

Political Being in Securitised Sites: Everyday Acts of Citizenship¹

Xavier Guillaume (University of Geneva) & Jef Huysmans (The Open University, UK)

Xavier.Guillaume@unige.ch & J.P.A.Huysmans@open.ac.uk

Citizenship is a paradoxical practice. [reference to Engin's encyclopaedic definition; check Linklater's book on men and citizen: Engin Isin, 'Citizenship' in: Ray Hutchison (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Urban Studies*, London: Sage] It is a technique of instituting hierarchies and privileges by formally delineating individuals' horizontal and vertical relations within a polity. Although it draws attention to rights and duties of being political (Isin, 2002: 1), citizenship distributes these differentially and therefore institutes social and political stratifications. In that sense citizenship is a technique of domination and subjugation. The modern tradition of citizenship, as it sprung from the French and American revolutions, also contains a critical legacy, however. Despite the dominating and subjugating work of modern citizenship, it is also an empowering institution through which universal claims of equality and freedom are mobilized to challenge instituted hierarchies and discriminations.

The question of this article is: what can this critical legacy of citizenship mean in securitised sites where security practice implicates people in the reproduction of stratifications via their everyday practice? We pick up the challenge that Peter Nyers formulated in a survey of how security and citizenship practices are mutually implicated in undercutting the critical legacy of citizenship (see Nyers, 2009a). His question "What is left of citizenship?" (Nyers, 2009b) is in the first instance a challenge for citizenship studies. Yet, it is equally a gauntlet thrown at security studies, and in particular the critical study of securitizing processes. The latter has produced a highly detailed understanding of the nature of securitising practices and its violent, stratifying and discriminating

¹ Acknowledgement to add. All translations are ours except where indicated.

effects. Securitising processes, however, emerge primarily as governmental practices that significantly curtail the possibility for transformative political being in securitised sites. Nyers' question asks for exploring more systematically if the critical legacy of citizenship can have any bearing upon the politics of insecurity. We answer his question by introducing a conception of citizenship that allows us to see the constitution of political being in the everyday practices of people in securitised sites.

We first start our argument by showing how the study of the interstices between citizenship and security is not exhausted by questions of political legitimacy and the competition and reconciliation of various rights but needs to include the intertwining of governmental techniques. In particular, we highlight two processes of intertwining governmental techniques of citizenship and security that constrain transformative political being: the practices of statecraft and the governmental technology constituting subjectivities in their everyday life. Both interpretations of the interstices between security and citizenship practice demonstrate that the critical legacy of citizenship is heavily restrained by the intertwining of security and citizenship. So, what is left of citizenship as an institution of empowerment in securitised sites? In order to answer that question we then offer an appropriative conception of citizenship. Mobilising and engaging with Engin Isin's processual conception of acts of citizenship, we provide a reading of the latter as not necessarily reflecting a transformative moment but an appropriative one. Emancipatory notions of acts of citizenship are problematic today because they presuppose an ability to mobilize and organize a disruption against an instituted polity, an institution or instituted scripts of rights. Individuals, or groups, are however confronted more and more with securitised sites or securitising technological processes where, and through which, it is then difficult to find a centre of gravity upon which collective mobilization in the name of an emancipatory project can effectively act.

The appropriative dimension of acts of citizenship is constructed around Michel de Certeau's and James Scott's reading of resistance as tactics, that is to say as unorganized, individual, opportunistic

actions that usually are accommodating to the system of domination in place. Further, we read that within securitized sites or in relation to securitising technologies, 'the people' can only generally seize an opportune, but ultimately fleeting, moment to re-appropriate for themselves a site or a technology that will never be their own. It only is at this fleeting moment whence the act "transforms" the situation. We argue that this form of appropriation cannot be defined a priori. Yet, within securitized sites, tactics may represent a form of political agency. In order to illustrate this claim, we finally turn to humour and airport, as a securitised site, as a potential tactic to re-appropriate an environment, even an atmosphere, that is not subject, by nature, to external change from individuals. We argue that in certain circumstances humour represents an epiphenomenal rupturing of the practices of statecraft and constitutive technologies of the self found in an airport.

Governing citizenship, governing insecurity

At first sight the relation between security and citizenship is pretty straightforward. Security institutions protect citizens from dangers and harm. They respond to the right of citizens to security. Article 12 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man (1789) states, "The security of the rights of man and of the citizen requires public military forces. These forces are, therefore, established for the good of all and not for the personal advantage of those to whom they shall be intrusted." A dual politics opens up at this interstice. The political legitimacy of a regime can be both vested in and questioned in the name of its 'delivery' of security for its citizens. The priority of the right to security in comparison to other citizens' rights can be politically contested – e.g. the debates about balancing liberty and security and about national security versus social security expenditures. These are central questions of modern politics and they open up complex political sites. There is no need to repeat these here. Yet, setting up the relation between security and citizenship in this way fades a central dimension of what is taking place at these interstices of rights and political legitimacy: both security and citizenship are techniques of governing and their intertwining institute specific methods and technologies of governing and constituting political being. Citizenship is not simply a set of rights or a

body of rights holders – a people; it is also an institution of governing and constituting relations by stratifying, excluding, discriminating, etc. Similarly, security is not just a right or a practice of protection. It is also a technique of rendering hierarchies, differences and categories of political being through evoking and enacting insecurities in particular ways. Like citizenship is a technique of governing through distributing and differentially assigning rights and duties and the definition of political subjectivity, security is a technique of governing human relations and their relations to their environment through defining insecurities and bringing to bear security institutions and technologies upon these relations.

