

**Social constructivist comparative study of security communities: EU,
ASEAN and a hypothetical India-Pakistan security community**

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Introduction

This paper will envision a hypothetical security community based on ideational norms between India and Pakistan. It will utilize the methodology of popular culture approach within an interpretive exploratory framework. At the elite level, it will explore ‘negative norms’ constructed by the elites’ social practices in both India and Pakistan. Some of the norms that will be examined include: the educational policies of both states; the rhetorical practices of maligning ‘the Other’ during election campaigns; and ruling state elites’ censorship policies imposed on the mass media despite the popular desires of people in both India and Pakistan. These social norms have so far proven to be an obstacle for the formation of a security community. At the popular level, this paper will explore ‘positive norms’ constructed by popular social practices in both states. These include literary classics written by acclaimed writers of both societies that depict nostalgic feelings of each other; religious practices [Bhakti movement] of the subcontinent and contemporaray joint mass media initiatives of the two states with the code name of ‘Aman ki Asha’ [Desire for Peace].

This paper will also make a brief comparative study of two existing security communities the European Union (EU) and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and a hypothetical India-Pakistan security community. It argues that every security community is context bounded and that there are certain normative structures underlying all three. This normative structure works as a foundation by formulating regional ideational interests as well as creating the collective identity of a security community. This final argument will demonstrate that a security community is a ‘context’ bounded construct and that its applicability and possible replication in other

parts of the world is largely unfounded. This means that every security community is based on its own regional normative structure and there is no simple way of duplicating a successful security community arrangement from one region to another region without first understanding its own particular regional socio-cultural normative order.

This paper is divided into two main sections with each having three sub-sections. The first main section exclusively focuses on the hypothetical India-Pakistan security community. Its first sub-section elucidates the path dependency of security communities. The second sub-section deals with elites social practices by examining the negative norms which are impediments to the formation of an abstract India-Pakistan security community. The third sub-section explains some of the positive norms by highlighting popular social practices. The second main section briefly juxtaposes the EU and ASEAN security communities with the India-Pakistan abstract security community. The first sub-section is on the EU. The second sub-section will identify the normative structure of ASEAN. The third sub-section will present a comparative analysis of the three security communities.

7.1 A Path dependence model of a security community

A path dependence model refers to the understanding of institutions according to their normative behaviour by historically tracing their roots in their respective regional cultures (North, 1990). For the establishment of a security community, two states may develop a 'path dependence model' which means that there should not be a fixed correlation between cause and effect, but rather their security ties should be strengthened step by step and in any direction (Wæver, 1998). The formation of a security community thus "remains precariously balanced on a constellation of a large number of factors"

(Waever, 1998: 76). Protagonists of a security community have singled out 'desecuritization' as the prime reason behind security community formation (Waever, 1995). This means that once a state joins a security community its contentious security concerns will 'progressively' decrease in favour of other mutual benefits (Waever, 1995). By accepting identity and security as a discourse, I further examine the path dependency of a security community by arguing:

- That it is dependent upon the shared experiences of chosen traumas in the psyche of the population. Elites can construct experiences positively for a community's sake or negatively for their own vested interests.
- That the public rhetoric of the elites plays a role in security community formation. Weaver has already defined 'desecuritization' as the prime reason for security community formation. However, this is not only about desecuritization. Perhaps more importantly, it also has to do with the formation of a collective identity for the sake of desecuritization. States which are involved in a conflict will only lessen their guard towards each other, if they see an alternative progression of collective identity formation in a security community.
- That there is a confluence between the socio-cultural norms of a society and the regional norms of the security community. Most often studies of security communities are aimed at the level of the security community and the participating states compliance with its community norms. However, I will argue that a lot is also at stake in obtaining a better understanding of the socio-cultural norms of societies that are involved and participating in such a security community.

- That there is a hidden normative structure based on the socio-cultural norms of societies which can bind the states together, such as set rules for inclusion and exclusion in a security community, which further acts as a deterrence for its norms compliance.

Therefore, the formation of a security community is a long gradual process and more importantly, it is not strictly related to security at all. This path dependency of security communities will be comparatively examined in the third sub-section of this chapter. It will examine how this path or some of its features are being followed by the security communities and more importantly what are the lessons to be learned for a hypothetical India-Pakistan security community from the particular experiences of the EU and ASEAN security communities.

I argue with regard to the formation of an India-Pakistan security community that there is little possibility of having an ‘amalgamated’ security community, since this goes against the rationale of creating an independent Pakistan in the first place. Instead, I argue for the creation of a ‘pluralistic’ security community hypothetically conceived at the popular level which would have enough potential to change the elites’ constructed discourses concerning the current security dilemma which exists between India and Pakistan. Ideationally, there is enough normative ground to unite the two countries in a security community framework of their own. This is due to the fact that the people of both states know each other very well with a shared experience of living side by side as communities before the partition of the subcontinent. The popular social practices based on the socio-cultural norms of these two countries share much in common. It is at the

level of the elites that insecurity is being created regarding both states' identities and potential threats to their existence.

An important factor in the context of the formation of a security community is the ruling elite's behaviour with regard to their 'speech acts'. One speaks of 'speech acts' or 'discursive practices' when the elites discursively construct an issue (Waeber, 1995). The elites' discursive practices can play an important role in a state's security discourse since at critical junctions they help to create an intersubjective understanding of either hostility or cooperation among states. So my conception of a security community lies at the junction of elite and popular social practices.

A conceptual India-Pakistan security community refers to some intangible or abstract factors. These factors have been discussed in terms of 'negative norms' at the elite level and are seen as being responsible for preventing the formulation of a security community (Khoo, 2004). Among these negative norms, I will particularly focus on the educational policy of both states, the elite's electoral behaviour and the popular culture of Indian film industry. I mean by educational policy the history books illustrating state narratives of identity which are published by the state and are being taught at all levels of education. The elites' social practices in popular culture also include their role in imposing a 'censorship regime' on popular Indian cinema. At the popular level, the positive norms I will be examining include the popular culture of literary classics, religious norms of Sufism and mass media initiatives for friendship between the two countries.

7.1.2 Elites social practices: negative norms

Among social norms, the educational text books used at the primary and the secondary school levels are of considerable importance. It is at this level that young minds are exposed to the outside world for the first time. These young minds come to know their existential identity by learning various national narratives that are being taught to them in their history text books. On average, a child begins school at the age of four and finishes high school at age sixteen. In India and Pakistan, the curriculum, prescribed books and the publication of history books at both the grade school and higher school/ college level are under governmental control. In Pakistan, history has been taught under the subject label of 'Social Sciences' since 1961. History is a compulsory subject at school and the officially prescribed text books are a way of imparting historical knowledge. The content analysis of these books illustrates that up to this point the text books have been used as a means to create the image of India and Pakistan as "Us versus Them". The relational aspects of social identity in the young minds of these students are being formed in these texts by positively attributing a Pakistani identity and negatively describing an Indian one or vice versa. By the time children reach adolescence, almost every Indian child is fervently anti-Pakistani and every average Pakistani is ardently anti-Indian. From high school to the graduate college level, history changes its taxonomy to "Pakistan Studies". Every student must pass these obligatory courses in this subject area and the subject material comes only from the officially prescribed text books.

The pedagogical culture that uses these text books is also very interesting, since in both India and Pakistan the knowledge provided in text books is largely unexamined and is often considered sacred. In order to pass their examination, students are required to

memorize the subject matter by heart. The critical evaluation or cross examination of the material is discouraged in the class room (Hasanain and Nayyer, 1997). It seems that the history is not being taught with unbiased views or with objective facts, but rather teaching has become a useful conduit for the state elites' to superimpose their biased nationalist ideas on young minds. I start with the case study of the educational practices in Pakistan.

A distinguished historian in Pakistan, in his text entitled "The murder of history", K.K. Aziz surveyed the history text books of Pakistan that are prescribed for educational institutions (Aziz, 1998). The following are some of the examples taken from his book. The excerpts from a history text book published at Peshawar [Khyber- Pakhtoonkhawa province] in Pakistan states:

"The Hindus wanted to control the government of India after independence. The British sided with the Hindus. But the Muslims did not accept the decision" (Aziz, 1998: 13).

More extracts from the Grade 4 text book:

"The religion of the Hindus did not teach them good things...Hindus did not respect women" (Hasanain and Nayyer, 1997).

"Hindus worship in temples which are very narrow and dark places, where they worship idols. Only one person can enter the temple at a time. In our mosques, on the other hand, all Muslims can say their prayers together" (Hasanain and Nayyer, 1997).

Another prominent Pakistani historian, Ayesha Jalal, quotes from a compulsory history text book used for college students written by Ikram Rabbani and Monawar Ali Sayyed entitled the "Introduction to Pakistan Studies" which states that "the coming of

Islam to the Indian subcontinent was a blessing because Hinduism was based on an unethical caste system” (Jalal, 1995: 78). As Aziz has pointed out, the titles of the chapters in these text books also make interesting reading. Some of the chapter names include: “Differences in Muslim and Hindu civilizations,” “The need for the creation of an Independent State,” “The Ideology of Pakistan” and “India’s Evil Designs against Pakistan” (Aziz, 1998: 16).

Invariably, in almost all history books, whether they are grade school text books or academic history books, what is common among them is the tendency to label Hindus as ‘unclean’ and their culture as ‘inferior’ (Aziz, 1998). The treatment of the history of the post-independence years in Pakistan is not that much different either. For example, it is claimed in the texts books in Pakistan that the India-Pakistan war of 1965 was a success for the Pakistani army and that it was initiated by Indian forces. This is in spite of the fact that there is now a general consensus among various Pakistani intellectuals that the 1965 war was started by Pakistan in the Kashmir region under the code name “Operation Gibraltar” which sought to liberate Indian held Kashmir, but that the conflict ended in a stalemate with neither side accomplishing anything (Nawaz, 2008). The same is true for the 1971 war with India. The Pakistani text books frequently refer to India’s involvement in the separation of East Pakistan which may be true, but seldom are there references made to the atrocities committed by the Pakistani army and the social practices of the political elites leading to the chaotic situation in 1971.

