

**The Perils of Power-Sharing Arrangements
in the Transition from Civil War to Peace and Democracy**

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Abstract

Why peace- and democracy-building do not often go together in countries emerging from violent civil conflicts? This paper argues that power-sharing arrangements between government and rebel groups, often imposed by external actors, are one reason. Power sharing is an effective institutional tool for negotiated settlement of civil war, but it is essentially a short-term solution. Power sharing offers security guarantee to civil war adversaries and reduces the credible commitment problems in peace processes. However, it builds wartime cleavages into post-war political structures and provides a powerful incentive for former warring parties to garner political support primarily from their own ethnic or religious groups. The persistence of wartime cleavages in turn inhibits the development of public confidence in newly established governmental institutions. Therefore, power sharing is likely to function as an institutional barrier to the establishment of democratic governance and raise the risk of conflict resumption in the long run. Analyzing post-war political processes and individual survey data, this paper shows such long-term adverse effects of power sharing in Bosnia-Herzegovina. While comparing the Bosnian experience with Mozambique, it seeks to identify the mechanism of how different institutional design leads to distinctive pathways of post-conflict transitions.

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I. Introduction

In 1946-2002, a total of 134 civil wars have begun and ended. Of these, 45 conflicts (33.6%) were resolved through the signing of a peace agreement, 72 cases (53.7%) ended in a decisive military victory either by the government or by rebel groups, and 17 wars (12.7%) stopped fighting through a unilateral call for ceasefire or truce.¹ One thing to note in these statistics is that these civil wars took place in only 75 countries, which means that multiple civil wars occurred in the same countries. In other words, once a country is swept by violent conflict, residual hostilities from a prior war can escalate easily into a new war. This repetitive nature of conflict suggests that it is very difficult to maintain peace after civil war.

Far more difficult is the building of democracy in these conflict-prone societies. Although the international community, especially the United Nations (UN), has substantially expanded its endeavors to promote democracy in post-civil war societies, the record of such international efforts is not particularly rosy: of fourteen “major” UN peacebuilding operations since the end of the Cold War, only five can be regarded as having achieved a minimal level of democracy: El Salvador, Guatemala, Mozambique, Namibia, and Nicaragua (Paris 2004).

Why peace and democracy do not often go together in countries emerging from violent civil conflicts? First of all, civil war damages the socioeconomic requisites and political infrastructure for democracy, generating unique obstacles to establishing a democratic political system, such as widespread corruption, extreme poverty, and the unstable boundaries of political community. Moreover, civil war countries face tensions between peacekeeping and democracy building, because fostering democratic processes, such as holding elections, entails a considerable degree of uncertainties that can undermine political stability (see Jarstad 2008). Thus, democracy is often considered a luxury for post-civil war countries because the creation of stable order is the first priority in the aftermath of violent conflict (Huntington 1968).

Such tensions between peace- and democracy-building are particularly acute when civil wars ended by peace negotiations. Civil wars are much more difficult to resolve by negotiations than international wars, as the issues at stake (e.g., overthrowing or seceding from a central government) are very hard to reconcile. Furthermore, negotiated settlements of civil wars are more vulnerable to the resumption of violence than are one-sided military victories, because warring parties keep their organizational structure and power within the same boundaries of a sovereign state even after the signing of a peace agreement and have less difficulties in renewing a conflict if the transition from war to peace proceeds in favor of one side over the other (Licklider 1995). International actors thus play a critical role in initiating negotiations and maintaining the fragile peace in the aftermath of civil war. They also intend to promote democratic governance with a particular set of institutional arrangements – power sharing. Sharing executive and legislative powers among civil war adversaries is believed to be not only the optimal but also the only feasible solution for establishing a durable peace and democracy in post-conflict societies (Lijphart 2002). This so-called power sharing approach is based on the presumption that security concerns of warring parties can be effectively addressed by ensuring

¹ Using Doyle and Sambanis’s (2006) list of civil wars and Sambanis’s (2004) definition of how civil wars end, I classified all 134 wars into negotiated settlement, military victory, and ceasefire/truce.

their participation in government decision-making, which in turn encourages the cooperative behavior necessary for the promotion of democratic practices.

This paper argues that the power sharing approach is essentially a short-term solution, however. Sharing powers between government and rebels and institutionally guaranteeing their security in the post-conflict transition is an attractive tool to initiate negotiations and make a deal for peace in civil war countries. But they generate long-term adverse effects on post-conflict democratization because of the institutional pathologies of power sharing. The next section specifies the theoretical logic of why I consider power-sharing arrangements as one of the reasons that make all good things not go together in the transition from war to peace and democracy. In the following sections, I will show how the adverse effects of power sharing are played out in the actual context of negotiated settlements by comparing Bosnia-Herzegovina (hereafter BiH) and Mozambique. These two cases are selected to single out the institutional effects of peace agreements. Both BiH's and Mozambique's deadly conflicts were resolved by peace negotiations that were mediated by the UN and powerful international actors. One critical difference is that while a rigid power sharing was arranged in BiH as part of the peace deal, there was no such institutional arrangement in Mozambique. In order to assess how this difference in institutional arrangements affect the post-conflict transitions in the two countries, I first compare the settlement terms of peace agreements and then the processes of three key peacebuilding operations that are necessary for the promotion of democratic governance in war-torn countries: disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR); economic reconstruction; post-conflict elections and reconciliation among ordinary people.

II. The Peace Trap in Negotiated Settlement to Civil War

One of the most difficult parts in the negotiated settlement of civil war is designing new political institutions that can reconcile conflicting interests of government and rebel groups. Thus the creation of post-civil war institutions is often mediated or imposed by external actors. The long-term consequences of such internationally mediated institutional design for post-conflict peace and democracy are likely to be affected by two factors. One is whether the international mediation is solely based on short-term purposes without long-term considerations. The other is whether post-conflict institutions are designed to effectively mitigate wartime cleavages.

Drawing on the debate between the consociational versus the integrative approach (Lijphart 1977; Horowitz 1985), scholarly discussions on the institutional management of post-conflict reconstruction have centered on power-sharing arrangements among civil war adversaries (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003; Horowitz 2002; Linder and Bächtiger 2005; Lijphart 2002; Mukherjee 2006; Norris 2008; Roeder and Rothchild 2005). The international community also considers power-sharing arrangements to be the only realistic institutional option for ending civil war through peace negotiations and for maintaining political stability during post-conflict periods. As Lijphart (2004) identifies, power-sharing arrangements consist of four institutional components: allocating executive seats to former warring parties to promote elite accommodation at the national government; electoral proportionality; regional autonomy; and veto power arrangements.

The underlying logic of the power-sharing approach is that sharing executive and electoral seats as agreed upon by warring parties can reduce the security dilemma between the combatants. Granting significant autonomy to territorially concentrated rebels can also be an effective solution to stopping the fighting immediately. Put differently, the power-sharing approach expects that well-designed political institutions can encourage moderate and cooperative behavior of warring factions by ensuring that they will significantly influence government decision-making in the transition from war to peace. That is, the logic of the power-sharing approach is based on an optimistic hypothesis that good institutions can generate a virtuous circle in post-conflict transitions: power-sharing institutions encourage the cooperation and moderation of warring parties, and this institutionalized cooperation will contribute to political stability and ultimately to the establishment of democratic governance.

However, power sharing is essentially a short-term solution to end civil war as quickly as possible and likely to produce long-term adverse effects on post-civil war democratization. Power sharing is an effective institutional option for resolving civil conflicts through peace negotiations, as it institutionally guarantees the security of warring groups (Walter 2002). But its long-term effects may not be desirable for the establishment of durable democracy. Arguably, this temporal inconsistency can be attributed to a trade-off between short-term peacemaking and long-term democracy building in civil war countries. The short-term interest in making peace by signing a peace agreement and the long-term goal of democracy promotion do not always coincide, but in fact often conflict, depending upon the time horizons held by key political actors involved in the transition away from civil war.

This short-term versus long-term trade-off arises particularly when civil war adversaries reach a mutually destructive stalemate. Power sharing is often proposed by international mediators to resolve the military stalemate. By balancing the distribution of political powers among warring parties, it provides them with a strong security guarantee during the transition from war to peace. This institutionally guaranteed security serves as a powerful incentive for civil war adversaries to initiate negotiations and sign a bargain for peace. However, the power-sharing approach often makes post-civil war countries find themselves to be caught in the peace trap. While power sharing is effective for making peace by negotiations, it builds wartime cleavages into post-war political structures. It also provides an incentive structure under which former warring parties perpetuate those wartime cleavages into post-conflict politics to enjoy the status quo of the initial institutional set-up. This persistence of wartime cleavages leads to frequent deadlocks in governmental institutions and hinders the development of state capacity necessary for democracy building in post-conflict societies. War-induced cleavages are also likely to be deeply entrenched in post-war electoral politics, as power-sharing institutions provide a powerful incentive for former warring parties to garner political support primarily from their own constituencies. Such institutionalized wartime cleavages in turn help maintain ordinary citizens' support for former warring parties and lower their confidence in central governmental institutions. That is, power-sharing arrangements are more likely to generate a vicious circle than a virtuous one, thereby delaying the establishment of democratic governance and raising the risk of conflict resumption in the long run.

In short, a fundamental problem of power sharing is its institutional rigidity. Once power sharing is agreed upon, it is hard to change the initial institutional set-up. This is because power sharing

is essentially an elite-level pact assuming a strong and coherent leadership in each warring party and does not take into account potential within-group elite divisions during post-conflict transition periods. If dissatisfied factions within former warring parties threaten to derail the entire peace process, power-sharing institutions are likely to function as a barrier because they are designed not to adapt to such newly emerging grievances. The end result is thus often either the collapse of power sharing itself and the return to conflict, as seen in Cyprus and Lebanon, or the persistence of ineffective and weak governmental institutions, as we will see in the Bosnia case below. It is thus paradoxical that while power sharing has been proposed as the most effective institutional tool to resolve a military stalemate of long-standing civil conflict, it tends to transform the military stalemate into a political stalemate that can raise the risks of conflict resumption by reducing the prospects for building democratic governance in the long run.

III. Institutional Design in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Mozambique

To empirically examine how the adverse effects of power sharing are played out in the negotiated settlement of civil war, this paper compares post-conflict political processes in BiH and Mozambique. BiH is an exemplar case where a rigid power sharing has been imposed by strong external actors to end the bloodshed, while Mozambique is a case where a power-concentrating system has been institutionalized since the end of a 16-year long conflict.