The important point for us is that the study of the interstices between citizenship and security is not exhausted by questions of political legitimacy and the competition and reconciliation of various rights but needs to include the intertwining of governmental techniques. In particular, we want to highlight two processes of intertwining governmental techniques of citizenship and security that constrain transformative political being. The first contains the critical legacy that rests on universalising rights in practices of statecraft. Citizenship is an institution of rendering statehood through turning universals into privileges which security practice radicalizes by making political relations existential. The second process consists in security and citizenship increasingly intertwining in technological processes that constitute forms of political being grounded in the enactment of anxiety implicating subjects in the reproduction of normality and its stratifying and discriminating effects in the minutiae of their everyday life.

Statecrafting: universals into privileges

As already stated, citizenship does not just refer to the subjects in whose name security is declared – the citizens who need protecting. It is also a technique of statecraft that governs sites of insecurity by giving citizenship rights to some and reducing them for others. Citizenship practice crafts statehood by transforming universal notions of equality and freedom that form the progressive content of modern citizenship into privileges. Moments and sites of insecurity and the security policies enacting

them play an important role in this. For example, Rebecca Kingston shows how banishment changed in nineteenth century France from a criminal justice practice to a technique asserting the state through taking citizenship rights from subjects in the name of security.

Under the old regime, banishment was a sentence used for reasons of public security and often levied against vagabonds as a means to rid a jurisdiction of the groups of people most likely to commit crimes of assault and theft. In contrast, we no longer see banishment in the 1810 code in relation to matters of everyday public security, but rather to matters of state. As presented by Count Berlier in a further elaboration on the new legislation, banishment like deportation would be used by courts in instances where the acts of individuals indirectly compromised state security, such as in disobeying certain orders or communicating inappropriate information to enemies short of aiding and abetting invasion (matters of outright rebellion and treason were punishable by death). (Kingston 2005: 33)

The act of forcibly removing a citizen from state territory and stripping them of their civil and political rights became a matter of political rationality, as opposed to a matter of moral sanction or general public security. (Kingston 2005:34)

The idea that citizenship implies universal rights that a people hold irrespective of their status and lineage is moved to the background to the advantage of citizenship being a privilege granted by the state.

Peter Nyers makes a similar argument in relation to the notion of "accidental citizenship" as employed in the US after the attacks of 11 September 2001. "Accidental citizenship" is a pejorative way of referring to citizenship conferred upon individuals born in the US to non-US citizen parents.

He argues that the idea of such citizenship being accidental has been used in the US to take citizenship away from US citizens, i.e. to exclude those who were included in the citizenship regime through birth. It is a discourse underpinning the unmaking of citizenship, obtained through birth, by ascribing danger and enmity to a group of citizens.

When the subject form of citizenship is the accident form, citizenship is exposed as being incidental and contingent, not essential and enduring. In response to the potential crisis in political legitimacy that comes from exposing the accident, 'accidental citizenship' is securitized and made into a status that is dangerous to the body politic, and therefore subject to the exceptional measures of a national security state. (Nyers 2006: 26)

Securitizing "accidental citizenship" crafts the state into a sovereign authority with the right to turn that what is seen as given into a privilege that can be taken away.

In both cases, citizenship is not a universal right that individuals hold in their relation to a state but a technique of granting and taking away of rights. In doing so, citizenship is an instrument through which the state crafts itself as a governing entity with the power to work universal rights into privileges, stratifying individuals by differentially distributing rights.

Exceptionalist renditions of insecurity that enact an existential threat to the state intertwine relatively easily with these governmental practices of citizenship (see Buzan et al., 1998; Huysmans, 1998, 2006: 124-44; Neocleous, 2008; Wæver, 1995). Claiming that the national security of the state is at stake is often a key resource for challenging the universality of rights in the name of the need to protect the state and its people. As demonstrated in the examples of banishment in the eighteenth and nineteenth century France and accidental citizenship today, securitising radicalises citizenship as an institution of hierarchies and exclusions. Moreover, this securitising practice has a capacity to hollow out the political trust of citizenship. It crafts a polity under severe threat in which normal politics can be legitimately transcended, for example by suspending fundamental rights, subjugating

social justice to security, curtailing rule of law, or instituting authoritarian forms of government. It restrains the political capacity of citizenship by radicalising the assertion of unity among citizens – the rally around the flag phenomenon – and by rendering relations to strangers existentially dangerous – i.e. turning strangers into dangerous aliens. Unlike what some, drawing on Schmitt's conception of the political, are arguing nowadays, such existential renditions of citizenship are non-political; they eat away what makes citizenship a different institution from war: the necessity to engage with strangers, to turn aliens into people one negotiates and exchanges with, rather than locking them away or seeking their elimination:

... the friend versus enemy dialectic is in fact not a condition, but a nonrelation as far as politics is concerned. By contrast, being political means to constitute relationships between oneself and others either via affiliation and identification, or agon and estrangement. These relations are political insofar as groups orient toward each other without the intent of elimination or effacement. (Isin 2002: 32)

Technological formation of subjects

Citizenship and security do not only intertwine in practices of statecraft but also in technologies of governance constituting normality and governable subjects that reproduce it in their everyday practice. The focus shifts from the distribution of rights to the creation of political subjectivity through governmental technology, private as well as public, that inscribe insecurities upon bodies and that institutes discriminations and stratifications through technologies of profiling. For example, Benjamin Muller shows that biometric technologies change how biometric technology, often extended in its application by emphasising insecurities, changes how subjects are constituted as citizens by the instruments mediating access to rights, services and entitlements. Instead of crafting citizenship in the name of an identity based on discourses of origin and insiders and outsiders these technologies manage identity through biological characteristics that directly authenticate access on the basis of bodily data. They are less concerned with the person's identity than with the automated

providing or denying of access to entitlements and services by authenticating bodies through retina scans, algorithmic profiling, finger prints, etc.