The Pakistan Studies text book for Grade 9 and 10 (Secondary School level) states: “In 1971 while Pakistan was facing political difficulties in East Pakistan, India helped anti-Pakistan elements and later on attacked Pakistan”.

The processes involved in writing, publishing and printing these text books reveals the involvement of state's ruling elites. For example, the government of Pakistan selects a panel of educational advisors who devise the syllabi and curriculum. The advisors have themselves acknowledged that there are set policy 'guidelines' given to them that indicate which historical aspects are to be emphasized (Aziz, 1998). Moreover, they are advised to write these books with the ideological framework of the establishment of Pakistan in mind. The ideology of Pakistan, obviously, demands the marginalization of Hindus or India and promoting Islamic ideology or highlighting Muslim rule of the subcontinent. After the submission of drafts by the educational advisors, their work is again reviewed and revised by the government before it is sent for final publication (Aziz, 1998). The policy guidelines given to the writers of these text books include, the development of an awareness among the students of Hindu-Muslim differences, evaluating the role of Indian aggression towards Pakistan and the reinvigoration of the Kashmir dispute by elaborating the evil designs of India (Naseem, 2006).

There is a strong connection between historiography and the state's identity concerning the writing of these history text books. It seems as if the state's elites are involved in a self-fulfilling prophecy that seeks to glorify the identity of the state while sacrificing objective historical facts to the altar of nationalism and patriotism. This is done despite that fact that people in both India and Pakistan have a common history and ancestral heritage. The majority of Pakistanis are the descendents of Hindus who later converted to Islam. But it is a strange fact that in all the history text books of Pakistan the genealogy of Pakistanis is linked to the Turk militias and Afghan war lords who invaded

India time and again. The educational norms have become a cultural repository for the state's identity.

This shows the ways in which the social practices of elites have an influence on educational policies and demonstrates how Pakistan's identity is being discursively constructed at the cost of portraying India as the sole nemesis of Pakistan's identity and stability. I am not saying that there are no differences between the Muslim and the Hindu culture or civilization. There is no doubt that both have distinct cultures and that this difference is one of the basic reasons for the independence of Pakistan. However, the emphasis on these differences when teaching young minds socially constructed historical narratives is not unlike germinating hatred and conflict for future generations. At the educational level, the teaching of History can serve as a tool to instruct the future generations of society what is wrong and what is right. Currently the educational norms in both states serve to promote malice when constructing each others identities. Once these identities are carved out and formed then the narration of history becomes the conflict between the 'righteous Muslim' or Pakistanis and the 'idolatrous Hindu' or Indians (Jalal, 1995).

What is common between the various regimes [democratic or totalitarian] in Pakistan is the historiography of Pakistan under the tutelage of its ideology. This has helped to formulate the state's identity under the broad rubric of Islamic nationalism on the one hand and the 'Otherness towards India' on the other hand. How does identity based on an ideology strengthen the elites who profess it? Apple points out that it "distorts one's picture of social reality and serves the interest of the dominant classes in the society" (Apple, 1979: 20,21). For a Pakistani student the 'social reality' is

constructed by distorting the facts of history. The national symbolism of Pakistan's identity is paraphrased below from some of the history text books used in Pakistan. Some of the text books claim that:

1. Pakistan came into being when Muhammad Bin Qasim entered Sindh in 712 AD. Sindh is referred to as the 'Bab-e-Islam' or gateway to Islam in the text books. The symbolism used to create a common ancestry between Muslims on the subcontinent and former Arab rulers is being connected by the naming of 'Bab-e-Islam'. However, Islam was not spread throughout India by Arab invaders. Islam was in fact spread throughout India by 'Sufism'.
2. Akbar, the great Mughal Emperor who ruled India, is denounced as a ruler of the subcontinent since he practiced many 'Hindu' traditions and married Hindu 'ranis' or ladies.
3. The freedom movement of India is symbolized by the struggle against Hindu domination and the search for an Islamic identity of the state. The emphasis has been placed on the struggle against Hindu domination rather than on the attempts by the people to throw away their common colonial yoke (Ali, 2.11.2002)
4. The post-independence period in the text books is repetitive with symbolic phrases of 'our neighbouring enemy state' casting an 'evil design' on our statehood. Thereby, holding India responsible for being behind all the misery of Pakistanis.

Let us now take a look at the educational policies of India. In many ways, the basic tenants for a biased historiography remain the same with the categorization of

Muslims as “violent, despotic and masculine” while their Hindu counterparts are portrayed as “indolent, passive and effeminate” (Chaturvedi, 2001). The history text books for schools and colleges in India have been produced by the National Council of Educational Research and Training [NCERT] since 1970s. NCERT is a central body formed by the Indian government in New Delhi. Some books for school children are also published by the respective states’ boards. An interesting episode occurred in 2002 when NCERT issued four new text books under a revised curriculum. A supervisory organization that was intended to watch the development of Indian history ‘The Indian History Congress’ [not to be confused with Indian Congress Party], scrutinized the new text books especially on the question of how new “values” are being indoctrinated through the “education in religion” by the elites (Habib, Jaiswal et al., 2003: preface). The Indian History Congress was established in 1935 to oversee the development of Indian history. It published its detailed report in 2003 which heavily criticized the history text books being used in Indian schools and colleges. It is interesting to read the report which states: “the text books draw heavily on the kind of propaganda that the so called Sangh Parivar [a group of Hindu fundamentalist parties] publications have been projecting for quite some time” (Habib, Jaiswal et al., 2003: 3).

In the text books the Hindu leaders were being portrayed as ‘true patriots’ during the freedom struggle to throw away the colonial yoke, while all the Muslim leaders were portrayed as communalist separatists. The narratives about Muslim rulers on the subcontinent depicts them as ‘invaders’ and ‘temple-destroyers’ with nothing positive brought by them to India in terms of monuments and cultural heritage (Habib, Jaiswal et al., 2003).

The revised curriculum was issued when the Indian political party Bharatiya Janata Party [BJP] was in power and its slogan of “Hindutva” or cultural revitalization of India was in vogue. Educational norms were being used here as a vehicle to promote the Hindutva values of the BJP. An explanation of these ‘new values’ and their indoctrination in educational norms will help us to better understand the constructed nature of the security dilemma between India and Pakistan. Text books in India are easily accessible and are a cheap source of knowledge and history which play a fundamental role in ‘transmitting’ cultural values to future generations (Pandey, 2006). The cultural myths spread about Muslims in Indian text books portray them as being arrogant, belligerent and prone to fundamentalism (Nandy, 1997).

In almost all history text books in India the symbolism used for the partition of the subcontinent and the independence of Pakistan is punctuated with phrases like ‘entirely inevitable’, ‘with a heavy heart’, ‘was allowed to happen’, ‘a blow to nationalism’, ‘to allow the scourge of communalism’. A Grade 10 text book, published by NCERT, states: “the nationalist leaders agreed to the partition of India in order to avoid the large scale bloodbath that communal riots threatened...but they did not accept the two-nation theory” (Kumar, 2001: 207).

According to renowned Indian historian R.C. Majumdar, the primary reasons for distortions in objective history in these text books was because of the government’s directives to the historians who were put in charge of writing them (Majumdar, 1970). These directives from the government included the repudiation of Muslim rulers of the subcontinent and their portrayal as invaders and destroyers of Hindu temples which led to the ‘politicisation of history’ (Bhargava, 22.1.2000). In other words, it is evident that a

deliberate policy was adopted by the political elites at the helm of affairs to hold hostage the various means of disseminating knowledge by concealing the true facts and distorting the adequate portrayal of historical events. This paved the way for the development of distrust between the people of both countries and trust is the fundamental edifice required for building a security community. In spite of having a common cultural past and having struggled together for independence from colonialism, the 'official' historians of the two countries are at loggerheads with each other. One despises the 'Other' while portraying their competing national narratives of the past. The aim is to forge a nexus between historiography and the national identity of the Indian state (Bhargava, 22.1.2000). The paradox of history text books is self explanatory, where in, the Indian text books often reject the 'Two Nation Theory', the basis of the independence of Pakistan, and the partition of the subcontinent is only being accepted under the cloak of dire circumstances. It is the demand of Indian identity to marginalize sentiments toward the partition and keep the communalist forces at bay, while in Pakistan the incessant clinging to Islamic ideology at the expense of Hindu alienation is an alternate projection (Kumar, 2001).

To summarize, the elite guided educational policies of India and Pakistan have encouraged the establishment of intersubjective feelings of hostility between India and Pakistan. The identities of the states are conflated with the reconstructed myths from the socio-cultural norms of society. The presence of this kind of material in the educational curriculum has long lasting effects on the minds of impressionable school children. India as 'the Other' becomes an easy scapegoat to imbibe ethnic and regional fissures within Pakistan. The same is true for India, where lessons are being taught on the futility of the founding of Pakistan along communalists lines in a multi-ethnic pluralistic India.

Now the question arises, how is it that the trust deficit has spread to every nook and corner in India and Pakistan, especially given the high illiteracy rates and huge populations of both countries? In this regard, the role of the mass media, especially popular Indian films, and electoral norms, which disseminate hate towards each other, must be taken into account as significant contributing factors. Starting with the electoral practice of maligning Pakistan, I will focus on the electoral campaign and the related atmosphere during the 15th general Lok Sabha [lower house] elections in 2009 that was created by the BJP and the Congress Party [as the two major main stream parties]. Due to periodic martial law regimes in Pakistan, I overlook the case study of Pakistan's political parties' electoral campaigns. However, one common focus of all main stream Pakistani political parties in their election campaigns is engaging in dialogue with India regarding the settlement of all out-standing issues, including the core issue of Jammu and Kashmir.

