state elites and the peacebuilders was also generally very cooperative. Acts of resistance and confrontation came from the domestic opposition and were directed at the ruling political party rather than at the interveners. While in power, the Macedonian VMRO-DPMNE implemented the provisions of the Ohrid Framework Agreement (despite some nationalist rhetoric), but when the party was in the parliamentary opposition between 2002 and 2006, it initiated a referendum campaign in order to prevent the implementation of the new law on decentralization and territorial re-organization as foreseen in the Ohrid Agreement. This referendum was held but failed due to low voter turnout.

In the cases of high mission intrusiveness, the relations between the domestic political elites and the peacebuilders were more complex. The partial or complete take-over of state functions by external actors has provoked domestic challenges to the external engagement. This is especially true for cases in which democratization was a derivative of local demands for independence. Here, the bargaining process is initially very cooperative since local elites regard

democratization as the price to pay for gaining independence. However, as soon as this objective was achieved, high mission intrusiveness was perceived as external tutelage and impedimental to sovereignty, autonomy, and local ownership.

This was the case in both Kosovo and East Timor. There, domestic resistance was an expression of demands for faster and more wide-ranging national ownership. Although peacebuilders and state elites shared the same objectives of democratic statehood, the slow pace of the hand-over of decision-making powers from the peacebuilders to national institutions caused tensions between them.

In Kosovo, the degree of external interference into local affairs was immense. The initial period of a complete external take-over of all government functions between late 1999 and early 2000, which was the peak in leverage that UNMIK had, was followed by a protracted transfer of competencies to the elected local actors. The external-local interaction process can be divided into three phases, which are characterized by a gradual change from mutual cooperation to open confrontation. During the first months of the mission, the interveners enjoyed a high degree of legitimacy within the Kosovo Albanian political elite, borne by domestic appreciation for the security guarantees provided by KFOR, who prevented the return of Serbian security forces to Kosovo, and joint efforts to build initial structures of local self-government. UNMIK rewarded such local cooperation with the deliberate transfer of executive competencies to the Kosovo government structures after parliamentary elections in autumn 2001 and the subsequent establishment of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG) in early 2002. However, as local expectations of a quick and full transfer of authorities and of independence from Serbia exceeded the reality on the ground, cooperative external-local relations began to shift into conflictive interaction. In an attempt to block off the demands for greater autonomy, UNMIK introduced the standards-before-status policy, which initiated the third phase in the bargaining process between the peacebuilders and the local elites as well as the population: mass confrontation.

Similarly in East Timor, the very intrusive intervention in Timor-Leste was at the outset a concerted effort with the external and the national actors generally working towards the same goals of democracy and independence and sticking to an agreed timetable. This initially very cooperative relationship between the UN transitional administration and the domestic elite changed when key players in the Timorese political elite expressed their frustrations over the slow process of the transfer of powers within the East Timor Transitional Administration (ETTA) framework. The perception of East Timor as a “kingdom of the UN” (Chopra, 2000) was shared by many East Timorese people who felt disempowered by the international actors who apparently took decisions on their behalf. After the country's independence in May 2002, when the externals have been relegated from being the administrators of East Timor to being guests of the East Timorese, the local elites showed increasing impatience with their ‘mentors’ to a point where they openly defied their presence.

In Afghanistan, resistance initially did not come from the state elites, i.e. Karzai and the warlords in their provincial fiefdoms, but from the oppositional Taliban who are united in their anti-Western ideology and in their fierce resistance against the Western democratization agenda. The military defeat of the Taliban by the International Force (ISAF) with support of the Northern Alliance initiated a period of tranquility and cooperation between peacebuilders and the Afghan state elites led by Karzai. Soon, however, the Taliban and other insurgent groups re-emerged. Motivated by a range of grievances, including tribal marginalization in new governance

structures and abuse or deaths from operations by foreign militaries, they continued their violent struggle against the Western "occupation". The fact that the Taliban as a key faction to the conflict were excluded from the Bonn talks in December 2001, which produced the framework for Afghanistan's political transition, fueled their incentive to destabilize the nascent Afghan state. In the absence of a peace agreement, the case of Afghanistan, therefore, is one of conflictual peacebuilding, where one faction remains excluded and retains a desire to continue the violent struggle. There are also a number of spoilers who benefit from continued insecurity and lawlessness via the lucrative and exploding drug trade.