Partially why biometrics is so successful in concealing its exclusionary and discriminatory character is the way in which it tries to hide the question of identity behind the preoccupation with authenticity. In some sense, we need not *know* the friend, but merely authorize access to particular resources, rights and entitlements to the authenticated friends, while blocking access to the unverifiable. (Muller 2004: 286)

By using services and accessing entitlements subjects enact in a very ordinary, almost unnoticeable, way the discriminations between citizens and between citizens and non-citizens that are "hard-wired" into the biometric technology of authenticity.

Engin Isin develops another argument focusing on how neoliberal technologies of governance elaborately render subjectivities through working upon affects rather than reasoning. Insecurities are not rationally explained and presented. Instead, images, narrations and experiences of fear and anxiety saturate everyday life inscribing insecurity upon the bodies of individuals who then increasingly enact themselves as neurotic subjects. "The subject at the centre of governing through neurosis is not addressed to mobilize its rational capacities to evaluate truth claims but through affects that manage its anxieties" (Isin 2004: 225). For Isin governing through neurosis creates problematic conceptions of citizenship:

[T]he neurotic subject articulates neurotic claims. All its wants are transformed into rights: the right to security, safety, body, health, wealth, and happiness as well as tranquillity, serenity and calm. The neurotic citizen develops an intense aversion to the realization that it should be subject to either necessity or anxiety in seeking these rights. The need to eliminate necessity or anxiety from its existence turns its wants into claims.

In essence, these claims are impossible because they articulate rights that cannot exist.

(Isin 2004: 232-233)

In these analyses citizenship remains something that is subjected to and constituted by (changes in) governmental practice rather than a vehicle for becoming political in the sense of challenging and disrupting, however fleetingly and momentarily, stratifications and exclusions that are instituted by securitising governmental practices. Moreover, these securitising practices are often seen to implicate people in their own subordination. Neurotic citizens are associated with an orientation towards one's individual well being and safety rather than the common concerns of a collective of citizens. Because of the technologically mediated relations and the functional logic of many of the profiling practices most subjects will activate the stratifications and discriminations of profiling by simply going about their everyday business, such as taking an airplane (Lyon 2001).

Both interpretations of the interstices between security and citizenship practice – i.e. as a practice of statecraft and as a governmental technology constituting subjectivities – demonstrate that the critical legacy of citizenship is heavily restrained by the intertwining of security and citizenship. The room for intensifying the universality of equality and freedom shrinks when citizenship becomes embroiled with existential practices of statecraft where the polity and citizenry are formed in reference to war. The public enactment of progressive conceptions of justice is also severely curtailed when profiling technologies constitute stratifications and discriminations in the minutiae of everyday practice and when governmental technologies craft psychologized citizens enacting neurosis. Security practice thus seems to further reinforce citizenship as being an institution of domination rather than empowerment. So, what is left of citizenship as an institution of empowerment in securitised sites?

Towards an appropriative conception of citizenship

Paradoxically, it is precisely the fact that securitising processes intensively act upon citizenship that makes the latter an important resource for exploring the possibilities and nature of critical politics. It places a critical capacity that is an immanent part of modern traditions of citizenship inside securitised sites. The modern tradition of citizenship, as it sprung from the French and American revolutions, contains a critical legacy that security seeks to contain but mostly does not destroy. Modern citizenship contains irresolvable tensions – between the unity of people and the conflictual plurality of opinions and between the differential identification of citizens and strangers and the universality of equality amongst human beings – that make it a political rather than simply a governmental category (Balibar, 2002: 175-204). Citizenship does not only refer to the constitution of a polity by granting and guaranteeing rights and by narrating and ritualising a people as citizenry into being. Indeed, citizenship constitutes what Bonnie Honig calls a “dilemmatic space,” whereby ‘the people’ is constituted as a political agent not through discrete events but through an on-going positioning on “multiple, conflictual axes of identity/difference such that [the people’s political] agency itself is constituted, even enabled—and not simply paralyzed—by daily dilemmatic choices and negotiations” (Honig, 1996: 259). It includes the idea that rights, membership and political legitimacy are subjected to political contestation among ‘the people’.

In international studies the dilemmatic dimension and critical legacy of citizenship is mostly conceptualized through conceptions of post-national citizenship – a practice of bringing universal rights to work transversally as a challenge to nationalist and statist visions of rights in the international system (see Benhabib 2002; Linklater 1998). Engin Isin introduces a more radical reading of this dilemmatic nature and the empowering capacity of the institution of citizenship. Through reading “acts of citizenship”² he draws attention to rupturing of existing citizenship status

² Isin distinguishes between citizenship as status, i.e. a set of instituted rights and obligations, practice, i.e. the gradual extension of rights to a group of people recognized as citizens, and acts, i.e. “those moments when, regardless of status and substance, subjects constitute themselves as citizens – or, better still, as those to whom the right to have rights is due” (Isin 2008: 18).

and scripts through the self-enactment of people as new political subjects who are due the right to hold rights. In doing so, he draws attention away from the enactment of universal rights as such and emphasises that citizenship is a vehicle for the political transformation of the subject and the relations in which they are caught. Indeed, contrary to much of the literature in critical security studies and international studies, political agency is not here posited as naturally emerging from a right that has to be reclaimed by the acquisition and spread of a specific status – citizenship – in a cosmopolitan fashion (Linklater 2005). Neither is it the victim of dystopian security practices constitutive of a debilitating political self that has to be salvaged.