The shadow of both states' identities looms large in all electoral campaigns in India, but has particularly become a more prominent feature in Indian election campaigns since the 1990s. It is cultural in the sense that the contested socio-cultural norms of Hinduism are being deliberately rejuvenated by political parties and used in their electoral campaigns in order to re-vitalize the Hindu identity of India. This all started after the demolition of the Babari Mosque in 1992 and various communal riots between the Hindus and the Muslims in India, i.e. the Ayodhya riots in 1992 and the Gujarat riots in 2002 and 2005. The state's identity became more narrowly defined and based on the idea of one people - one community. The Indian states' identity was no longer extended to Muslims living within India and the Indian state became more hostile in their relationship with Pakistan. The secularist fervour during the Congress Party

governments' before the 1990s nose dived with the emergence of 'Hindutva' at the centre stage of politics.

With the rise of the BJP in the 1990s, Indian election campaigns took on a more belligerent tone toward Pakistan. This is because the BJP quite often use the anti-Pakistani card to stir nationalist feelings among the electorate. Even the secular Congress Party which was in power in India before the 2009 general elections cannot break away from the established electoral norms of maligning Pakistan. The BJP and the Congress Party were the major two parties in India during the 2009 elections. It is pertinent to see what the elites of these parties propagated through their social practices towards Pakistan. The Manifesto of BJP was released in April 2009 under the title 'Good Governance, Development and Security' for the 15th general elections in India (BJPManifesto, 2009). The opening pages explained the rich cultural history of India from 900 AD to the present times, evading the period of Mughal rule in India. It states, with regard to cultural heritage that is irrevocably linked to Hindu mythology, that: "The civilisational consciousness of India has been well defined by the sages and philosophers and has its roots in Bharatiya or the Hindu world view... Hinduism is the most ennobling experience in spiritual co-existence" (BJPManifesto, 2009: 5). Here India's cultural heritage is being directly linked to the 'Hindu world view', without any regard to the cultural influences of more than 300 years of Muslim rule during the Mughal period. It is a conscious effort on the part of the BJP party leaders to reinvigorate Hindu norms leading to animosity with Pakistan and the abhorrence of Muslim rule in India. It is akin to 'the return of culture' in the identity politics of the state (Lapid and Kratochwil, 1997). The Manifesto further pledged that if the BJP were elected it would pursue the construction of the contentious

Ram Temple at the site of Babari Mosque which had previously been demolished by Hindu mobs that were actively supported by the elites of the BJP in 1992. It is interesting to explain the role of the elites in this episode. The Liberhan Commission Report officially recognized the role played by the BJP elites in the demolition of the Babari Mosque. This one man commission headed by Justice Manmohan Singh Liberhan was established in 1992 to probe and find the reasons behind this gory incident. The report was submitted and later on was leaked to public after 17 years in 2009. The report formally indicts the ex-BJP prime minister Vajpayee, the ex-home minister of the BJP Advani and some other BJP stalwarts behind the 'meticulously planned' demolition of Babari Mosque (*TheTimesofIndia*, 1.7.2009; Gilani, 24.11.2009). This formal indictment shows the centrality of the elites' social practices behind the India-Pakistan rivalry.


Coming back to the Manifesto, it reiterated that the special status granted to Kashmir under Article 370 of the constitution of India would be withdrawn along with the promulgation of a uniform civil code of India. This would mean that Muslims would no longer settle their family disputes according to Muslim social laws and customs. All these issues were bracketed together in a chapter in the Manifesto entitled "cultural nationalism" (BJPManifesto, 2009: 8). Cultural terms like "Ramjanambhoomi" [birth place of Hindu god Ram] and 'Hindutva' have seeped into the society's vernacular after their propagation. The BJP elite's belief in "Hindutva" raises a new level of mistrust between India and Pakistan as is evident in the electoral norms which form another component of the [in]-security community between the two states. The bashing of Pakistan regarding security was one of the central points in the electoral campaign of 2009 in India. Pertaining to security, the BJP Manifesto states: "terrorism sponsored by

Pakistani agencies is only one of the reason behind the fear that grips the people in cities, towns and villages” (BJPManifesto, 2009).

The other major party that participated in the 2009 elections was the Congress Party. The Indian Congress Party does not profess ‘Hindutva’ credentials and labels itself as a ‘secular and nationalist’ party. It was the party in power [2004-2009] before the general elections and it highlighted various achievements in its Manifesto for the 2009 elections. Among its achievements, it listed the government of Pakistan’s formal acceptance of the involvement of a Pakistani national behind the Mumbai terrorist attacks in 2008 as a ‘notable victory’ in foreign policy for the Congress government (INCManifesto, 2009). During an electoral campaign speech the prime minister Manmohan Singh reiterated, “we all know the epicenter of terrorism in the world today is Pakistan. The world community has to come to grips with this harsh reality” (Naqvi, 1.4.2009). It is not just communal politics within India, when analyzing the broader context of India-Pakistan security relations it becomes readily apparent that what happens to Muslims in India has far reaching affects in the security relations between the two states. In addition to elites’ rehtorics, popular culture is another medium of the propagation of negative norms constructed by elites.

The cartoon shown below was published on the 26th of December 2008 in the *Daily Jang* [the leading Urdu daily in Pakistan which has the largest circulation in Pakistan as well as in the UK and Europe] in the aftermath of the Mumbai terrorist

attacks that occurred in India one month earlier (November 2008).



(Iqbal, <http://www.jang.com.pk/jang/dec2008-daily/26-12-2008/cartoon.html>)

This cartoon shows the crux of the India and Pakistan security dilemma. The right side of the pictures shows the official policy statements of the ruling elites of the two countries lambasting each other, while the left side shows the more popular image of people in their homes in Pakistan being glued to their TV sets watching the latest Indian film on the cable TV network and listening to popular Indian songs at their marriage ceremonies.

Popular culture includes the mass media, films, and print media, among other things. Mass media in the form of electronic and print media are fairly independent in both countries when compared to the film industry. As an offshoot to the approach I have adopted for the study of popular culture, I will also examine the role played in the film industry by the Indian elites in establishing animosity towards Pakistan. Indian films are one of the largest sources of entertainment for the population of both states and millions

watch them in their leisure time. Yet the film industry is not completely free in India. It is under the control of political elites who use state censorship policies to control and limit what is being produced. I will elaborate on this in significant detail.

My selection of Indian films as representative of popular culture is due to their significance in terms of their global reach, industrial status, popular following in Pakistan and the interference of the elites in their production. It is the only mass medium where all these factors have converged. All other forms of mass media, like print media and television, are relatively free from government control, however, due to government censorship policies elites' have a sort of leverage on films. Popular cinema is a vast medium with huge mass appeal irrespective of high illiteracy rates in both states. When compared to other forms of popular culture, Indian films share certain commonalities with Pakistani audiences and so what is being depicted in them has a direct impact on the psyche of the people across the border.

To understand the role of Indian films it is important to appreciate the global and domestic reach of the Indian cinema industry. The Northern Indian film industry is called Bollywood from the historic city of Bombay which is now called Mumbai in India. It is the biggest industry in the world in terms of viewers and budget allocation (Rajadhyaksha and Willemen, 1999). It is estimated that the yearly production of films in India is between '800 to 1000' films with '10-15 million' tickets sold daily (Srinivas, 2002). The Bollywood film "Slumdog Millionaire" won eight Academy Awards [Oscars] in 2009. For the majority of people in India and Pakistan watching Indian films is part of their regular social activities. More importantly, Indian films are easily available throughout Pakistan and since the language is perfectly understood with only small variations in

dialect no translation is required. In Pakistan, the language is called Urdu and in India it is referred to as Hindi or Hindustani. In the aftermath of the 1965 war with India, Indian films were banned in Pakistan, but pirated CDs and cassettes of Indian films are easily available (B.B.C., 23.1.2006). In 2006, the Pakistani government lifted the ban on Indian films to allow that they be viewed in cinemas (B.B.C., 23.1.2006).

It is interesting to mention here that Bollywood films are the ones which need 'no passport, no visa' to cross the border and reach Pakistan (Sen, 2005). It is the major source for knowing the identity of the 'Other'. In contrast to it, the Pakistan film industry is very weak and they have few viewers even within Pakistan. Currently, the Pakistani film industry is almost 'non-existent' with only '12 films per year' being produced (Tahir, 3.7.2010). Therefore, how the Bollywood film industry portrays Muslims and Pakistan in its movies has an important link with the social norms of society, since there is very little contact between the populations of both states. The cinema in India is an important indicator for understanding the social milieu in Indian society. It can be taken as 'a metaphor for society' (Ahmed, 1992).

Since 1990 onwards, India witnessed two phenomenal rises in two sectors of its polity. One is the rise of the right wing orthodox Indian party the BJP and the other is the growth of mass media in the shape of numerous television channels along with the surge of high budget Indian movies. A close nexus is established between the values and norms articulated by the orthodox right in India and the interpellation of these norms by the mass media. Prior to the 1990s, there were very few films made on contentious subjects like the partition of the subcontinent, security issues, the Kashmir dispute and the identity issues of the state. For example, 'Garam Hawa' [Hot Wind] was released in 1973 and

Indo Pakistan wars 'Hindustan ki Kasam' [Pledge to India] was released in 1973.

However, the decade of 1990 saw the popularity of 'martial themes' in Bollywood increase (Athique, 2008). The state elites strongly used the right of censorship on Bollywood films while 'Policing Hindi cinema' (Bose, 2009).

I have taken my data on Indian films from the 'Encyclopaedia of Indian cinema' (Rajadhyaksha and Willemen, 1999). This encyclopaedia is an authoritative account of the Indian film industry published in joint collaboration with the British Film Institute and the National Film Archive of India. It includes national film entries from 1896 through 1995 along with all the major regional language films of India [Tamil, Telugo, Bengali, Gujarati, Marathi]. The statistics are also staggering with '23 million Indians that go to the movies everyday' (Rajadhyaksha and Willemen, 1999). The statistics regarding the number of viewers of Indian films in Pakistan cannot be easily determined. However, the popularity of Indian films in Pakistan can be gauged by taking into account their accessibility on the cable television network in major parts of Pakistan as well as the presence of pirated CDs in the open market and the projection of Indian films in Pakistani mass media. There are many 'blockbuster' Indian films based on anti-Pakistan and anti-Muslim themes such as Roja, Mission Kashmir, Pukar, Gadar, LOC, Bombay and Border, among others films. I referred to these films as 'blockbusters' since they were a commercial success at the box office as reported in the encyclopaedia of Indian cinema (Rajadhyaksha and Willemen, 1999).