[Table 1 about here]

Table 1 compare BiH and Mozambique along some key factors commonly employed in the general literature on democratization (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Boix and Stokes 2004; Epstein et al. 2006; Przeworski et al. 2000). When the civil war ended, both countries faced triple transitions – from war to peace, from socialist to market economy, and from collapsed state to functioning democracy – and the international community has been deeply involved in their multiple transitions. But BiH appears to have been under more favorable conditions for the transition to democracy than Mozambique, given the expected associations between each factor and the likelihood of democratization. In particular, BiH shows higher levels of economic development and growth rates in the first five years after the war, shorter duration of conflict, and fewer casualties, all of which are expected to increase the chance for democracy building. However, while Mozambique is widely regarded as one of the most successful cases of post-civil war peacebuilding and democratization, BiH is still considered a non-democracy or even a non-independent polity with still fragile peace.²

Why do BiH and Mozambique show the divergent and counter-intuitive paths toward democracy? One might argue that Mozambique is an easy case, compared to Bosnia, because peace and democracy are generally more difficult to be established after ethnic civil wars. But the “non-ethnic” nature of the Mozambican civil war should not be simply understood as a beneficial factor for the country’s transition from war to peace and democracy, vis-à-vis the ethnic origin of the Bosnian civil war. In Mozambique, the most salient cleavage throughout the

² Polity IV Democracy-Autocracy Index codes BiH as a non-independent polity as of 2008 because the Office of High Representative, which was created by the international community as part of the Dayton Peace Agreement, has *de facto* power to rule the country, including banning political parties and dismissing elected representatives.

war and post-war period has been a regional one – south versus center and north (Manning 2002b; Weinstein 2007), but the 16-year long civil war actually created multiple cleavages: the Mozambican National Resistance (Renamo) was often identified as an ethnic Ndaou project against the Mozambican Liberation Front (Frelimo) government dominated by Shangaan; the conflict was also understood as an armed struggle between the “haves” versus “have-nots,” or between the centralized socialist state versus traditional local authorities (Alden 1995; West and Kloeck-Jenson 1999). In Bosnia, ethnicity was the most salient wartime cleavage, but it has also overlapped with other cleavages as well, such as religion and urban-rural heritage (Pickering 2006). Thus, the mere dichotomy of ethnic versus non-ethnic civil war is not appropriate to understanding how war-induced cleavages have been managed in post-conflict transitions. I argue, instead, that the divergent paths are a result of different institutional arrangements during peace negotiations. The paired comparison of post-civil war transitions in BiH and Mozambique will illuminate how a short-term oriented institutional design at the peace negotiation table produces long-term adverse effects on post-civil war democratization.

III-1. The Dayton Peace Agreement

The Dayton Accords, formally known as the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, followed a series of failed international interventions immediately after the Bosnian civil war broke out.³ The first international mediation, led by the European Community (EC) and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) between March and August 1992, failed to stop the fighting. Subsequent efforts were undertaken by the UN, the European Union (EU), the U.S., Russia, and the Contact Group, with principal mediators including Cyrus Vance, Lord Owen, Thorvald Stoltenberg, and Charles Redman. These international interventions prior to the Dayton Accords largely failed, but the U.S. mediation by Charles Redman generated a partial peace agreement between Bosnian Croats and Muslims (see Atiyas 1995). Without including Bosnian Serbs, the two warring parties agreed in March 1994 to form a federal government. This agreement became the constitutional framework of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter FBiH), which was later established as one of the two entities in BiH.

The Dayton Peace Agreement, which was initialed in November and signed in Paris in December 1995, included a much broader set of military and constitutional issues than had previous (failed) agreements. It consists of eleven Annexes.⁴ In particular, Annex 1 specifies three phases of redeployment for armed forces along the inter-entity boundary and allows for the deployment of a 60,000-strong NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) acting under Chapter

³ For the causes of the Bosnian civil war and its violence during the conflict, see Gagnon (2004), Goldstein and Pevehouse (1997), Kalyvas and Sambanis (2005), and Woodward (1995).

⁴ Annex 1 focuses on the military aspects of the peace settlement and regional stabilization, Annex 2 on the inter-entity boundary line, Annex 3 on elections, Annex 4 on constitutions, Annex 5 on arbitration mechanisms, Annex 6 on human rights issues, Annex 7 on refugee and internally displaced persons (IDPs) issues, Annex 8 on the formation of commissions to preserve national monuments, Annex 9 on the establishment of public corporations, Annex 10 on civilian implementation of the peace settlement, including the appointment and role of a High Representative (HR), and Annex 11 on the establishment of an international police task force. The full text of the peace agreement is available at http://www.usip.org/library/pa/bosnia/dayton_gfa.html.

VII of the UN Charter.⁵ Annexes 2, 3, and 4 provide the structure of executive, electoral, and territorial power-sharing, with constitutionally guaranteed veto rights. Put specifically, the three Annexes divide BiH into two entities: the FBiH, with 51 percent of the territory (10 cantons); and the Republika Srpska (hereafter RS), with 49 percent.⁶ BiH's central state institutions include the following:

- A three-member rotating presidency directly elected in each entity from the three constituent peoples (Bosniaks, Bosnian Croats, and Bosnian Serbs) for a two-year term in the first elections;
- The House of Peoples, which comprises fifteen delegates selected by the upper house of the FBiH and by the National Assembly of the RS, with two-thirds from the FBiH (5 Bosniaks and 5 Croats) and one-third from the RS;
- The House of Representatives, which comprises 42 members elected by proportional representation, with two-thirds elected from the FBiH and one-third from the RS; and
- The Council of Ministers, nominated by the Chair of the Council of Ministers⁷ and approved by the House of Representatives, with no more than two-thirds appointed from the FBiH and Deputy Ministers appointed from a different ethnic group from the Ministers⁷.

This comprehensive set of executive, electoral, and territorial power-sharing arrangements is supplemented by veto power vested in the collective presidency and the parliamentary assembly: any policy decision can be declared destructive to a "vital interest" of the Bosniak, Croat, or Serb people by a member of the presidency or by a majority of delegates representing each ethnic group in the House of Peoples.⁸ These provisions show that BiH's ethnic power-sharing system is a textbook example of rigid institutional design. Furthermore, Article X in Annex 4 stipulates that the Dayton Constitution may be amended by a two-thirds majority of votes in the House of Representatives. But given the ethnic power-sharing arrangements in the lower house, it is not possible for a single ethnic group to win the super-majority needed to amend the constitution.

This rigid system is further complicated by the establishment of equally elaborate power-sharing institutions at the entity and even at the municipal level.⁹ The two entities have their own constitutions, parliaments, and presidencies. Although the FBiH constitution was not a direct creation of the Dayton Accords, it follows the same ethnic power-sharing model: 1) a joint presidency, with a Bosniak and a Bosnian Croat as President and Vice-President; 2) the House of the Peoples, which comprises 30 Bosniaks, 30 Bosnian Croats, and up to 14 Others, selected by the Cantonal Assemblies; 3) and the Federation House of Representatives, composed of 140

⁵ After the completion of its one-year mandate, IFOR was replaced by a 32,000-strong Stabilization Force (SFOR) in December 1996. SFOR maintained 12,000 troops until December 2005 and was replaced by a 7,000-strong European Union Force (EUFOR). Currently, the total number of the EUFOR troops is around 2,000 (see <http://www.euforbih.org>).

⁶ In terms of ethnic composition, three cantons are dominated by the Bosnian Croats, five by Bosniaks, and two contested.

⁷ The Chair is nominated by the president.

⁸ Another form of executive power sharing provided for in Annex 4 is to appoint ambassadors and other international representatives of BiH by the same ethnic quota: no more than two-thirds from the FBiH.

⁹ For a good comparison of power-sharing arrangements at the municipal level, see Bieber (2005a).

elected members based on proportional representation. The RS also elects its own president and vice-president as well as the 83 members that constitute the RS National Assembly.

One immediate problem was how to define the relationship between the central government and the two entities. Article III in Annex 4 briefly assigns the central government of BiH responsibility for foreign policy, foreign trade policy, customs policy, monetary policy, finances of the central government institutions, immigration and refugee policy and regulations, international criminal law enforcement, establishment and operation of international communication facilities, regulation of inter-entity transportation, and air traffic control. But the entities are responsible for all the other governmental functions, including powers not explicitly assigned to the central government, such as policy execution and revenue collection. As this constitutional allocation of powers is heavily weighted toward the entities, they hold far more significant decision-making authority and almost complete autonomy in implementing policies.

Given that the boundary between the two entities is based on the ethnic division that had been in effect exaggerated through the population displacement during the civil war, the Dayton Agreement was explicitly designed to lock the most salient wartime cleavage into BiH's political and legal structures. It is therefore full of paradoxes. First, the Dayton Constitution proclaims the goal of integrating all people into a unified BiH, but it bases such integration precisely on what divides BiH – ethnicity (Mansfield 2003). As a result, the central government institutions have remained dysfunctional and further reinforced ethnic divisions during the post-conflict transition period, with few mechanisms in place to promote territorial integrity and unified sovereignty. Second, while successful post-war reconstruction and peacebuilding require a certain degree of state capacity, the state institutions arranged by the Dayton Accords appear to be designed for deadlock in the central government and parliament. It is thus a natural result that the central government institutions have not been properly functioning (see Hayden 1999). Third, although the former Yugoslavian system had already shown the institutional pathologies of ethnic federalism, the Dayton Constitution recreated most of those “subversive institutions” (Bunce 1999; Deets 2006).

Why did peace negotiations forge such a paradoxical ethnic power-sharing system in BiH? The answer, arguably, lies in the time horizons held by international mediators during those negotiations. The Dayton Agreement was essentially imposed by the international community in general, and the United States in particular. The architect of the peace initiative, Richard Holbrooke, tactically used several imposed deadlines and the threat of NATO bombing to put substantial pressure on neighboring Croatia and Serbia as well as on the warring parties in BiH. Since his evident objective was to stop the bloodshed as quickly as possible, Holbrooke followed a strictly deal-oriented strategy, rather than a process-oriented one, with little concern for its long-term implications (Curran et al. 2004). That is, the United States' first priority was an immediate peace settlement; the actual terms were of secondary importance (Watkins and Roegrant 1999). In this respect, a legal scholar appropriately assessed that the warring parties of the Bosnian civil war were largely bludgeoned and partly bribed into putting their signatures to the Dayton Accords without playing any significant role in developing the settlement terms (Szasz 1997). Furthermore, Franjo Tudjman, President of Croatia, and Slobodan Milosevic, President of Serbia, signed the agreement on behalf of the Bosnian Croats and Serbs, respectively. The wartime leaders of the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) and the Croatian

Democratic Union in BiH (HDZ), Radovan Karadzic and Mate Bodan, were not signatories at Dayton. This led to a consistent lack of commitment of the former warring parties to implementing the settlement terms during the post-conflict transition period.