We have argued in the previous section, however, that intertwining citizenship and security seriously constrains the effective political mobilization of universal rights by turning universality continuously into privileges and undercuts the possibilities for progressive collective mobilization by implicating individuals in a technological and neurotic creation of subjectivities reproducing the securitising processes. We therefore need to pick up the question ‘What is left of citizenship as an empowering practice?’ by exploring specifically how aspects of the critical, dilemmatic legacy of citizenship can be enacted in situations where it is difficult to effectively re-activate universal rights in an instituted normative order or to mobilize people collectively against a vested system around intensified understandings of universality. We do this by reframing the conception of acts of citizenship in terms of practices of appropriation. Although we believe Isin’s move from status and practices to acts is a necessary one to concentrate on the empowering dimensions of citizenship, we move further in that by focusing on securitized sites we specify a hard case of “where” this agency can be enacted. Securitized sites are sites that constrain to such extent the ability of subjects to creatively break from or rupture these sites’ material and symbolic structures that to consider political agency as a break or

a rupture might hide from our gaze a series of phenomenon that are appropriative rather than emancipatory in nature.³

Emancipatory notions of acts of citizenship are problematic today because they presuppose an ability to mobilize and organize a disruption against an instituted polity, an institution or instituted scripts of rights. When securitising operates heavily through dispersed technological processes, envelops itself into multi-faceted aspects of everyday life or is situated in specific sites that preclude such disrupting capability (see Aas et al., 2009), it is then difficult to find a centre of gravity upon which collective mobilization in the name of an emancipatory project can effectively act. Neither law nor the political field are obvious centres of gravity when securitising becomes enveloped in everyday life, constitutes neurotic subjects, and the dispersal of technologies and practices blurs public/private distinctions. How then to enact the empowering dimensions of citizenship in these situations?

At this point, we believe it is useful to introduce Michel de Certeau's distinction between two dimensions in practices of resistance, the strategic and the tactical dimension. The strategic dimension refers to the power relations some social agents can develop through their ability to delimit and define, even if only partially and symbolically, an environment "as their own" and through which they will manage their relations to others. Securitised sites reflect such strategic dimension because they reflect strategies by certain agents to resist an exteriority that is defined as targets (who/what/where is granted security) or threats (who/what/where constitutes a threat to security). Spatiality is key for strategies. They seek to institute a site "in itself," to shield the site from the decay of time, but also to participate in "panoptic practice" vis-à-vis this exteriority (controlling, managing, invigilating). These strategies "uphold and determine the power to appropriate for oneself

³ Engin Isin's conception of acts does not exclude such a reading of acts of citizenship. The notions of act and rupture remain quite ambivalent in their relation to these different ways of thinking political agency, i.e. as (i) emancipation and collective mobilisation and (ii) appropriation and momentaneous transfiguration. On the one hand the notion of act is theorised in a Heideggerian and Derridean philosophy on the other it is placed in Bakhtin's dialogical and more process oriented thought (see Guillaume 2010: chapter 1 and 2).

one's own site" (de Certeau, 1990[1980]: 59-60, 63). Securitized sites are sites imposing onto 'the people' a certain mode of governance and governmentality, they are sites 'the people' cannot make their own. They exist in securitized sites by being implicated into the mechanisms producing the site either as docile bodies, free subjects making choices within the parameters set by the governing practice, or as dangers, threats, risks that 'animate' the site. Strategic acts of citizenship rupture these sites through mobilising numbers of people – multitudes – enacting claims of freedom and equality, justice and injustice that seek to transform the existing hierarchies, stratifications and boundaries that security practices institute. Acts of citizenship fall here squarely within the tradition of critical social movements, civil society, and revolutionary moments that mobilize subordinated people to redefine instituted parameters of sites of living together; to impose their alternative conception of what makes the collective living together just and worth living. The civil rights movement in the US, the *sans papiers* movement in France, and the anti-globalisation movement are among the paradigmatic examples of the era in which the class struggle gave way to a focus on exclusions.

Tactics, on the other hand, refers to an *art de faire* (art of doing) and an *art de dire* (art of saying) developed through time by social agents who can only deploy themselves, and their possible actions, in an environment that they cannot delimit or define "as their own". The securitized airports are one such site; the regime of visibility created by surveillance cameras connected to profiling methods is another. How does one challenge instituted procedures of identification, boundaries that are drawn – e.g. the coloured person being always stopped at the checkpoint – when one needs to necessarily 'function' within these sites? While strategies "bet on the resistance that establishing a place offer to the decay of time; tactics bet on a cunning use of time, of opportunities that time offers and of the games that time introduce in the foundations of power". Tactics offers no gain but only a fleeting moment of re-appropriation over an environment that is designed and imposes signs to impress itself symbolically and/or physically on the people coming in contact with it. As De Certeau puts it, "it is an art of the weak". Indeed, within securitized sites, 'the people' acts out on a terrain that is not its

own and upon which it cannot act. Yet it can act *within* it. Tactics thus reflects the inability of 'the people' to possess "a global project" or to "encompass its adversary in a distinct, visible and objectivated space" (de Certeau, 1990 [1980]: 61). The excessiveness implied by the 'sovereignty of the people' becomes one of challenging or questioning the logic of social practice that the securitising practices seek to inscribe in sites and bodies by re-appropriating instruments, schedules, schemes of security practice rather than mobilising a multitude of people against discriminating practices.

How does this conception of tactics as *art de faire* and *art de dire* translate in acts of citizenship? Within securitized sites, 'the people' can only generally seize the "opportune moment" to re-appropriate for themselves a site that will never be their own, it is but only a fleeting moment whence the act "transforms" the situation. The form of this appropriation cannot be defined a priori; "the occasion continues to trump definitions, because it cannot be isolated from a conjuncture or an operation" (de Certeau, 1990 [1980]: 60-1, 63, 124, 127). Yet, within securitized sites, tactics may represent, as we will argue in the next section, a form of political agency. In the securitizing process of depoliticizing citizens as potential claimants into individuated subjects that are a function of security practices and technologies, tactics disrupt the logics behind securitization. It does so at at least two different levels.