In Bosnia, the fundamental challenges to the peacebuilding process from the beginning were the diverging interests of the peacebuilders and the domestic elites and the lack of political will by domestic actors. For their statebuilding and democratization tasks, the peacebuilders were primarily dependent on the cooperation of local actors, particularly as the international community at that point in its understanding of statebuilding prioritized the passage of power to domestic actors as quickly as possible. In an attempt to quickly construct a working Bosnian government, elections were held in 1996 in a vulnerable security environment which installed war victors as legitimate state leaders. These had narrow interests in peacetime restoration and democratization but their main interest was the hold on power. Their legitimization through free and fair elections gave the newly-elected local elites increased power in the bargaining process – especially regarding the disputed issue of minority returns –, which created the potential for instability. The international administrators had to cajole the politicians to honor their rhetoric commitments to democratization. The bargaining tools between peacebuilders and domestic elites in the first five years of the intervention, therefore, were compromise and co-option. The overall relationship was a "symbiosis between the OHR and nationalist parties" (Evenson, 2009: 116): Flagrant obstruction of Dayton was sanctioned, but since the international community relied on the appearance of a functioning system, the Bosnian leadership "had all the time in the world" to secure and strengthen its political power (Evenson, 2009: 115). Despite continuous use of ethnic fear as a campaign theme by the Bosnian political elites, the peacebuilders continued to supply resources for statebuilding and take the popular blame for unpopular decisions that the domestic elites would not make.

Local resistance finds its expression in violence

In the bargaining process, the most powerful means that the domestic actors have at their disposal to extort a revision of the peacebuilding contract from the internationals is the use of violence or the credible threat to use violence. This violence can be directed at the rival group(s) in the country, i.e. the former wartime enemy, or at the peacebuilders directly, or both at the same time. In the first case, the intention is to demonstrate that a renewed outbreak of the war is possible if parts of the peacebuilding contract are not being renegotiated; both majority and minority groups use this strategy. In the latter case, the course and the objectives of the intervention as a whole are challenged and the aim is to drive the interveners out of the country.

In Kosovo, the gradual deterioration of cooperative interaction culminated in the events of the March 2004 riots. Ethnic violence was directed mainly against the Serb-speaking community (Serbs and Roma) in Kosovo's enclaves. The riots left nineteen people dead, over 900 injured, thousands of Serbian houses and religious buildings destroyed, and have led to a renewed displacement of about 4,000 Kosovo-Serbs and Roma to Serbia proper, all under the eyes of KFOR and the international police. The perpetrators were mainly youngsters and radical spoiler groups of the Kosovo-Albanian majority. But even selected local partners temporarily opted to

adopt spoiler positions by playing the 'ethnic card' in order to gain political profit and to challenge the international interim administration in Kosovo.

In East Timor, violent anti-UN protests in December 2002 were an expression of general anti-UN resentment of the elites and the population. With only a few hundred militant protesters, the riots were relatively small in scale but had an immense impact in the small country. The fact that some international supermarkets were burnt down were a clear sign that the violence was deliberately directed at the UN presence.⁴

Afghanistan is experiencing an ongoing civil war. Insurgents openly undermine the Bonn process by engaging the Western troops in asymmetric warfare and by causing high civilian casualties in suicide attacks. While the rapid defeat, or retreat, of the Taliban in late 2001 suggested that the movement had collapsed, by spring of 2002, there already were asymmetric-style insurgent attacks directed against sites of state authority in several provinces and soon also in the capital. Quality and quantity of insurgent activities against the ISAF troops have increased dramatically since 2006.