These types of films caused resentment among Pakistanis because of their negative propaganda. It seems that these sorts of films are only being produced to spread the elites' agenda of constructing negative norms concerning Pakistan. The availability of

cable television in almost every part of Pakistan and the frequent airing of new Indian films has made the accessibility of watching Indian films easier for the people of Pakistan. The Indian films also witnessed a change in their credentials. From the romantic and melodious films of the 1950s, the 1960s, and the 1970s, the tone and tenor of Indian films changed in the 1990s so that they were more action packed, more nationalist and increasingly anti-Pakistani. The connivance of the social norms of Hindutva [explicated by the Indian elites] and the majority of Indian films released since the 1990s has helped to produce ‘a monolithic Indian identity that is Hindu’ (Malhotra and Alagh, 2004). Such an exclusive identity has marginal spatial place for the Muslims of India. In most of the films produced since the 1990’s, Muslims are stereotyped as traitors, terrorists, insurgents and brutal in order to create a ‘phobia’ in Indian society by portraying ‘negative images’ of Muslims (Jinabade, 2009). In the post-independence period, many Muslim stars in Indian cinema adopted Hindu names to receive acclaim and pass easily given the implicit norms of the ‘All India League of Censorship’ (Hijri, 2008). Some of these big names include “Dilip Kumar” [Yusaf Khan], “Menna Kumari” [Mahjabeen Bano], “Madhubala” [Mumtaz Jehan Begum Dehlavi] (Hijri, 2008: 60-61). The Bollywood films that are based on the nationalist discourse derive their themes extensively from Hindu ‘mythology and symbolism’ in spite of India being a multi-cultural secular country (Hijri, 2008). Many films are produced on thematic issues of the confrontation with Pakistan [films like Fiza, Soldier, Border, Bombay, Gadar, etc.] in order to reify the Hindu identity.

For example, ‘Bombay’ is a Bollywood film released in 1995, after being censored many times by the Indian government (Bose, 2009). The film was released amid

the social milieu of the demolition of the Babari Mosque (1992) and the role played by the Hindu religious parties. The film portrays the role of Mr. Bal Thackeray, the Hindu fundamentalist leader of “Shiv Sena”, an anti-Muslim and anti-Pakistani militant party from Mumbai. The film is based on a love story between a Muslim girl and a Hindu boy and was shown during the heightened religious and communal tensions in India at that time. The Indian Censor Board deleted the words “Pakistan”, “Islamic state”, “the visuals of Babari Mosque” under the pretext of suppressing communal violence which might ensue after the release of the film (Bose, 2009). But this did not help its cause, since after the film was released its director had to run for his life and his home was bombed. ‘Bombay’ was also boycotted by Muslims in India and its release was banned in many Muslim countries on account of its incorrect portrayal of Muslim social norms. Bollywood films like ‘Bombay’ have the power and social recognition of disseminating the views of powerful groups or elites at the expense of ‘misrepresenting’ Muslims who are in the minority in India (Mallhi, 2005).

Indian films that deals with Kashmir tend to emphasize India’s claim on Kashmir include ‘Mission Kashmir’ and ‘Refugee’. These films were banned by the Pakistani government, but pirated cassettes and CDs were still available and were watched by people of Pakistan with a ‘pinch of salt’ (Athique, 2008). Another Bollywood film “Roja” was one of the most popular films in 1992 in India. It was based upon the India-Pakistan rivalry over Kashmir when the Kashmir separatist struggle started in 1989 in Indian held Kashmir. The film has long sequences to convince viewers of the ‘righteousness’ of the Indian claim over Kashmir and has many scenes which are anti-Pakistani. In one dialogue scene in the film the viewer is told, “India has already been

partitioned once and now we will not allow it to divide again”. The Indian claim over Kashmir was supported with powerful national narratives and Pakistan was depicted as the source of evil and the aggressor state behind the Kashmir separatist struggle. Dirks explains that ‘Roja’ was used as medium for “a particular set of political arguments about the state” (Dirks, 2008: 142). The film was officially recognized by the state. The film won three national awards and surprisingly, it also won the award for the “Best Film on National Integration”. Here Indian national integration is forged at the expense of maligning Pakistan and vice versa. In other words, the Indian identity gets an ‘identity signifier’ through films by castigating Pakistan’s presence and identity. The aim of films like ‘Roja’ is for the ‘manufacture of consent’ of the state disguised with cultural contestations (Bharucha, 1994). It is important here to elaborate further on the ‘manufacture of consent’ by censorship policies in Indian films and how these films contribute in developing norms of animosity towards Pakistan. ‘Border’ is another Indian film released in 1997 and was a blockbuster in India, receiving many national awards. The songs of the films were an instant hit. The film is based on the theme of the 1971 war with Pakistan. Naturally the Pakistan army was on the losing side in the film and the image of Indian army was pictured as having valour and dignity. The anti-Pakistani dialogues in the film are its hallmark, punctuated with nationalist melodrama to impress the Indian audiences. However, it may be asked, what is the message being conveyed to the Pakistani audiences? It reflects the stereotyping of Pakistan as the “Other”.

There is a long history of the involvement of the state’s elites in lieu of the ‘censorship policies’ on Indian films. Significantly, the influence of elites is more

prominent in those films where the image of Pakistan being portrayed is as an enemy of the state or the “Other”. Every film in India requires a certificate from the Central Board of Film Certification (CBFC). The Board is a statutory body organized under the Indian Cinematograph Act of 1952. Even though the first amendment of the Indian Constitution grants people’s ‘Right to the Freedom of Speech and Expression’, the constitution also grants special powers to the executive to impose restrictions on the mass media if what is to be aired is deemed detrimental to the security of the state (Bhowmik, 2002). The 14th amendment to the Indian constitution also gives more authority to the state to impose ‘reasonable restrictions’ on forms of expression on the pretext of the sovereignty and the integrity of India (Granville, 1999). It is also interesting to note that other forms of expression like print and electronic media manage to secure their freedom because of their “political clout” and it is only the popular cinema which ‘remained vulnerable’ (Bhowmik, 2002). Here political clout refers to the involvement of Indian political elites who are sometimes the owners of the various media channels or in other cases there are media conglomerates which finance the election campaigns of the ruling political elites in India. Every film meant for public viewing, be it a commercial venture, documentary film or an art movie has to be reviewed by the state to get a CBFC certificate before it can be shown publically. Appeals against any arbitrariness lie with the Indian Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. Even the appellate body is a government ministry and it is like ‘an appeal from Caesar to Caesar’ (Noorani, 1983). A film is given a certificate for ten years and it can be renewed after that period. This shows the arbitrary and impulsive attitude of the executive to keep forms of mass media in check and control (Noorani, 1983). All the guidelines, principles and policies of the CBFC are framed by the

government. Section 5B of the Indian Cinematograph Act of 1952 sets the 'Principles for guidance in certifying films' as:

“A film shall not be certified for public exhibition if, in the opinion of the authority competent to grant the certificate, the film or any part of it is against the interest of the security of the state, friendly relations with foreign states, public order, decency or morality, or involves defamation or contempt of court, or is likely to incite commission of any offence”
(Bhowmik, 2002:3576).

Along with the above 'set guidelines' for film certification the central government also has the discretion to issue 'directives' to the competent authority, i.e., the CBFC. The members of the CBFC are politically appointed and are not selected based on their expertise in the field of cinema (Bhowmik, 2003).

In 2002 the CBFC refused to give a certificate to Anand's documentary film 'Jung aur Aman' [War and Peace]. The committee made the following recommendation to the director to 'delete the scenes showing Pakistanis burning India's national flags. But nothing was said regarding 'Indians burning Pakistan's national flag' (Bhowmik, 2002: 3575). Many critics of Indian films have questioned this governmental role as 'cultural police' (Bhowmik, 2002).

Similarly in March 2003 the CBFC also refused to give a certificate to the documentary film 'Aakrosch' [Cry of Pain] based on the communal violence directed against Muslims in Gujarat in 2002. This incident caused a communal frenzy in India and led to increased tension between the two countries. The state police did not even allow private showings of the film since it did not have the censor certificate by the CBFC (*TheHindu*, 2003). In any case, most private television channels in India do not even dare to air documentary films on political issues (*TheHindu*, 2003).

Nevertheless, Indian films that portray violent scenes usually go uncensored by the CBFC when they show the bravery of the Indian armed forces at the humiliation of the Pakistan army (Bose, 2009). An example worth mentioning here is the film ‘LOC’ [Line of Control] released in 2003. This is a film about the Kargil war between India and Pakistan. ‘LOC’ was released during a heightened military stand off between the Pakistani and Indian armed forces. At this time, India had rapidly mobilized its military to the border under the code name of ‘Operation Parakaram’, only for Pakistan to reciprocate by sending its military in the year 2001-2002. In the film, Pakistan was treated as a rogue state and an overtly hostile one with General Musharraf being portrayed as the main architect of the Kargil war among Indian audiences. Another film, “Gaddar: Ek Prem Katha” [Mutiny: A Love Story] was released in 2001 and depicts the turbulent partition period of 1947. In this film, the Pakistani Muslim father of a girl is the villain behind an otherwise love story of a Sikh boy and a Muslim girl. ‘Pukar’ [Cry Out] is another film based on theme of cross border terrorism.