In short, the primary goal of the Dayton Agreement was to end the war immediately. Yet it institutionalized the most salient wartime cleavage in the tri-ethnic collective presidency, ethnic-based federalism, mutual veto systems, and ethnic quotas in the parliament and bureaucracy. It thus provided a strong incentive for the former warring parties to remain at the ethnic status quo, and a strong disincentive for cross-ethnic cooperation. This incentive structure has encouraged ethnonationalist elites to manipulate the institutions and prevent the development of multi-ethnic governance. Trapped in the ineffective and non-productive workings of governmental institutions, international actors, who were already heavily involved in every post-conflict transition activity in BiH,¹⁰ have become much more powerful than they originally intended (see Chandler 2000).¹¹

III-2. The Rome Peace Agreement

Ending Mozambique's civil war, the General Peace Agreement was signed in Rome on October 4, 1992. It was an accumulated outcome of peace negotiations between Frelimo and Renamo for more than two years. After the first round of face-to-face negotiations in Rome in July 1990, a total of twelve rounds of peace talks were consistently and astutely mediated by the Italian government, the Santo Egidio (a Vatican-linked Catholic charity organization), and the Archbishop of Beira.¹²

The Rome Agreement consists of seven Protocols and four short Annexes.¹³ In particular, Protocols II, III, and IV are the core (and longest) part of the agreement and specify criteria for the formation of political parties, principles of national elections, and demobilization of combatants in the early post-conflict transition period. The overall rationale of these three protocols was to set up a framework in which Renamo could transform itself from a guerilla group to a legitimate political party competing in a multiparty democracy, without calling into question the country's territorial integrity and national unity. It should be noted that the Rome peace agreement, unlike the Dayton Accords, did not arrange for any power-sharing institutions but simply provided for an electoral system based on the principle of proportional representation for election to the National Assembly.¹⁴

¹⁰ Each Annex of the Dayton Accords specifies which international organizations shall guide and monitor the implementation of settlement terms. NATO is primarily responsible for all military aspects of the agreement; the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) for elections, regional stabilization, and human rights issues; the UN for the international police task force and civilian implementation of the agreement, including the creation and operation of the Office of High Representative (OHR); the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for the BiH Central Bank; and the European Court of Human Rights for the Constitutional Court and refugee issues.

¹¹ Even after the "Bonn Powers" allowed the HR to impose legislation and remove elected officials in December 1997, some Balkan observers contend that giving more powers and authorities to the OHR is the only realistic option to make BiH a functioning multiethnic democracy (Daalder and Froman 1999; Lyon 2000).

¹² For a detailed account of peace negotiations, see Hume (1994).

¹³ The full text of the peace agreement is available at www.usip.org/library/pa/mozambique/pa_mozambique.html.

¹⁴ The president is elected by a majority of votes cast under a run-off system.

Instead, Frelimo and Renamo agreed to create politically balanced commissions in which both warring parties and the international community would be fairly represented and decisions based on discussion and consensus. Thus, the UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) and major donor countries (the U.S., UK, Italy, Portugal, and France) were closely involved in creating and running those commissions during the transition period. Put specifically, Annex IV of the Rome Agreement lays out the composition of four transitional commissions:

- The Supervision and Control Commission is responsible for overall implementation of the settlement terms and consists of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General (UNSRSG) as the head of ONUMOZ (chair), the Organization of African Union (OAU), and major donors, in addition to Frelimo and Renamo.
- The Ceasefire Commission monitors ceasefire, disarmament, and demobilization and comprises the UNSRSG (chair), donor countries,¹⁵ Frelimo, and Renamo.
- The Reintegration Commission plans and oversees social integration of demobilized combatants and is composed of UNSRSG (chair), donor countries,¹⁶ and the two warring parties.
- The Joint Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican Defense Forces oversees the creation of 30,000 unified armed forces and consists of Frelimo, Renamo, and major donors.

Overall, the Rome Accords gave international actors in Mozambique far less power and authority in the country's peacebuilding process, compared to those in BiH. How, then, could Frelimo and Renamo agree to end the fighting and hold a democratic election without any institutional guarantee through power sharing at the executive, electoral, or territorial levels? The answer can be found in both internal and external conditions. The first round of peace talks began when both the Frelimo government and Renamo rebels came to recognize that neither party could win the war by military means. By 1986, Frelimo had lost control outside of Maputo and the provincial capitals to Renamo, but it launched a successful military campaign in 1988-89. A military stalemate continued until the final peace agreement was reached in 1992.

Frelimo's biggest concern, aside from the war with Renamo, was that Mozambique had suffered severe economic recession since the early 1980s. Hence, the Frelimo government abandoned its socialist economy and began to pursue market reforms under the IMF Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP) after 1987. It also gave up the notion of being a Leninist vanguard party and adopted a multiparty democratic constitution in November 1990, just four months after the peace negotiations started.

These fundamental political and economic reforms led by Frelimo actually preempted Renamo's central political demands. Denounced as an ethnic Ndaou project or as a bloody puppet backed by Rhodesia and South Africa, Renamo had sought to gain political legitimacy by calling for a market economy and multiparty democracy since 1981, when it adopted its first official manifesto. Therefore, Renamo found itself in an impasse during the peace talks, unable to win the war decisively and at the same time fearing competition with Frelimo at the ballot box

¹⁵ They include the U.S., UK, Italy, Portugal, France, Botswana, Nigeria, and Egypt.

¹⁶ In addition to the major donors, they further include the European Community, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Netherlands, Germany, Switzerland, Spain, and South Africa.

without a clear political economic alternative to the ongoing Frelimo-led reforms (see Alden and Simpson 1993).

External conditions were also not so favorable to Renamo. Frelimo began to pursue a peace with the Renamo's main supporter, South Africa, and reached a bilateral agreement, the 1984 Nkomati Accord, in which the Frelimo government and the Apartheid regime agreed to end the political and military support being provided to each other's insurgencies. Frelimo's relationship with the United States also improved as it sought to conduct fundamental political and economic reforms.¹⁷ Yet, this does not mean that Frelimo enjoyed much more favorable external conditions than Renamo. The Soviet Union was never willing to commit as strongly to Frelimo as it did to Angola's socialist regime. Despite the Nkomati Accord, South Africa continued to provide Renamo with military assistance. However, South Africa's relationship to Mozambique was not equivalent to Serbia's or Croatia's relationship to Bosnia. The absence of ethnic allies in neighboring countries and Mozambique's relatively weak strategic importance to the two superpowers were beneficial for both Frelimo and Renamo to reach a peace agreement without heavy intervention by powerful external actors, as seen in BiH.

These external conditions in turn gave sufficient room for Frelimo to decline Renamo's call for power sharing. Yet, it is worth noting that the international community attempted to impose power sharing in Mozambique during the peace talks. U.S. Under-Secretary of State for African Affairs George Moose and UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali put pressure on Frelimo to create power-sharing institutions, and Western donor countries were also committed to democratic decentralization and empowerment of traditional authorities, congruent to Renamo's demands for power transfers to its regional strongholds (Alden 1995; West and Kloeck-Jensen 1998). But Frelimo was firm in rejecting the idea of power sharing, instead seeking more informal ways of building consensus with Renamo. In this context, Frelimo benefited from the failed peacebuilding process in Angola in October 1992 – the same month the Rome Peace Agreement was signed.¹⁸ Due to the lessons learned through that experience, international mediators focused not on imposing power sharing, but on designing a thorough demobilization programme.

Instead of imposing power sharing, the international community created one crucial incentive structure: in order to receive substantial support for economic reconstruction and market reforms, Frelimo had to preserve the perception that Mozambique had established a durable democratic peace. Frelimo therefore had reason to engage Renamo in informal negotiations and make concessions to Renamo during the peace negotiation and post-conflict transition period (see Manning 2002a). The Rome Peace Agreement, in short, created an incentive structure different from that of Dayton. The most salient wartime cleavage in Mozambique – region – was not built into post-conflict institutions. Instead, the Rome Agreement allowed room for informal

¹⁷ Samora Machel, President of Mozambique, officially visited the U.S. for the first time in September 1985. Before his visit, Mozambique had joined the World Bank and the IMF in 1984. In response, the U.S. lifted the Congressional ban on development aid to Mozambique in mid-1984, and Mozambique received about \$34 million in economic and food aid from the U.S in 1985 alone (*Keesing's Contemporary Archives* 32, 34804).

¹⁸ Angola held its first multiparty democratic elections under a new constitution in September 1992, one year after the Bicesse peace agreement was signed in 1991. But the elections took place prior to completely demobilizing the government and rebel soldiers. As a result the rebel group, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), returned to the armed conflict because it was not satisfied with the election results.

compromise between the warring parties during the process of political transition from war to peace and democracy, without setting up a rigid institutional barrier to further negotiations.

IV. Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR)

In BiH and Mozambique, the military aspects of implementing the peace agreements have been largely successful, in that neither country has returned to conflict. Such implementation normally involves a DDR process, which consists of interrelated short- and long-term projects. For the DDR process to be effective, it is widely recognized that the international community should take an integrated, holistic approach, rather than considering each element in DDR separately.¹⁹ The DDR process is also important for post-civil war democratization as it is intended to create nationally unified armed forces controlled by a democratic government. Thus, comparing the process and outcome of DDR between BiH and Mozambique would help us to discern whether the two countries' divergent paths toward democracy are related to the DDR process.

At first glance, it is surprising that the Dayton Accords did not address the DDR process in detail. There were two reasons for this omission. First, the Dayton mediators feared that the sensitive security issues surrounding DDR would have made the peace deal even more difficult (King 2001, 8). Second, the NATO-led IFOR lacked experience beyond traditional interstate security issues, since it was the first time that NATO had been involved in peacebuilding operations after intrastate conflicts. IFOR thus focused largely on immediate military issues: the boundary demarcation between the FBiH and the RS, and the separation of each ethnic group's armed forces along that boundary. Put differently, the institutionalized knowledge of UN missions for DDR in various post-civil war countries, such as Angola and Cambodia, was not duplicated in the Dayton Accords. As a result, DDR in BiH has been based on an ad hoc process.

Nonetheless, the DDR process in BiH has made varying degrees of progress. IFOR, and subsequently the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR), were very successful in terms of heavy weapons disarmament; but light weapons and small arms were not accorded the same attention.²⁰ The demobilization of former combatants has been undertaken gradually, led by the World Bank and the International Organization for Migration (IOM). Although it is difficult to assess the exact number of demobilized combatants due to the mix of military and paramilitary forces, some sources report that approximately 380,000 of over 400,000 ex-soldiers have been demobilized since Dayton (Heinemann-Grüder et al. 2003; Pietz 2004).²¹ Yet, the reintegration of demobilized combatants into civilian life has been slow. By its nature, reintegration in post-conflict societies is a long-term process and inevitably related to socioeconomic development. While early progress through the World Bank's Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (EDRP) looked positive, with \$7.5 million spent between 1996 and 1999, external

¹⁹ The UN defines *disarmament* as the collection and disposal of small arms and light and heavy weapons of combatants, *demobilization* as the process by which armed forces of both government and rebels either downsize or completely disband, and *reintegration* as assistance measures provided to former combatants that would increase the potential for their economic and social reintegration into civilian life (UN DDR Guideline 1999).

²⁰ Since the end of the conflict, a large number of small arms have been available in BiH, some of them smuggled to Kosovo and even Iraq (Pietz 2004, 27).