Bosnia has not experienced a renewed outbreak of violence during the international presence. Instead, the domestic elites pursued a strategy of 'sitting it out'. Being aware that the peacebuilders were under constant time constraints to reach their objectives and realizing that the international focus soon shifted to the conflicts in Kosovo and Afghanistan, the Bosnian domestic elites did not express their resistance with violence. And they did not have to: IFOR and SFOR had experienced severe direct attacks during the war and were very anxious to provoke any renewed violence during the peace process. In the first years, they even did not execute their mandate to detain persecuted war criminals for fear of public uprisings.

How peacebuilders respond to the challenges

In responding to the violent challenges by the domestic actors, peacebuilders used their coercive capacities for restoring public order. By increasing the number of their troops and making use of their robust mandates, they intended to regain control of the security situation, which succeeded in Kosovo but failed dramatically in Afghanistan. And this purely military type of peacebuilding leverage was not an asset in the bargaining process over the overall course of the mission. The only real case of applied leverage without resorting to military means is Bosnia, where the introduction of the Bonn Powers in 1997 led to a more vigorous implementation of the democratization agenda.

In Kosovo, peacebuilders responded to the riots with a temporary increase in the number of KFOR troops. Although a drawdown process had already been underway, the contingent was restocked in order to be able to control the situation (Kramer and Dzihic, 2006: 25ff).

Similarly in Afghanistan, the strategy that peacebuilders applied in response to the mounting resistance of the Taliban and warlords was the drastic increase of ISAF troops and an expansion of combat operations. ISAF's mandate was initially limited to securing Kabul and surrounding

⁴ The violence that erupted in East Timor in April/May 2006 was not linked to the international presence but the result of an internal crisis, triggered by a conflict between different segments of the Timorese armed forces. The crisis led to the implosion the security sector and the subsequent expansion of general armed violence throughout the country.

areas, but the UN Security Council authorized the expansion of the mission throughout the entire territory of Afghanistan in October 2003. When that expansion was completed three years later, the number of troops stood at 31,000. Faced with increasing insurgency since 2006, ISAF became more and more involved in intensive combat operations. By June 2010, the number of troops stood at 119,500 troops from 46 contributing nations.

Only in Bosnia, the peacebuilders responded to the domestic challenges with non-military means since the challenge itself was non-violent and a gradual swelling instead of a sudden eruption. In a determined effort, peacebuilders clearly seized the initiative with the introduction of the Bonn Powers in 1997 and their heightened use particularly after 2000. The Bonn powers of the Office of the High Representative (OHR) included the right to draw up legislation for institution building, to annul legislation drafted by parliament, and to dismiss obstructive domestic officials. This created opportunities to 'renegotiate' part of the contract on the side of the peacebuilders. Some particularly forceful High Representatives, such as Paddy Ashdown (OHR from 2002 to 2006), used these powers to demonstrate who had the upper hand in the interaction process. Once the OHR got serious about realizing minority returns, it proved that it could deal with the heightened threats of extremists and secure minority return to some extent through a coordinated work of UNHCR, IFOR/SFOR for security protection, and OHR and OSCE for legal issues.

In East Timor, the violent anti-UN protests did not lead to any significant changes in UNMISSET's activities. The original plan to draw down gradually and to hand over competencies to local institutions was retained.

Peacebuilders are forced to make concessions on their democratization agenda

Peacebuilders are, of course, well aware that democratization cannot be enforced with military coercion. Despite their coercive capacities and wide-ranging executive authorities, they are in the end powerless in the face of domestic opposition against the peace mission itself. Peacekeeping missions have a significant positive impact on the stability of peace, as Fortna (2008a) has shown, and they are successful in containing residual violence. But, as the example of Kosovo shows, instances of violence can prompt the interveners even in robust and very well resourced missions to adjust their democratization agenda and to give in to domestic demands for greater autonomy. This is because peacebuilders depend on a secure and stable environment and on the cooperation of domestic actors for a smooth and stable implementation of the many peacebuilding projects and also for the security of the international personnel. Hence, they are willing to compromise their ambitious democratization agendas in the face of a deteriorating security situation. Local elites are, therefore, able to revise the original peacebuilding contract by using or threatening to use violence. In the course of that process, peacebuilders lose much of their initial leverage, which considerably reduces their ability to act as a credible guarantor or enforcer of democratization.