‘Lamhaa’ [Moment] is another film based on Kashmir struggle. In the movie previews it promised ‘to tell the story of violence in the region as never seen before’ (*Dawn*, 30.6.2010). The film faced stringent censorships before its release in July 2010. The Indian censor board objected that the narration on Kashmir in the preview of the film should not start with ‘the most dangerous place in the world’. The film explains the post-partition traumas in Kashmir and wide spread corruption in Indian held Kashmir, and was at loggerheads with the Indian film censor board.

The censorship of films in India and Pakistan are firmly controlled by whatever government currently holds power. The Indian Supreme Court’s decision regarding the

state's right to censor, as not only 'desirable, but also necessary' is quoted in all the annual reports of Indian certification board (Bose, 2009). It is evident from this analysis of India's censorship policies that they are significantly influenced by the ruling elites who are 'politically motivated' in constructing social norms of hatred towards Pakistan (Bhowmik, 2002). The connivance of CBFC with state elites shows state patronage of anti-Pakistan 'jingoistic films' like 'Roja', 'Gadar' or 'Sarfrosh' that incite audiences to shout 'anti-Pakistan slogans' (Bhowmik, 2003). These sorts of films show the stark contrast in the state's attitude towards films which are based on themes of mutual harmony and peace like Anand's documentary 'Jung aur Aman' [War and Peace]. Even the Indo-China relations were not spared from this state manifestation in a film entitled 'Haqeeqat' made by Anand in 1964. This film showed the valour of Indian forces in the shadow of the 1962 war with China, received 'unprecedented' acclaim by the state (Bhowmik, 2003). In many ways, Indian popular cinema seems to be held hostage by 'politicians malice' and tailored to match their vision of Indian security (Bhowmik, 2002). The film censorship regime in India has become a 'manifestation of state power' (Bhowmik, 2003). Vasudevan attributes this to the lack of a 'modernist outlook of the political elite' (Vasudevan, 2005). It is the culmination of Indian rulers desire for 'cultural homogeneity' by way of 'social engineering' that leads to 'disoriented cultural' practices (Bhowmik, 2003). It serves as a vehicle for imposing Hindu identity on the entirety of multi-cultural India by excluding minorities as a project of the 'Hindu nationalist discourse' and identifying a common enemy [Pakistan] (Bose, 2009). The aim of the 'political manipulation' of the censorship regime is not only to prevent 'objectionable films' from mass screening, but also to deliberately promote 'favourable'

ones and such actions have been taken by all governments 'irrespective of their ideological bias' (Bhowmik, 2003).

The state's involvement in censor boards can help shape and determine public opinion to support its social practices. Films that produced animosity toward the other are responsible for creating a 'stereotyping image'. This is what French philosopher Michel Foucault refers to as the 'Power of Knowledge'. He points out that those who hold power are also in the position to disseminate particular beliefs and values of society (Foucault, 1994). Power relations cannot be explained solely in terms of governmental authority, but they are also found in a 'system of social networks' (Foucault, 1982). The power of popular cinema in India particularly from the 1990s onwards has helped to disseminate 'Hindu majoritarian nationalism' by constructing myths from religious norms (Vasudevan, 2000). This explains the underlying structure of social power that has its roots in cultural norms but is being controlled by the ruling elites in India and Pakistan. They have helped in the construction knowledge and power relationships by reinforcing negative stereotypes of each other.

The question may be asked, can change be brought about in people's perceptions of one another, if alternative films were released about each other that reinforce norms of friendship and goodwill between the two countries? Although examples of these types of films are rare, I argue, particularly considering the large demand for Indian films in Pakistan, that, if it is given half a chance, there is every possibility that the current hostile relationship may blossom into friendship. In the backdrop of a military standoff between the two countries in 2002, a film was released in India in 2004 entitled 'Veer Zaara'. This film was based on the friendship between two countries and was hugely popular among

both Indian and Pakistani audiences. Another film that was nominated for an Oscar award is 'Lagaan'. This is a film which looks at the past and shows how Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs and Dalits joined together to defeat an imperial power. It shows the 'cultural accomplishment' of the past (Stadtler, 2005). The venue of battle is an imagined field of cricket. Do such past cultural accomplishments have the potential to change the present trappings of today's security dilemma?

7.1.3 Popular social practices: positive norms

The suggestive normative structure of an India-Pakistan security community can be found in nostalgic literary works written by acclaimed Indian and Pakistani writers. Some of the Pakistani authors include Saadat Hassan Manto, Intizar Hussain, Bapsi Sidhwa and many others. On the Indian side these famous writers include Krishen Singh Bedi, Ismaat Chughtai, Krishna Sobti, Bhisham Sahni, Gopi Chand Kishan, Qurratul Ain Haider, Krishna Baldev, Khushnet Singh and others. These authors all have fictionalized their own experiences of living together in an undivided India (Chakravarty and Hussain, 1998; Bhalla, 2008). Their narration of the period of partition carries within it the seeds of a conceptualized normative security community between India and Pakistan. Their status as towering personalities of Urdu/ Hindi literature is never in doubt in their respective societies; however, especially in Pakistan, they seldom get recognition from the state in lieu of teaching their books as course material for the younger generations. This shows the difference between the elite versions of a state's identity and the popular one. The commonality of language has made these master-pieces easily accessible and understandable for the population of both states. However, the state guided discourses of national identity do not offer these authors any place in the national curriculum.

Ted Hopf, a conventional constructivist, has examined the relationship between a state's identity and domestic or societal claims. He identified a 'social cognitive structure' based on 'discursive formations' which includes the study of literary classics in order to formulate a domestic 'discourse' of the state's identity (Hopf, 2002). In the preface of his *magnum opus*, Hopf encouraged scholars to "read pulp fiction in order to understand a state's foreign policy". Presently, the state's elites postulate educational norms by way of spreading cultural myths of ancient rivalries against one another in the minds of people. An alternative 'social cognitive structure' could be offered that would be based on the work of these renowned literary personalities in both states. Thus, it can be seen as a way of informing and presenting the credentials of the 'Others' identity. I will briefly explore some of these classic texts in order to show what kind of social cognitive structure I propose be offered as an alternative.

The classic short story writer in Pakistan, Saadat Hasan Manto in his story 'Dekh Kabira Roya' [Look Kabir has Wept] presents the uselessness of savagery behind the carnage during partition. The main character is Kabir who is named after the Sufi saint Kabir who was the main figure behind the seventeenth century 'Bhakti movement'. The movement promoted the mutual coexistence of Hindus and Muslims on the subcontinent by encouraging them to shun their religious differences. In another classic, 'Toba Tek Singh', Manto laments the level of hostility between India and Pakistan. In this story, Hindu and Muslim elites are portrayed as lunatics fighting incessantly over a piece of land in 'Toba Tek Singh' [a city in Pakistan]. Intizar Hussain, another Pakistani writer, derided the present day animosity between India and Pakistan and talks about tranquil times in his novel 'Basti' [community]. The name of Intizar's novel 'Basti' or community

explains the ideal type of co-habitation between Hindus and Muslims in the pre-partition days. He explains how the Muslims and the Hindus respected each other's religious traditions and fervently participated in each other's festivities. While giving an interview he narrated his devout Muslim father's best friendship with an equally devoted Hindu (Bhalla, 2008). This again shows one of the differences between Western understandings of a security community, where secularism serves as the foundational pillar, as opposed to contrastingly religious South Asian states like India and Pakistan. It should also be mentioned that there is a big difference between religious Hindu or Muslim fundamentalist and a devout Hindu or Muslim.

The nostalgia created in these writings by the first generation of people who participated in the partition of the subcontinent needs to be shared with today's fourth generation. These stories also need to be added to the history books used in schools in both India and Pakistan. Indian writer Qurratulain Hyder's novel 'Aag ka Darya' [River of Fire] is the most famous work on both sides of the divide (Hyder, 2007). The list is never ending since literary classics are being created by literary elites of both states constantly. The popular social practices show that these novels and stories are being read and enjoyed by the people in both states, yet these sorts of stories or texts are not included in the educational curriculum of the two states. Both writers in India and Pakistan have shown nostalgic feelings toward one another in their works. Many acclaimed Indian and Pakistani writers and novelists set their works in the past when people lived together in peace and tranquillity. After partition, these writers have emphasized mutual respect and love of each other's country. Bapsi Sidhwa in the opening page of Alok Bhalla's book wrote, "We, Indians and Pakistanis alike, are always

emotionally involved in our politics...I should add that politics in the subcontinent touches each person's life" (Bhalla, 2008). The novels of these writers are extremely popular on both sides of the border. They have written extensively on the former periods of friendship between the two communities [Hindus and Muslims]. The irony is that though the contribution of these writers have been recognized by their respective governments and some of them have been given national awards, the works of these authors have not yet been incorporated in the general curriculum of the education system.

In summary, the main thrust of these great classics is that they present Hindu and Muslim identities in a more complex manner than the antagonistically articulated identities in the two states' nationalist identity discourses. But the question arises why is this 'social cognitive structure' not given a central place by the states' ruling elites? The answer is obvious and points towards the vested interests of the ruling elites of both states and their politically motivated agendas.

Hinduism and Islam are generally considered to be two very distinct religions. Islamic principles and the Hindu religion are believed to have nothing in common between them. Although Muslims and Hindus lived side by side for centuries on the subcontinent, their religious beliefs are poles apart. However, in the 15th century, the 'Bhakti Movement' developed on the subcontinent which tried to bridge the gap between the two communities with regard to their religious differences. The movement was highly successful in the region with a mass following on the subcontinent. This does not mean that Muslims and Hindus just started to ignore their religious differences, but that their followers started giving respect to each other and each others religious doctrines. Perhaps most importantly, the Bhakti movement has already done work in this direction by

developing peaceful religious norms of mutual coexistence. It is useful to mention some of the more salient principles of the Bhakti movement in the context of establishing better security relations between India and Pakistan.