²¹ By 2003, the FBiH armed forces were reduced to 13,200 soldiers (9,200 Bosniaks and 4,000 Croats) and the RS forces to 6,600 (Heinemann-Grüder et al. 2003, 8).

financial support for DDR has decreased since then. Furthermore Bosnia's unstable economy – especially high unemployment rates (about 42 percent in 2003) – has posed the major obstacle to the reintegration of demobilized soldiers into ordinary economic life.²²

The DDR process in Mozambique has also shown mixed results. Unlike the Dayton Accords, the Rome Peace Agreement provided for a detailed DDR process. Drawing lessons from the flawed peacebuilding process in Angola, the international community consistently emphasized that demobilization should be completed before the first post-conflict elections. In this vein, ONUMOZ estimated 63,000 Frelimo and 20,000 Renamo soldiers would be demobilized and planned to reintegrate both government and rebel soldiers into a 30,000-member new Mozambican Defense Force, as stipulated in the Rome Accords.²³ Since 6,000 UN peacekeepers were deployed in August 1993, the demobilization of Frelimo and Renamo combatants appeared to have been completed by August 1994 – two months before the first elections. The international community also embarked on one of the most comprehensive reintegration programs ever attempted in the context of UN PKO, which involved four different approaches and mobilized \$95 million from donor countries. In particular, one of the four approaches, the Provincial Fund, was initiated when ONUMOZ declared its mission complete and withdrew in November 1994. This program designed explicit plans for demobilized soldiers to start small-and-medium sized businesses in their home provinces. Within three years after its initiation, the Provincial Fund was considered a resounding success (see Alden 2002). Yet the Rome Agreement was not without its flaws. Its relative neglect of disarmament delayed the verification of arms and ammunition until August 1994 and made little progress thereafter due to the program's short time frame and poor funding.²⁴ This flawed disarmament has generated continuous problems of weapons smuggling to South Africa, nurturing criminal networks of ex-soldiers within Mozambique.

In sum, the DDR process in BiH and Mozambique largely hinged on the degree of commitment by the international community (for example, the level of funding) in the early period of peacebuilding operations. Further DDR at a later phase of post-conflict transition has been more closely associated with the extent to which the two post-civil war countries are able to rebuild their economies.

V. Post-Civil War Economic Reconstruction

BiH and Mozambique shared a similar structure of economic reconstruction after the end of war. First, both countries' economic recoveries have been driven by international aid. Since Dayton, the international community has provided some \$9 billion to rebuild BiH (McMahon 2004/05,

²² The UNDP Human Development Report of BiH (2002, 38) estimates that one-third of the unemployed are demobilized soldiers.

²³ Ironically, ONUMOZ found it difficult to constitute the 30,000 new armed forces because the retirement packages to demobilized soldiers (e.g., 18 months of subsidies in cash) were more attractive than the salaries for soldiers in the new army (Alden 1995, 119-20).

²⁴ For instance, ONUMOZ requested \$52.4 million in 1993 to implement a more comprehensive disarmament program, but it was rejected by the UN Headquarters in New York (Vines 1998, 194).

571).²⁵ Mozambique was the largest aid recipient in sub-Saharan Africa, receiving \$1.1 billion per year in 1990-94 (Kulipossa 2006, 43). Second, as a result, the two countries have become heavily donor dependent: international aid accounts for 30 percent of official GDP in BiH and more than 50 percent of government spending in Mozambique (Lyon 2000, 111; Kulipossa 2006, 40). Yet, this substantial amount of foreign aid to both countries has not resulted in significant reduction of poverty and unemployment. BiH's unemployment rate is about 40 percent of the total workforce,²⁶ and one in five Bosnian people lived below the poverty line as of 2002 (World Development Indicators 2004; *Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) Country Profile* 2003). The poverty rates in Mozambique are even worse: 54 percent of the total population was living in absolute poverty as of 2003 (IMF 2005 Country Report).²⁷

[Tables 2 and 3 about here]

Tables 2 and 3 compare some socioeconomic indicators available for pre-war and post-war BiH and Mozambique. BiH's estimated population in 2005, ten years after the war, was still below the pre-war level, in part because a large number of refugees had not returned: the total number of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) during the war was estimated to be 1.5 million and 1 million, respectively, but about half returned by 2004 (Robinson and Pobric 2006, 237). BiH's fertility rate is also fairly low: 1.26 children per woman. In contrast, it took only one and a half years in Mozambique for half of the refugees and IDPs (total 3.5 million) to return to their pre-war homes (Alden 1995, 109), and Mozambique's current fertility rate is 5.13.

Yet, one can see in Tables 2 and 3 that post-war economic development in the two countries shows a somewhat different picture. BiH demonstrates higher per capita income than Mozambique throughout the entire post-conflict transition period.²⁸ It also shows much faster economic recovery. During the first five years after civil war, the Bosnian economy grew at an annual average rate of 22.3 percent, whereas Mozambique's economy shrank at -0.4 percent annually.²⁹ In addition to fluctuating economic growth, Mozambique suffered hyperinflation until four years after the conflict. Foreign aid statistics as a share of Gross National Income (GNI) show a similar pattern in both countries: peak levels of international aid during the initial phase of post-war transitions have rapidly decreased thereafter.³⁰ The potentially powerful

²⁵ Belloni (2001, 165) points out that about three-quarters of this international aid to BiH has actually been spent to maintain the NATO-led SFOR.

²⁶ BiH's unemployment rate cannot be accurately estimated because there is no post-war census data and its grey economy substantially absorbs "officially" unemployed people. Taking into account such distorting factors, some conservative estimates for BiH's unemployment rates range from 22.2 percent to 28.1 percent (UNDP HDR 2002). Yet these low estimates do not consider a large number of people on the "waiting list" who are "officially" employed but do not have a job in reality.

²⁷ The only available unemployment statistics for post-war Mozambique indicates that 21 percent of the total work force was unemployed in 1997 (*CIA World Factbook* 2007).

²⁸ But note that BiH is one of the poorest countries in Eastern Europe: its GDP per capita is 19 percent lower than the average of all the other countries in the region and 21 percent below the world average (UNDP HDR 2002, 3).

²⁹ This early pattern has been reversed in the next five years of post-conflict transitions. While Mozambique became one of the fastest growing economies in sub-Saharan Africa, BiH's economy actually shrank since 2000: Mozambique's average growth rate from t_6 to t_{10} is 6.5 percent, but BiH's is -3.0 percent.

³⁰ One crucial reason for decreasing foreign aid was the outbreak of conflict in neighboring countries. For instance, the Kosovo war directly affected decreases in funding for the World Bank's reconstruction programmes in BiH, and both the EU and the U.S. cut expenditures to Bosnia by 50 percent in 2000 (Lyon 2000, 111).

negative effects of decreasing foreign aid seem to have been partially attenuated by Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), which has increased since the aid began to drop substantially. FDI inflows have increased in both BiH and Mozambique and now constitute a significant proportion of the two countries' economies (5.24 percent of total GDP in BiH and 11.28 percent in Mozambique in 2002). However, little FDI has been made in manufacturing or labor intensive export-oriented industries, thus contributing little to the reduction of high unemployment rates in both countries (World Bank 2003).

This unsettled process of economic reconstruction is related to the shadow of civil war in the two countries. In BiH, the widespread corruption, defective tax system, and clandestine illegal economy around former warring parties have disrupted the post-war economic recovery (Andreas 2004; Pugh 2002, 2005).³¹ These factors threaten the Mozambican economy as well. In addition, low levels of education and a less-skilled work force play an obstructive role in Mozambique's economic recovery from the 16-year conflict.³²

On balance, BiH would have been a more likely place for successful post-conflict democratization than Mozambique, as the modernization theory has long claimed that economic development is the most important prerequisite for democratic transition (Boix and Stokes 2004; Epstein et al. 2006; Lipset 1959). This inconsistency between the general understanding of democratization and the two countries' divergent paths can be understood by looking at the overriding role of post-conflict political institutions. The following section examines how BiH's and Mozambique's different institutional arrangements have contributed to, or impeded, the moderation of the most salient wartime cleavage in post-war electoral politics.

VI. Post-Civil War Electoral Politics

VI-1. Ethnic entrenchment in Bosnian electoral politics

The first post-conflict elections took place in BiH in September 1996, just nine months after the Dayton Agreement was signed, as stipulated in Annex 3. The reason for this short time frame was that NATO-led IFOR was supposed to withdraw from BiH in one year (Shoup 1997). Given that hostilities among the three ethnic groups had been exacerbated through the violent conflict and wartime ethnic cleansing divided the country into ethnically homogeneous entities and cantons, it was not surprising that the results of the first elections looked like those of an ethnic census. As Table 4 shows, three main ethnic parties who were civil war adversaries – the Social Democratic Action (SDA), Croatian Democratic Union in BiH (HDZ), and Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) – took the three-member collective presidency with great ease, as well as 86 percent of seats in the House of Representatives (36 of 42 total seats). As the rushed elections allowed little time for multiethnic opposition groups to organize, the electoral performance of the center-left multiethnic coalition, the Joint List for BiH (ZL), was indeed discouraging: it gained only

³¹ In 2002, a joint investigation by BiH and international agencies estimated that the total loss of revenue from customs duties and sales tax is about \$30 million per year, with \$4.5 million going to criminal organizations in the RS (Festic and Rausche 2004, 30).

³² For instance, about half of Mozambique's population is illiterate, whereas the literacy rate in BiH is 97 percent (World Development Indicators 2004).

two seats in the lower house elections. The more serious opposition parties, although they performed poorly as well, were also ethnic-based parties to a lesser extent.³³

[Table 4 about here]

The results of early elections had profound political implications for the subsequent process of democracy promotion. They gave political legitimacy to those who led BiH into the war, and who shared little more than a common interest in sustaining and strengthening ethnic divisions. Ethnonationalist elites were able to avail themselves of the institutional tools created by the Dayton Constitution. The three main ethnic parties intentionally paralyzed the functioning of central state institutions and prevented any policy decision or legislation potentially harmful to their ethnic interests. For instance, BiH's Parliamentary Assembly met just once and passed no legislation for six months after the first elections, and the Council of Ministers was constituted of only three ministers but without staff, funding, or even office space (US GAO 1997, 7).³⁴ In short, the first election results brought into full realization every pitfall that could have been expected from the rigid power-sharing arrangements (see Bieber 2005b, 2005c; Deets 2006; Hayden 2005; McMahan 2004/05; Shoup 1997; Woodward 1999).

The first elections also served as a wake-up call for the international community. Alarmed by the strengthened political positions of the ethnic parties, the international community sought to ameliorate dysfunctional governmental institutions by reducing the ethnic parties' powers. Therefore, at the Bonn Peace Implementation Council summit in December 1997, the already powerful authority of the Office of High Representative (OHR) was further empowered to dismiss elected representatives who obstruct the implementation of the Dayton Agreement, to keep radical ethnic parties from participating in elections, and to impose some reform policies and legislation directly. For example, the OHR removed or suspended 115 elected and appointed officials from public office from 1997 to 2004 and banned the Serbian Radical Party of the RS (SRS) in the 2000 general elections (Manning 2004b, 61).