As a response to the violent domestic challenge in Kosovo, peacebuilders were driven to open up Kosovo's unresolved status question, to initiate the Vienna status talks in 2006 and eventually to (selectively) accept Kosovo's unilaterally-declared independence from Serbia in 2008. This marks the current political compromise between the (western) international actors and the local majority elite at the detriment of UNMIK's initial peacebuilding agenda for multiethnic democracy in Kosovo. So, the March 2004 riots in Kosovo and the willingness of the international community to commence status talks in 2005 caused a shifting of leverage from external to local actors.

The challenge to install both security and democracy was greatest in Afghanistan. Since the launch of the intervention, the imperatives of security and counter-terrorism stood in stark contrast to the ambitious statebuilding efforts, which emphasized national ownership and the 'light footprint' of the interveners. Reliance on warlords and their militias in these efforts further constrained the establishment of neutral state structures whose representatives adhere to democratic rules. At the same time, the absence of these structures and the inclusion of informal but powerful actors contributed to the creation of an electoral but not institutionalized democratization and undermined the rule of law. Ultimately, the failure of the peacebuilders and their protégé Karzai to establish well-functioning state structures and their penetration by corrupt and illegitimate actors has further diluted stability by calling into question the legitimacy of the new regime.

Bosnia was in fact the only case where peacebuilders attempted to apply the leverage they had. When they realized that their fear of violence – against the IFOR/SFOR troops and amongst different ethnic groups – was not justified, they have increased their assertiveness in implementing the mandate and have introduced and also self-confidently used the Bonn Powers.

Mechanism 2: Mission intrusiveness as a form of leverage to outweigh adaptation costs

Zuercher et al. (2009: 244ff) and Zuercher and Narten (2009) show that adaptation costs and the local demand for democracy are key to explaining the nature of the relationship between local elites and external peacebuilders. Here, it will be examined how peace missions are used as a form of leverage that enables peacebuilders to outweigh the adaptation costs of the domestic elites. In contrast to domestic resistance against highly intrusive peace missions as external tutelage, resistance against the democratization agenda of the peacebuilders stems from these adaptation costs. The idea of is that local elites in post-war countries might not want democracy because they have to bear the various costs of adapting to the new system. When adaptation costs are low, the relationship between external and domestic actors is generally cooperative because the local elites have more to gain than to lose from the democratization process. When adaptation costs are high, the leverage that peacebuilders bring into the bargaining arena must outweigh these costs, otherwise local elites will rebel against the external paternalism and the wearisome democratization process. Hence, what matters is the intrusiveness of the peace mission *relative* to the adaptation costs of the state elites. The leverage that peacebuilders derive from the footprint of the mission can either be used positively, as an external guarantee to those domestic elites favor democracy over other forms of governance, or negatively as a credible threat or enforcement mechanism for those rejecting democracy to ensure compliance with democratic rules.

Adaptation costs

For this study, adaptation costs are defined as costs that would hypothetically occur if local elites implemented a transition to liberal peace, without foreign support or interference. The evidence from the sample suggests that the costs of a democratic transition are linked to the local demand for democracy. There are two situations in which adaptation costs are atypically low and demand for democracy atypically high. The first such situation is in the context of a war for independence when democracy comes bundled with independence. Elites and the population are prepared to accept the adaptation costs for democracy because they desire independence.