First, tactics momentarily re-establish a form of equality between a "then subject now citizen" and a security apparatus. One logic behind securitization works at the level of the imposition of hierarchies upon us. These hierarchies may be existential – what/who is a threat? what/who is safe? what/who is suspicious? –, behavioural – what (not) to do/say/look at –, or more mundane – what to pack and how, etc. – yet, they have all in common that they are justified by the securitization behind their articulation and that they set 'the people' as the passive and subjugated follower of the mechanical deployment of techniques, practices or discourses of security. Tactics momentarily reset these hierarchies by disrupting this mechanical deployment. Through their arts of doing and saying, 'the

people' re-appropriate for themselves moments, sequences, rhythms, logics that are usually imposed upon them by re-instating moments of unfinalizability in what are, within the security apparatus, *final and total* moments, sequences, rhythms and logics. As well synthesized by Scott Hutson (2000: 125), "Unfinalizability is the notion that everyday life is a messy and open undertaking where freedom, creativity, innovation, and surprise make the world an incomplete and inconclusive place" (see also Bakhtin, 1984 [1929/1963]: 6-7, 165-6; 1984 [1965]: 49; Morson and Emerson, 1990: 36-40, 90-6). This situation of unfinalizability, we argue, re-establishes a form of equality between 'the people' and the security apparatus through the momentary re-establishment of an infinitude that characterizes the political. The political, we argue, is reflective of a situation of heteroglossia (Bakhtin, 1981 [1934-5]: 263, 270-5), where centripetal and centrifugal utterances are competing while living in "complex space-time configurations that are produced... by different actors and are only able to reach relative, incomplete and temporary adjustments; they therefore are unachieved and open historical systems" (Bayart, 1985: 351-2).

Second, and consequently, tactics momentarily re-instate freedom by the sheer enactment of tactics. We argue that by enacting tactics, 'the people' re-appropriate to themselves a situation as well as a temporality upon which they have no hold, no say, no power. Through this enactment of an appropriation, however fleeting it might be, tactics are underlying the inherently political character of securitized sites as actually being "unachieved and open" as well as re-instating political agency within the logics of securitization. In the realm of everyday life, political agency has first to be re-situated within a processual understanding of what agency is. Following Mustafa Emirbayer and Ann Mische (1998: 970), agency, within a processual framework, is "the temporally constructed engagement by actors of different structural environments—the temporal-relational contexts of action—which, through the interplay of habit, imagination, and judgment, both reproduces and transforms those structures in interactive response to the problems posed by changing historical situations." Agency is thus a form of engagement, of enactment, reflecting a situated configuration between iteration, projectivity, and practical evaluation (Emirbayer and Mische, 1998) that is strongly

dependent on the specific shape of the environment within which it is happening – its spatial, temporal, relational shape – as well as on the specific practical memory that is attached to this environment and this enactment (de Certeau 1990 [1980]: 125-31). In other words, political agency is reflective of the occasion that is "seized" by 'the people' to re-appropriate, however fleetingly, this specific environment for themselves and through this enactment re-opening this environment to a form of unfinalizability. In short, by seizing the occasion 'the people' is re-instating freedom in places where it is precisely this re-instatement that is cordon off.

At this juncture, we believe it is important to unpack what this appropriative dimension of tactics is and to do so it is worth turning to De Certeau's inspiration for his concept (de Certeau, 1990 [1980]: esp. 124-34). The concept of tactic is partly inspired by an important book by Marcel Detienne and Jean-Pierre Vernant about the Greeks' *mètis*, their "ruses of intelligence." Their study of the term throughout almost ten centuries of Greek civilisation highlights four key characteristics of appropriative practices as *mètis* "presides over all activities whereby human beings must learn to manoeuvre hostile forces, too powerful to be directly controlled, but that one can use despite them, without confronting them face-to-face" (Detienne and Vernant, 1974: 57). These four characteristics are (i) the *mètis*' *ambiguity* – the *mètis* can be either seen as a fraud, as a cheat or it can be seen with admiration and wonder –, (ii) its *temporality* – the *mètis*' "temporal horizon" is the opportune occasion whence the action is not reflective of an impulsion but of practical knowledge –, (iii) its *multiplicity* – the *mètis*' is "multiple and diverse", it reflects its ability to adapt to "changing and contrasted" situation and environment –, and (iv) its *craftiness* – the *mètis* "acts in disguise. To deceive its victim, it borrows a shape that mask, instead of revealing, its actual being" (Detienne and Vernant, 1974: 19-31).

Re-interpreted in light of de Certeau's tactics, appropriative acts are ambiguous because within securitized sites they can be transgressive or deferring of the security apparatus within which they are enacted. In other words, political agency is not solely identifiable in acts that are transgressive,

thus expressing a form of voicing, but has to be identified also in acts that are seemingly showing an accommodation of the security apparatus. We will turn to the question of the link between political agency and resistance below. More, appropriative acts are not defined by their enactments per se, as would implicitly indicate the idea of seizing the opportune occasion, but by their integration in larger processes within which these enactments take place. In other words, it is first important to reconstruct the larger process of securitization, a process that is not limited to the sheer performative dimension of a speech act but is embedded in sociological, technical and political processes (at both the macro and micro levels). These processes constitute the temporal horizon within which the opportune occasion arises and produces meaning by its sheer enactment. Acts of citizenship, for instance, direct our attention not to the moments or events of resistance by 'the people' but to 'the people' as participating to a series of events and moments within which appropriative practices take place and meaning; appropriations that, from a political perspective, unfold as excessive enactments of freedom and equality. This movement to acts, and thus to processual thinking, is important to understand this excessiveness emerging from the multiple forms these tactics can take and that are difficult to determine before their enactment and their identification within a certain process.