The movement was initiated by Kabir [1398-1518] of Banaras [India] who is considered a saint by both Muslims and Hindus. His aim was to propagate peaceful religious norms of Islam and Hinduism. The idea behind the movement was to help Muslims and Hindus of the subcontinent to rise above their religious differences and live peacefully together in the undivided India. The Bhakti movement was the converging point of mysticism in Islam and Hinduism. Kabir taught that the attributes of God remain the same whether one calls him “Ram” in Hinduism or “Allah” in Islam. He believed that all these differences were human artifices and not divinely created. He emphasized the positive attributes of Hinduism and Islam which were acceptable to both Hindus and Muslims. He stressed the unity of Muslims and Hindus in a common ‘religio-social platform’ (Hedayetullah, 1977). Kabir also denounced the self appointed guardians of Hinduism, the Brahmins, the caste system in India and the Muslim pirs [clergy] who distorted religion according to their own interests. He proclaimed the Universality of human beings while stressing the simple comprehensible principles of Islam and Hinduism to the people. However, after Kabir’s death the Bhakti movement fell into disarray.

Sufism is revered by the people of both India and Pakistan. The shrines of Muslim saints in India are held in equal esteem by Hindus and Muslims alike. It is quite interesting to see local Hindus meditating at the shrines of Muslim saints like Saleem Chisti in Fatehpur-Sakri, Mueen uddin Chisti and many others in India. The popular mass

media initiative, “Aman ki Asha’ [Desire of Peace] of national dailies like *The News* (*Daily Jang*) of Pakistan and *Times of India* [partially explained in Chapter 1] also explain the deviation of popular social practices from elites social practices. The popular stories of the masses of both states are published daily in these widely read newspapers in both states. These stories depict the desires of the people to visit their lost belongings on either side of the border, visit their distant and close relatives and a desire for family reunification. The strict visa requirements of both states do not allow people to freely visit each other’s countries. Visas are usually issued only for the intended city and people are not allowed to travel throughout the whole country. In spite of all these limitations, the Pakistan High Commission in India on an average issues 500 visas daily (Butalia, 2.7.2010). The absurdity of these stringent visa regimes and social practices enforced by the elites are even more evident whenever the border controls are eased a bit with emotional gatherings at the border crossings between India and Pakistan of lost family members on either side of the border at last being reunited (Butalia, 2.7.2010).

To conclude, the differences between popular and elite social practices allow room for community formation at the popular level. It is important that we study security and identity as a discourse, and not as a pre-established reality of an anarchic world system. The prominent grey areas of cooperation between the two states have been held hostage by the elites due to their dichotomous separation of identities. India and Pakistan after having already identified each other as the other’s existential threat need to fortify their constructed claims with daily routines in order to create the right context for their message. At the elite level, the preparation of educational curriculum, elite’s rhetoric and censorship regimes imposed on popular culture are some of the daily routines of the

elites. At the popular level, the role of literacy classics, Sufism and popular mass media initiatives show congenial popular social practices for security community formation. Culture can change due to changes in social practices and it helps individuals get through their every day rituals if things are simplified around them. In recent decades, the citizens of India and Pakistan have been presented only one perspective of the other as their enemy. No effort has been made by the ruling elites of either country to promote living with a friendly neighbour with whom both have centuries old cultural ties and experiences.

There is no doubt that a systemic power structure does explain a state's behaviour to a certain extent, but what is often ignored is the cultural determinant of power politics. How does power influence the beliefs of people by supporting myths and the contested social norms of society? The people of both countries have common ancestors, understand the same language, wear the same clothes and quite often imitate each other's social norms at occasions like marriages, yet the 'we-feeling' required for a security community is currently at its lowest ebb. The absence of economic transactions with virtually no interstate institutions to conduct trade between the two countries has hampered the cause of creating an economic community according to the neo-functional and functionalist theories of regional integration (Choi and Caporaso, 2002). There is limited social mobility across the borders between India and Pakistan which is a key variable required for regional integration. The silver lining lies in re-constructing the state narratives from the vestiges of some common norms developed as Hindu-Muslim communities and evolved by living together for centuries.

The overwhelming success of the secular Indian Congress Party in the 15th general elections in May 2009 and the resolve of the Pakistani government to bring the plotters behind the Mumbai carnage to justice are steps taken in right direction. The Indian Congress party emerged as the largest party in the Lok Sabha [lower house] with its alliance [UPA] winning 262 seats in a house of 573 seats, slightly short of simple majority of 273 and the BJP alliance [NDA] won only 158 seats. These elections are significant in the aftermath of Mumbai terrorist attacks and the belligerency of the BJP camp towards Pakistan. The Indian electorates' dismissal of the BJP's credentials of 'Hindutva' and their communal politics along with their anti-Pakistan electioneering are further testimony of the gulf that exists between the elites professed social norms and their acceptance at the popular end.

The norms of mutual respect and friendship are not allowed to develop between the people of both countries by the ruling elites who have their own vested interests in perpetuating the current security dilemma and state rivalry. Indian cinema has the potential to act as an effective non-state actor by playing a vital role in establishing social norms of cooperation and trust building across the borders. A joint venture could be set up between the two countries to produce films on common themes and issues such as poverty or terrorism. It is also essential that text books which profess hatred and intolerance toward each other should be eliminated from the educational curriculum of both states. This is a tall order, but here in lies the foundations of an ever illusive security community based on social norms of peace. Along with materialistic determinants of a security community what is needed as a precursor is a socially conceptualized "collective identity".

For the resolution of any conflict or the formation of any security community formation, it is first imperative to understand the cultural contexts of the two states. As Bailey explains:

“In the end the best conflict managers will not be cultural outsiders. They will be those for whom the culture is second nature. The enlightened outsider, laboriously searching for the relevant cultural constructs, has much to learn. The willful outsider, who disdains the search and thinks he has a formula good for all occasions and all cultures, has almost everything to learn”
(Avruch, 1998:108).

In the next section, I will make a brief comparative analysis of hypothetical India-Pakistan security community with the EU and ASEAN. I will first examine two existing securities communities the European Union (EU) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). This analysis will be based on the path dependency model of security communities discussed in Section 7.1 of this chapter. It will particularly focus on the question of what lessons should be learned from the EU and ASEAN experiences when contemplating an India-Pakistan security community in a social constructivist framework.

7.2 Comparative study of security communities: EU, ASEAN and Pak-India security communities

This section deals with the ideational components of the EU and ASEAN security communities by identifying their hidden normative structures. The argument of elite versus popular social practices will remain the same while treading on the path dependency of security communities (Section 1).

7.2.1 European Union

The first two steps of the path dependency model examined the discursive practices of elites and the role of chosen traumas in effecting the formation of a security community [Section 1]. In the case of India-Pakistan, we have shown how the partition of

the subcontinent served as a tool in the hands of the elites to construct each other's identities as hostile binaries [Chapter 4]. In the case of Europe, the shared chosen trauma was the ravages of World War II and the positive role played by the elites in 'desecuritizing' their contentious security issues for higher mutual benefits (Waever, 1998). Europe's need for having a common security community has been discursively constructed out of the fear of war from Europe's past history. The myth of the past fear of war was too strong behind more integration without delving into the minutiae of the we-feeling as a precursor to the formation of a security community. The 'referent' of security shifted from the traditional state centred approach towards a collective fear of Europe's past (Waever, 1998).

Critical social constructivists have examined the role of the elites' discursive practices in the integration discourse of the European Union (Onuf, 1989; Diez, 1999). The language spoken by the elites at 'critical junctures' (Marcussen, Risse et al., 1999) of European integration have special meanings attached to them. It is not only the particular words used by the elites in order to speak for or against the Union, but they can also be viewed in a wider context as 'performatory acts' (Diez, 1999). The case of British identity is often juxtaposed with that of German or French identities (Marcussen, Risse et al., 1999). For the British integration with the European Union means the loss of their 'Common Wealth' status and the loss of the portrait of their monarch on the British Pound. The British debate is often Euro-sceptic. The speech of Sir Winston Churchill in the House of Commons on the 11th of May 1953 still reflects the British mind set vis-à-vis the European Union. At the time, Churchill stated: "we have our own Commonwealth and Empire" (Marcussen, Risse et al., 1999). In contrast to this perspective, an analysis of

German and French elites shows the use of 'Euro-Speak' rhetoric. For the Germans their identity construction after World War II required integration and more Europeanization to overcome the guilty feelings of being responsible for the war. At the time, Thomas Mann claimed, "we do not want a German Europe, but a European Germany" (Marcussen, Risse et al., 1999: 622).

The third step in the formation of a security community at the popular level is the presence of socio-cultural norms for the formation of a collective identity. For the case of a hypothetical India-Pakistan security community, I have chosen linguistic similarity and common popular social practices. In contrast to it the European Union is a peculiar security community in the sense that though every European state strives for its membership, there is no common perception of European identity which binds the European societies together. It is remarkable that states in the European Union have compromised their sovereignty to a supra-national organization without socializing or presenting a unified European identity to their people. If it is essential for a security community to develop a "we-feeling" among the people of various nations, then it can be asked where is this common feeling in the case of the EU?