Struggle for independence tends to build high elite coherence and a considerable popular support for the leadership. Both are prerequisites for state-building processes and better the chances for a successful democratization process. When elites enjoy widespread support from the population, this further reduces the costs of a democratic transition because elites can safely assume that they will prevail in elections. In the second situation, adaptation costs for democracy are also low when democracy offers a way out of a hurting stalemate. If the parties to a war are convinced that neither can win on the battlefield, they might be inclined to accept the costs that are associated with the adaptation of democratic rules of the game.

Adaptation costs were low in Namibia and East Timor, where local elites and the people embraced the idea of democracy in combination with independence. SWAPO in Namibia and the FRETILIN in East Timor were certain to win in the first free and fair elections. In Kosovo, democracy was also more of a derivative of the local demands for independence, and adaptation costs were moderate because of the proximity to the European Union and awareness of democratic principles; yet, strong patron-client relationships and a history of corruption were obstacles to the full implementation of democracy. In Mozambique, the peacebuilding efforts coupled with democratization offered a comfortable solution to the military stalemate between Renamo and Frelimo. In Macedonia, adaptation costs for the regime were relatively low because the EU accession process was the strategic objective of both Macedonians and Albanians.

By contrast, adaptation costs are high and demand for democracy low for four broad reasons. For one thing, introducing democratic rules endangers the strongest military party's grip on power because it may lose in elections what was won in battle. Also, liberal peace brings with it norms and rules of good governance that put a stop to lucrative, informal predation of state resources and also jeopardize the economic gains of war. Third, democratic procedures and good governance threaten patron-client networks in the political and the economic sphere, when these are the very foundation of authority of most regimes in post-conflict states. Democracy, of course, threatens the survival of a regime that is dependent on its capacity to rule by patronage. A fourth reason for high adaptation costs and low popular demand is the disappointment with previous experiences with democracy or democratization attempts and a phase of war fatigue after violence when the people want security and stability instead of political participation.

In Rwanda, the opening of the political system under Habyarimana in 1990 and the subsequent emergence of extremist forces that led to the genocide created a deep mistrust in Rwandan society of democracy as a catalyst of ethnic-based violence. Hence, popular demand for democratization after the end of the war was low, while the longing for security and reconciliation was prevalent. At the elite level, however, the sentiment emerged that democracy was an option for implementing consensus politics and power-sharing. Equally in Tajikistan, the appeal of democracy among the elites and society was limited, mainly because the horrors of the civil war were attributed to failed experiments with democracy in the early 1990s. The population craved security and stability, while the political elites were skeptical of democracy as a new ideological front and a trigger of new regional separatism.

Adaptation costs were high in Bosnia. The main issue for the elites of all parties to the Bosnian war was ethnicity, not democracy. Consequently, the ethnic-based system that was part of the Dayton Peace Agreement was acceptable as it guaranteed the positions of those ethnic-based parties that dominated during the war. The power-sharing guarantees that were attached to 'democracy' lowered adaptation costs considerably. Thus, there was a substantial interest among elites to limit democratic competition instead of pushing for it, as is exemplified by the enormous

difficulties of 'moving beyond Dayton' in terms of reforming the ethnic-based constitutional principles. Therefore, the role of the international community in some ways actually worked against a local interest in democracy.

In Afghanistan, adaptation costs were extremely high. The country has a long history of widespread nepotism and cronyism. The introduction of Western democratic principles and transparent governance would be difficult for any domestic actor in this country of deep-rooted religious traditions. Much of the country's economy is based on drug cultivation, smuggling, illegal private taxing, and corruption.

Are peace missions able to guarantee or enforce the new rules of the democratic game?

Although the footprint of a peacebuilding mission is partly based on robust mandates and military muscle, these will not be useful to enforce democracy directly. Peacebuilders can only use these capacities indirectly as a security guarantee against violent spoilers or external threats of violence. What matters more are the non-military means that peacebuilders have for exerting influence: adequate mission resources, enough civilian staff and, most importantly, decision-making powers. But when too much international force and imposition actually undermines the legitimacy of the very institutions of self-government international actors are building, this leads to an outcome which leaves the immediate post-war status quo largely intact and hence perpetuates a non-democratic mode of governance.