Processes are "actual or possible occurrence that consists of an integrated series of connected developments unfolding in programmatic coordination: an orchestrated series of occurrences that are systemically linked to one another either causally or functionally" (Rescher, 2000: 22). This definition should not suggest that processes are only ordered linearly, they are only partially so, the focus having to be on the relationality within the processes (Lango, 1996). The difficulty in identifying the relationality of acts of citizenship within a series of processes, themselves determined to a great extent by a security apparatus, is precisely the fact that appropriation as resistance has multiple forms that cannot be delimited a priori; the multiplicity of the acts reflects the practical knowledge of subjects, their craftiness, that translate into a (re)instalment of political agency *within* a series of occurrences largely structured, controlled, and managed by the security apparatus. Henceforth, appropriative acts do not constitute a "rupture of politics" (Isin, 2008: 36), but rather enable us to

consider *how* securitized sites *already* are full of politics. As such our reading offers a counterpoint to perspectives that reads acts of citizenship as solely a specific event or ruptures. Defining acts of citizenship as appropriations is to recognise the unfinalizability of such acts. Acts of re-appropriation cannot represent an "event" per se because they do not break or oppose the technologies of the securitized sites but "make use" of them if the "opportune moment" arise. Acts of citizenship thus reinstate the unfinalizability that is extracted from securitized sites; they reinstate political agency within rather than create out with or against.

A possible example of re-appropriating security products was the news item that a Manchester band used CCTV to make a promotional video.⁴ They allegedly played in front of different CCTV cameras, then used the Freedom of Information Act in the UK to claim the footage and assembled a video out of it. They claimed it was much cheaper than doing it through a production company. It probably was a hoax. Not all the footage was from CCTV and the band could not produce documents that they had claimed the CCTV footage. But even if it did not really happen, as a possibility it illustrates how appropriation of security products can work. The important question that this example does not answer but definitely raise is how such a practice of re-appropriation can be an act of citizenship, i.e. an articulation of the aporia of citizenship, of the sovereignty of the people, of equality and freedom. In order to answer this question, it is first necessary to explore the question what constitute resistance in everyday life. In sociology, political anthropology or organizations studies, the specific qualities resistance can take in everyday life have been key to reframe questions pertaining to social, economic and political domination. By unpacking what resistance can mean in everyday life, we engage with ways to think about political agency that are akin to those pertaining to a processual conception of citizenship and security.

⁴ See, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstoppers/howaboutthat/1938076/The-Get-Out-Clause-Manchester's-stars-of-CCTV-cameras.html> (last accessed: 29 July 2010); <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/manchester/7389023.stm> (last accessed: 29 July 2010); http://www.manchestereveningnews.co.uk/news/s/1048686_band_in_the_frame (last accessed: 29 July 2010).

In accordance with authors like de Certeau or Scott, we consider that resistance can be “unorganized, unsystematic, and individual, ... opportunistic and self-indulgent, ... and/or ... imply, in their intention or meaning, an accommodation with the system of domination” (Scott, 1985: 292). We are thus left with two questions, a) what can actually constitute an actualization of an act within securitized sites and b) how such actualization constitute a re-instatement of political agency as act of citizenship within securitized sites. These are difficult questions for by their nature, acts of citizenship within securitized sites cannot be ascertained before their enactment. One cannot rely on a philosophical anthropology posited previous to any processes but rather to extract from these processes an empirical anthropology (Veyne, 2008: 26-7, 113) that will be consistent with and reflect the context, the expression and the relationality of these acts (Guillaume, 2007). The following illustration will help us providing situated answers to these two key question.

In fine, what these developments stress is that to understand political acts within securitized sites, one has to move beyond an understanding to what Scott (1985: 292) typified as “real resistance” to one focusing on “epiphenomenal activities.” Indeed, if one sets aside the presence or absence of revolutionary consequences – a central issue in approaches interested in class struggles –, what is understood as “real resistance” is characterising as activities that counts as resistance, and political agency, those that are organised, selfless and intentional and that are working against domination. In order to illustrate this, we would like to turn to the place of humour in securitized sites and how it can constitute an actualization of an act in Isin’s sense and how it can particularly constitute an act reflective of political agency – i.e. an act of citizenship.

Example: humour as act of citizenship

Why humour? Considering the specific characteristic of securitized sites, humour is a potential tactic at hand to re-appropriate an environment, even an atmosphere, that is not subject, by nature, to external change from individuals. Think about airports. Airports are in many ways “possible microcosms of wider societal surveillance trends” (David Lyon in Adey, 2004a: 501). Airports are non-

places (*non-lieux*), they are spaces that are not defined in terms of identity, relationality or historicity, even though the latter can re-instate themselves in these spaces at some point (Augé, 1992: 100-1).⁵ Airports are spaces within which “are set the conditions of circulation [by which] individuals are supposed to solely interact with texts with no enunciators than ‘moral’ persons or institutions ... which presence is vaguely guessed or more explicitly affirmed ... through the injunctions, advices, comments, ‘messages’ conveyed by countless ‘medium’ ... all an integral part of our contemporary scenery” (Augé, 1992: 121). Moreover, airports are dystopian and securitized sites *par excellence*; passengers’ mobility, behaviour and affects are watched, channelled, controlled, monitored and disciplined (Adey, 2004a, 2004b, 2008, 2009; Salter, 2007). Transport Security Administration (TSA) guidelines in the United States of America conveniently indicate to any passengers how to pack one’s bag and how *not* to pack it, how to dress, and also how to address. In effect, TSA indicates to you that you have to “Think before you speak. Belligerent behaviour, *inappropriate jokes* and threats will not be tolerated. They will result in delays and possibly missing your flight. Local law enforcement may be called as necessary” (http://www.tsa.gov/travelers/airtravel/screening_experience.shtm, last accessed 29 July 2010). It is customary now to find, at least in U.S. airports, signs in ordering passengers not to crack a joke while going through security checkpoints.