It is part of the European integration story that there is no essentialist version of national identity which is based upon the categorical assessment of an out-group and an in-group identities or us versus them (Tajfel, 1982). In other words at the popular level, although people in Europe today have national identities, they also carry with them the semblance of a 'European' identity which is not based on the concept of Europe as the 'Other'. From a sociological point of view, people carry multiple identities and these identities do not necessarily have to conflict. Instead these multiple identities can be seen

as forming ‘eccentric’ circles of identities, each accommodative of the other (Risse, 2009). European identity also includes the concept of ‘bounded integration’ (Cederman, 2001). This means that the nation states carry their national identities along with the ‘we feeling’ of a community while bound together in a territory (Cederman, 2001). Cederman examines the reality on the ground by exploring the level of the ‘civic participation’ of Europeanization norms in ‘education, language and mass media’ (Cederman, 2001). The conclusions are startling since the nation states in Europe have a tight grip on their educational policies. The curricula is primarily being taught in respective national nomenclature and Europeans show a preference of choosing their own national channels when watching mass media (Cederman, 2001). This sense of boundedness may be one of the prime reasons for the absence of a European ‘demos’ that is a community that is made up of people carrying the ‘we-feeling’ among themselves

Another aspect of a hypothetical India-Pakistan security community is the role of the mass media and the impact Indian films have on Pakistani audiences. Let us analyze the role of the mass media as an intermediary between national identities and European identity. Deutsch has already conceptualized the ‘we-feeling’ as a result of the dense communicative network between the states in a security community (Deutsch, 1970). There is a definitive role which the mass media plays in constructing collective identities (Schlesinger, 1991; Schlesinger, 1993; Rajagopal, 2001). A space for the ‘European Public sphere’ was created in the national public sphere in order to realize this objective. This reality grapples with the fact that there was no national recognition or legislation to provide the European public sphere a space in the various countries national media until the first half of the 1980s (Semetko, Vreese et al., 2000). In 1984 the European

Community issued a ‘Green paper’ on ‘Television without Frontiers’ (TWF). The implementation of this TWF directive depended upon the national regulations which each state had devised for its media policy (Harcourt, 2002). The E.C. directive ‘Television without Frontiers’ was amended twice and its latest version is now a days called the ‘Audiovisual Media Services Directive’ (AVMSD). It ‘covers all EU audiovisual media services’ and must be incorporated into national law by the end of 2009 (AVMSD, 2009). This latest directive does not oblige any European nation states to promote the imaginary concept of European cultural identity, but rather its aim is to create a ‘level playing field’ for the commercial activities of the audiovisual industry among various media players of the Union. In an ambiguous way Article 3(i) of the directive asks the member states to promote ‘European works’, but does not specify what exactly is meant by ‘European works’. What then is the normative structure of the EU which sets the terms of inclusion and exclusion in this security community?

The normative structure of the European Union

The cultural demarcation of European identity can be found in the Lisbon Treaty signed in 2007 and which came into effect in 2009. In the preamble of the Lisbon Treaty it is clearly written what is meant by Europe.

“DRAWING INSPIRATION from the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe, from which have developed the universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person, freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law, (Europa, 2007: emphasis original)

Therefore, the ‘inspiration’-al value of the European Union forms the core of European identity. If we historically examine the inheritance of Europe we find a cultural fault line running through the entire region of Europe. Judean-Christian identity, the schism between the Judean-Christian tradition, the struggle with the papacy and

absolutism, the Crusades, the period of the Enlightenment and the civil rights movements, are all various manifestations of this grand family ‘inheritance’ that is shared by all Europeans. It does not matter if the role of the various individual European states were conflicted with regard to these trends, the states were still all involved in one way or the other. All European states owe their traditions to this common ‘inheritance’. It is important to historically deconstruct the values of this inheritance in order to arrive at a better sense of what constitutes European identity.

In his book ‘Europe, a history’, the historian Norman Davies explains the ‘concept of Europe’. It is worth quoting his exact words, he points out:

“Europe” is a relatively modern idea. It gradually replaced the earlier concept of ‘Christendom’ in a complex intellectual process lasting from the fourteenth to the eighteenth century. The decisive period, however, was reached in the decades on either side of 1700 after generations of religious conflict. In that early phase of the Enlightenment it became an embarrassment for the divided community of nations to be reminded of their common Christian identity; and ‘Europe’ filled the need for a designation with more neutral connotations” (Davies, 1996: 7).

Davies quotes T.S. Eliot, a famous poet, who said on the eve of the German defeat in 1945 that:

“I am talking about the common traditions of Christianity which has made Europe what it is, and about the common cultural elements which this common Christianity has brought with it...It is in Christianity that our arts have developed; it is in Christianity that the laws of Europe _until recently_ have been rooted. It is against a backdrop of Christianity that all our thoughts have significance. An individual European may not believe that the Christian Faith is true, and yet what he says, and makes, and does, will all...depend on [the Christian heritage] for its meaning”
(Davies, 1996: 9).

It might be true that a simplistic monolithic European cultural identity does not exist in today’s European Union. The long hiatus of changing trends has severely limited the scope of a single European identity. But I am interested here in exploring or trying to establish a unified European identity. I am interested in tracing the legacy of Europe

which is based on these historical epochs, shared among diverse European states and experienced by all ordinary Europeans. In other words, it is Europe's shared interests based on its common heritage that determines the rules for inclusion or exclusion from membership in the EU.

At the popular level, the opinion polls conducted by the BBC in various EU countries shows strong opposition to Turkish membership can be explained on the parameters of the European Union normative structure. The reasons cited against Turkish membership were its large population, high poverty levels and 'doubts about cultural compatibility with Europe'. The strongest opposition came from the French, the Germans and the Austrians (www.bbc.com, 30.9.2005). In the same BBC survey a very interesting remark was made by Guillaume Parmentier, a leading French political pundit, who said, "the Turkish elite has been European for centuries; but the vast democratic expansion of Turkey involves Anatolian peasants, who are not European by culture, tradition or habit"(www.bbc.com, 30.9.2005).

The famous phrase by nineteenth century Italian statesman Massimo d'Azeglio, that "we have made Europe, now we have to make Europeans" (Cederman, 2001), still has some resonance in today's European identity discourse. There are a few lessons to take from the formation of the EU. One lesson is the positive role played by the ruling elites in creating a common security community. Another lesson can be drawn from the popular level that is how in the end Europe's chosen trauma of World War II had the positive effect of increasing support among European nation states and peoples for the formation of a common security community which ultimately led to the formation of the European Union. I will now explain the normative structure of ASEAN.

7.2.2 The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)

_____ ASEAN is an association of ten countries of Southeast Asia formed in 1967. These include Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Laos, Myanmar, Cambodia, Vietnam, Philippines, Singapore and Brunei Darussalam. If the EU was able to flourish in a cobweb of legalistic norms guided by their institutionalist's practices, then ASEAN represents a different type of security community which shows an aversion to such institutionalism. There is little interference by the Secretariat of ASEAN in Jakarta in the domestic affairs of its member states. ASEAN's policy of non-interference has been proudly cited as the "ASEAN way" and this is the normative structure of ASEAN. The problem with ASEAN countries is that some of them have been under long spells of despotic rule. In these cases, the state's identities were being 'engineered' by these elites amid challenges of increased ethnic diversity and the lack of civic culture whereby they served as socio-cultural 'gatekeepers'(Shaw, 2009). Faced with conditions of increased ethnic diversity and the weak institutional stability of ASEAN, the task of formulating 'national values' was conducted by the states elites as a 'legitimate discourse'(Shaw, 2009).

Why is ASEAN such a loosely structured security community and what is the relevance of 'the ASEAN way' in its normative structure in making this security community? The 'socio-cultural' norms that make up 'the ASEAN way' are "Mushawaraya" [consultation] and 'Mufakat" [consensus] (Acharya, 2009b). ASEAN norms have already been studied at the elite level (Solidum, 1981; Adler, Barnett et al., 2000; Acharya, 2001; Rumelili, 2007). However, at the popular level, they have seldom been explained. I will study ASEAN based on some anthropological insights taken from

its member states. This will help us to understand the informality behind the normative structure of the ASEAN way.

Generally, the political culture of ASEAN countries shows that all Southeast Asian states are “galactic” polities. Stanley Tambiah first used the term “galactic” polities to refer to states that act as if they occupy their own autonomous galaxies in the universe where each has its own ‘sphere of influence’ and distinctiveness (Huang, 2009: 16). Anthropological and sociological studies of ASEAN countries (Kahn, 1998; Goda, 1999) explain the presence of a highly patriarchal and hierarchical societies where subservience to the command of the higher authority does not represent the transgression of individual rights or liberties, but rather is seen as a matter of respect towards the authority. Southeast Asian culture as a whole shows reverence to religious ideals and the beliefs of Confucius.

All ASEAN countries, with the exception of Thailand, were subjugated by colonial rule for a long time. This is their common and shared chosen trauma. There are more spiritual and social obligations of ‘give and take’ in a community setting, rather than any explicit rules or codified laws. The other important factor underlying Southeast Asian nations (apart from subjugation from colonialism) is the reverence of the people towards religion. It is a strange concomitance that four different religions are practiced by ASEAN countries which includes Islam, Buddhism, Christianity and Hinduism.

The ‘ASEAN way’ is a delicate balance of religious, cultural and ancient social practices from Southeast Asian societies. Ancient kingdoms and the presence of four religions made it a very long cultural discourse to traverse, but I will only focus on those aspects which are relevant for understanding the ‘informality’ behind the decision

making processes of the ASEAN security community. The Indonesian concepts of a leader and a follower revolve around the traditional norms of “bapakism” which refers to a ‘bapak’ (father) and the ‘anuk buah’ or children (Pye and Pye, 1985: 117). A leader is like a father who guides his children through the vicissitudes of the dangers of the outside world and in return desires the respect and reverence of his followers. That is how the former Indonesian President Sukarno developed the concept of ‘guided democracy’ during his reign in office. There is explicit ‘reciprocity’ in ‘patronage clientage relationship’ in an Indonesian society (Pye and Pye, 1985). In the Philippines, they also have a similar cultural practice called ‘utang-na-loob’. This means if someone receives a favour in the Philippines then they are in the same coin personally obliged to reciprocate the favour (Pye and Pye, 1985: 124).