Adaptation costs are lower than mission intrusiveness

When domestic adaptation costs for democratization are lower than the leverage that peacebuilders have in terms of mission intrusiveness, the prospects for democracy are promising because the mission serves as a guarantee that supports the domestic democratization endeavors. East Timor is the best example for this scenario: Adaptation costs were low, popular demand was high and the UN interim administration provided all the resources, expertise and international attention for the country to get off on the right foot. In Namibia, Macedonia, and Mozambique, adaptation costs were equally low but the peacebuilders' leverage did not come from the intrusiveness of the mission but had other sources (see above). The missions only brought with it additional backing from the international community and, in the case of Namibia, limited support to governance through the takeover of some executive functions and active assistance in the drafting of the new constitution. But what is most important in all these cases is that the military component of the peace missions constituted a credible external security guarantee in eyes of the local elites. Even if the missions did not have a robust mandate under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (as was the case in Namibia and Macedonia), the mere presence of military observers was expected to deter any internal or external security threat.

Adaptation costs are higher than mission intrusiveness

In those cases in the sample where the intrusiveness of the peace mission was not high enough to outweigh adaptation costs and to enforce democracy, the outcome was autocracy. The 25,000 Russian soldiers of the CIS/PKF in Tajikistan provided military power in the peacekeeping process and fulfilled their objective of bringing peace and stability. But in terms of democratization, external actors did not have a positive influence; rather, the big neighbor Russia provided a compelling example of a functioning alternative to democracy. In Rwanda, the international community was overall in a weak bargaining position vis-à-vis the new

government. With their failure to halt the genocide, they had gambled away the leverage that a peace mission can have. The large amounts of aid that flowed into the country after the genocide were not used to push for democracy because donors felt that they had lost credibility and the right to criticize the new regime. In both these settings, the peace missions could not enforce a democratization agenda that was not embraced by the domestic actors and they could likewise not act as a guarantor of domestic efforts that were not present.

Adaptation costs and mission intrusiveness are balanced

The most complex scenario is when domestic adaptation costs and peacebuilding leverage are 'in limbo' and neither actor can gain the upper hand. The outcome is a continuous struggle for leverage and control on both sides. Formally, democratic principles characterize the post-conflict order but behind the democratic façade, there is no democratic substance because the state elites are able to extend their scope of action and to force the peacebuilders to make concessions. Despite being dependent on the peacebuilders for resources and the provision of security, local elites have their own implementation leverage vis-à-vis the peacebuilders: The peacebuilders depend on the cooperation of the local elites not only generally for a secure and stable environment, but they also require their everyday cooperation for the realization of their peacebuilding objectives. That provides much opportunity for the local elites to influence the peacebuilding process beyond the fear of open conflict. The strength that a mission has and the influence it can exert in terms of democratization are therefore only relative. Even very intrusive and strong missions are weak when the local elites refuse to cooperate in day-to-day business. The fact that peacebuilders in balanced bargaining processes are enforcers and guarantors at the same time and that they have to continuously adapt their strategies according to the actions of the state elites makes them gradually lose their authority. A lengthy bargaining process leads to the gradual reduction of peacebuilding leverage. Local elites, naturally, benefit from this scenario because time is on their side. They will try to minimize their adaptation costs, i.e. try to keep their grip on political power, continue lucrative, informal predation and maintain patron-client networks in formally democratic structures. The outcome of this balanced bargaining game is a hybrid regime, where democratic structures are formally in place but only weakly institutionalized and of low capacity.