This does not necessarily mean that after the first elections the international community came to show a higher level, long-term commitment to Bosnia's transition to democracy. To the contrary, deeper involvement of international actors in Bosnian politics has hindered the development of the institutional capacity of the central government. Put specifically, the OHR has a staff of over 700 and an annual budget of more than \$20 million as of 2003 (McMahan 2004/5, 587), and the EU has been spending \$25 million since 1998 on the external management of BiH government institutional capacity, including \$3 million for strengthening the presidency, the Council of Ministers, and the Parliamentary Assembly (Chandler 2001, 118). Yet the money has largely been spent on high salaries for foreign officials, who vainly try to substitute for the work of domestic institutions.³⁵

³³ The Party for BiH (SBIH) seceded from the SDA, and the Union for Peace and Progress (SPiM) was supported by the Serbian regime. See Kasapovic (1997) for more details.

³⁴ In Annex 4, the minimum number of ministers required for the constitution of the Council of Ministers is three: a prime minister, a foreign minister, and a foreign trade minister. The establishment and appointment of other ministers should be approved by the House of Representatives.

³⁵ In addition to the maintenance of the OHR with a large number of staff, for example, Annex 4 in the Dayton Accords stipulates that the Bosnian Constitutional Court shall consist of nine members, two from each ethnic group

Thus, the heavy international involvement has largely resulted in “capacity sucking-out” rather than “capacity building” of the BiH’s central state (Knaus and Cox 2005, 51; see also Chandler 2000). Moreover, over a decade of international intervention has often operated with short-term rationality, because this long international involvement was not designed in Dayton but a result of being trapped in Bosnia’s fragile peace. For example, as the 2002 elections were approaching and public dissatisfaction was increasing with the poor economic reforms of the incumbent Alliance for Change – a coalition of ten moderate parties formed by the OHR’s strong pressure after the 2000 elections – Paddy Ashdown, the High Representative (HR), enacted one reform policy every three days for 150 days (Knaus and Cox 2005, 47-49).

As such, the OHR has been closely involved in BiH’s electoral politics through enforcing pre- and post-election coalitions among moderate parties and banning radical ethnic parties and politicians. Nevertheless, the election results throughout the entire post-war period do not suggest a substantive shift in voter support from ethnic to multiethnic parties. The three former warring parties have always won the presidential elections, except in 2006. The lower house election results seem to suggest a fading strength of the three main ethnic parties, as their seat share has decreased since the 1998 elections. However, except for the Social Democratic Party (SDP), the major political parties competing against the SDA, the HDZ, and the SDS are not multiethnic but essentially ethnic-based parties as well, although slightly more moderate.³⁶

Moreover, a party-list PR with no electoral threshold, as agreed upon in Dayton,³⁷ has produced a highly fragmented ethnic party system. For instance, 48 parties were registered for the 1996 elections, 27 in the FBiH and 21 in the RS. Of these, 31 parties ran for the House of Representatives, and only five gained one or more seats independently.³⁸ This highly fragmented party system has not been conducive to a stable coalition. The Alliance for Change, a ten-party coalition government led by the SDP, was formed after the 2000 elections due to pressure from OHR. But all ten parties in the Alliance decided to run separately in the 2002 elections, and its second strongest party, the Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina (SBiH), even decided to rejoin forces with the SDA (Burwitz 2002). As a result, the three ethnonationalist parties returned to power at all state- and entity-levels in the 2002 elections, whereas the SDP lost heavily in both national and local elections, compared to its seat and vote share in the 2000 elections.

and three from those who are selected by the European Court of Human Rights and are not citizens of BiH or any neighboring countries. It also provides that the Central Bank shall be run by an IMF appointee who cannot be a Bosnian citizen; thus the Central Bank was established in September 1996 and run by a Frenchman, Serge Robert, who was appointed by the IMF for a 6 year term (*EIU Country Profile 1996-97*, 13).

³⁶ In the 1998 elections, the Sloga coalition consisted of the Serbian People’s Alliance (SNS), the Socialist Party of the RS (SPRS), and the Party of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD), all of which are considered parties of the Bosnian Serbs. The Party of Democratic Progress of the RS (PDP) in the 2000 elections and the SBiH and the SNSD in the 2002 and 2006 elections are also slightly more moderate ethnic-based parties.

³⁷ Replacing the provisional election rules arranged by the Dayton Accords, a permanent Election Law was adopted in August 2001. It introduced a three percent vote threshold. This threshold has not reduced the high fragmentation of Bosnia’s ethnic party system, however. Another important change introduced by the 2001 Election Law is the transfer of election authority from the OSCE to the BiH Election Commission, which consists of seven members appointed by the HR (one from each of the three ethnic groups, one from “Other,” and three from the international community): for details, see Belloni (2004) and OSCE (2006).

³⁸ The Joint List (ZL) was a pre-election coalition of five parties, including the SDP, but it gained only two seats.

[Table 5 about here]

This ethnic entrenchment in electoral politics has been more significant in the legislative elections of the two entities, where more powers are allocated by the Dayton Constitution than in the central state. As presented in Table 5, the SDA and SDS have always been the governing parties in the FBiH and RS, respectively, except in the 2006 RS elections.³⁹ The HDZ has normally been the second strongest party in the FBiH House of Representatives, but it lost half of its seats in 2006 mainly due to internal disputes.⁴⁰ On the other hand, it is apparent in Table 5 that the vote share of these three former warring parties has declined over time. However, if we consider the ethnic composition of vote share at the entity-level elections, the three main ethnic parties have consistently won with more than double the vote share of their nearest rivals (Manning 2004b, 67).

In sum, the post-war electoral politics in BiH started with the rushed first elections in a context where ethnic political representation and veto powers are constitutionally guaranteed, thereby providing significant institutional opportunities to the ethnonationalist parties who led the country into the most violent conflict in Europe since World War II. Institutional incentives provided by the rigid power sharing have facilitated the ethnic entrenchment in electoral politics, offering no incentive for ethnic parties to appeal to cross-ethnic voters and affiliations. In addition, heavy international intervention in the post-war elections has often been based on short-term purposes without cohesive strategy, hindering the development of institutional capacity necessary for the establishment of multiethnic democracy. Overall, the ethnic cleavage in BiH has been reinforced not only through the war but also by the post-war elections. Changing the rigid power-sharing arrangements that have shaped the incentive structure of ethno-nationalist elites may be necessary for invoking change toward multiethnic cooperation and tolerance in BiH. Otherwise, the perpetuation of ethno-national cleavages in Bosnian politics would not be easily attenuated. But the three constituent groups have made little progress in making a consensus on constitutional reforms so far (see Tuathail et al. 2006).

VI-2. Two-party competition in Mozambique

According to the 1992 General Peace Agreement, the president of Mozambique would be elected for a five-year term on the basis of a simple majority, and the 250 National Assembly members would be elected for a five-year term on the basis of a party-list PR. The key difference in the post-war electoral dynamics between Mozambique and BiH is that ONUMOZ did not rush to the first elections. The first post-conflict elections were supposed to take place within one year after Frelimo and Renamo signed the Rome Agreement; but they were not held until October 1994, two years after the agreement. Because of the powerful lessons that the UN learned from the Angola peace process, ONUMOZ did not intend to hold the first elections in haste without complete demobilization of Frelimo and Renamo soldiers. Another difference is that the Rome Accords set up a five percent vote threshold for the legislative election. This provision has

³⁹ Note that the total number of seats in the FBiH House of Representatives has decreased from 140 to 98 since the new Election Law was adopted in 2001.

⁴⁰ The HDZ 1990 is a split party from the HDZ and pursues a more hard-line policy on ethnic issues. It gained seven seats in the 2006 elections.

prevented the proliferation of political parties in the National Assembly and essentially contributed to the subsequent development of a two party system in Mozambique.

[Table 6 about here]

Table 6 presents four presidential and legislative election results in Mozambique since the end of war. In the 1994 elections, nineteen minor parties took part in the parliamentary elections, but only the Democratic Union (UD), a right-wing coalition of three minor parties, passed the five percent threshold, obtaining nine seats. Frelimo and Renamo were the only parties that launched nationwide campaigns, while the minor parties campaigned only in the major urban centers of Maputo and Beira (Wood and Haines 1998, 111). Renamo won the majority of legislative votes in five provinces in the central and northern regions and a third of presidential votes. This result surprised most Mozambican observers, since Renamo had been infamous for brutality during the conflict; a survey conducted in October 1992 indicated only 0.9 percent of respondents expressing support for Renamo, while 59 percent said that they would vote for Frelimo (Alden and Simpson 1993, 128).

Renamo's impressive electoral performance was certainly a positive signal for the country's transition from war to peace and democracy. If Renamo had performed poorly in the first elections, it would have seriously considered a return to conflict. Such a possibility actually existed in the early post-conflict period, when Renamo still maintained its military capacity and regional strongholds. After the first elections, Renamo's tactics were to threaten the Frelimo government only to gain concessions (Manning 2002a).

This initial success in transforming Renamo from a guerilla group to a political party competing in a multiparty democracy is a clear achievement of the UN-led international peacebuilding efforts. ONUMOZ actually spent a \$17 million UN Trust Fund to support Renamo's transformation into a political party in the run up to the 1994 elections.⁴¹ It played two more fundamental roles in the initial transition from civil war. First, ONUMOZ implemented the peace settlement terms in a flexible manner. Drawing an agreement from Frelimo and Renamo, ONUMOZ extended the interim period in which post-war institutions remained malleable and peace was still fragile. During this period, international peacebuilding operations focused on demobilizing former combatants and organizing elections, while leaving other issues open to discussion. For instance, Renamo and some representatives of the international community preferred to form a power-sharing government and allocate the governorship where Renamo won in the 1994 elections; but Joachim Chissano, Frelimo's presidential candidate, rejected power sharing at any level of government (Manning 2002a, 74-75). This tension, however, did not disrupt the country's nascent peace process. Second, ONUMOZ allowed a "dual-track" process for the transition to democracy: institutionalizing the formal rules of majoritarian democracy and at the same time permitting informal elite bargaining and compromise. This two-track strategy has persisted throughout the entire post-war period in Mozambique, as it is less costly to Frelimo

⁴¹ Renamo obtained \$11 million in cash from the international community and managed to extract an additional \$5 million on the eve of the first elections by threatening to boycott the elections. Since then, Renamo has continued to extract financial resources from the state: for instance, the party received \$1.4 million per year in 1999-2004 (Carbone 2005, 431).

than any power sharing and coincided with Renamo's goals after signing the Rome Agreement (see Manning 2002b).