In Burma, group identity is centred around the concept of ‘awza’ (Pye and Pye, 1985) which means that one who has leadership qualities in a group will be implicitly recognized and will not be openly celebrated as the group leader. In other words, it is a ‘subjective’ attribute which is intersubjectively recognized by all the members of the group. But at the same time it is also a contested concept since every Burmese boasts of ‘pon’ or authority and aspires for ‘awza’ in a group setting. Furthermore, if one fails to succeed in one’s endeavours he will attribute it to ‘abnadeh’ (Pye and Pye, 1985) which is an innate desire to help the cause of others at the expense of one’s own personal sacrifice. Similarly, in Thai culture the consideration towards others or deference for other’s cause is a virtue called as ‘krenjjie’ (Pye and Pye, 1985). Thai culture explains that ordinary people are vulnerable and therefore must bow before the commands of the superior. Every superior has to manifest kindness towards others which is called ‘metta’

which in return ‘certifies’ the superior with ‘karuna’ which is the ‘constructive’ leadership quality to lead from the front (Pye and Pye, 1985). The legitimacy of the use of power in Vietnamese culture depends upon ‘uy tin’ which means ‘trustworthy authority’ (Pye and Pye, 1985) and there is a moral sense attached to it (Pye and Pye, 1985). Another obligation for leaders in Vietnam is to uphold the practice of ‘phuc duc’ which means that one has to do good deeds so that the future generations will enjoy the fruit (Pye and Pye, 1985).

The Malaysian culture in times of conflict demands complete silence and withdrawal by suppressing the emotions and preventing any hue and cry (Pye and Pye, 1985). This helps us to understand the Malaysian people’s peaceful posture towards Indonesia in the mid-1960s during Suharto’s reign in Indonesia, in spite of ‘konfrontashi’ [armed conflict] with Indonesia during the years of President Sukarno time in office in Indonesia. It was during this same time that ASEAN was founded in 1967. Malaysian cultural norms eschew violent revenge or crying out in pain. Malaysian society is also ‘loosely structured’ (Pye and Pye, 1985). In the eyes of Malaysian people, authority is centred on “deferential accommodation, Islamic norms of fatalistic commitment to uncompromising ideals and British aristocratic standards of fair play but with status barriers” (Pye and Pye, 1985: 256).

ASEAN represents a socially constructed community that has been carefully created by the elites who at the same time remain sensitive to the prevailing cultural norms of the region. ‘Communitarian’ values that stresses people’s obligations rather than their ‘individualistic’ rights forms a central part of “Asian values” (Blondel, 2006). The ideational components of a security community also emphasize one’s obligations and

the respect one owes to their superiors or guardians similar to the traditional Asian family structure. For example, for Thai people the King is the highest source of authority and the monarchy is Thailand's 'cherished' national symbol which is accorded the highest level of 'legitimacy' (Reynolds, 2005). How can the structure of ASEAN's 'nascent' security community overtake a centuries old traditional system of monarchy?

The mutual compatibility of local traditions and foreign ideas has led to the distinctive 'constitutive localization' (Acharya, 2004; Acharya, 2009a) of security community norms. With 'constitutive localization', 'foreign' ideas of regional cooperation or community are not being subsumed en-mass, but rather they are trimmed and tailored by the elites according to the popular prescription and cultural milieu before its adoption at the regional level. The lessons to be learned from the formation of the ASEAN security community is the unique informal role consultation plays for elites in shaping policies that respect the social traditions and cultural milieu of ASEAN societies. The long struggle of these states against colonial rule is their common shared chosen trauma so the elites are particularly mindful of the independence and sovereignty of each state. This explains the absence of intuitionism in ASEAN. ASEAN is also an elite driven project, but it has no wide popular base to carry this project forward.


7.2.3 The Comparative analysis of Security Communities: India-Pakistan, EU and ASEAN

_____ It is important to note that the amalgamation of both material and ideational components is required for the formation of a security community. The presence of a normative structure in the security community provides states with a shared world view. However, the impact of this normative structure differs in all three security communities.

Popular culture in the India-Pakistan security community is of immense significance to both states, even though it might be meaningless in the EU or ASEAN contexts. The hypothetical India-Pakistan security community follows a bottom-up approach (from popular to elite) due to the similarity of socio-cultural factors at the popular level. In contrast to it the EU and ASEAN followed a top-down approach [from elites to popular] in the formation of a security community.

A comparative chart of these variables and their impact on the three security communities summarizes the results as follows:

Material factors	European Union	ASEAN	India/ Pakistan
Shared Interests	No war after 1945, communist threat	Communist threat	Nuclear issue and Kashmir issue
Hegemony	USA security shield	USA withdrawal	USA & USSR rivalry
Ideational factors			
Chosen trauma	World War II	Colonialism	Partition of the subcontinent
Interests	Elites guided project	Elites talk shop	Elites social practices as hostile binaries
Normative variable			
Culture	Judaea-Christian common culture	'ASEAN way' at elites level only	Positive norms of popular practices
			Negative norms at elites' level



In the case of the EU, all the three variables (material, ideational and normative) have a positive impact since the states show shared cultural traits along with a shared interest to avoid the communist threat. Perhaps more interestingly is the role played by the presence of United States hegemony that offered a sort of security umbrella to help achieve the target of the formation of a collective security community. The chosen trauma of World War II was positively used by the elites to further integration in Europe and at the popular level, it also acted as a psychological deterrent in the minds of Europeans not to become an obstacle in the path of the formation of the European Union. The Judaea-Christian culture of the European Union is an implicit normative structure which forms the rules of inclusion and exclusion.

Southeast Asian states also possessed a shared interest in preventing the spread of the communist threat and this helped to facilitate the establishment of the ASEAN security community since there was no large superpower in the region (both are considered positive attributes). The colonial struggle was the common chosen trauma of all ASEAN countries except Thailand (partial positive). ASEAN does not share a common culture at the popular level, but it shows some positive effects at the elite level. The ASEAN way is the normative structure of ASEAN and after tracing its way from the

socio-cultural norms of ASEAN societies it works well at the elite level only (partial positive).

In the case of the India-Pakistan hypothetical security community, both states have shared material interests to resolve the Kashmir issue and their nuclear rivalry (positive attributes), but during the Cold War the superpower rivalry in the region re-aligned India and Pakistan in opposite camps (negative attribute). India sided with the former USSR and Pakistan became the 'allied ally' of the USA. Among both states the partition of the subcontinent is their shared chosen trauma, but this was negatively portrayed by the elites' social practices in the identity discourses of both states (negative attributes). The normative structure of India-Pakistan shows some partial positive trends by way of popular social practices, but they are negative at the level of the elites.

In order to understand the nature of security communities, I invoke here the dichotomous sociological terms first introduced by German sociologist Ferdinand Tonnies. The terms are 'Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft' (Tonnies, 1955). 'Gemeinschaft' and 'Gesellschaft' are both forms of associations between people but on a slightly different scale. In the Gemeinschaft, the 'natural will' forms the underlying core of the association in which people share the same cultural understandings and memory groups together in a community. In the Gesellschaft, the 'rational will' of participating members forges them to make an alliance or association and their primary motives are to achieve individual material interest through collective action. It does not mean that there is no material interests involve in Gemeinschaft, but the trigger for an alliance is primarily based on shared common norms.

The European Union is more rationally organized and consensually formatted where Gesellschaft features are more common in contrast to the ASEAN and the India-Pakistan security communities which possess Gemeinschaft attributes. Although the member states of the European Union have an implicit understanding of their common 'heritage', it is still primarily their rational material interests which drives the engine of the European Union. In contrast to it the highly paternalistic Asian societies are more akin to organize themselves normatively than following an organized economic agenda for the fulfilment of security community objectives. It is perhaps good to end this section by quoting Tonnies who pointed out that "the essential character of such organizations is an existing common natural will or a constituted common rational will, both of which are conceived of as unities" (Tonnies, 1955: 247).

The 'context bounded' security communities are working according to their 'role specific' behaviour. It is impossible to adopt a ready made solution for a security community without explaining the cultural variables of the region. The European Union security community affirms the efficacy of institutional norms and a 'move forward' approach despite its vast cultural diversity. The 'fear psychology' of Europe's past has had a huge impact in gathering support for the cause of the greater union. But how much integration and how long it will go is the question being asked in today's Europe? It seems that there is too much on Europe's integration plate than it can be safely digest. This has taken the EU to the crossroads. On the one hand, there is no doubt that the novel experiment of the EU in the twenty first century has severely dented the rationale of state centric approaches, but the sustainability of such a *magnum opus* is making further policy choices hard to realize. On the other hand, the individual member states in Europe are

increasingly becoming schizophrenic to any new tides of immigration in lieu of further integration. The lofty ideals of multi-culturalism and liberalism are now being questioned daily not only in the public discourse, but on the floors of the parliaments of the member states.

The ASEAN security community is dependant upon the constraining power of norms on its ruling elites. The changing behaviour of states in ASEAN is well accounted for if we seek guidance from cultural factors constructing the societies of Southeast Asia. It is imperative to study these social factors instead of lumping them together as like units. ASEAN is better understood by using the metaphor of the 'two level game' (Schelling, 1980). One game is being played by the elites at the forum of ASEAN while the other is being played by the societal norms which shape the conduct of the elites' at home. If we deconstruct ASEAN at the two levels and see the influence of cultural variables we can understand the presence of a wide gulf between its official claims of intersubjective community norms and the states' actual social practices.

The hypothetical India-Pakistan security community shows viable and visible under currents present at the popular level of the two countries which can provide focal points for the ruling elites. In order to explain the duality between state's social practices and people's mass perceptions, one needs to look at sociological accounts. The problem with both India and Pakistan relates to the 'forces of production' being in the hands of contesting elites who are involved in making 'cultures of insecurity' (Weldes, Laffey et al., 1999).

Every security community is context specific and culturally 'bounded' where its ditto replications around the globe are only a delusion. The making of a security

community is contingent on pre-existing cultural fault lines which define the identity of the region. A common or similar identity is in turn commensurate with the building of a security community. Security communities revolve around a shared sense of belonging to a region. There are common ideational factors or normative structures underlying the collective material interests of the states in a security community. This leads to 'we-ness' among the member states of the security community. The normative structure is based on a cultural core described by Anand as the 'value systems and perceived norms shared by states' delegates at formal and informal meetings which are helpful in creating a sense of regional solidarity, leading to jointly approved decisions" (Anand, 1981: xxiv). It is important to stress in conclusion the immense value of the cultural and the normative aspects of security communities. The more we appreciate their path dependence on normative grounds the better we can identify their respective spheres of influence and understand their motivations and actions.

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