In Kosovo, peacebuilders initially pursued a strategy of maximum intrusiveness but were later forced to give in to the demands of the increasingly frustrated Kosovo-Albanians for autonomy and independence in order to secure stability and peace in Kosovo. In some respect, peacebuilders were successful in their role as guarantor and enforcer of democracy: The KFOR troops continue to be a very credible and welcomed guarantor of security for the Albanian elites and the population because they deter a potential Serbian invasion and protect the borders of independent Kosovo. However, corruption in the administration and the political sphere is only marginally curtailed through the veto powers of UNMIK, later ICO, and the capacities of EULEX to monitor, mentor, and advise. Drug smuggling, human trafficking, weapon trade etc. were hardly restricted by the international police presence. Also, peacebuilders could not use their formal enforcement powers to put an end to lucrative, informal predation and stable patron-client networks. They have formal oversight authority and veto powers but they are constrained to effectively use these powers because they contradict their objective to foster national ownership and enhance national accountability. Strong patron-client relationships are still prevalent in Kosovo: voting behavior, for example, is still largely based on clan affiliation and regional origin, so that election results are predictable and the Albanian political elites do not need to worry about being voted out of office. Only in terms of filling high-level political posts

with candidates based on informal networks, the ICO has the capacity to veto. But since the ICO wants to foster national ownership, it has been using the veto powers only indirectly.

The situation is similar in Bosnia, where peacebuilders had equally broad enforcement powers and the UN and then NATO mission had dominant force to guarantee stability. But the true weakness of forceful actions of the peacebuilders was also apparent, as the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) in practice 'divided' powers of sovereignty between the peacebuilders and the local elites. Any real follow-through and follow-up was dependent on local government officials, their functionaries, and also on the normalization of local community life. This was something which the OHR could not enforce but only encourage. In other words, the OHR had the formal power to force changes through but it was in fact always dependent on the local actors to implement some level of their decisions. Hence, lucrative, informal predation and stable patron-client networks continued despite formal international oversight mechanisms. One must also keep in mind, however, that the OHR was strictly mandated to implement the DPA, and this was plainly not designed to end these conditions. The capacity of the OHR to end the political power monopoly by enforcing democratic rules in elections depended to a large extent on the timing of the elections. Even if they are considered free and fair, strong patron-client relationships will predetermine the outcome. For the domestic political actors, it was a very comfortable position that the peacebuilders depended on their cooperation. With the OHR as a last-stop executive, it was often much more rational for them to leave unpopular decisions for the international community. While opportunities for their participation and for competition technically existed, they had little incentives to use them. The ethnic-based system that largely entrenched the dominant position of the war-time elites, and the overruling power of the 'internationals' largely prevented initiatives to use their democratic spaces. All this contributed to a hybrid system in Bosnia.

In Afghanistan, the international actors formally ceded to a sovereign Afghan government under Karzai and respected its autonomy. Informally, however, the US had dominant control over decisions. The Karzai administration's complete dependence on foreign troops and foreign money continues to provide immense leverage to the international actors. But more and more, peacebuilders have lost a lot of that initial leverage due to the ongoing warfare and their continuous support of an increasingly weakened Karzai who is embedded in clientelistic networks. And there is one striking feature that distinguishes the bargaining game in Afghanistan from the other cases in the sample: The interaction takes place not only between the peacebuilders and Karzai but also between Karzai – the Afghan representative of the external actors or the protégé of the Western peacebuilders – and the warlords loyal to him (Whitty and Nixon, 2009: 209). The oppositional Taliban who are united in their anti-Western ideology and in their fierce resistance against the Western democratization agenda are spoilers. The presence of so-called 'secondary elites' and spoilers complicates the whole bargaining process – and ultimately the peacebuilding process. The outcome is co-opted peacebuilding. Reforms were merely symbolic, and statebuilding has lost its luster through a failure to incorporate, of not democratization, then at least anticorruption and accountability.