The subsequent national elections reflected the consolidation of a two-party system in Mozambique.⁴² Although there are growing concerns about Renamo's weakness as a viable opposition party that can check Frelimo's hegemonic power (Manning 2010; Ostheimer 2005; Weinstein 2002), both parties displayed a high degree of internal cohesion and voting discipline among their constituencies until the 1999 elections. But continued participation in electoral and legislative politics led to contrasting developmental trajectories. While Frelimo has maintained an effective organization that was built over two decades of one-party rule and has been successfully adapted to multiparty competition, Renamo has consistently revealed a lack of organizational and human resources. For instance, Frelimo's party membership has steadily increased, from 100,000 in the early 1980s to 250,000 in 1999 to 1.4 million in 2001 (Carbone 2005, 430), but Renamo has had difficulties in keeping its old "comrades" and recruiting new members (Manning 1998, 2004a). Renamo also showed too much reliance on the personal and extra-parliamentary leadership of its wartime leader, Afonso Dhlakama, and such weaknesses resulted in poor performance in the 2004 and 2009 elections.

[Table 7 about here]

In turn, Renamo's weaknesses contributed to the shift in party support in formerly Renamo-controlled regions. Table 7 shows the changes in the geographical distribution of parliamentary seats won by the two parties since the 1994 elections. Since its struggle for independence against Portuguese colonialism, Frelimo's political base has been in the southern and far northern regions. On the other hand, Renamo's regional strongholds during the war were primarily based in the central region. The 1994 election results precisely reflected this regional cleavage, generated and reinforced during the 16-year civil war. This regional entrenchment of multiparty competition in post-war Mozambique was reproduced to a similar extent in the 1999 elections. However, Renamo lost heavily to Frelimo in the 2004 and 2009 elections. In particular, the shift in the seat share in Tete and Nampula since 2004 is suggestive, in that these two provinces were "Renamo regions" during the conflict and up until the 1999 elections.

In short, a two-party system has been developed in Mozambique through the relatively successful management of post-conflict elections and the establishment of a procedural democracy. A driving force was the war-induced cleavages that were overlapping with other cleavages to a significant extent: south versus center, ethnic Shangaan vs. Ndau, and centralized former socialist state vs. traditional rural authorities.⁴³ However, the most salient wartime cleavage – region – began to detach from the party cleavage since the early 2000s, when Mozambique became one of the fastest growing economies in sub-Saharan Africa and Frelimo's internal power transfer from Chissano to Armando Guebuza, the current President of

⁴² The electoral volatility index for Mozambique in 1994-2004 is half the African average and the party system fragmentation index was 2.14 in 1994, 1.99 in 1999, and 1.85 in 2004 (Carbone 2005, 435). These indexes essentially show the stable structure of Mozambique's two-party system.

⁴³ See Kyed and Buur (2006) and West and Kloeck-Jenson (1999) for how the schism between Frelimo and traditional local authorities – such as chieftains (*regulos*) – was created and intensified during the civil war and how it is now being mitigated by Frelimo's decentralization reforms.

Mozambique, occurred peacefully with a great deal of public support. New socioeconomic cleavages seem to be emerging in Mozambican society while crosscutting the regional cleavage, in part as a result of Frelimo's neo-liberal economic reforms over a decade (see Pereira et al. 2003; Pitcher 2006). After all, although Mozambique's civil war divided the country along the ethno-regional cleavage – as the Bosnian civil war did along the ethno-religious cleavage – its post-war electoral politics is now being freed from the wartime cleavage. This is primarily because Mozambique's institutional arrangements, unlike Bosnia's ethnic power-sharing system, have not built the wartime cleavage into its post-war political structures.

VII. Public Attitudes toward Former Warring Parties and Post-war Institutions

To examine how ordinary people perceive former warring parties and to what extent they trust governmental institutions established in the transition from war to peace, I analyze the Bosnia sample in the World Value Surveys 1999-2001 and the Mozambique sample in the second round of Afrobarometer. Tables 8 and 9 first present public support for former warring parties in the two countries.

[Table 8 about here]

The World Value Surveys were carried out in BiH in 2001, when the Alliance for Change was in power and public dissatisfaction was growing with its tepid political and economic reforms. Respondents were asked, “if there were a national election tomorrow, for which party on this list would you vote?” One clear result in Table 8 is that the three ethnonationalist parties have zero support from respondents of other ethnic groups: all SDA supporters are Bosniaks, all HDZ supporters are Bosnian Croats, and all SDS supporters are Bosnian Serbs. Another way to detect any tendency toward voter moderation is to see whether the SDP garners enough support across ethnicities. Yet the descriptive statistics in Table 8 show that almost 80 percent of SDP supporters are Bosniaks – not surprising, given that the SDP has been consistently weak in the RS.

After all, the ethnic cleavage is still deeply entrenched, not only in BiH's party politics but also in ordinary people's hearts and minds. In Table 8, the only hopeful sign for Bosnia's development into a multiethnic democracy is the relatively moderate share of public support for each ethnonationalist party within its respective ethnic group, compared to similar statistics in the early post-conflict period: while 54.3 percent of Bosniaks voted for the SDA and 52.3 percent of the Bosnian Serbs voted for the SDS in the 1996 elections (Manning 2004b, 67), only 30.2 percent of Bosniaks expressed their support for the SDA and 28.7 percent of the Serbs did so for the SDS in the 2001 World Values Surveys.

[Table 9 about here]

On the other hand, Mozambique shows a different snapshot of public support for the former warring parties. In 2002, the Afrobarometer asked respondents in Mozambique, “Do you feel close to any particular political party or political organization? If so, which party or organization is that?” Table 9 presents the distribution of respondents by political party and by region. One

surprising result is that the vast majority of Mozambicans feel close to Frelimo, regardless of region: 97.2 percent of respondents in the south, 85 percent in the center, and 96 percent in the north answered that they are closer to Frelimo than to Renamo; whereas only 6.6 percent of total respondents expressed closeness to Renamo. Frelimo's supporters are also almost evenly distributed across regions: 40.4 percent in the south, 34.6 percent in the center, and 25 percent in the north. One might argue that some contextual factors should be taken into account to understand this result, such as the Frelimo government's remarkable economic performance (18.31 percent GDP growth rate in 2001 and large inflows of FDI and foreign aid at the time) and sustained ability to manage the potential crisis that followed the 1999 elections⁴⁴ in contrast to Renamo's internal disputes among Dhlakama, its representatives in the National Assembly, and regional party officials (Pereira et al. 2003; Woods 1999). But these contextual factors do not account for the similar pattern of public support for Frelimo and Renamo that we can find in another round of Afrobarometer.⁴⁵ Although the wording of the Afrobarometer question cannot be directly interpreted as vote support for each of the two parties, Frelimo's overwhelming popularity across regions clearly suggests that the regional cleavage that had divided the country until the 1999 elections is being disassociated from individual citizens' party support.

[Table 10 about here]

What about public confidence in post-war political institutions? Tables 10 and 11 present public confidence in the key domestic and international institutions that have been created by or involved in peacebuilding operations in BiH and Mozambique. The World Values Surveys asked Bosnian respondents: "I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all?" Entries in Table 10 are the percentage of respondents who have "a great deal of" or "quite a lot of" confidence in each institution. First, a large majority of Bosnian people does not have confidence in the central government and parliament but have higher trust in the police, which was established separately in each entity after Dayton. Ethnicity plays a certain role even here: Bosniaks have relatively higher confidence in those three central state institutions than do the Bosnian Croats and Serbs. This ethnic difference makes sense if we consider the fact that Bosniaks essentially obtained most of what they had wanted through the peace negotiations leading up to Dayton, compared to the other two ethnic groups. Moreover, a much larger ethnic difference can be found in public confidence in international institutions: while a majority of Bosniak respondents feels confident in NATO and the UN, only 13 percent and 17.3 percent of the Bosnian Serbs trust these two international institutions, respectively.

[Table 11 about here]

⁴⁴ Although international election observers claimed that the elections were free and fair, Renamo refused to accept the election results, as the difference between Chissano and Dhlakama in the presidential race was just 205,593 votes. This political tension resulted in bloody strikes and the deaths of Renamo supporters (*Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin* 24).

⁴⁵ In Afrobarometer Round 3 collected in 2005, 89.6 percent of Mozambican respondents expressed that they feel closer to Frelimo than to Renamo.

In contrast, Mozambique shows a higher degree of public confidence in domestic and international institutions in general, except for the police. The Afrobarometer asked respondents: “how well do you think the following institutions do their jobs? Mark out of ten, where 0 is very badly and 10 is very well.” Entries in Table 11 are the percentage of respondents who marked higher than 5 in answering the question. Once again, regardless of region, a large majority of Mozambicans expressed their confidence in the president and National Assembly and in three international institutions that have been actively involved in post-conflict reconstruction: the African Union (AU), the World Bank, and the UN. The police are the only institutions that garner a lower degree of public trust in Mozambique than in Bosnia. This reflects a significant limitation of the Rome Peace Agreement, which did not properly address police reforms. In addition, the police have been the main target of Mozambique’s civil society for its involvement in widespread corruption and politically biased operations (Seleti 2000). On the other hand, Annex 11 of the Dayton Accords provided for the establishment of a UN International Police Task Force (IPTF) to carry out police reforms, which has been assessed as a relative success compared to other post-conflict reforms in BiH (King 2001).

In sum, Bosnia’s most salient wartime cleavage is still deeply entrenched in the minds of individual citizens when they express their party support and degrees of trust in core domestic and international institutions; whereas the most salient wartime cleavage in Mozambique does not appear any longer to be a powerful determinant in party support and public confidence in post-civil war institutions. As the reverse pattern of public trust in the police in BiH and Mozambique suggests, however, successful post-conflict reforms may be able to moderate public attitudes even in countries deeply affected by violent conflicts.

VIII. Conclusion

Post-conflict transition is a highly complicated process. Successful peace- and democracy-building in civil war countries has been rather the exception than the norm. But the international community has learned important lessons from so many failed cases as well as from so few successful cases. When explaining a particular case of peace and democracy promotion, one can provide a long list of idiosyncratic causes of success or failure. A newly created political institution is just one of those many factors. Yet institutional design for the transition from civil war to peace and democracy matters for two general reasons. First, institutions are shaped by the interests and expectations of major political actors. Second, once in place, institutions shape the incentive structure of those political actors and affect their political choices in the long run. In civil war settings, as conflicting interests among warring parties are not easy to reconcile, the creation of post-civil war institutions is often mediated or even imposed by external actors. These internationally mediated or imposed institutions exert long-term effects on post-conflict transitions.

This paper has argued that the most widely adopted institutional approach in the international peacebuilding community, power sharing, can generate a long-term adverse impact on peace and democracy, as it primarily aims at ending a war as quickly as possible and tends to lock wartime cleavages into post-war political structures. BiH’s post-conflict political processes have illustrated how the long-term adverse effects of power-sharing arrangements are actually played

out in the negotiated settlement to civil war. The Mozambique case, in contrast, has shown a beneficial effect of avoiding such rigid institutional design. In essence, the comparison of the post-civil war countries suggests that political institutions well designed to end a civil war are not necessarily as good for promoting democratic governance. The fundamental problem of power sharing is that it lacks flexibility in adapting into newly emerging political demands in the complicated process of post-war transitions, while reinforcing the status quo of the initial institutional set-up. International intervention in civil war settlements has provided a public good for a regional and global peace, but imposing an inappropriately designed institution only to expedite peace negotiations can be detrimental to the longer-term process of post-civil war democratization. This is a dilemma that international actors have often faced and continue to face in promoting peace and democracy in countries affected by violent civil conflicts.