In De Certeau’s terms, airports are reflective of a strategy to inscribe in space ways to confront the exteriority that is represented by ‘the people.’ Airports are *designed* and produce *signs* to efficiently control and channel targets that are not only to be authenticated and identified as potential threats through surveillance technologies but also commoditized as potential consumers. More, airports as a security apparatus are more and more designed and produce signs in order to pre-empt behaviours and emotions. As a strategy, the airport seeks to induce expressions – physical, behavioural or

⁵ Peter Adey and Mark Salter (2007) are critical of Augé’s characterization of the airport as a non-place. We believe that Adey and Salter are not contradicting the key intuitions behind Augé’s move. Augé does not deny the *re*-instatement of precisely what Adey and Salter are saying Augé’s depiction is missing – airports are characterised by designs, technologies and practices that are reflective of contemporary societies. Rather, Augé is interested in non-places as epitome of what he calls supermodernity (*surmodernité*). Supermodernity is characterised by factual and spatial overabundances as well as the individuation of references (see Augé, 1992: 35-56). These characteristics are precisely those at work in Adey and Salter’s work.

emotional – and confessions in order for passengers “to betray the movement of an intention, an ideology, a belief, or, indeed, what is becoming known as terrorist or ‘hostile intent’” (Adey, 2009: 280; see also Salter 2007). In such environment, humour is forbidden because it precisely disrupts the rhythm and atmosphere airport’s signs and designs carry. Humour cannot be emancipatory for “the parameters of resistance are also set, in part, by the institutions of repression” (Scott, 1985: 299). As such humour cannot be expected to perform an emancipatory task; it is not a strategic mobilization by a movement that disrupts mobility in the airport in the name of addressing discriminations while drawing on claims of a universal equality of people. Yet, it can be appropriative. Consider the following illustration.

On August 2, 2002, a screener at Hartford’s Bradley International Airport poked through the wallet of Fred Hubbell, an 80-year-old World War II combat veteran who had already undergone two full searches in that airport that morning. “What do you expect to find in there, a rifle?” the exasperated Hubbell asked. He was then arrested for “causing a public disturbance” and fined \$78. Dana Cosgrove, the TSA airport security chief, later justified the arrest on the grounds that “all that the people around him in the waiting room heard was the word rifle.” (Bovard, 2004)

This local “incident” was even elevated to a more national prominence when Senator Lieberman toured the airport, 10 days after the “incident”, as it was one of the first to federalize its security. Senator Lieberman himself “raised the recent arrest of ... Fred Hubbell... who made an ill-conceived joke after being searched twice at Bradley. ... Lieberman said airport security was no laughing matter. ‘Be forewarned that federal airport screeners do not view their jobs as a joking matter’ ...” (<http://lieberman.senate.gov/index.cfm/news-events/news/2002/8/lieberman-praises-bradley-for-security-advances>, last accessed 29 July 2010). Hubbell’s sarcastic comment is clearly seen as disruptive, not because it is a threat but because it *momentarily* breaks what is expected from the target of surveillance, it *momentarily* exposes what is induced by (de)sign by the security apparatus. By

essence, humour is unable to modify the environment and circumstances within which it is enacted ('t Hart, 2007: 7). Yet, humour can be recognised as a form of resistance or, even, social protest.

The security moment turns citizens into strangers and triggers a need for security apparatuses to take explicit position as they need to negotiate their relation to the citizen-stranger and thus render visible the discriminations and stratifications that are enacted by security practices in the name of protecting the people. By this account, citizenship is not the imposition upon the subject of procedures to protect her/him; the border guard/immigration officer/security agent only relaying these procedures. More precisely, if we try to understand this situation from the perspective of the citizen-as-status, one becomes aware of the granting of a privilege – citizenship – that is not entailed by the status per se but by the performance of the sovereign power upon the subject by granting him/her a specific status that is punctually re-affirmed, after a process of identification, control, confession, at the "border" (see Salter, 2008). This turn to citizenship-as-practice, while sociologically and politically more accurate, is nonetheless limiting as it tends to limit our gaze to dystopic practices of imposition and exception. Rather, to explore citizenship-as-process enable to re-instate in our understanding of the nexus between security and citizenship this part of unfinalizability we identified earlier; citizenship-as-process opens up our theoretical and practical ability to engage with everyday practices and discourses. In light of the question of humour as a form of resistance, what humour can achieve is to turn the dystopic relation between the agent of security and the subject/object of security into one of conversation, of (re)negotiation of what this newly open space of unfinalizability between strangers as citizens means.

As a form of resistance, humour – whether under the form of clowning, cynicism, sarcasm, teasing, or irony –, however, should be seen as more than a mere “safety valve” enabling oneself to defend or distance one self from the effects of a security apparatus (Speier, 1998). A major issue with such a conception lays in the idea that humour shields an authentic self from external and unsettling forces. Indeed, humour can be seen as a “productive act because it crafts [appropriative] space within

relations of domination. This space ... is not pre-given ..." (Fleming, 2005: 54-5).⁶ It is precisely at this productive juncture that we can understand how humour can be conceived as a *political* tactic. Humour is a form of political agency in so far as it sheds lights on and, within a security apparatus, disrupts by its utterance the "expression of a particular structure of power relations" (Mouffe, 2005: 18; in light of a processual approach see also Guillaume, 2009). The political is a constellation of power relations that is subject to challenging and conflicting utterances about what is the dominant "ordinary model of legitimacy" (Boltanski and Thévenot, 1991: 86-7). As characterized above, the political thus is reflective of a situation of heteroglossia (Bakhtin, 1981 [1934-5]: 263, 270-5). Within a security apparatus, humour is a form of political agency precisely because it re-instates, however fleetingly and momentarily, an openness *within* the apparatus. Moreover, it "demands" of the security personnel to enact their conception of the people, often not only on the marginalized, excluded subject but also on the citizens they are protecting.