5. CONCLUSION


Although this study does not seek to put forward watertight causalities, the cases in the sample do reveal some similarities and patterns that might prompt further systematic research. For one thing, the paper could discard the policy assumption that highly intrusive peace missions directly produce democratic outcomes. Even in cases where peacebuilders were equipped with enormous resources, coercive capacities and wide-ranging authorities, the outcomes were not flawless liberal democracies. More importantly, the paper described two analytically distinct processes which explain the outcome of democratization in the framework of peace missions. Peace missions are understood as a tool in the bargaining process between peacebuilders and local elites. Throughout that process, peacebuilders have to respond to two types of challenges: Local resistance against the peace mission itself and local resistance against the democratization agenda. Even if the interaction process starts off cooperatively, the dynamics change at some point and local actors depart from the agreed-upon path to advance their own interests. It seems predictable that greater mission intrusiveness generates greater domestic resistance and demands for local ownership, even if both parties still share the same objectives of democratic statehood (and independence in the cases of Kosovo and East Timor). As Chesterman (2004) and others have rightfully observed, efforts to establish legitimate governance and democracy by setting up a system of "benevolent autocracy" necessarily causes the ends to ostensibly collide with the means.

When peacebuilders use the weight of their peace missions as leverage either as a guarantee or as an enforcement mechanism for democracy, they do so in an attempt to outweigh domestic adaptation costs. The cases in the sample have shown that if adaptation costs, which the local elites have to pay for changing the status quo toward democratization, are lower than the peacebuilders' leverage, the prospects for democracy are promising; if they are higher than the leverage that the peacebuilders bring, the outcome is autocracy. If the local adaptation costs and the leverage of the peacebuilders are balanced, the outcome is a continuous struggle for leverage and control of the peace process on both sides and the installation of a formal democracy without substance.

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Figure 1. Intrusiveness and Outcomes



Source: Zuercher et al., 2009: 252

Notes: The stability index is given on a scale ranging from 1 (stable) to 5 (relapse into war); it is a combined score based on the cases study assessments, UCDP conflict intensity levels, COSIMO conflict intensity scores, and the Political Terror scale; measured in the fifth year after the intervention start.

Table 1. Scale of Peace Missions

Scale of Peace Missions						
Peace mission	Duration	Duration	Resources (first five years) in 1000 US\$	Max. total personnel	Population	Scale
Macedonia	Aug 2001 - June 2006	59	66500	3500	2038000	6.74
Mozambique	Oct 1992 - Dec 1994	27	492600	8878	15945000	7.41
Tajikistan	Nov 1997 – July 2007	117	57000	6883	6173000	7.44
Rwanda	March 1993 - March 1996	37	453900	5640	5440000	17.41
Namibia	April 1989 - March 1990	12	416200	8493	1417000	29.93
East Timor	June 1999 - ongoing	133	2000000	10169	815000	3318.96
Afghanistan	Okt 2001 - ongoing	105	80000000	66900	24507000	22930.59
Bosnia	Dec 1995 - ongoing	175	19400000	56047	3332000	57106.71
Kosovo	June 1999 - ongoing	133	20000000	51020	2100000	64625.33

Notes: Duration in months as of June 2010. Budget figures for Macedonia and Afghanistan are conservative estimates as there are no publicly available figures on the costs of NATO operations. Estimates of the costs of ISAF are taken from: <http://www.stern.de/politik/ausland/einsatzkosten-afghanistan-dingos-drohnen-und-auslandszulagen-600026.html>. There are no figures on the costs of the CIS/PKF in Tajikistan, the figures given are for UNMOT only. Population figures are obtained from the UN Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat: World Population Prospects - The 2008 Revision at <http://esa.un.org/unpp>. Data are only available for every five years; the given figure is the one that falls into the five-year time frame chosen for each case in the project. The final score for scale is given in thousands.

Table 2. Scope of Peace Missions

Scope of Peace Missions									
Peace mission	peace enforcement	exec. policing	security sector reform	exec. powers	legisl. powers	constitution	judicial powers	econ. policies	Scope Factor
Tajikistan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.000
Macedonia	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0.125
Mozambique	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.125
Rwanda	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.125
Namibia	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0.250
Afghanistan	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	0.625
Bosnia	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0.875
East Timor	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0.875
Kosovo	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1.000

Figure 2. Intrusiveness of peace missions