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Table 1. Comparison between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Mozambique

| | Bosnia-Herzegovina | Mozambique |
|---|---|---|
| Post-conflict institutional arrangements | Comprehensive power sharing: executive, electoral, territorial power sharing with mutual veto systems | Only a PR system was introduced as part of the peace agreement. |
| International PKO | UN enforcement PKO | UN multidimensional PKO |
| Per capita income | \$2,188 (in 1995) \$4,538 (average in 1995-2000) | \$1,138 (in 1992) \$1,145 (average in 1992-97) |
| Economic growth | 17.14% (in 1995) 22.33% (average in 1995-2000) | -9.28% (in 1993) -0.40% (average in 1992-97) |
| Another conflict | No | No |
| Past experience in democratic transitions | No | No |
| Oil export | No | No |
| Type of war | Ethnic | Non-ethnic |
| Duration of war | Less than 4 years | 16 years |
| Casualties | About 70,000 | About 500,000 |
| Ethnic fractionalization | 0.6805 | 0.7653 |
| Religious fractionalization | 0.7098 | 0.6200 |
| Population | 3,247,000 (in 1996) 3,964,000 (in 2002) | 13,653,000 (in 1993) 17,997,000 (in 2002) |

Table 2. Socioeconomic Indicators in Bosnia-Herzegovina

| | t _{prewar} 1991 | t ₀ 1995 | t ₁ 1996 | t ₂ 1997 | t ₃ 1998 | t ₄ 1999 | t ₅ 2000 | t ₆ 2001 | t ₇ 2002 | t ₈ 2003 | t ₉ 2004 | t ₁₀ 2005 |
|--|-----------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|
| Population (in thousands) | 4449 | 3709 | 3608 | 3607 | 3818 | 3959 | 4035 | 4111 | 4165 | 4243 | 4346 | 4430 |
| Per capita income (PPP-converted, \$US 2005) | 1573 | 2188 | 3510 | 4818 | 5310 | 5603 | 5798 | 5252 | 4763 | 4272 | 4685 | 4898 |
| GDP growth (%) | -9.85 | 17.14 | 60.39 | 37.25 | 10.21 | 5.53 | 3.47 | -9.42 | -9.30 | -10.32 | 9.67 | 4.55 |
| Inflation, GDP deflator (%) | na | 9 | -17 | 13 | -2 | 8 | 25 | 4 | 6 | 2 | 3 | 2 |
| Foreign aid (% of GNI) | na | 57 | 33 | 25 | 18 | 19 | 12 | 10 | 8 | 6 | 7 | 5 |
| FDI, net inflows (US\$, millions) | na | 0 | -2 | 1 | 66.7 | 177 | 146 | 118 | 268 | 382 | 708 | 607 |

Sources: The Penn World Table 6.3 the World Development Indicators 2008.

Table 3. Socioeconomic Indicators in Mozambique

| | t _{prewar} 1975 | t ₀ 1992 | t ₁ 1993 | t ₂ 1994 | t ₃ 1995 | t ₄ 1996 | t ₅ 1997 | t ₆ 1998 | t ₇ 1999 | t ₈ 2000 | t ₉ 2001 | t ₁₀ 2002 |
|--|-----------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|
| Population (in thousands) | 10432 | 13180 | 13691 | 14781 | 15765 | 16298 | 16760 | 17220 | 17677 | 18125 | 18559 | 18979 |
| Per capita income (PPP-converted, \$US 2005) | 1454 | 1138 | 1190 | 1209 | 1037 | 1098 | 1197 | 1268 | 1198 | 1245 | 1473 | 1619 |
| GDP growth | 1.47 | -9.28 | 4.58 | 1.63 | -14.28 | 5.87 | 9.08 | 5.93 | -5.50 | 3.93 | 18.31 | 9.85 |
| Inflation, GDP deflator (%) | na | 35 | 46 | 56 | 51 | 65 | 9 | 5 | 4 | 12 | 15 | 8 |
| Foreign aid (% of GNI) | na | 81 | 63 | 61 | 51 | 29 | 27 | 26 | 19 | 22 | 26 | 55 |
| FDI, net inflows (US\$, millions) | 6.7 | 25.3 | 32 | 35 | 45 | 72.5 | 64.4 | 213 | 382 | 139 | 255 | 348 |

Sources: The Penn World Table 6.3 the World Development Indicators 2008.

Table 4. Presidential and Parliamentary Election Results in Bosnia-Herzegovina

| 1996 | | | |
|---------------------------------------|-----------------|---------------------------------------|------------------|
| Presidential: vote share (%) | | Parliamentary: vote share (%) / seats | |
| Muslim candidates | | Votes from FBiH | |
| SDA | 80.0 | SDA | 54.2 / 16 |
| SBiH | 13.6 | HDZ | 25.3 / 8 |
| DNZ | 2.7 | ZL | 7.9 / 2 |
| ZL | 2.3 | SBiH | 7.0 / 2 |
| Croat candidates | | Votes from RS | |
| HDZ | 88.7 | SDS | 54.5 / 9 |
| ZL | 10.1 | SDA | 17.4 / 3 |
| Serb candidates | | SPiM | |
| SDS | 67.3 | | 12.8 / 2 |
| DPB&SPiM | 30.0 | | |
| SPAS | 1.5 | | |
| SPKrajina | 1.2 | | |
| 1998 | | | |
| Presidential: vote share (%) | | Parliamentary: vote share (%) / seats | |
| Muslim candidates | | Votes from FBiH | |
| Coalition CD | 86.8 | Coalition CD | 47.9 / 14 |
| DNZ | 6.2 | HDZ | 19.7 / 6 |
| BPS | 5.7 | SDP | 14.5 / 4 |
| BOSS | 1.3 | SD BiH | 3.0 / 2 |
| Croat candidates | | NHI | |
| HDZ | 52.9 | DNZ | 3.0 / 1 |
| SDP | 31.8 | | 2.3 / 1 |
| NHI | 11.4 | Votes from RS | |
| Serb candidates | | Sloga coalition | |
| SDS&SRS | 44.8 | SDS | 27.7 / 4 |
| Sloga coalition | 51.3 | Coalition CD | 21.0 / 4 |
| DPS | 3.9 | Coalition CD | 16.6 / 3 |
| | | SRS | 15.3 / 2 |
| | | RSRS | 3.6 / 1 |
| 2000 | | | |
| Parliamentary: vote share (%) / seats | | | |
| Votes from FBiH | | Votes from RS | |
| SDP | 27.3 / 8 | SDS | 39.7 / 6 |
| SDA | 27.0 / 7 | PDP | 15.2 / 2 |
| HDZ | 19.3 / 5 | SNSD&DSP | 10.6 / 1 |
| SBiH | 15.6 / 4 | SDA | 7.4 / 1 |
| DNZ | 2.2 / 1 | SPRS | 5.7 / 1 |
| NHI | 2.0 / 1 | SBiH | 5.4 / 1 |
| BPS | 1.8 / 1 | SDP | 5.2 / 1 |
| DSP BiH | 1.8 / 1 | SNS | 4.5 / 1 |

| 2002 | | | |
|------------------------------|-------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------|
| Presidential: vote share (%) | | Parliamentary: vote share(%) /seats | |
| Muslim candidates | | Votes from FBiH | |
| SDA | 37.3 | SDA | 32.4 / 9 |
| SBiH | 34.8 | SBiH | 16.2 / 5 |
| SDP | 17.5 | HDZ/HKDU | 15.9 / 5 |
| DNZ | 4.1 | SDP | 15.7 / 4 |
| Croat candidates | | BOSS | |
| HDZ | 61.5 | SP | 2.6 / 1 |
| EB | 17.4 | DNZ | 2.5 / 1 |
| NHI | 8.8 | HDU | 2.3 / 1 |
| RS | 5.1 | NHI | 2.2 / 1 |
| Serb candidates | | Votes from RS | |
| SDS | 35.5 | SDS | 33.7 / 5 |
| SNSD | 19.9 | SNSD | 22.4 / 3 |
| SRS | 8.7 | PDP | 10.4 / 2 |
| SDA | 8.2 | SDA | 7.3 / 1 |
| ANR | 4.6 | SRS | 4.8 / 1 |
| SDP | 4.5 | SPRS | 4.3 / 1 |
| | | SBiH | 3.9 / 1 |

| 2006 | | | |
|------------------------------|-------------|--------------------------------------|-----------------|
| Presidential: vote share (%) | | Parliamentary: vote share (%) /seats | |
| Muslim candidates | | Votes from FBiH | |
| SBiH | 62.1 | SDA | 25.5 / 8 |
| SDA | 28.1 | SBiH | 23.0 / 7 |
| PB | 8.3 | SDP | 15.4 / 5 |
| Croat candidates | | HDZ/HNZ | |
| SDP | 40.8 | HDZ 1990 | 8.0 / 3 |
| HDZ | 25.1 | BPS | 6.1 / 2 |
| HDZ 1990 | 17.8 | RZB | 4.4 / 1 |
| RZB | 8.8 | DNZ | 3.2 / 1 |
| HSP | 6.7 | DNZ | 1.9 / 1 |
| Serb candidates | | Votes from RS | |
| SNSD | 54.8 | SNSD | 46.9 / 7 |
| SDS | 24.9 | SDS | 19.4 / 3 |
| PDP | 4.8 | PDP | 5.1 / 1 |
| | | SBiH | 4.2 / 1 |
| | | SDA | 3.7 / 1 |
| | | DNS | 3.6 / 1 |

Sources: OSCE certified election results (www.oscebih.org); the National Assembly of the Republika Srpska (<http://www.narodnaskupstinars.net/eng/naslovna/naslovna.php>); *Bosnia Report*, various years; and *the Europa World Yearbook*, various years.