As already said, in the current conditions at the airport, humour can turn a citizen into a stranger not because of humour but because the security personnel and routines enact a conception of citizens as a humourless people. In such conditions, humour can indeed become an act of citizenship through which people implicitly claim equality as a human being towards the security personnel who then have to negotiate this implicit claim. In contraposition but in constructive tension with Isin's identification of contemporary citizens as anxious subjects (2004) and acts as deeply rupturing in the political field (2008: 36; see our discussion above), humour represents this epiphenomenal rupturing of this constitution of the anxious subject in the policies of protection by enacting even momentarily a subjectivity vested in conversation and equality.

Naturally, humour is not necessarily epiphenomenal in Scott's sense and can represent a form of organised social protest. As Mikhail Bakhtin has shown, the carnivalesque was fully part of the organisation of medieval societies. During specific periods, the official world was challenged by the

⁶ We replace Fleming's "emancipatory" by "appropriative" in order to reflect the tactical dimension of humour as resistance.

world of laughter; they were not competing but were simultaneously available. “All of these ritual-spectacular forms, organized on the principle of *laughter*, were distinguished extraordinarily sharply ... from *serious* official (ecclesiastical and feudal-state) cultic forms and ceremonies. They provided a completely different, emphatically unofficial, extra-ecclesiastical and extra-state aspect of the world, of the person, and of human relations; it is as if they constructed a *second world* and a *second life* beyond everything official ...” (Bakhtin, 1984 [1965]: 5-6).⁷ Humour was, in a sense, part of the strategy; it was integrated within the fabric of society. Ritualised transgression, that was accommodating social domination, could end up turning into violent rebellions against this domination (’t Hart, 2007: 4). Within securitized sites, humour cannot deploy itself in that fashion, its *modus operandi* is limited to its tactical disengagement, “whereby the self is detached from the normative prescriptions of [the security apparatus] through irony and cynicism. ... [D]isengagement of this kind is not capitulation; rather it is a re-engagement with another register of [political] life. ... it is ... an active disengagement; the ability to comply without conforming” (Fleming and Sewell, 2002: 860, 864).

Confronted with a security apparatus such as those of the airport, humour is a tactic that fulfills the *mètis*’ requirements. If one takes the example of flannelling, a passenger can laud security measures, “through an elaborate, even exaggerated, display of deference, enthusiasm or conformity” yet “signals the exact opposite, displaying contempt for those very norms” (Fleming and Sewell, 2002: 866). Flannelling is ambiguous, it acts “in disguise,” it evolves and is enacted depending on the situation and environment one is faced with and, at heart, it is ambiguous. Humour then disrupts the unfolding of the programmatic securitizing process not by disturbing it in any way that would lead to emancipation from the process. Rather, humour is more simply re-instating an element of unfinalizability of both the securitising process and the instituted conception of citizenship on an occasion within the process. Citizens can turn strangers, security personnel needs to negotiate its relation to the humorous voice who suddenly dialogues rather than acquiesces.

⁷ This more appropriate translation is from Ken Hirschkop (1999: 275).

Conclusion: bringing citizenship into security

To the question "What is left of citizenship?," Peter Nyers and the other authors of *Securitizations of Citizenship* (2009a) offer a rather dark and dystopic view. 'The people' are enmeshed in governmentality practices, articulated in the name of citizenship via security practices, producing neurotic citizens and docile bodies significantly limiting the critical quality of citizenship as an emancipatory project. Our answer, while not denying this bleak but acute assessment, opens up citizenship as enabling the politicization of securitized sites. Indeed, while critical security and citizenship studies seek to unpack dystopian security practices and technologies and mention the possibility of re-instating political agency against security apparatus, they often fail to bring to the fore what such political agency will look like and how resistance works. Citizenship, even constrained in its deployment in certain sites or moments, remains a "dilemmatic site" whereby political agency "is constituted, even enabled—and not simply paralyzed—by daily dilemmatic choices and negotiations" (Honig, 1996: 259). The question thus become one of identifying how acts of citizenship can enable a form of political agency in these securitised sites and moments. Reworking Isin's "acts of citizenship," we introduced a distinction between emancipatory and appropriative resistance. Whereas the first seek to transform these sites, the second can only appropriate these sites during a fleeting occasion since it cannot overtake the overwhelming asymmetry of power relations inscribed in these sites.

At this juncture we are left with two key questions: what constitute an actualization of an act within securitized sites? and how such actualization constitute a re-instatement of political agency? A first move was to decentre resistance, and thus political agency, from a motivated, organised, collective, altruist and strategic conception to a conception that include the possibility that it can be "unorganized, unsystematic, and individual, ... opportunistic and self-indulgent, ... and/or ... imply, in their intention or meaning, an accommodation with the system of domination" (Scott, 1985: 292). This implies that to answer what constitute an actualization of citizenship cannot be addressed a priori its enactment. A second move was to present a potential form of enactment, humour, within a

specific securitized site, airport. We argued that humour disrupts the unfolding of the programmatic securitizing process not by disturbing it in any way that would lead to emancipation from the process but by re-instating an element of unfinalizability on an occasion within the process. This moment of unfinalizability, we argue, is where political agency lays and where citizenry practice can bring to bear claims of equality and freedom upon securitising practices.

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