Table 5. Entity-level Election Results in Bosnia-Herzegovina

| 1996 | | | | | |
|--|----------------|-----------|---------------------------------|----------------|-----------|
| FBiH House of Representative (140 seats) | | | RS National Assembly (83 seats) | | |
| Party | Vote share (%) | Seats | Party | Vote share (%) | Seats |
| SDA | 54.3 | 78 | SDS | 52.3 | 45 |
| HDZ | 25.3 | 36 | SDA | 16.3 | 14 |
| ZL | 7.9 | 11 | SPiM | 11.5 | 10 |
| SBiH | 7.4 | 10 | SRS | 6.7 | 6 |
| DNZ | 1.8 | 3 | DPB | 3.0 | 2 |
| HSP | 1.2 | 2 | SBiH | 2.4 | 2 |
| | | | ZL | 2.1 | 2 |
| | | | SP-Krajina | 1.6 | 1 |
| | | | SPAS | 1.3 | 1 |
| 1998 | | | | | |
| FBiH House of Representative (140 seats) | | | RS National Assembly (83 seats) | | |
| Party | Vote share (%) | Seats | Party | Vote share (%) | Seats |
| Coalition CD | 49.2 | 68 | SDS | 21.7 | 19 |
| HDZ | 19.9 | 28 | Coalition CD | 16.9 | 15 |
| SDP | 13.7 | 19 | SNS | 12.9 | 12 |
| SD BiH | 3.2 | 6 | SRS | 13.1 | 11 |
| NHI&HKDU | 3.0 | 4 | SPRS | 10.7 | 10 |
| DNZ | 2.1 | 3 | SNSD | 7.3 | 6 |
| BPS | 1.4 | 2 | RSRS | 3.7 | 3 |
| SPRS | 1.2 | 2 | SKRS | 2.6 | 2 |
| HSP | 1.1 | 2 | SDP | 1.4 | 2 |
| DSP BiH | 1.1 | 2 | HDZ | 1.5 | 1 |
| BOSS | 1.0 | 1 | NHI&HKDU | 1.4 | 1 |
| KC | 0.5 | 1 | KKO | 0.4 | 1 |
| BSP BiH | 0.4 | 1 | | | |
| HSS BiH | 0.2 | 1 | | | |
| 2000 | | | | | |
| FBiH House of Representative (140 seats) | | | RS National Assembly (83 seats) | | |
| Party | Vote share (%) | Seats | Party | Vote share (%) | Seats |
| SDA | 26.8 | 38 | SDS | 36.1 | 31 |
| SDP | 26.1 | 37 | PDP | 13.3 | 11 |
| HDZ | 17.5 | 25 | SNSD | 13.0 | 11 |
| SBiH | 14.9 | 21 | SDA | 7.6 | 6 |
| DNZ | 2.1 | 3 | SBiH | 5.2 | 4 |
| BPS | 1.7 | 2 | SDP | 5.0 | 4 |
| NHI | 1.6 | 2 | SPRS | 4.9 | 4 |
| SP | 1.3 | 2 | DSP | 4.1 | 4 |
| BOSS | 1.1 | 2 | DNS | 3.5 | 3 |
| Others | 6.9 | 8 | SNS | 2.3 | 2 |
| | | | Others | 5.0 | 3 |

| 2002 | | | | | |
|---|----------------|-----------|---------------------------------|----------------|-----------|
| FBiH House of Representative (98 seats) | | | RS National Assembly (83 seats) | | |
| Party | Vote share (%) | Seats | Party | Vote share (%) | Seats |
| SDA | 32.7 | 32 | SDS | 31.2 | 26 |
| HDZ&DK | 15.8 | 16 | SNSD | 21.8 | 19 |
| &HNZ | | | PDP | 10.7 | 9 |
| SDP | 15.6 | 15 | SDA | 7.1 | 6 |
| SBiH | 15.3 | 15 | SRS | 4.4 | 4 |
| BOSS | 2.8 | 3 | SBiH | 3.7 | 4 |
| SP | 2.3 | 2 | SPRS | 4.2 | 3 |
| DNZ | 2.3 | 2 | DNS | 4.0 | 3 |
| EB | 2.0 | 2 | SDP | 3.4 | 3 |
| NHI | 2.0 | 2 | Others | 9.5 | 6 |
| Others | 9.4 | 9 | | | |

| 2006 | | | | | |
|---|----------------|-----------|---------------------------------|----------------|-----------|
| FBiH House of Representative (98 seats) | | | RS National Assembly (83 seats) | | |
| Party | Vote share (%) | Seats | Party | Vote share (%) | Seats |
| SDA | 27.4 | 28 | SNSD | 45.0 | 41 |
| SBiH | 23.9 | 24 | SDS | 19.0 | 17 |
| SDP | 16.3 | 17 | PDP | 7.1 | 8 |
| HDZ | 8.1 | 8 | DNS | 4.2 | 4 |
| HDZ 1990 | 6.8 | 7 | SBiH | na | 4 |
| BPS | 4.4 | 4 | SDA | na | 3 |
| PB | 3.4 | 3 | SPRS | 3.7 | 3 |
| RZB | 3.4 | 3 | SRS | 3.0 | 2 |
| DNZ | 2.0 | 2 | SDP | na | 1 |
| HSP&NHI | 2.7 | 1 | | | |
| SNSD | 1.6 | 1 | | | |

Sources: OSCE certified election results (www.oscebih.org); the National Assembly of the Republika Srpska (<http://www.narodnaskupstinars.net/eng/naslovna/naslovna.php>); *Bosnia Report*, various years; and *the Europa World Yearbook*, various years.

Table 6. Presidential and Parliamentary Election Results in Mozambique

| | Presidential elections: vote share (%) | | | |
|---|---|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| | 1994 | 1999 | 2004 | 2009 |
| Frelimo | 53.3 | 52.3 | 63.6 | 75 |
| Renamo | 33.7 | 47.7 | 31.7 | 16.4 |
| Others | 13 | | 4.7 | 8.6 |
| | Parliamentary elections: vote share (%) / seats | | | |
| | 1994 | 1999 | 2004 | 2009 |
| Frelimo | 44.3 / 129 | 48.5 / 133 | 62.0 / 160 | 74.7 / 191 |
| Renamo | 37.8 / 112 | 38.8 / 117 | 29.7 / 90 | 17.7 / 51 |
| Democratic Union (UD) | 5.1 / 9 | 1.5 / 0 | 0.3 / 0 | na |
| Democratic Movement of Mozambique (MDM) | na | na | na | 7.6 / 8 |
| Others | 12.8 / 0 | 11.2 / 0 | 8.0 / 0 | na |

Source: Mozambique Political Process Bulletin (<http://www.mozambique.mz/awepa>); Electoral Institute for the Sustainability of Democracy in Africa (<http://www.eisa.org.za/WEP/mozelectarchive.htm>).

Table 7. Distribution of Parliamentary Seats by Electoral District in Mozambique

| Electoral district | | 1994 | | 1999 | | 2004 | | 2009 | |
|--------------------|-----------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|--------|
| | | Frelimo | Renamo | Frelimo | Renamo | Frelimo | Renamo | Frelimo | Renamo |
| South | Maputo City | 17 | 1 | 14 | 2 | 14 | 2 | 14 | 1 |
| | Maputo Province | 12 | 1 | 12 | 1 | 12 | 1 | 15 | 1 |
| | Gaza | 15 | 0 | 16 | 0 | 17 | 0 | 16 | 0 |
| | Inhambane | 13 | 3 | 13 | 4 | 15 | 1 | 15 | 1 |
| Center | Sofala | 3 | 18 | 4 | 17 | 6 | 16 | 10 | 5 |
| | Manica | 4 | 9 | 5 | 10 | 7 | 7 | 12 | 4 |
| | Tete | 5 | 9 | 8 | 10 | 14 | 4 | 18 | 2 |
| | Zambezia | 18 | 29 | 15 | 34 | 19 | 29 | 26 | 19 |
| North | Nampula | 20 | 32 | 24 | 26 | 27 | 23 | 32 | 13 |
| | Cabo Delgado | 15 | 6 | 16 | 6 | 18 | 4 | 19 | 3 |
| | Niassa | 7 | 4 | 6 | 7 | 9 | 3 | 12 | 2 |
| Total | | 129 | 112 | 133 | 117 | 160 | 90 | 191 | 51 |

Source: Carbone (2005, 429); Electoral Institute for the Sustainability of Democracy in Africa (<http://www.eisa.org.za/WEP/mozelectarchive.htm>).

Table 8. Ethnic Cleavage and Individual Party Support in Bosnia-Herzegovina

| Party | SDA | HDZ | SDS | SDP | Others | Total |
|-----------|--|---|---|-------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|
| Ethnicity | | | | | | |
| Bosniaks | 130 30.23% 100% | 0 | 0 | 136 31.63% 78.61% | 164 38.14% 54.30% | 430 100% 61.96% |
| Croats | 0 | 38 44.19% 100% | 0 | 24 27.91% 13.87% | 24 27.91% 7.95% | 86 100% 12.39% |
| Serbs | 0 | 0 | 51 28.65% 100% | 13 7.30% 7.51% | 114 64.04% 37.75% | 178 100% 25.65% |
| Total | 130 18.73% 100% | 38 5.48% 100% | 51 7.35% 100% | 173 24.93% 100% | 302 43.52% 100% | 694 100% 100% |

Source: The World Value Surveys 1999-2001.

Note: Entries in each cell are the frequency, row percentage, and column percentage of total respondents in order. The Chi-square statistic is 551.45 and significant at the 0.001 level.

Table 9. Regional Cleavage and Individual Party Support in Mozambique

| Region | Party | Frelimo | Renamo | Others | Total |
|--------|-------|---------|--------|--------|--------|
| South | | 311 | 9 | 0 | 320 |
| | | 97.19% | 2.81% | | 100% |
| | | 40.44% | 16.16% | | 38.42% |
| Center | | 266 | 40 | 7 | 313 |
| | | 84.98% | 12.78% | 2.24% | 100% |
| | | 34.59% | 72.73% | 77.78% | 37.58% |
| North | | 192 | 6 | 2 | 200 |
| | | 96.00% | 3.00% | 1.00% | 100% |
| | | 24.97% | 10.91% | 22.22% | 24.01% |
| Total | | 769 | 55 | 9 | 833 |
| | | 92.32% | 6.60% | 1.08% | 100% |
| | | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% |

Source: The Afrobarometer Round 2

Note: Entries in each cell are the frequency, row percentage, and column percentage of total respondents in order. The Chi-square statistic is 39.26 and significant at the 0.001 level.

Table 10. Institutional Confidence in Bosnia-Herzegovina

| | Bosniaks | Croats | Serbs |
|------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| Government | 34.69% (588) | 20.77% (183) | 25.05% (393) |
| Parliament | 23.41% (581) | 17.59% (182) | 16.45% (389) |
| Police | 70.50% (590) | 62.84% (183) | 53.55% (394) |
| EU | 57.07% (573) | 53.55% (183) | 32.04% (387) |
| NATO | 52.88% (573) | 44.81% (183) | 12.95% (386) |
| UN | 51.30% (573) | 46.16% (182) | 17.27% (388) |

Source: The World Value Surveys 1999-2001.

Note: Entries are the percentage of respondents who feel confident in each institution and the number of total respondents in parentheses.

Table 11. Institutional Confidence in Mozambique

| | South | Center | North |
|-------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| President | 69.57% (552) | 76.71% (468) | 80.92% (325) |
| National Assembly | 61.33% (481) | 64.88% (393) | 75.34% (292) |
| Police | 41.07% (538) | 53.73% (456) | 66.15% (322) |
| African Union | 66.07% (168) | 60.10% (193) | 69.42% (121) |
| World Bank | 67.26% (168) | 67.90% (162) | 89.71% (130) |
| UN | 74.88% (207) | 71.27% (181) | 82.01% (139) |

Source: The Afrobarometer Round 2.

Note: Entries are the percentage of respondents who feel confident in each institution and the number of total respondents in parentheses.